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The Greeks and their Foreign Friendships, 435-336 BC 
Lynette G. Mitchell 
ABSTRACT 
The study of Greek politics must begin wi th study of friendship in the 
Greek w o r l d as the two are inextricably intertwined. The f irs t chapter 
devotes itself to considering what friendship was for the Greeks, and who 
they considered their friends to be, and this becomes the basis for 
considering friendships in political contexts. 
This thesis is concerned w i t h Greek interstate affairs i n the years 
between 435 and 336, and considers the Greeks and their friends in other 
states and the impact this had upon domestic and foreign policy. The role of 
the institution of Jtpo^evia is considered, as the official medium for liaison 
between poleis, as well as the unofficial contacts. Domestic appointments are 
also studied, and the effect that "foreign" friendships had on selection for 
magistracies. 
Yet the Greeks d id not only deal wi th Greeks, but, wi th in this century, 
were compelled to look outside their own wor ld and interact w i t h states 
outside Greece, such as the Persian Empire or Thrace, as well as those on the 
fringes of their world , particularly Macedon. But these other cultures d id not 
always have the same understanding of what friendship was and what 
duties and rights were due to friends as the Greeks d id , and this led to 
misunderstandings and difficult ies in the relations between Greeks and 
non-Greeks. The differences that could exist were exemplified by the Greeks' 
dealings w i t h Phil ip of Macedon, and the Greeks' failure to reaUse this 
contributed largely to their ultimate defeat at Philip's hands. 
Appendices list holders of diplomatic and mil i tary appointments 
during the period 435-336 for whom we have evidence. 
The copyright of this thesis rests w i t h the author. No quotation f rom it 
should be pubUshed without her prior consent and information derived 
f r o m i t should be acknowledged. 
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Section A 
Chapter One: Introduction 
"You acted very naturally", said he. He seemed thoughtful, and after a 
few moments added: "All the same, I don't think much harm would have come of 
accepting." 
"No harm, of course. But we could not be put under an obligation." 
"He is rather a peculiar man." Again he hesitated, and then said 
gently: "I think he would not take advantage of your acceptance, nor expect you 
to show gratitude ...He has rooms he does not value, and he thinks you would 
value them. He no more thought of putting you under an obligation than he 
thought of being polite ..." 
E. M. Forster A Room with a View 
The Greek wor ld was built upon webs of friendship, and friendship 
connections were important i n both domestic and foreign politics. The 
anthropological study of friendship has grown apace in this century, and, 
latterly, interest has grown in the way in which modern anthropological 
studies can be used in understanding friendship in the Greek wor ld . No 
examination of gift-theory can begin without Mauss, but, equally, there have 
been many developments and further insights into the way gifts functioned 
in societies since the appearance of Essfli sur le don in the 1920s. Finley was 
the f i rs t to see the implications of gifts and reciprocity i n the Homeric 
w o r l d , ! and many others have developed this theme. From the work of 
Finley and others, i t has become clear that no study of Greek society and the 
way i t worked can really begin without first understanding the place of 
reciprocity and Greek friendship. 
This is also true for Greek politics. Gabriel Herman has done the most 
important recent work on the place of gift-exchange, particularly in the f i f t h 
and four th centuries (though his work spans a longer period than that), 
w i t h the publication of his book. Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City, 
Finley World of Odysseus. 
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and a number of articles which carry on ideas and themes raised in the book. 
As w i l l become obvious f r o m this thesis, Herman's work has been very 
important to my own study of Greek friendship in f i f t h - and fourth-century 
politics. However, although i t was an important beginning, I do not agree 
w i t h all Herman's conclusions, as w i l l also become obvious. I have three 
main objections to Herman's position, and this has had a profound effect on 
the direction in which I have gone. Firstly, I do not believe, as Herman does, 
that personal cormections abroad in the f i f t h and fourth centuries were still 
only the domain of the old aristocratic families. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that the noui homines of the f i f t h and four th centuries, who had 
no inherited connections of their own, had the facility and willingness to 
f o r m these connections themselves, and that this was one vehicle for 
obtaining political importance. 
This leads to my second objection. Herman suggests that the interests 
of personal connections abroad were inherently opposed to the interests of 
the demos; but I w o u l d prefer to argue that the demos used these 
connections for its own advantage. That does not mean that there could not 
sometimes be a coiiflict of interests between one's friends overseas and one's 
countrymen, but the Greeks were aware of this possibility, and these 
conflicts resolved themselves in different ways at different times. This also 
involved the subjective judgement of what was best for the state, and what 
may have seemed best to one man may not have seemed best to his political 
opponent: such was the nature of Greek politics. 
M y th i rd objection concerns reciprocity itself and how it operated in 
different cultures. I t w i l l be the contention of this thesis that reciprocity 
must be culturally defined, and that, although different societies practised 
reciprocity, its manifestation was often dif ferent and bore different 
implications i n different societies. This means - a fundamental point on 
which Herman and I must disagree - that Greeks did not understand non-
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Greek friendships. Although they entered into relationships like ^evia wi th 
non-Greeks, they d id not realise that the non-Greeks d id not have the same 
expectations of the relationship as they d id . To all appearances the 
relationship was what they knew and understood, but the assumptions that 
each party made about the relationship were radically different. 
This thesis is about Greeks and their friends outside their own state, 
and concerns those both wi th in the Greek wor ld and outside i t , and the 
impUcations of these friendships for foreign affairs. I have confined myself 
for the purposes of this thesis to considering the century between the events 
leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the death of 
Philip. This was an important period in the history of the Greek poleis, and, 
while being a manageable portion for a three-year thesis, i t is a period in 
which there were many sigiuficant events and developments. 
I t is also a period of history wi th many problems. I have not been able 
to deal w i t h all the issues that arise f rom these years, but I hope that I have 
dealt w i t h those difficulties which are most relevant to this thesis, and have 
indicated where there are other uncertainties. 
On the theoretical side, I have started f r o m the work of Marshall 
Sahlins,! who developed a typology of reciprocity for primitive societies. I 
have adapted his model for the way in which I believe the sources tell us 
Greek society worked. This model fundamentally provides the "language" 
w i t h which we can discuss reciprocity, and a way of looking at Greek society. 
But i t is no more or less than that: a tool for describing Greek social 
structures. 
* * * 
In this introductory chapter, I w i l l , f irstly, provide a brief account of 
the years 435 to 336 to provide a historical context wi th in which the thesis 
! Tribesmen; Stone Age Economics. 
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can be placed;^ secondly, I w i l l look at the theory of reciprocity and develop a 
model for reciprocity i n Greek society; and, finally, consider the implications 
of this for political friendships. 
The Greek World 435-336 
I t wou ld take too long to give a f u l l history of these years, and that is 
not the concern of this thesis. What follows, instead, is a brief overview of 
the major polit ical and diplomatic events which took place, i n order to 
provide a context for the discussion of particular events and to highlight the 
major themes for this period. 
435-404 
During the years of the Peloponnesian War, Greece was divided into 
two major blocs: one centring upon Athens and the Delian League, and the 
other upon Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. Most of the contact 
between states arose out of the conflict between these two groups. The major 
theatres for the war in the earlier years were Attica and the Peloponnese, the 
marginally Hellenic areas i n north-western Greece and the western islands, 
the Thraceward parts and Sicily. 
After declaring war i n 431, Sparta made almost annual raids on Attica 
un t i l 425, whi le Athens undertook regular naval excursions around the 
Peloponnesian coast. From 432, Poteidaea was a sore point, and, after forcing 
the city to surrender i n the winter of 430/29, Athens lost i t to Brasidas i n 424 
as we l l as her northern colony of Amphipolis . Towards the end of the 
summer of 427, the Athenians interfered in Sicily in a f i rs t attempt to 
establish control over the island. Athens' guard over Naupactus and her 
1 Various chapters will look at these periods in more detail. This will simply serve as an 
introduction. 
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friendship w i t h the Acarnanians became important, as first Phormio, then 
Demosthenes, and, finally, Conon concentrated in these areas.^ 
A l l was not necessarily well in the Spartan and Athenian camps, 
however. Athens was forced to deal wi th the revolts in subject states, such 
as Poteidaea and Mytilene, and tensions in Corcyra reached fever pitch. 
Likewise, i n 424, Brasidas narrowly averted the betrayal of Megara to 
Athens.2 
In 421 peace was made between Athens and Sparta and, although 
many of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies d id not approve of the peace and 
refused to take part, an Athens/Sparta alliance was formed. A new alliance 
was also then formed between Argos and dissident members of the 
Peloponnesian League, and the new ephors in Sparta, who were not in 
favour of the peace, agitated privately for an alliance wi th the Boeotians.^ 
Relations between Athens and Sparta disintegrated, and the Athenians 
formed an alliance w i t h Argos,'* which led to a confrontation between 
Spartan and Athenian troops at Mantineia. In 415, matters were further 
complicated by the Athenians' expedition to Sicily. Allegedly supporting the 
Egestans, the Athenians sent a large force to attack Syracuse,^ which in turn 
sought the support of Sparta, and was given a Spartan commander, 
Gylippus. A likely Athenian victory was turned into a devastating defeat, 
and the Athenians lost ships, men, experienced generals and prestige. 
In 412, the Persians were drawn into the war and the complexion of 
the campaigns was changed.^ The Persian satraps, Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazus, along w i t h the Athenian allies of Asia Minor , variously 
1 Personal friendships were an important way of interacting with these more remote parts: 
see Chapter Four. 
2 On this, see Chapter Three. 
3 For the events after the Peace of Nicias and the negohations behind this proposed alliance, 
see Chapter Three 67-73. 
4 For Alcibiades' involvement, see esp. Endnote 2. 
5 On kinship as a pretext for meddling in the affairs of other poleis, see Chapter Three 74-6. 
6 For Persian involvement with the Greeks, see Chapter Five. 
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sought Spartan support for revolts against Athens in Asia Minor . 
Tissaphernes' b id was successful, and although he proved a treacherous and 
u n f a i t h f u l ally, the Spartans negotiated for an alliance securing Persian 
f u n d i n g i n return for the cities i n Asia Minor. After a varied friendship 
w i t h the Persians, and after revolution and counter-revolution i n Athens, 
the Spartans f inal ly managed to vanquish the Athenians in 404 wi th the 
support of the younger son of the Persian King, Cyrus.^ 
404-386 
The major theme of the years after the war in Greece was Sparta's 
involvement in Persia and the vexed question of the Asiatic Greeks.^ In 401, 
on the death of the Great King and accession of Artaxerxes, Cyrus, the 
younger son, decided to contest the throne and revolted against his brother 
using an army bui l t upon Greek mercenary troops.^ After the death of 
Cyrus, Tissaphernes acquired the western provinces which had been Cyrus', 
and demanded that the Greek cities should submit to h im. The Spartans' 
response was to defend the cities' independence, and they continued to be 
active i n Asia unt i l 394.4 
In 397 the Persian, Pharnabazus, decided to stir up trouble for Sparta 
in Greece and sent Timocrates, the Rhodian, to the Greek cities w i th gold to 
incite war. A n alliance was formed between Athens, Thebes, Argos and 
Corinth. Agesilaus, the Spartan king at the head of the army in Asia, was 
forced to return to Greece to deal w i th the problems at home. Meanwhile, 
the Persian fleet, w i t h Conon the Athenian and Pharnabazus at its head,5 
1 On this personal friendship between Cyrus and Lysander, see Chapter Five 209-10. 
2 See esp. Chapter Five 191-3. 
3 On the ^evia relationships which formed the basis of the army, see Chapter Five 211. 
^ For the apparent connections of the harmosts in the Hellespont and Asia Minor, see Chapter 
Four 148-51,152. 
5 On the implications of this friendship for later magisterial appointments for Conon and 
Timotheus, his son, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi (under 367/6). 
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troubled the Spartans first in Asia then in Greece. Finally, however, after an 
attempted peace between Persia and Sparta in 392, the Spartans, at the cost of 
conceding the cities i n Asia Minor to the King , made a peace w i t h 
Artaxerxes i n 386: the first "common peace" in Greece.^ 
386-360 
The years that fol lowed, up to the battle at Leuctra i n 371, were 
dominated by Sparta as she "enforced" the peace of 386. While undertaking 
supposedly disciplinary action, Sparta interfered wi th her alUes, Phleius and 
Mantineia, w i t h the federation which had formed itself in northern Greece 
around Olynthus, and i n Thebes by taking the Cadmeia.2 The Thebans 
ejected the Spartans i n 379. Meanwhile Athens, i n response to Spartan 
aggression, built up a second naval league. 
I n 375/4 a Persian-initiated peace was made.3 War soon broke out 
again, but i n 371 a peace conference was held at Sparta. When the Thebans 
wished to swear on behalf of the Boeotian Federation, hostilities resumed. 
Cleombrotus led the Spartan army into Boeotia and the Thebans defeated 
h i m at Leuctra.^ Af te r the battle, the Athenians called a new peace 
conference at Athens. 
I n 369 there was a realignment of the major states. Athens was 
increasingly afraid of the growing Theban power and forsook her alUance 
w i t h Thebes for an alliance wi th Sparta. Another attempt at peace, initiated 
by the Persians, was made in 368 but came to nothing. In 367, the Spartans 
sent an ambassador to the Persian court. When they heard of this, the other 
cities also sent ambassadors, though the Theban, Pelopidas, won the King's 
1 See Chapter Five 193. 
2 On the way in which Sparta dealt with her allies in this period, see Chapter Three 86-7. 
3 See Chapter Five 194. 
4 On Cleombrotus' relations with Thebes, see Chapter Three 93-4. 
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favour.1 This attempt at common peace was unsuccessful, but a limited 
peace which included Thebes and Corinth was made in 366/5. 
Meanwhile, the power of a new federation, the Arcadian Federation, 
had grown. A split in this federation led to war again, and Sparta and 
Athens were called in to help one side and Thebes the other. An 
inconclusive battle was fought at Mantineia in 362/1 where both sides 
claimed victory. Afterwards, a peace was made, though Sparta refused to 
join as she refused to recognise the independence of Messene. 
359-336 
In 359, PhiUp I I came to the Macedonian throne.2 After securing his 
own seat, Philip began to threaten other northern states, Greek and 
Thracian, including Athenian strongholds.^ After Philip had taken 
Amphipolis in 357, Athens declared war on him. The Sacred War brought 
Philip south into mainland Greece, but, in 348, Philip sent messages to 
Athens offering peace.^ A settlement was finally reached in 346, which 
brought the Sacred War to an end, though not without harm to Athens' 
ally, Phocis.5 Though Athens and Macedon were technically at peace, 
hostilities were provoked between the states again soon afterwards. Philip 
attempted a renegotiation of the terms of the peace, beginning in 344, but 
this came to nothing.^ Athens formally declared war on Philip in 340 after 
the Macedonians captured the corn fleet in the Hellespont, and remained at 
war with Philip until his final conquest of the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338.7 
^ On Pelopidas, the Theban, Timagoras, the Athenian, and Antalcidas, the Spartan, at the 
Persian court, see Qiapter Five 214-6. 
2 See Chapter Seven. 
^ On Athenian interests in Thrace, see Chapter Six 222-5. 
^ For Philip's diplomatic strategy in dealing with the Athenians, see Chapter Seven. 
5 On this settlement, see Chapter Seven 250-6. 
^ See Chapter Seven 256-62. 
7 On Philip's settlement of Greece after Chaeronea, see Chapter Seven 263-7. 
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In 337, the Hellenic league was founded with Philip at its head, but by 336, 
Philip was dead. 
Friendship and Reciprocity 
Before considering the part that friendship played in Greek politics, 
we must establish what, in Greek society of the f i f th and fourth centuries, 
was understood by friendship and whom one considered to be one's friends. 
As Aristotle remarks. 
Concerning friendship ((t)iA,ia) - what it is and of what kind, 
and who is a friend {(^iXoc^, and whether "friendship" has one 
meaning or many, however many there are, and also how one 
must treat a friend and what is just in regard to friendship -
these call to be considered no less than the things that are fair 
and desirable in the characters of men.^ 
The Greeks were very interested in who their friends and enemies were, a 
concern which manifests itself in their earliest writings, and the ethos of 
helping one's friends and harming one's enemies was fundamental to 
Greek thought, so that Solon wrote about 600 BC: 
Grant that I may always have happiness at the hands of the blessed gods 
and a good reputation at the hands of all men; 
and thus that I may be sweet to friends i^i7uoi<0 and bitter to enemies 
(exSpoioi), 
and respected by the former, but for the others terrible to behold. ^  
Isocrates, in the fourth century, highlights the moral value of this ethic 
when he says. 
1 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1234 b 18-22. 
2 Solon (West) 13.3-6; cf. Homer Od. 4.691-2; Hesiod Op. 342,349-56. On this principle of 
helping friends/harming enemies, see also, for example, Dover Greek Popular Morality 180-
4; Blundell Helping Friends and Harming Enemies esp. 26-31; Goldhill Reading Creek 
Tragedy 79-106. 
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Similarly consider it disgraceful to be beaten by your enemies in 
doing evil, and surpassed by your friends in benefactions.^ 
Central to the concept of friendship was the notion of reciprocity. 
Aristotle writes that "a man becomes a ^iXoc, whenever, being loved 
((})iA,0'U|ievoq), he loves in return (dvTi(t)iA.f|) and this is known to both."2 
Something was given and something received in return as one's duty and 
one's right. This pattern of giving and receiving is amply attested 
throughout Greek literature and was fundamental to the way in which 
society functioned and hence to its stabiUty. Xenophon's Socrates sets out 
clearly the principles of the exchange in his discussion with Chaerecrates 
over his quarrel with his brother. When Chaerecrates says that he does not 
know how to make his brother treat him as a brother should, Socrates 
replies: 
'Tell me," he said, "If you wished to prevail upon one of 
your acquaintances (xivd xc5v Yvcopi^ cov)^  to invite you for dinner 
when he is sacrificing, what would you do?" 
"Of course, I would begin by inviting him myself when I 
sacrificed." 
"And if you wished to persuade one of your (\)[Xoi to take 
care of your property when you were away, what would you do?" 
"Of course, I would first undertake to look after his 
property when he was away." 
"And if you wished to get a guest-friend (^evoq) to 
entertain you when you came to his city, what would you do? 
"Of course, I would entertain him first when he came to 
Athens; and if I wished him to be eager to negotiate on my behalf 
for that which I had come, of course it would be necessary to do 
this first for him also." 
1 Isoc. 1.26. 
2 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1236 a 14-15. See also Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1155 b 27-1156 a 5; and Plato 
Lysis 212 d: OvK dpa eoti (j)lXov xcp ^lAotivu 0V)58V \if\ OVK (xvu(t)iXo\5v; Ot must h»e admitted, 
however, that this premise is ultimately found to be unsatisfactory and the argument is left 
unresolved). It should be noted that in both the Plato and Aristotle passages dted there is an 
explicit acknowledgment of reciprocity in the dvu- compounds of (t)iX£CO; cf. Xen. Mem. 2.6.28; 
Arist. Mc. Elh. 8.1156 a 8,1157 b 30. 
^ For o'l yvtopijxoi = "acquaintances" here rather than nobles (for which see Stanton Athenian 
Politics 67 n. 3), cf. Xen. Mem. 2.3.1. 
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"Can it be that you have long kept your knowledge of the 
magic spells of men a secret?" Socrates said, "Or are you afraid that 
you might disgrace yourself if you do your brother a good turn 
first? Indeed, a man who anticipates his enemies (e%0poi) in doing 
harm and his friends ((t)i>^i) in doing benefactions seems to be 
worthy of the highest praise."^ 
Yet not only was the giving of a service the surest way of making the 
return certain, it was also one's duty to make a return if a service was given. 
Euripides' Orestes exclaims to the errant Menelaus, 
Give to me, Menelaus, not of that which is your own, 
but give back to me what you have received, having received it 
from my father -
I am not talking about possessions. If you save 
my life, you save my dearest possession. 
Am I unjust? I ought to receive some unjust thing from you for 
this evil. 
For even my father, Agamemnon, 
having mustered Greece unjustly, went under the walls of Ilium, 
not himself doing wrong, but healing 
the wrong deed and injustice of your wife. 
You must give me this, one for one. 
He gave his life truly, as friends ((()i>.oi) ought for friends {^iXoi), 
labouring for you beside the shield, 
so that you might take back your wife. 
So since you received this there, pay back the same to me, 
since you wil l have laboured and stood as a saviour 
on my behalf for one day, not filling out ten years.2 
When a service was done for someone, that person was placed under a 
moral obligation to pay it back. This ethic of quid pro quo underpinned 
Greek social life in the classical period, as it had in previous periods, and 
was openly and unabashedly proclaimed as such. 
Yet the ideology of reciprocity was not confined to Greek society. 
Other cultures with which the Greeks came in contact also practised 
reciprocal exchange as a social norm, though not always within the same 
1 Xen. Mem. 2.3.11-4. 
2 Eur. Or. 643-57. 
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value systems or based upon the same division of society into friends and 
enemies. Other societies, for instance, divided their communities on the 
basis of kinship, where the interaction of individuals depended on their 
"kinship distance" from each other. That is, in such societies, a brother 
would have different rights and obligations within society from a fellow-
tribesman. Among the Greeks, on the other hand, although kinship 
networks were widespread, for practical purposes the emphasis was on one's 
place not in a kinship network, but in a ^iXxa network, so that social 
distance was not dependent upon whether one was 'kith and kin' , but 
whether one was a ^iXoq or an exQpoc,. This is a distinction which becomes 
important when considering how Greeks in a (t)iXia-based system interacted 
wi th non-Greeks within a kin-based system; and it wi l l be one of the 
fundamental propositions of this thesis that this phenomenon can be used 
to explain the social and political "dysfunctions" in the f i f th and fourth 
centuries BC. 
Reciprocity and Models of Exchange 
Since the beginning of this century, anthropologists and sociologists 
have recognised the importance of reciprocity and economic systems of 
exchange as an ideology underpinning societies.^ Reciprocity, writes 
Gouldner, has a role in maintaining social stability, and is also a "starting 
mechanism" in that it helps "to initiate social interaction and is functional 
in the early phases of certain groups before they have developed a 
differentiated and customary set of status duties".^ Gifts and services of 
1 This bibliography is by no means complete, but see, for example, Mauss The Gift; 
Malinowski Argonauts of the Western Pacific esp. ch. 14; Homans American Journal of 
Sociology 63 (1958) 597-606; Gouldner in Friends, Followers and Factions 28-9 (= American 
Sociological Review 25 (1960) 161-78); SahUns Tribesmen; id. Stone Age Economics; Bell 
Journal of Quantitative Anthropology 3 (1991-1992) 251-60. 
2 Gouldner Friends, Followers and Factions 37,39. Here Gouldner is drav«ng a distinction 
between reciprocity and "complementarity", which, he claims, is sometimes confused with 
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various kinds and functions form the substance of this exchange. Moses 
Finley was the first to consider the implications of this for the ancient Greek 
world,! and since then there has been an increasing interest in interpreting 
and understanding the history, economics, and literature of the Greeks in 
terms of reciprocal exchange.2 The main focus of the present discussion is to 
consider how this social phenomenon affected the politics of f i f th- and 
fourth-century Greece. To this end, it wil l be useful to develop a working 
model of the general "shape" of reciprocal relationships as a starting point 
for an understanding of reciprocity as it functioned in classical Greece. 
Sahlins' model of reciprocal exchange^  
Marshall Sahlins, in his study of tribal culture, writes that "there is an 
economic aspect to every social relationship. Father-son, maternal uncle-
nephew, chief-follower: each implies a mode of exchange of one kind or 
another, consistent in its material terms with its social terms."'* He sees the 
reciprocity and is usually emphasised as the stabilising force in society. Complementarity, 
he says {ibid. 33-4) has four distinct meanings: 
1. "that a right (x) of Ego against Alter implies a duty (-x) of Alter to Ego". 
2. "that what is a duty (-x) of Alter to Ego implies a right (x) of Ego against 
Alter". 
"On the empirical level, while this is often true, it is sometimes false. For example, what 
may be regarded as a duty of charity or forebearance, say a duty to "turn the other cheek", 
need not be socially defined as a right of the recipient." 
3. "that a right (x) of Alter against Ego implies a duty (-y) of Alter to Ego". 
4. "that a duty (-x) of Ego to Alter implies a right (y) of Ego against Alter". 
"Only the last of these two are also reciprocal." 
1 Finley World of Odysseus esp. 64-6, 95-105; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece 233-45; 
Politics in the Ancient World esp. 24-49. 
2 See, for example. Hands Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome; Donlan CW 75 
(1981/2) 137-75; Herman Ritualised Friendship; Blundell Helping Friends and Harming 
Enemies; Millett Lending and Borrowing; as well as a number of lx)oks and articles dealing 
with the interpretation of fifth century tragedy: for example, Scodel HSCP 83 (1979) 51-62; 
ColdhiW Reading Creek Tragedy 79-106; Greenberg HSCP 66 (1962) 157-92; Konstan 
Philologus 129 (1985) 176-85; Stanton Herwies 118 (1990) 42-54; id. "Aristocratic 
Obligation in Euripides' Hekabe" [forthcoming in Mnemosyne]; Schein Metis 3 (1988) 179-
206; id. in Cabinet of the Muses 57-3; Goldtarh CR&BS 33 (1992) 109-26; Roth Mnemosyne 
46 (1993) 1-17. 
3 What follows is a highly abbreviated form of Sahlins' theory, highlighting only those 
features most pertinent to this study. 
4 Sahlins TnbesmeM 81. 
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tribal exchange system as "constructed from the scheme of social 
segmentation" and claims that "each sector implies appropriate norms of 
reciprocity. Differences thus appear in the way people deal with each other, 
according to the way they are socially divided from each other."^ To 
illustrate this, he describes the variations in "the directness and equivalence 
of exchange" as a continuum, placing what he terms as "generalized 
reciprocity" at one end, "negative reciprocity" at the other, with "balanced 
reciprocity" in the middle. In brief, he defines generahsed reciprocity as a 
giving which is "putatively altruistic", where there is no reckoning and "the 
direct expectation of a return is unseemly, at the most implicit."^ He adds, 
however, "Not that there is no obhgation to reciprocate, but the expectation 
of a return is left indefinite, unspecified as to time, quantity and quality ... 
the time of reciprocation and the value of return gifts are not only 
conditional on what the donor gave, but also on what he needs and when, 
and likewise what the recipient can afford to give him and when."3 
Negative reciprocity, on the other hand, he defines as "the attempt to get 
something for nothing", "requited only by an equal and opposite reaction on 
the principle of lex talionis.'"^ At the mid point, balanced reciprocity is 
"direct exchange: the return is made straight off and is equivalent in value 
to the goods received ... Balanced reciprocity is 'less personal' than 
generalized reciprocity, so from our distorted vantage, 'more economic'."^ 
Against these three broad categories of exchange, Sahlins places the 
"sectoral plan" of tribal society which is graded in relation to "kinship 
distance"; starting with the household, and working out through those of 
^ Ibid. 
^Ibid. 82. 
82-3. 
4 Ibid. 
^Ibid. 83. 
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the same lineage, village and tribe to those of other tribes.^ Sahlins says that 
in most tribal societies " 'nonkin' connotes the negation of community (or 
tribalism); often it is the synonym for 'enemy or 'stranger'."^ He illustrates 
this pattern with the following diagram^: 
Inter-tribal sector 
Tnbal sector 
sector 
House 
ed Balanced 
reciDTOci reciproci 
Negative 
reciprocity 
Reciprocity and kinship residential factors 
Along with the caveat that this model is only hypothetical, and, of course, is 
a wildly over-simplified representation of society, Sahlins points out other 
considerations that should be taken into account. Firstly, that different 
societies wi l l display these kinds of reciprocities to different degrees.'* "To 
adjust our standardized conception to the variations posed by real societies, 
it wi l l be necessary to move the balanced reciprocity 'mid-poinf inward in 
1 Ibid. 84. Sahlins points out (ibid.), however, that "The play of sectoral distinctions on 
reciprocity is complicated by the influence of spatial distance on measures of Idnship 
distance'. Qose kinsmen live nearby and distant kinsmen far away, because kinsmen who live 
nearby are reckoned in a sociological sense whereas those who live at a distance are distant 
kinsmen. The rule is subject to several exceptions; eg. fellow-clai\smen or genealogically close 
relatives who happen to reside in other places. These may be treated economically as if in a 
nearer social sphere." See also Sahlins Stone Age Economics 197-8; cf. Service The Hunters 
14-21. 
2 Sahhns Stone Age Economics 196-7. 
3 Sahlins Tribesmen 85. 
^Ibid. 84. 
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some cases, outward in others, reflecting narrower or wider fields of 
generalized exchange. Indeed, just such pulsations of generosity may 
materialize within the same tribe over a period of time and changing 
circumstances."! 
A second factor which needs to be considered is the moral 
dimension.2 Gouldner writes, "we may suggest that each side lives up to its 
obhgations, not simply because of constraints imposed by the division of 
labour with its attendant mutual dependency, but also because the partners 
share the higher level moral norm: 'You should give to those who give you 
benefits'."3 Sahlins writes that "It ought to be recognised from the beginning 
that the distinction of one type of reciprocity from another is more than 
formal. A feature such as the expectation of returns says something about 
the spirit of exchange, about its disinterestedness or its interestedness, the 
impersonality, the compassion. Any seeming formal classification conveys 
these meanings: i t is as much a moral as a mechanical scheme."^ One thing 
that flows on from this, though Sahlins himself does not state it, is the 
requirement of a greater moral force to propel the return as the exchange 
becomes more abstract in character and quantity. As the initial gift itself 
becomes more abstract, so the obligation to repay also becomes more abstract 
and a greater sense of the moral force of the exchange is required to 
maintain the flow. 
Finally, rank in the community and wealth also play an important 
part in the reciprocal arrangements, and are often closely bound to each 
other.5 "Not the least among the nobility's privileges is the economic one, 
the lord's due; nor is noblesse oblige the least of obligations. Thus the dues 
1 Ibid. 
2 Sahlins Stone Age Economics 198-200. 
3 Gouldner Friends, Followers and Factions 35, Compare here Mauss' "spirit of the gift" (The 
Gift esp. 10-3) and Sahlins' critique of this (Stone Age Economics 149-83). 
^ Sahlins Stone Age Ecorumics 192. 
^SMins Tribesmen 86-95; Stone Age Economics 204-15. 
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and duties fall on both sides of a relation of rank: both high and low have 
their claims on each other ... in tribal society social inequality is more the 
organization of economic equality, and high position often only secured or 
maintained by o'ercrowing generosity."^ 
This "chiefly generosity" has two main manifestations. The first of 
these occurs where there is an established system of rank and the position of 
the chief is secure by virtue of his being chief.^ Here, by a system of giving 
more than can be returned, the giver keeps the receiver perpetually in his 
debt. "An unrequited gift, as Bushmen would say, 'creates a something 
between people.' At least it engenders a continuity in their relation, during 
all that period it is not reciprocated. More than that, the recipient of a favour 
is in an equivocal position - in debt."^ Thus "over-giving" can play an 
important function in maintaining loyalty, by keeping the relationship in a 
constant state of indebtedness, the receiver in a constant state of debt. The 
second of the functions of chiefly generosity, "chiefly redistribution", exists 
in societies where "dominance is a personal capacity rather than a 
constituted position" and the redistribution by the chief back down through 
the social hierarchy of the gifts given to him is required to maintain his 
precarious position."* Motivation marks the difference in the two kinds of 
generosity. "In the first case, the existing rank order evokes certain economic 
relations; in the second, certain economic relations are used to evoke rank. 
The first is the way of true chieftainship, operating on the principle, "to be 
noble is to be generous." The second is the way of the big-man, working 
from the corollary proposition that "to be generous is to be noble."^ 
1 Sahlins Tribesmen 86-7; cf. Powis Aristocracy 27-31. 
2 Sahlins Tribesmen 88. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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The Greek World 
Sahlins' model was designed to describe systems of exchange in 
primitive societies, and has been used by Walter Donlan as a way of 
considering Homeric society, categorising the various reciprocal exchanges 
in the Homeric epics as "generalized", "balanced" or "negative" 
reciprocities.! His stated aims are, firstly, to describe economic exchanges in 
Homer; secondly, "to show that the epics have an internal unity" by 
demonstrating the consistency of these exchange patterns; and, thirdly, "to 
' f ix ' Homeric society along the continuum of ideal types of social 
organization."2 His main concern is with balanced and generalised 
reciprocities, however, and he dismisses negative reciprocity as being of 
limited importance in this context, writing that, "Because almost all such 
exchanges occur at the inter-tribal level, their connection with the internal 
structure of Homeric society is peripheral."3 He divides the relationships 
evidenced in the epics neatly into the remaining two categories: among the 
the balanced reciprocities he includes "compensatory exchanges" such as the 
payment of debts and fines and "compactual" exchanges such as peace-
making and friendship agreements, hospitality and gift-exchange, and 
among generalised reciprocities all economic transactions within the oikos, 
and he emphasises the redistributional role of the "chief" figures, such as 
Telemachus, Odysseus and Agamemnon.4 After a thorough survey of the 
epics, he concludes that two conflicting types of distribution are at work 
within the framework of both generalised and balanced reciprocity, and that 
this "favors the thesis that Homeric social organization consisted in 
! Donlan CW 75 (1981/2) 137-75. 
^Ibid. 137. 
^Ibid. 141. 
^Ibid. 154-172. 
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'imperfect' chiefdoms, displaying elements associated with the egalitarian 
tribal model."^ 
However, this kind of discussion of Greek society wil l not work for 
the f i f th and fourth centuries. The society of the classical world, though still 
having kinship and the oikos at its heart, was based not only on kinship but 
also on a set of ties other than kinship ties, though in some ways like them. 
The reason why this confusion arises is that, as Millett points out in his 
study of the fourth-century economy, Sahlins' model cannot be transferred 
directly on to a Greek society. For, as Millett observes, it is ^ikia "that 
emerges as the Athenian [though we could even say Greek] equivalent of 
Sahlins' kinship, extending along the spectrum of reciprocity as far as the 
zone in which balanced merges into negative reciprocity."^ Therefore, it is 
necessary to look at the (^iXia relationship more closely and consider how it 
might affect any model of reciprocal exchange in Greek societies: 
^iXia 
It is widely accepted that the Greek word ^iXia, and its cognate ^[Xoq, 
cover a wider range of meaning than our word "friendship" or "friend" and 
could have little or nothing to do with intimacy or affection.^ As well as the 
modern English idea of friends as companions and associates with whom 
one was intimate - for example, Orestes and Pylades: Pylades says that the 
affairs of ^iXoi are common to (^iXoi and that he can only show he is a (^iXoq 
1 Ibid. 154, 173-4. 
2 Mil let t Lending and Borrowing 111; see also Humphreys Anthropology and the Greeks 70. 
3 See, for example, Mil le t t Lending and Borrowing 113; Blundell Helping Friends and 
Harming Enemies 39-49; Strauss Athens after the Peloponnesian War 21. Examples of all 
the different types and kinds of (^xXia relationships pervade the literature, so I w i l l only 
include one or two of the most representative types here. For further surveys of the scope of 
(j)iA.ia relationships, see Blundell loc. cit.; Millett Lending and Borrowing 113-6. This is not to 
say that all ^ikia relationships were bereft of affection, but that, while there could be 
affection, the word <^iXia itself does not necessarily imply it . For the place of affection in ^Ma 
relationships, see Foxhall "The Politics of Affection: Friendship in Greek Societies" 
[unpublished]. 
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by helping Orestes^ - one also numbered among one's (^iXoi one's family: 
mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandparents, children,2 and so on.^ In 
Euripides' Orestes, Helen numbers her sister, Clytemnestra, among her 
(j)iXoi;4 Helen accuses Electra of not talking in a manner befitting a (^iXoq 
((t)lX,co<;);5 Electra addresses Orestes as (^iXxaxe;^ Tyndareus, the father of 
Clytemnestra, and Menelaus are ^iXoi}^ and Menelaus is a ^iXoq to Orestes,^ 
as he was to Agamemnon.^ OiXia also encompassed a broader range of less 
"personal" relationships, including simply "functional" relationships. 
Aristotle remarks that soldiers and sailors address their companions as 
Attempts have been made since antiquity to classify the types of ^iXia. 
The stoics used the idea of a series of concentric circles to describe the levels 
of relationship, with the self in the innermost circle, parents, brothers, wife 
and children in the next, then uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, 
nieces and cousins, then other kinsmen, demesmen, tribesmen, then 
fellow-citizens and neighbours (daiuyeixoveq) and those of the same race 
(6|ioe6vei(;), with the last and largest circle, encompassing all the other 
circles, being the whole human race.^ ^ 
! Eur. Or. 735,802-3. 
2 The question of parents and children is a particular one and w i l l be discussed in more depth 
later on. 
3 Nineteenth century English was not unfamiliar wi th this idea, though it has lost its 
currency in late twentieth century usage. Mrs Bennet, for example, in Jane Austen's Pride and 
Prejudice, says when her newly married daughter, Lydia, has gone north to be wi th her 
husband's regiment: " I think ... that there is nothing so bad as parting wi th one's friends. One 
seems so forlorn without them (vol. 3, ch. 11)." Mrs Bennet clearly includes family among the 
circle of her friends, where we would now prefer to differentiate between the two: family and 
friends. 
4 Eur. Or. 97. 
5 Eur. Or. 100. 
6 Eur. Or. 217,1045. 
7 Eur. Or. 475. 
8 Eur. Or. 449-50; cf. 371-2. 
9 Eur. Or. 482. 
10 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1159 b 27-9. 
See Hierocles in Stobaeus (Wachsmuth and Hense) 4.671-3. 
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This model has been picked up in modern times, but the pattern of 
the levels of relationship varies significantly. For Earp, "the Greek is 
surrounded, as it were, by a series of fortifications against the outer world."^ 
In the "innermost fortress" Earp places nearest kin and friends and at the 
"outmost wall all Hellenes"; then, for the Athenian, making "intermediate 
defences" of phratries, demes, tribes and citizenship, and weaker ties with 
allies, colonists and Ionians.2 Dover, on the other hand, writes that "an 
Athenian felt that his first duty was to his parents ... his second to kinsmen, 
and his third to his friends and benefactors; after that, in descending order, 
to his fellow-citizens, to citizens of other Greek states, to barbaroi and to 
slaves."^ Again, Blundell, while admitting that 'There are many levels and 
varieties of philia, with degrees of closeness extending out from the self, 
overlapping and intersecting like ripples on a pond", discusses the degrees 
of relationship under three main headings: the family, fellow citizens, and 
"personal friends bound by reciprocal favour and often, though not 
necessarily, by mutual esteem and affection."^ 
Aristotle, while maintaining that there are essentially three different 
species of ^iXia i^iXia based on affection, pleasure, and utility),^ discusses 
many different kinds of ^iXoi, and says that the claims upon these different 
groups are not all the same.^  In the Eudemian Ethics, he says that the 
different groupings of ^iXia are: kinship (a-uyyeviKTi), comradeship or 
intimacy (exaipiicn), partnership (KOIVCOVIKTI) and civic friendship 
(7toA,ixiKTi).7 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle himself refines and 
changes these categories and says that partnerships (Koivcoviai) are elements 
1 Earp The Way of the Greeks 32. 
^Ibid. 32-3. 
' 3 Dover Greeit Popular Morality 273-8. 
Blundell Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 39-49. 
5 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1156 a 6-10; Eud. Eth. 7.1236 a 15-33. 
6 See Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1157 b 1-5,1159 b 31-1160 a 8,1165 a 14-6; Eud. Eth. 7.1241 b 324; cf 
Mc. Eth. 8.1159 b 35-1160 a 3. 
7 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1242 a 1-2. 
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of the state (7ioA,ixiKfi Ko ivcov la ) , making a general category for all political 
associations based on "utility", and he adds ritualised-friendship (^£via) as 
another category, because it is a similar kind of relationship to political 
Koivcoviai.! Thus he ends up with four distinct groups of ^iXoi (which he 
himself places in two different categories): kinship and comradeship; and 
partnership based on utility and ritualised friendship.2 
The next thing we must do is look at these groups of ^iXoi and try to 
pin them to some broader generaUsations and consider how they might fit 
into some kind of Sahlins-esque model of generalised, balanced or negative 
reciprocity. 
Kin (avyyeveig, OIKETOI and dvayKodoi) 
Kin were one's closest (SjSXox, those to whom one owed the greatest 
obligations. Euripides' Admetus claims it is his due that his parents should 
give their life for his, and when they refuse, claims that "in word, but not in 
deed, they were (t)l?ioi."3 Blundell writes, "One is tied to other family 
members by a presumptive bond of natural affection, arising from blood ties 
and common interests."^ One has a natural duty to one's family because 
they are family. 
It may, however, be an unequal relationship. Aristotle writes 
concerning such unequal relationships, as between the ruler and the ruled: 
Among this kind belong the relationship between father and son 
and benefactor and beneficiary. And among these there are 
differences. The ^\k\a of a father for a son is different from that of 
a man for his wife, the first being like the ruler and the ruled, and 
the second like the benefactor and beneficiary.5 
^ Arist . Nic Eth. 8. 1160 a 8-14,1161 b 15-6; cf. 1156 a 10-12. 
2 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1161 b 11-6. 
3 Eur. Ale. 339. 
4 Blundell Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 40. 
5 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1238 b 22-5; cf. Nic. Eth. 8.1158 b 15-9. 
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But he then goes on to point out that just as the relationship is unequal, so 
the return may be unequal: he says, "in these ^xXiai the 'befriending in turn' 
(x6 dvu^iT^EiaQai) is either equal or unequal."^ In these kinds of 
relationships such inequalities are based on a different kind of justice, for it 
is equal according to proportion, but not according to quantity (Ka6d:cep K a i 
x6 5 i K a i o v exepov, Kax' dvoX-oyiav yap laov, K a x ' dpi9|i6v 5' O-OK ioov).2 
In addition, different kinds of kinship each have different levels of 
closeness.3 Aristotle recognises the special relationship between parents and 
children and the part affection has to play in this kind of ^iXia.'^ He says that 
"^iXia seems to be more in befriending (ev x^ ^IXEIV), than in being 
befriended (ev X(p ^ iXdoQai)," giving as an example the mothers who send 
their children out to be nursed, and though they love ((j)iA,o\)(Ti), do not seek 
love in return (dvxi(t)iXeia8ai).5 However, this is an extreme and altruistic 
relationship, and in the common order of things Aristotle says that 
"whenever children assign to parents what is necessary for those who have 
given them life and parents to sons what is necessary for children, the ^iXia 
of such as these wil l be fitting."^ There is a giving and receiving on both 
sides. 
Yet a son is also always in his father's debt, as there is nothing he can 
do which is worthy of what has been done for him.7 Similarly Xenophon's 
Socrates asks. 
Whom could we find who has received benefits at the hands of 
others more than children at the hands of their parents? Parents 
made them to have existence from that which has no substance 
and to know as much as is noble and share in as much as is good 
of what the gods provide for men. These things seem so 
1 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1238 b 26. 
2 Arist. Eud. Eth. 7.1238 b 20-1. 
3 Cf. Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 b 16-7. 
'* Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 b 16-30, 1162 a 4-15. 
5 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8. 1159 a 27-33. 
6 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1158 b 21-3. 
7 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1163 b 18-21. 
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altogether worthwhile that all of us shrink from abandoning 
them more than anything else. Cities counting it among the 
greatest crimes have made it an offence punishable by death, on 
the grounds that they could prevent the wrong-doing through 
fear of no greater evil."^ 
The relationship between parents and children is the closest and most 
profound: while the child will always be indebted to the parent for giving 
him life, so the parent is also capable of the "pure gift", to act in absolute 
altruism for the child. 
On the other hand, friendship between brothers, according to 
Aristotle, is like that between a group of comrades (f] exaipiKTi), since 
brothers are of similar age and rank, and for the most part, similar in feeling 
and temperament,^ though to a greater degree, since brothers, Aristotle says, 
love each other because they come from the same source.^ Cousins and 
other relatives, however, derive their relationship by their descent from a 
common source, and "some are more intimate, and some are more distant 
according to whether the ancestor is near or more remote.""* 
Thus, familial relationships have degrees of greater or less closeness. 
Close family relationships are based upon a generalised reciprocity. Not all 
kin have the same claim, but among one's closest kin - perhaps defined by 
the limits of the household^ - there is no accounting of services which have 
been given or paid back; in fact the giving and receiving are often dissimilar, 
for such ^iTda, Aristotle says, seeks what is possible, not what is due.^ 
1 Xen. Mem. 2.2.3. 
2 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 a 25-7,1161 b 33-1162 a 1,1162 a 9-15. 
3 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 b 30-2. 
4 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1162 a 1-4; cf. 15-6. 
5 Foxhall "The Politics of Affection: Friendship in Greek Societies"[unpublished] 3-5. There 
are problems even in defining the household: Admetus' wife, Alcestis, was 6upaTo(;, "outside" 
the household (Eur. Ale. 805,828,1014; cf. 811 where she is described as oQvnoq), despite the 
fact that she had borne children (compare Lys. 1.6, which Foxhall {ibid. 3-4) discusses). 
6 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1163 b 15; cf. Sahlins Tribesmen 83. 
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Intimates (excdpoi, iftiXoi, emx1\5eioi) 
The group I am calling "intimates" were those most closely 
approximating to our modern ideas of friends. Like kin, they belonged 
among those to whom one owed a bond of affection, and those whom one 
loved for their own sake, rather than for the sake of their usefulness.^ In 
order to define more precisely the bounds of this class, we should discuss 
and try to disentangle the terminology for intimate relationships. 
Three words could be used to signify those with whom one was 
intimate: ^xkoip- ejaTi^Seioi or exaipoi. The semantic range of each of these 
words is broad, and ^\KJO\ and e7n.xTi5eioi were often used more generally 
than with this narrow meaning of "intimates". However, it is evident that 
sometimes that is precisely what they did mean, and this can lead to 
considerable confusion. It will make the way clearer to look at each of these 
terms in turn and to define some wider limits to their various connotations. 
^Tatpoi 
One's exaipoq, in the most basic sense, referred to someone who 
was of the same age and status as oneself, with whom one was on terms of 
intimacy. In epic, exaipoq referred to the close relationship between members 
of the elite.3 Aristotle, as noted above, compares exaipoi to brothers as being 
of equal age and rank and sharing all things in common.^ In tragedy, Pylades 
^ This would most closely approximate Aristotle's xeAda ^ Ola: see Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1156 b 7-
32. 
21 am here referring to a more spedfic usage for the word than the generic usage of 
which embraced all those within one's (j)iWa network. One of the difficulties in discussing the 
language of <j)iA,ia is the number of levels on which various terms worked. Since we are dealing 
with a language which was still alive and dynanuc, this should not surprise us, and for this 
reason it is impossible to tie words rigidly to spedfic meanings. One example, which will be 
discussed in more detail later, is ^ bjoc^ which could mean "guest", "host", "stranger", and a 
range of meanings in h)etween. In dealing with the language, we must allow for this flexibility 
and lack of precision, and avoid the temptation to apply strict categories which the language 
itself cannot sustain. 
3 Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation 15. 
4 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1161 a 25-7,1161 b 33-1162 a 1. 
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is presented as the exaipoq par excellence to Orestes, and the emphasis is on 
his "brother-like" qualities. When Iphigeneia, in Euripides' Iphigeneia in 
Tauris, asks Orestes whether he and Pylades are "brothers from one 
mother," Orestes replies, "In friendship ((j)iA,6xTixi), yes. But we are not 
related by blood, woman."^ Pylades says that he numbers Orestes among his 
f^XiKOi, those companions of the same age and status,^ and Orestes says of 
Pylades, 
The saying goes: obtain exoipoi, not family alone. 
As a man who is welded in your ways, though he be outside the 
family, 
is of more worth as a ^iXoq than countless brothers.^ 
Although Pylades is kin of sorts,^ being a distant cousin to Orestes and the 
betrothed of Electra,^ Orestes still considers him as 6DpaTo(;, as one "outside 
the threshold" and not part of the inner circle of family.^ Yet a exaipoq was 
ideally a man "welded in the ways" of his ^{Xoi."^ Pylades claims that the 
affairs of ^iXox are of common concern to ^iXoi,^ and says to Orestes, 
How will I show that I am a ^iXoq, 
if I don't help you now when you are in terrible trouble?^ 
All this is consistent with the analysis we find in Aristotle of intimate 
friends whose first concern is to look after the best interests of their ^iXoi, 
and who share all things in common.^o 
l E u r . r r 497-8. 
2 Eur. Or. 732-3. 
3 Eur. Or. 804-6. 
4 Eur. Or. 732-3. 
5 Eur. Or. 1078-9. 
^ Cf. Alcestis as QMpaioc^ 24 n. 5 above. See also Th. 6.30.2 (where Thucydides marks off 
exalpoi, ^VYyevei^  and WEiq as three separate categories: compare Xen. He//. 2.4.21: jipoq 9e(i3v 
jtaTpcpdJv Koa nr\zp(^v Kcd <j\)yyeveiac, KCO. KXiSeauac, KCO. exoapiou;, Tcdvxcov yap TOUTCOV 
noXAoi KoivtovoCficv 6Xhf\koic^ cdSoiinevoi Kcd Qeohq KW. dv0pc6no\x; naiioaaGe cqioptdvovTe^ 
eic, Tf\v TcaxpiSa ... 
7 Eur. Or. 805; see Price Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle 110-20. 
8 Eur. Or. 735. 
9 Eur. Or. 802-3; cf. 1093-6. 
10 See esp. Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1156 b 7-24, see also 8.1159 a 33-1159 b 1, which emphasises x6 
(t)iX£iv as a virtue and the essential part of a lasting (j)iWa. Note the irony of this in relation to 
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A exaipoq could also be a more technical term for a member of a 
group of exaipoi, known as a hetaireia. Hutter writes of hetaireiai: 
Adapting itself to various constitutional forms, it alternately 
played the roles of aristocratic drinking club, bodyguard to tyrants, 
law firm of democratic leaders, oligarchic conspiracy, and electoral 
campaign committee.^ 
They were usually small,2 and the emphasis was on equality of age, rank and 
common interest.^ Such groups could take on a political flavour, and 
Herodotus suggests their importance in the seventh century in the 
attempted seizure of the acropolis at Athens by Cylon, though they were not 
always political.^ In the fifth century, Thucydides writes that synomosiai at 
Athens, which were a similar style of organisation to hetaireiai (though at 
the more political end of the spectrum),^ were associations for use in law 
courts and appointments,^ and these groups were influential in the 
oligarchic coups of 411 and 404.7 xhey also clearly played an important part 
in the dvil war in Corcyra,^ and in Thebes, Ismenias and Leontiades are both 
said to be leaders of their own hetaireiai.^ However, Connor rightly warns 
that. 
Pylades, who, though a good ^ihx;, is ultimately presented by Euripides in the Orestes as a 
bad man. 
^ Hutter Politics as Friendship 27-8; see also Connor New Politicians 26. 
2 See Arist. Nic. Eth. 9.1171 a 14-5; cf. Connor New Politicians 28 n. 43. 
3 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1157 b 19-24,1159 b 32-4,1161 a 25-7,1161 b 33-1162 a 1,9-10,9.1165 a 29-
30; Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation 29. 
4 Hdt. 5.71.1; Connor New Politicians 26. 
^ As the name suggests, however, they were bands of individuals who swore oaths to each 
other, so probably a more formal group. It must be made clear, however, that they were not 
absolute synonyms: not all hetaireiai were synomosiai, as hetaireia covered a greater range 
of associations, just as not all symposia were hetaireiai (on the connection between symposia 
and hetaireiai, see Murray in Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion 150-1). Calhoun 
{Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation 6) suggests that synomosiai could be made up of a 
few hetaireiai. 
6 Th. 8.54.4. 
7 411: Th. 8.48.3-4, 65.2, 92.4; 404: Xen. Hell. 2.3.46. On the importance of these as political 
associations in Athens, see below. 
8 Th. 3.82.5, 6. 
9 Xen. HelL 5.2.25; see also Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1. 
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It is important not to overinterpret the evidence concerning these 
clubs. They were perhaps very informal gatherings, often largely 
social. Surely they were not essentially or inevitably political, still 
less conspiratorial. Their activities were as varied as the 
disposition of the members - some of whom were content, no 
doubt, to dally in the amiable company of flute girls. Others 
helped each other out financially or supported members who 
were in trouble in the courts. Others talked politics and argued 
about which measures and which individuals they would 
support. And under circumstances which encouraged the 
politicization of all action, and bred in some frenzy and 
fanaticism, certain hetaireiai might be led to sedition, 
assassination and conspiracy to overthrow the government."^ 
It must also be stressed that to be a exaipoc; or have exaipoi did not 
necessarily mean that one belonged to a formal or political hetaireia. 
Socrates undoubtedly had (Sfxkox who were known as his exaTpoi,^ and 
although these exaipoi would have formed an informal coterie, Plato can 
still write in Socrates' defence that he did not belong to a synomosia.^ 
Conversely, to be a exaipoq could simply be a technical term indicating that 
one was part of a recognised group.^ 
To conclude, the word exaipoq could cover a sliding scale of meaning 
from a "brother-like" companion to a political associate, but the class of 
^iXoq I am including among one's "intimates" was principally a companion 
of the same age and rank with whom one shared common interests. It was a 
fraternal relationship as between brothers, with similar duties and rights 
attached. If one was a kxdxpoc^ one could also belong to a hetaireia, whether 
of drinking partners or of political confederates. At the more distant and 
political end of the scale, a exaipoq as a member of a political hetaireia 
1 Connor New Politicians 26-7 & see also 26 n. 40. 
2 See, for example, Xen. Mew. 2.8.1,10.1; Plato P/raedo 118. 
3 Plato Apology 36 b. 
4 The Macedonian exaipoi are a separate issue, but they were certainly not men who were 
equal in rank or status to the Macedonian kings. For a general discussion of the development of 
the exaipoi in Macedon, see Cawkwell Philip 32-3, 38-9. 
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belonged to the class of ^xhii defined by utility, not intimacy, and so belongs 
in the class I am calling K O I V C O V O I . 
^mtiiSeioi and t^Xoi 
^iXoq can be the general term for any person bound to another in the 
reciprocal relationship of ^iXxa. However, in certain contexts, it can take on 
more specific connotations. It can be used as a synonym for exaipoq, as when 
Xenophon has Cyrus say about men who hide their wealth: 
Indeed these men seem to be mean (Tiovripoi) to their ^iXoi, for 
often, through not knowing what their possessions are, (^ikoi, 
though they are in need, do not say anything to their exaipoi, but 
are left suffering. ^  
However, it also seems to be used for a spectrum of those who, though 
among one's circle of friends, are not, strictly speaking, exaipoi. Thus 
Xenophon says to the Thracian, Seuthes, 
O Seuthes, I give you myself and these, my exaipoi, to be your 
faithful (7aaxoi)2 ^iXoi, and none are unwilling, but all, even 
more than I, wish to be your (t)iXoi.3 
Here to be (j)iXx)q to Seuthes is obviously quite different from being exaipoq to 
Xenophon; for in calling them exaipoi, Xenophon is saying something about 
the closeness of the relationship that he is not saying when he offers them 
as ^ikoi to Seuthes. 
' ETtixiiSeioq, like ^iXoq, is another general word for those with whom 
one has a relationship of ^iXia. The base mearung of the word is something 
like "fitting", "suitable" or "appropriate": thus there can be an e7axTi6eiO(; 
^Xen.Cyr. 8.4.33; cf. Xen. Mem. 2.6.15-6. 
2 On a suggested etymological connection between the noun, ^ iXM^q, and the adjective, iaai6c, 
{m.aT6<; certainly bielongs to that "significant" group of words which are connected with ^iXia), 
seeTaillardatREG 95 (1982) 1-14. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.3.30. 
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XWpoq for pitching camp.i Flowing on from this, it could also be a relatively 
neutral designation for one's sympathisers, whether this was based upon an 
individual personal relationship^ or a general inclination towards a political 
persuasion, such as oi e7cixii5eioi E K Teyeoq.^ Similarly, in 431, the Spartans 
thought that Archidamus seemed to be "soft" {[LctXaKOi^ and ejiixii5ei0(; to 
the Athenians,"* and, in 407, Alcibiades, when he saw there was goodwill for 
him ([xfiv Jc6A,iv] ewouv o-uaav) and that his ejaxTiSeioi were summoning 
him privately (ISiQc), sailed back to Peiraeus.5 
It could, however, refer to an intimate personal relationship, either of 
kinship or comradeship. For example, Thucydides writes of the Athenians 
that, during the plague, "some became forgetful ... and did not recognise 
themselves or their em.xr\dexoi."^ When the Sicilian campaign came to its 
bitter end, Thucydides writes that, "since the corpses were unburied, when 
anyone saw one of his mxTiSeioi lying there, he became grief-stricken with 
fear."7 Thus e7nxTi6ei0(; was also a word that covered a broad range of 
meaning, from merely "suitable", through political association, to a close 
personal relationship. 
In fact, with this breadth of meaning, baxr\dexoq in a large number of 
its uses seems to have been little more than a synonym for ^iXoq, so that 
Callistratus, the Athenian, could ask of the Spartans, 'Indeed who could 
disturb us by land, if you were our ^iXoil And again who could do you any 
harm by sea, if we were emxTiSeioi to you?"^ This equivalence in meaning is 
1 Th. 2.20.4; see also 6.66.1, 8.66.2. 
2 Such as ^ evta, Jipo^evla or even exaipeia. 
3 Th. 5.64.1; see also 5.76.2, 7.73.3. 
4 Th. 2.18.3; see also 4.78.2,4.113.3, 5.44.3, 6.46.2, 6.64.2, 7.86.3, 8.17.2, 8.70.2; cf. 8.65.2. 
5 Xen. He//. 1.4.12. 
6 Th. 2.49.8. 
7 Th. 7.75.3. 
8 Xen. He//. 6.3.14. 
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most striking when Isocrates uses a formulation of mxiiSeioi K O I e%0poi in 
place of the common (^iXoi Kai exQpoO 
Like ^iXoq, emxTiSeioq could also be differentiated from exaipoq. For 
example, Lysias writes: "This man Theocritus was exaipoq and eTaxnSeioq to 
Agoratus."2 Though exaipoq and knizr\5eioq here amount to virtually the 
same thing, they give two different shadings to the relationship, exaipoq 
here perhaps emphasising the political colour and e7nxTi5eioq the personal.^ 
Another combination, ^iXoq K O I EKix^dexoq, also becomes a relatively 
conunon phrase in the orators: for example, "Sostratus was ejnxriSeioc; Kai 
^iXoq to me."'* Here, rather than contrasting with one another, the two 
words seem to reinforce each other. Alcibiades, on his return to Athens, 
being afraid of his ex6poi, comes on deck to look for his ejnxriSeioi and is 
reassured when he sees his cousin Euryptolemus and his other oiKeibi and 
(t)iXoi.5 Here his mxiiSeioi would appear to be the sum of his oiKeioi and 
^iXox, that is, his family and "sympathisers".^ 
What conclusions can be drawn from this? Firstly, exaipoq refers to 
someone of the same age, station and social group with whom one could 
have an intimate personal and fraternal relationship. Secondly, (^iXoq and 
ilsoc.16.8. 
2 Lys. 13.19. Compare combinations of ^ iXoq and exoapoc;: Dem. 54.35; Isoc. 1.24,8.112,15.96. 
^ The range of use of the two words, as we have seen, could even allow exatpoq to emphasise 
the personal and emv^SeLOC, the political, but this does not disturb the central point: that 
there is a difference implied by using both words together. Perhaps the combination of the 
exaipoq Kai ETaxi^ Seioq as a urut gives this sense, and there is no point in trying to be too predse 
about which is giving px>litical colour and which personal. Another common combination is 
^ikoc, Kai ^ Evoq, though this becomes a topos relatively early to designate ritualised friends 
as distinct from other kinds of ^evoi. Originally, however, the two words probably conveyed 
the two senses of personal and political. I do not think as some do (see for example, Stanton 
Hermes 118 (1990) 42-54) that these phrases are referring to two separate relationships 
(that is, <t)iXia and exaipda, or ^ \Xia and ^evia). Rather the two words are a hendiadys 
describing one relationship, each word contributing a shading to the overall meaning. 
Compare also the usage of (jiiAoi Koa oii|4iazoi: Xen. Hell 4.8.26; IG 76.17; cf. IG ^ 75.21-2. 
4 Lys. 1.22; see also 13.92; Dem. 45.60,50.27,59.23; Isaeus 2.3. 
5 Xen. He//. 1.4.18-9. 
^ Compare, however, Xen. Hell. 1.7.16, where Pericles' status as kin to Euryptolemus is 
combined with tus intimacy as e7axii8eiO(;, and EHomedon is then named ^ iko(;, though this 
perhaps less to mark any difference t)etween Pericles and Diomedon as to emphasise Perides' 
doseness to Euryptolemus. 
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e7nxTi5ei0(; can sometimes share this meaning, but can also represent a wider 
circle of friends without bearing the connotation of similarity of age and 
class. Thirdly, i^iXoq and mxtiSeioq themselves may be synonymous, but are 
not always so; in fact, e7nxii6eiO(;, from its derivation, can have more 
overtones of being one who is "suitable", whereas (\iiXoc, can perhaps be 
more personal or relational. I trust that this has not been just a 
lexicographical exercise, but has shown how, though there are areas of 
common meaning, and all these words can at some point along their 
spectrum refer to a personal and intimate relationship, they do not always 
have this sense, but each could have more specific meanings exclusive to 
themselves. 
So who are one's "intimates"? I would suggest that they are those for 
whom one feels affection, whose best interests are one's first interests, who 
may be among of the same age and rank, but not necessarily so; and those 
with whom one has a relationship based upon generalised reciprocity. 
KOlVCDVOi 
Aristotle writes that "all ^iXm takes part in Koivcovia."^ However, he 
says, the ^iXiai of kin and comrades may be set apart, and the ^iXiax of 
citizens (noXiuKai) and tribesmen ((t)uX£XiKai) and fellow-sailors 
iav\iKXdiKa,i) are more Uke the ^iXiai between associates (KOivcoviKai); "for 
these seem to be, as it were, according to an agreement."^ So the kind of 
relationships that exist between fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, and other 
Koivcoviai have a different basis from those of a more intimate kind. 
Aristotle explains what this is, and I will quote him almost in full: 
All KOivcoviai seem to be parts of the TtoXixiKii [Koivcovia]; since 
people journey together for some advantage and for procuring 
1 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 b 11, see also 1159 b 31-2. 
2 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1161 b 14-5. 
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something as a means of living. The J C O X I X I K T I Koivcovia seems to 
have originally come together and to have kept going for the sake 
of advantage; the law-givers also aim at this and say that the 
common advantage is just. So other Koivcoviai aim at a share in 
advantage, like sailors aiming at the advantage in sailing for 
earning money, or some such thing, or comrades-in-arms aiming 
at the advantage in war in loot or victory or the conquest of a city, 
and similarly also tribesmen ((^-oXtxai) and demesmen (6r||i6xai). 
Some Koivcoviai seem to exist for pleasure, like religious groups 
(eiaawxai) and dinner clubs (epaviaxai). These exist for the sake of 
sacrifices and company. All these seem to be subordinate to the 
Tto^ixiKTi [Koivwvia]; for the K O X I X I K T ) [Koivcovia] aims not at an 
advantage in the present, but at an advantage for the whole of life 
... Indeed all Koivcoviai are portions of the T I O A . I X I K T ] [KOivcovia], and 
all such (^iXiai go with such Koivcoviai.^ 
The basis of such Koivcoviai, then, is the common advantage. Elsewhere, 
Aristotle defines these kinds of ^iXiai as those of utiUty.2 Such (^iXox, he 
says, are in relationship with each other not for themselves, but because of 
the good that may accrue to them because of each other,^ and such 
friendships are easily broken off, as the partners might cease being of use to 
each other if the relationship does change, or the motive for the <j)iA.ta might 
pass away, so that the ^iXia comes to an end, as it only existed for this 
reason.4 
The crucial factor in this sort of association is that it is based on an 
"agreement" for the exchange (Ka6' 6[ioXoyia\ ... xi dvxi xtvo(;), whether 
this is a moral or legal obligation.^ Even when the favour itself is difficult to 
value, the giver expects to receive either an equal or a greater return,^ so, 
Aristotle warns, one must take care at the outset from whom one receives a 
benefaction and for whom one does a benefaction (e-uepyexeixai) and on what 
conditions, so that one may accept these conditions or not.^ 
1 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1160 a 8-30. 
2 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1156 a 14-30; Eud. Eth. 7.1236 a 33-4. 
3 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1156 a 14-9. 
4 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1156 a 19-24; see also Foxhall 'The Politics of Affection: Friendship in 
Greek Sodeties" [unpublished] 7. 
5 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1162 b 27-8. 
6 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1162 b 31-3. 
7 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1163 a 1-8. 
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The term ^evoq also covers a broad range of meaning, from the ^evoq 
who is a "stranger", to the ^evo(; who is a "guest at dinner", to the ritualised 
friend. All these ideas are bound up inextricably with each other. In each 
case, the ^evoq starts as a man outside the other's community. But the 
^evoq/stranger has the right to be drawn into the other's community, and so 
into his ^\X\a network,^ because of the protection of Zeus ^evioq.^  So the 
^evoq/stranger has the potential to become the ^evoq/guest, which may lead, 
by a ritualised exchange of tokens (^evia),3 to his becoming the 
^evO(;/ritualised friend. The other use of Ijbjoc, for a mercenary soldier also 
derives from this inside/outside distinction, as the mercenary is an outsider 
who has been brought in, albeit in return for money. The ambiguity of the 
^evo(;/mercenary is made clear by Cyrus' Greek army, where he used 
^evoi/ritualised friends as commanders, who were given money to hire 
men as ^evoi/mercenaries.^ 
The relationship between ^evoi dates from the Homeric period, and 
remained substantially unchanged into the fifth and fourth centuries. 
Endius son of Alcibiades, the Spartan, and Alcibiades son of Cleinias, the 
Athenian, are among the better known of the fifth century ^evoi.5 One may 
1 So there is always a positive discrimination towards someone becoming a ^ iloc;. the stranger 
can choose to be kx^p^ but he can l)e a <t)iXo(; by right; cf. Odysseus who returned to his home as 
a beggar and was brought in and offered hospitality by Telemachus (Homer Od. 17.336-55). 
2 Note that Odysseus sought the protection of "Zeus ^eivio^ the avenger of suppliants and 
^elvoi" (Homer Od. 9.270-1) when he met Polj^jhemus (though the Cyclops respected neither 
aegis-t)earing Zeus nor the blessed gods [Od. 275-6]). For Zeus' role as the protector of ^ evoi, 
see Lloyd-Jones The Justice of Zeus 5, 7, 27; Herman Ritualised Friendship 124-5. 
3 This word also refers to the meal of hospitality given to strangers: it is no accident that non-
Athenians visiting Athens were invited to the prytaneion for ^ evia, while Athenians were 
given 8eX7tvov. Note the very interesting inscription honouring Arybbas of Molossia (/G ii^ 226 
(Tod 173]). Arybbas' grandfather was a naturalised Athenian citizen, and this decree confirms 
Arybbas' own citizenship. Arybbas is invited to the prytaneion for MTIVOV (as a citizen), 
while those with him (Molossians, so non-Athenians) are invited for ^ evia: see Rhodes ZPE 
57 (1984) 193-9. 
^ See Chapter Five 211. The usage of ^ hoq and its cognates could also fall in between some of 
these more distinct usages: see also Chapter Six 225 n. 3. 
5 Th. 8.6.3. On Alcibiades and Endius: Chapter Three 102-3; Chapter Four 173^; Endnote 2. 
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turn, then, to epic to see how this institution functioned and what 
expectations attached to it. In the Iliad, Homer describes the meeting of 
Diomedes son of Tydeus and Glaucon son of Hippolochus and the renewal 
of the ancient ^evia of their fathers: 
[Diomedes] planted his spear on the bounteous earth 
and said with gentle words to the shepherd of the people, 
"Indeed you are the ancient ^eivoq of my fathers; 
for divine Oeneus once entertained blameless Bellerophon in his 
halls, keeping him twenty days. 
And they gave to each other beautiful ^eivTi'ia. 
Oeneus gave a belt splendid with scarlet, 
while Bellerophon gave him a double cup of gold 
and I left it in my halls when I came here. 
I do not remember Tydeus, since he left when I was still a child, 
when the people of the Achaeans were destroyed in Thebes. 
So now I am your dear ^eivoq in the middle of Argos, 
and you are mine in Lycia, whenever I go to the people of that land. 
And let us avoid the spears of each other even through the crowd. 
For there are many famous Trojans and allies for me 
to kill, whoever a god should give me or I overtake with my feet; 
and there are many Achaeans for you to kill, whoever you can. 
But let us exchange armour with each other, so that even these may 
know 
that we boast to be ^eivoi of our fathers' houses.^ 
The relationship between Diomedes and Glaucon was a hereditary bond of 
^evia, of "guest friendship", or "ritualised friendship", which was passed 
from father to son.2 Such relationships were a means of forming cross-
community ties among the aristocracy of early Greece. By means of a 
ritualised exchange of gifts two individuals of different communities were 
able to enter into a non-kin relationship which brought with it a series of 
kin-like rights and obligations. At the most basic level, one's ^evoq could be 
expected to provide hospitality, just as Oeneus did for Bellerophon; but one 
could also be expected to look after the welfare of one's ^ivoq in a wider 
1 Homer Iliad 6.213-231. 
2 For the most thorough analysis of the institution of ^evia, see Herman Ritualised 
Friendship. 
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sense, and one could be called upon in times of need to come to the 
assistance of one's e^voq.^  
But although the rights owing to a ^evoq were like those owing to a 
kinsman, they differed in one significant respect: the giving and receiving 
was ritualised and institutionalised, and like was expected for like; in short, 
it was balanced rather than generalised reciprocity. Finley points out that the 
defining line between a social connection and a political relationship was 
fine. He writes: 
The stranger who had a xenos in a foreign land ... had an 
effective substitute for kinsmen, a protector, representative 
and ally. He had a refuge if he were forced to flee his home, a 
storehouse on which to draw when compelled to travel, and 
a source of men and arms if drawn into battle. These were 
all personal relationships, but with the powerful lords the 
personal merged into the political and then guest-friendship 
was the Homeric version, or forerunner, of political and 
military alliances.2 
The assumption behind the relationship was that an equal or better return 
for any gift or service was expected and could be demanded, and this was 
represented at the initiation of the relationship by the exchange of tokens, 
where the gift and counter-gift followed immediately on each other.3 
1 This, of course, was the ideal. Aeschines accused Demosthenes of torturing and murdering 
his own ^vkoc, and ^ evoq, Anaxinus of Oreus (Aeschin. 3. 224). Demosthenes apparently replied 
by saying that the salt of the city was of more value than the table of his e^voq [Anaxinus, 
according to Demosthenes, was a spy of Philip] (Aeschin. 3.224; Dem. 18.137). On the conflict 
of interests which could occur when the interests of one's E^vo<; apparently clashed with the 
interests of one's state, see Endnote 4. 
2 Finley World of Odysseus 102. 
3 On the ritual which established a ^evia relationship, see Herman Ritualised Friendship 
58-69. On the inequality of the gifts of Glaucus and Diomedes, see Donlan Phoenix 43-4 (1989-
90) 1-15. Compare Roman hospitium which was originally an institution which, Badian 
says, implied "an equivalence and near equality between the hospitable arrangements 
awaiting each party ... However, these relations of equality did not long continue. As Rome 
increased in importance, the Roman hospes increased in stature as against his foreign partner. 
In public hospitia, where formal engagements are recorded, we have formal proof that 
hospitium merged into clientela (Foreign Clientelae 11-2)." For the difficulties when 
supposedly equal relationships of ^evia are actually unequal, see Chapters Five esp. 220 and 
Seven esp. 276-8. 
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Until we come to ^evia, we have a model of society which looks very 
much like that of Sahlins: household at the centre, "intimates"/comrades 
next, and then a group encompassing fellow-citizens, political associates, 
and so on. These were all members of the community. 5evoi, on the other 
hand, were from outside the community. It is with this group of ^iXoi that 
we must realign the model, and redefine those who are "inside" or 
"outside". Now, in contrast to Sahlins' model, those "outside" the 
community (who, on Sahlins' model, are enemies) can be "inside" the 
friendship network. 
Kinship and Intimacy; KOlV(OV{a and ^Bvia Generalised and Balanced 
Reciprocity 
Kinship, comradeship/"intimacy", Koivcovia and ^evia are the four 
main friendship areas in the Greek world, which, in turn, can be divided 
into two main sectoral groups: kinship and intimacy; Koivcoviai and ^evlai. 
In addition, there are exSpoi, who may be from outside these areas, or even 
originate from within them. Just as in Sahlins' model, these sectoral groups 
can be matched with the different types of reciprocal giving. Aristotle marks 
off kinship and comradeship as relationships unlike KOivcoviai and ^eviai.^ 
Whereas KOivcoviai and ^eviai are based on mutual profit and are 
maintained by an equal exchange, that is, balanced reciprocity, kinship and 
comradeship work in the way of generalised reciprocity, where there is 
giving and receiving according to the needs and best interests of one's ^xXox. 
exBpoi 
Finally, we must consider the place of enemies, and the fundamental 
dichotomy between friends and enemies needs to be made clear. One knew 
1 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1161 b 11-6; cf. 8.1156 a 24-31. 
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well who one's friends were, and who one's enemies were. This was a basic 
division which cut across barriers of "social distance". A personal enemy for 
a Greek could as easily be a kinsman or fellow citizen as any one else.^ 
Orestes calls Menelaus a KaKoq ^xXoc, because he refuses to repay the debt 
Orestes beUeves he owes,2 and henceforth responds to him in a negatively 
reciprocal maimer by killing Helen and taking Hermione hostage.^ 
Just as one repaid a friend good for good, so one paid one's enemy bad 
for bad. Xenophon's Socrates says to Critobulus that. 
If ever you give me permission to say on your behalf that you are 
concerned for your ^xXox and you gratify no one so much as good 
friends (o-uSevi oiixco xaipeiq cbq (^xXoxq ayaQoxq) ... and that you 
realise that it is a virtue (dtpexii) for a man to surpass his friends in 
doing good, if ever you give me permission to say about you that 
you are concerned for your friends (6xi emiJ.eX.'ni; xe xc5v ^xXoi\ el)... 
and that you recognise that a virtuous man excels in doing good 
to his friends and harm to his enemies ((xv5p6q cxpexfiv eivai 
viKoiv zovq ^xXovc, ev 7no\5vxa, xoix; kxQpo\)q KaKcoc;), I think I 
would certainly be suitable as a fellow-hunter of gooci ^xXox for 
you.4 
Blundell writes: "The question of who started a quarrel is crucial. It is 
common to argue that one's opponent is responsible for initiating 
hostilities, thus giving oneself the right to retaliate."^ One of the worst 
positions that one could find oneself in was to be humiliated at the hands of 
one's enemies. Medea, as she plans the death of Glauce and Creon, crows, 
"Now I will be triumphant over my ex6poi, friends, and am on the way to it, 
now there is hope that ex6poi will pay the penalty."^ This poUcy of avenging 
oneself on one's enemy falls squarely into the category of negative 
reciprocity: "self-interested seizure, appropriation by chicane or force 
1 See Earp The Way of the Greeks 34. 
2 Eur. Or. 740, cf. 748. 
3 Eur. Or. 1129-30,1143-5,1191-3,1296-310,1323-48. 
4 Xen. Mem. 2.6.35. 
^ Blundell Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 37. 
^ Em. Med. 765-7. 
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requited only by an equal and opposite reaction on the principle of lex 
talionis."'^ 
Here, again, we diverge from Sahlins' model. While Sahlins classed 
as enemies all those outside the community, for the Greek there was a 
defined group of people whom he classed as his personal enemies, or exOpoi, 
who could come from inside the community.2 By the same token, those 
who had been ^iXoi could become exOpol. For example, the speaker of 
[Lysias] VIII complains of the treatment meted out to him by fellow-
members of a religious society, saying that it is impossible not to speak when 
one has been badly treated contrary to expectation (evocvxiov xf\c, kXTdboq 
KttKCoq Ttdaxco) and discovers one has been wronged by those who seem to 
be one's (|)iXoi.3 In Lysias IV, the speaker asserts that he and his accuser are 
friends - the proof of this is the favours he has done the man^ - though his 
accuser insists they are enemies.^ Even kin could become exOpoi, as the 
speeches of inheritance cases illustrate. The speaker of Isaeus I (On the Estate 
of Cleonymus) says: 
My opponents and I, gentlemen, do not have the same feelings 
towards one another, for I think that the worst part of my present 
troubles is not that I am unjustly in danger, but that I am 
contesting against kinsmen (olmoi), against whom it is not 
"nice" to defend oneself. For I would not think it was less of a 
misfortune to harm them in defending myself, since they are 
kinsmen, than to have originally suffered harm at their hands. 
But these men do not hold such an opinion, but they have come 
against us, having summoned their ^iXox, prepared orators and 
spared none of their resources, as though, gentlemen, they were 
1 Sahlins Tribesmen 82. 
2 There is an important distinction between a private enemy iexQp6(0 and a public enemy 
(no'k£\iiO(0. A private erunity could carry over into the public sphere (see Rhodes "Enmity in 
Fourth Century Athens" [unpublished]), but one could have personal friends among the public 
enemies of one's state. The Greeks were aware of this difficulty, and Xenophon has Agesilaus 
talking about this conflict in his meeting with Phamabazus at Dascyleium: see Endnote 4. 
3 [Lys.] 8.2; cf. 8.1. The speaker ultimately left the association ([Lys.] 8.19). 
4 Lys. 4.3-4. 
^ Lys. 45; see also Rhodes "Enmity in Fourth Century Athens" [unpublished]. 
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punishing exGpoi, and not doing harm to relatives and kinsmen 
(dvayKoioi Kai ovyyeveit;).! 
Anyone could become an exQpoc;, just as anyone could become a friend. But 
because the set of one's ex6poi was an enclosed group, and there was also a 
definable set of ^ikoi, there must also be a grey area, including those who are 
neither ^iXoi nor ex6poi, but could potentially belong to either set and could 
become one or the other.2 
On this basis, we can construct a new model of reciprocal giving, 
retaining Sahlins' typology of reciprocal exchange, but replacing the k in-
based structure for one based upon ^iXia. 
Potential Friends/ Potential Enemies 
Associates 
Comrades 
HoiisehohJ 
J I s 
\ ' / 
\Genejsdise^ Balanced A Negative 
Reciprocjiy Rejnproc/j^ RecipnKity 
EX0POI O I A O I ^ .^^  . . . 
Reciprocity in Greek Society 
A m o n g k i n and intimate companions, there is generalised reciprocity; 
between "associates", whether fellow-soldiers, mess-mates, fellow-citizens 
or tribesmen, and ^evoi, ritualised friends f r o m outside the community, 
there is balanced reciprocity; and between exOpol, enemies, negative 
1 Isaeus 1.6-7. 
2 However, as we have seen, because the stranger/outsider/^evo; had the right to be drawn 
iitside one's friendship network, since Zeus ^ evio^ ensured that it should be so, someone outside 
either circle would more easily beconie ^i'koq rather than e%0p6(;, though he could always 
make the positive choice to become an kx^poq. 
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reciprocity. As I have already stated, the essential difference between this 
model and that of Sahlins is that, whereas Sahlins places those wi th in the 
tribal sectors inside the framework of generalised or balanced reciprocity, 
and "non-kin" or strangers without and in the realm of negative reciprocity, 
this model redefines those who belong inside the friendship network, and 
those who belong outside. Individuals f r o m either inside or outside the 
community structure can be drawn inside the 0iAia network and experience 
positive reciprocity. This has the implication that anyone can enter into a 
fr iendship relationship w i t h all its rights and duties, but equally anyone, 
whether k i n or demesman, can become an enemy. Let a man be ever so 
close a kinsman, i f he is a bad ^i'koq, he is an exSpoq, and w i l l experience 
negative reciprocity.^ 
XdpiXEq and 5o3pa 
A w o r d needs to be said at this point about the substance of these 
^ikia exchanges. Reciprocal giving took the form, generally speaking, of an 
exchange of xdpixeq (favours)^ or 5c5pa (gifts).^ Aristotle writes that the 
reason w h y men set up shrines to the Graces (Xdpixec;) in public places was 
so that they might make a repayment (dnobomq) of xcxpixe(;, and that this is 
the thing that makes the X^p^c, distinctive: that i t is necessary both to do a 
service i n return to the man who did a favour ( i ^ xapiaa|i£vtp), and also to 
be the initiator oneself in doing a favour again.'* Orestes says to Menelaus, 
Give a share of your good fortune to your (^iXoi, 
^ There are a whole host of figures from tragedy who should have been (})iXx)i, but because of 
their actions became exQpoi and suffered negative reciprocity: Jason at the hands of Medea 
(Eur. Medea); Menelaus at the hands of Orestes (Eur. Orestes); Agamemnon at the hands of 
Clytemnestra (Aesch. Agamemnon), to name a few. 
2 A word whose meaning could range from simply "joy" or "pleasure" and "gratification" to 
"favour": Hewitt CP 22 (1927). 142-161; BlundeU Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 33-
4; Bergson Eranos 83 (1985) 14-6. 
3 Or its cognates. 
* Arist. Nic. Eth. 5.1133 a 3-5. On this passage, and xapiq in general, see Millett Lending and 
Borrowing 123-6. 
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since you have come as one who is fortunate, 
and having received what is good, do not keep i t to yourself, 
but also take your fair share of troubles 
paying back the xdpixeq of my father to those whom you ought. 
For they are ^iXoi in name, not in deed, 
who are not ^iXoi in times of misfortune.^ 
Awpa, on the other hand, were the tangible representations of the 
return, and could be exchanged to mark the conclusion of pacts such as 
^eviai. For example, Xenophon writes that those who wanted to make a 
^iXia w i t h Medocus, king of the Odrysians, brought 5(3pa.2 Just as the giving 
of xdpixeq makes ifiXoi, so does the giving of bapa: Xenophon says to 
another Thracian, Seuthes, "For my part, I think that all believe i t is 
necessary to show goodwi l l (e\)voia) to the man f rom whom one has 
received Scopa."^ 
Although both xapixsq and Scopa are legitimate mediums of exchange 
in the system of reciprocal giving, there are important differences in their 
nature, which produce significant differences in the type of exchange. For as 
5copa are tangible and x^pixeq are more abstract, so 5c5pa are more 
quantifiable and the value of a X^P'^'i is more ambiguous and more open to 
in t e rp re ta t ion .4 Awpa have a specific and recognised value so should 
f i t t ingly belong to those kinds of exchange where there is an account taken 
of the value of the gif t and a return of equal or greater value is required; that 
is, balanced reciprocity. Xdcpixeq, on the other hand, since i t is more diff icult 
to assess their exact value, would be more suitable in a generalised reciprocal 
exchange where there is not the same emphasis on an exact accounting of 
the value of the service.^ These are two generalisations which i t is 
1 Eur. Or. 449-55. 
^Xen.Amb. 7.3.16. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.7.46. 
4 See Arist. Mc. Eth. 8. 1163 a 10-21. 
^ For a similar kind of argument, see Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1162 b 21-1163 a 23. 
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important to bear in mind when one turns to interstate relations and the 
way in which different cultures interact. 
Equality in Friendship 
I t also needs to be emphasised that friendship in the Greek wor ld was 
perceived as basically an equal relationship, where a roughly equal return 
was given for any service. Aristotle says that, in friendship among the good. 
In befriending ((jjiXo-uvxeq) their (^ikoq, they befriend ((t)i?ioi5(nv) 
good for their own sake, for the good man in becoming a ^iXoq 
becomes good to that man who is his (^iXaq. So each man befriends 
((t)iX£i) the good for his own sake, and they make an equal return 
(x6 laov dvxa7io5i5cixn) wi th purpose and pleasure. For i t is said, 
'Friendship ((j)iX6zric) is equality (ioorriqy, and this is particularly 
true in friendships among the good."! 
Even among close companions - those who come closest to this perfect 
f r iendship , and who experience generalised reciprocity - there is an 
understanding that the exchange w i l l be roughly equal. But among the 
largest group of (^iXiai - those we have characterised as balanced 
relationships, but Aristotle calls friendships based on pleasure and uti l i ty -
friendships are based, according to Aristotle, on equality (eiaiv ... (t)iX,iai ev 
la6xTixi).2 
Aristotle also recognises that there are other relationships which are 
unequal in status, such as that between father and child, husband and wife, 
ruler and ruled.3 He says that in these unequal friendships what both parties 
are enti t led to receive f r o m the other is not the same,^ but these 
relationships should be proportionate, and the superior partner should be 
befriended more than he befriends {^akXov (l)iXeTa0ai f\ (^iXeiv), "for 
^ Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1157 b 33-1158 a 1; cf. 1163 a 1-2; End. Eth. 7.1238 b 14-6. 
2 Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1158 b 1. This accords, as we have seen, with our definition of balanced 
reciprocity. 
3 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1158 b 11-9. 
4 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8. 1158 b 20-1. 
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whenever the 'befriending' ((l)i>,Tiai(;) is according to worth, then somehow 
there is a sense of equality iic6zr[<0, and equality seems to be a part of 
(t)iA,ia."i So, whether the reciprocity was balanced or generalised, i t was 
important to the Greeks that there was a sense in which the relationship 
was equal, even i f this was really only notional. This does not disturb our 
distinction between balanced and generalised reciprocity, however, since 
balanced reciprocity was a consciously equal relationship, whereas wi th 
generalised reciprocity i t was only necessary that i t was generally felt to be so. 
The model we have developed describes Greek social structures. 
What we need to do now is look at its application in the poUtical sphere. 
Political Friendship 
Pohtical friendships both at home and abroad worked f rom a similar 
model - though they needed to be adapted to suit the needs of that 
developing entity, the polis - and political friendships were rooted in the 
same basic assumptions as social friendships. 
In domestic political activity, groups of ^iXoi and exoipoi (and here I 
am being deliberately ambiguous) clustered in various ways to negotiate for 
power. This is best described in terms of a "vertical axis" which penetrated 
"down" through society, and a "horizontal axis" which linked individuals 
of similar power and status both wi th in communities and between them. It 
should be pointed out at the outset that these poli t ical friendships, 
stemming as they do f rom the third and fourth categories of ^iXia on our 
model above (that is, Koivcovia and ^evia), were, by and large, balanced 
relationships. 
1 Arist. Mc. Eth. 8.1158 b 23-8; cf. 1159 b 1-3; 1162 a 34-1162 b 4. 
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The Vertical Axis 
The vertical axis is the upward and downward f low of goods and 
services through the layers of society. One of the most obvious expressions 
of this was patronage. The Athenaion Politeia talks about Cimon in the 
early f i f t h century opening up his estates to his demesmen "so that i t was 
possible for those who wished to enjoy the harvest."^ Similarly, Lysias has 
examples of men giving financial help to their demesmen.2 By giving freely 
to one's demesmen, tribesmen, or fellow-citizens, one was not merely 
winning distinction but buying good w i l l which could be paid back in terms 
of political support.3 One was forming a relationship, a "friendship", based 
upon the principle of giving for a return. A n d the relationship was a 
balanced and equal one. Though not quantitatively the same, the exchange 
was qualitatively equal in real value to each partner in the relationship. So 
what we have on this theoretical "vertical axis" is a pyramid, or system of 
superimposed pyramids, embracing the layers of society wi th individuals 
interacting in exchange relationships of equal benefits. 
What is more, connected to this vertical f l ow , there were other 
networks one could tap into. There were also other exchange relationships 
going on of a more "generalised" kind: of brothers interacting wi th brothers, 
fathers w i t h sons, men wi th their neighbours. Each member of the pyramid 
had a whole network of relationships of his own which could be invoked at 
need. Xenophon tells the story that before the assembly at which the fate of 
the generals at Arginusae was to be decided, Theramenes and his friends 
made arrangements wi th large numbers of people wearing black cloaks and 
w i t h their heads shaved at the festival of the Apaturia, to come to the 
assembly, as though they were kinsmen of the dead, and so try to excite 
^ [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 27.3. 
2 See Lys. 16.14, 31.15-6. 
3 Cf. Rhodes JHS 106 (1986) 136. 
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public feeling against the generals.^ Whether this story is true or not is 
disputed, but i t is a story which seemed plausible to a contemporary. There 
was a complex "meshing" of reciprocal activities which could all be called 
on, and which could all be motivated for political prof i t . This was not 
ral lying a regular political party, as Hansen remarks,^ but i t was probably 
using other networks, "friendship" networks, for a political purpose. 
That is not to say that political, or politicised, groups d id not exist, 
despite Hansen's objections.^ There is abundant evidence both f rom Athens 
and f r o m other Greek states of groups which clustered around prominent 
individuals. The focus of these groups were the political leaders: Pericles, 
Alcibiades, or Demosthenes, for example.^ Hansen has argued that these 
men d i d not have political groups or foUowings whom they could call into 
action to vote on their behalf i n the assembly or the courts, but this is to 
deny the evidence.^ There is evidence for these groups in many Greek states, 
and they are described in the sources as "those about Theramenes"; or 
"those w i t h Xenares and Cleobulus", to give a Spartan example. These 
groups, i t seems, were modelled on the hetaireiai, which, as we have seen 
above, were i n origin groups of men of the same age and status who met 
together fo r symposia. Yet they were not r ig id parties as we wou ld 
understand them. Rather, there was a certain f lu id i ty in their composition. 
As Rhodes has recently written about such groups in Athens, 
I n Athens there were political leaders w i t h policies, and the 
leaders d id have supporters who helped them to get their policies 
adopted and acted upon; but they were working wi th in a system 
in which there was no party programme or party discipline and 
even the most popular leader could not be sure of success on 
every occasion, i n which today's decision might reverse or 
1 Xen. Hell. 1.7.8. 
2 Hansen Athenian Democracy 284; Hansen mistranslates and misinterprets Xen. Hell. 1.7.8. 
^ See above on hetaireiai 27-8. 
^ See Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation 7. 
5 Hansen Athenian Democracy 266-87 (contra Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and 
Litigation 128; cf. Connor New Politicians 25-9). 
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obstruct yesterday's decision, in which Nicias and Alcibiades 
might both have enough support for both to be appointed to the 
command of the great Sicilian expedition.! 
The element that bound these groups together was (^iXia, friendship. The 
members were ^ikoi to each other and so were bound to each other by the 
rights and duties attendant upon the ^ikm relationship. 
Pericles and Cleon 
However, Connor writes that in the late f i f t h century there was a new 
style of poli t ics, which turned away f r o m indiv idua l relationships to 
fo rming "mass alliances" between political leaders and the state.2 Plutarch 
says that Pericles on entering public life withdrew f rom his ^ikoi, only being 
seen on one street, and that the one that led to the agora and the 
bouleuterion, and that he turned down all private invitations to dinner, 
except for the marriage of his cousin, when he stayed only until the libations 
were made.3 As Connor explains, there are two ways i n which this would 
w i n h im the support of the demos: 'The first is by presenting Pericles as the 
indispensable expert i n the complexity of public business, the second is by 
presenting h i m as an impar t ia l public servant, w i thou t dangerous 
obligations to philoi."^ Connor believes that Pericles was the forerunner to 
Cleon, who developed this new style of politics which "deemphasizes the 
power of the friendship groups and stresses the mass allegiance which 
ski l fu l and eloquent leaders can win."5 
Yet i t is not entirely a new development, but an adaptation of the 
existing pattern. For Pericles, by withdrawing f rom his ^iXoi and using state 
funds for jurors' salaries and his building projects,^ was simply changing the 
1 Rhodes 'The 'Acephalous' Polls 7" [unpublished] 12. 
2 Connor New Politicians 117-8. 
3piut.Per. 7.5. 
4 Connor New Politicians 121-2. 
^Ibid. 135. 
6 See [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 27.3-4; Plut. Per. 9.2-3,11.4-12.1. 
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range and scale of his ^iXia network. N o w , rather than f o r m i n g 
relationships w i t h individual ^xXoi, he was effectively, and ostentatiously, 
making all the citizens his friends. He was doing no more than any other 
patron for his clients.^ The change is one of scale. The stage is larger, but the 
process is the same. 
Liturgies 
Public liturgies were also an extension of this giving by the rich to the 
less wel l off. Liturgies were, in effect, an institutionalised version of the 
patronage system.^ The honour that accrued to the Hturgist has, in the past, 
not been suff ic ient ly valued as honour, but i t also has less abstract 
implications. The orators argue that one's liturgies ought to be taken into 
account i n legal decisions.^ The speaker i n Lysias' Against Aristophanes 
says, 
concerning my father, since the accusations have been made as of 
a man who has done wrong, forgive me i f I say what he has spent 
on the d t y and on his ^iXoi, for I don't do this for the sake of glory 
((t)iA,0Ti|j,ia) but as a proof that he is not the kind of man who must 
be forced to spend a great deal and to desire to have something of 
the public property wi th the greatest danger. ... Indeed my father 
has not ever desired to hold public office, but he produced all the 
choruses and performed seven trierarchies, and has made many 
large contributions.^ 
There was a return for services such as these. A man who performed a 
l i t u rgy w i t h dist inction w o u l d gain enhanced time, and no doubt the 
support of those who had benefited f rom his liturgy. The relationship was 
again not w i t h an individual, but wi th a collective, yet i t still conformed to 
^ Compare the Persian kings, for example, and their use of gifts: see Chapter Five 197-200. 
2 See Finley Politics in the Ancient World 36-7. 
3 See Makris "The Expectation of Charis from the Performance of Liturgies in Classical 
Athens" [unpublished]. 
4 Lys. 19.56-7. On ^ iXozmia, see Whitehead C&M 34 (1983) 55-74. 
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the same pattern of giving for a return. Something was expected back for 
what had been given. 
The Horizontal Axis 
Political activity along the "horizontal axis" can take place wi th those 
both w i t h i n the community and without . W i t h i n the community, the 
leaders of political groups could band together for greater poUtical leverage. 
For example, Plutarch says that when the vote for ostracism looked likely to 
f a l l on either Alcibiades, Nicias or Phaeax, Alcibiades and Nicias united 
their respective hetaireiai and turned the vote against Hyperbolus.^ 
Likewise, when Peisander was agitating for support in 411, he visited all the 
synomosiai i n Athens.2 
Contacts could also be made between communities, and i t is wi th this 
k i n d of inter-;7o/is activity that this thesis is pr imari ly concerned. These 
occurred basically on two levels: an individual level, and a polis level. On 
an indiv idua l level, men in one polis could interact w i t h other men f rom 
another polis, either through their pre-existing social networks (for 
example, ^evoi), or through groups which were sympathetic, at least in their 
political ideologies, and this w i l l be discussed more extensively in Chapter 
Three.3 Obviously, poleis also negotiated w i t h each other as units. But 
before we study how they interacted, we should look at two assumptions, 
which are, paradoxically, different but intrinsically entangled in each other, 
about what the polis was and how civic identity was defined. 
! Plut. Ale. 13.4-7; Nic. 11.1-5; Arist. 7.3-4. Hansen rejects this story (eg. Athenian 
Democracy 280-7) but it is defended by Rhodes ("The Ostracism of Hyperbolus" 
[forthcoming]). 
2 Th. 8.54.4. 
3 In Chapters Two and Three, the material will be be collected and presented as "Unofficial" 
and "Official" Contacts. This division cuts across the categories outlined here of individual 
contacts or polis contacts, but is a valid and useful way for collecting and looking at the 
evidence. 
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On one model, citizenship and civic identity are l inked to the idea 
that the state is the sum of its parts and citizenship is essentially 
participatory: 1 dv5peq yap KoXiq, K a i ox> xexx^] ov8k vf\eq ctvSpcov K e v a i , as 
Thucydides' Nicias said.2 The other model views the "state" as an abstract; as 
merely an institution. Neither of these is entirely true for the Greek polis, 
but both can be true at different times, even in a single polis, and this reflects 
the polis' development f rom operating on a purely personal level as we f ind 
in the Homeric wor ld , to acting as an impersonal, abstract unit.^ 
This has implications for the way in which the polis dealt w i th its 
w o r l d . On one level, i t behaved, in a sense, as a "corporate citizen". Thus 
where an indiv idua l citizen would use ^evia as the vehicle for drawing 
someone f r o m outside the community into his ^iXia network, the polis 
translated this into 7ipo^evia.4 Increasingly in the f i f t h and fourth centuries, 
naturalisation i n Athens of those outside the community whom the 
Athenians wanted brought inside their polis structure became a significant 
part of their foreign policy.^ In this way, those f rom outside the community 
could potential ly - at least i n theory - become residents and active 
participants i n the community itself, prospects which were l imited for the 
Tipo^evoq who was essentially non-resident.^ 
On another level, the polis formed impersonal arrangements -
treaties and alliances - as an entity (the Polis) w i th other poleis. These were 
^ For discussions of the "old" and "new" paradigms for citizenship in Athens, see Manville in 
Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology 21-33, though 1 do not entirely agree with his 
assertion that "there is no abstract 'state'; citizenship and polis are one and the same, 
growing out of a dynamic and constantly evolving association of families and kinship groups." 
While his second point is correct, in the classical period in any case, the polis could act as an 
abstract entity, as I will argue below. 
2 Th. 7.77.7. 
3 One indication of the ambiguous nature of the polis is the language for referring to 
individual poleis in the fifth and fourth centuries. For example, the Spartan state is oi 
AaKe5ai|i6woi, just as Athens is often o i ' AeT]vaioi. While ol AaKe8ai|i6vioi and o'l' A&rivcaoi 
behave as units, the very terms used imply the parts. 
'* The r61e of Ttpo^evia in inter-polis relations will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
5 See esp. Chapter Six 234^3. 
^ On the problems and possibilities in regard to Thucydides of Pharsalus, see Endnote 1. 
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simply balanced reciprocal agreements, where each side of the agreement 
had corresponding and answering terms.^ It is significant that states which 
swore to become allies swore to have "the same friends and enemies" (o'l 
auxoi ^iXoi Kca ex8poi).2 
The role of kinship ties between poleis, whether actual or perceived, 
w i l l be discussed i n Chapter Three.^ I t should be noted, however, that as 
w i t h ind iv idua l personal friendships, k in of this k ind could also join the 
numbers of a polis' enemies. For example, although Corcyra was a colony of 
Corinth, i t was openly hostile in the period leading to the Peloponnesian 
War. Likewise, AmphipoUs, a colony of Athens, went over to the Spartan, 
Brasidas, i n 424.4 n jg significant that the Amphipolitans named Brasidas as 
their founder i n place of their actual founder, Hagnon.^ They were re-
establishing and realigning their "personal" affinities. 
To draw this together, we should note the fol lowing points. Firstly, 
the basic model for poUtical relations in the Greek wor ld derives f rom the 
model for social relations, and in many ways political activity was conducted 
on a purely social level. What is more, when i t was translated to the civic 
sphere, i t often fol lowed patterns based upon social patterns. Finally, the 
assumptions that underpin the social friendship network also underpin the 
political friendship networks. 
1 For example: the alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans (Th. 5.23.1-24.1); see 
Hooker Hmnes 102 (1974) 166-7. 
2 See for example: Th. 3.70.6; Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; cf. Th. 1.44.1. 
3 That, in fact, there was no clear-cut distinction between the two extremes is perhaps 
illustrated by the awarding of citizenship (which should be personal) to all the Plataeans in 
427 ([Dem.] 59.104; for discussion, see Osborne Naturalization 2.11-6), and all the Sanuans in 
404 (IG ii2 1 = ML 94 + Tod 97: see Osborne Naturalization 2.25-6). 
4 Th.4.106.2-4. 
5 Th. 5.11.1. 
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^Xia in the Greek World 
To conclude, Greek friendship was founded upon the embedded 
ideology of reciprocity, and we can use Sahlins' typology of generalised, 
balanced and negative reciprocity as a way of describing the exchange 
process. In contrast to other societies, however, the primary sectoral division 
in the Greek wor ld was defined by friends and enemies, rather than kin and 
non-kin . The impl ica t ion of this was that people f r o m outside the 
community were not regarded necessarily as enemies, but, through the 
medium of ^evia, could be drawn into the Greek's ^iXia network and 
experience a positive reciprocity. This applied to non-Greeks as well as other 
Greeks. A Persian could as easily become the ^evoq of an Athenian as a 
Spartan, at least as far as the Athenian was concerned. 
Friendship i n the Greek w o r l d was also in the classical period 
essentially an equal relationship in a roughly egalitarian society. Even 
among the innermost circles of ^iXoi w i th whom one was in a relationship 
of generalised reciprocity, i t was important to the Greek, as Aristotle 
emphasises, that the relationship should be seen as roughly equal, w i th an 
inequality i n affection making up the inequality in position. Equality was 
also the hall-mark of ^evia: hospitali ty was given i n exchange for 
hospitality, and g i f t was given in exchange for gif t . The relationship thus 
became an institutionalised kinship, and its stabiUty was maintained by 
reciprocal equality. 
But the non-Greeks whom the Greeks dealt w i th d id not necessarily 
view their wor ld in the same light. Not all non-Greeks saw equaUty, even a 
notional equality, as being essential to the relationship. In fact, some 
societies, such as Persian society, were based upon strict inequalities. In the 
same way, not al l societies were w i l l i n g to treat those outside the 
community as i f they were part of i t just because they had contracted a 
friendship agreement. On the contrary, such friendships tended to be brittle 
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and to break easily when the non-Greek partner had had enough of the 
relationship; that is, the non-Greek d i d not necessarily approach the 
relationship as something of mutual benefit, but, primarily, as something of 
benefit to himself, so that when i t was no longer useful i t could simply be 
laid aside. 
These factors had a profound effect on the way in which Greeks dealt 
w i t h both Greeks and non-Greeks, and the expectations that they had of 
these relationships. In Section B of the thesis, I w i l l look at the place and 
importance of personal connections in Greek politics on both the inter-polis 
and the domestic fronts. Chapter Two w i l l consider the official contacts 
between poleis by considering the role of Ttpo^evoi in interstate relations. 
Chapter Three w i l l consider the ways i n which Greeks developed and 
executed foreign policy unofficial ly through their friends in other poleis, 
and discuss general trends, and particularly the extent to which personal 
connections were used i n inteT-polis affairs in Athens and Sparta. Chapter 
Four w i l l discuss how international friendships may have affected the 
appointment of magistrates i n the poleis. It w i l l be argued that magistrates 
w i t h personal connections were used particularly on missions to states on 
the fringes of the Greek wor ld , and methods of election w i l l be discussed 
(particularly for the election of generals at Athens) which would allow for 
selection on this criterion. Finally, Chapter Four w i l l pick up one of the 
themes of Chapter Three concerning the relative usage of personal 
connections by Athens and Sparta, and i t w i l l be shown that the Spartans 
elected a relatively larger number of magistrates on the basis of their 
overseas connections than the Athenians d id , thus highUghting the greater 
importance of personal connections in foreign affairs to Spartan. 
I n Section C, I w i l l turn to international relations between Greeks and 
non-Greeks. Chapter Five w i l l look at Persian contacts w i th the Greeks and 
the reasons for the successes of these contacts and the failures. Persian gift-
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g iv ing w i l l be considered, to show how this d i f fered f r o m the Greek 
conception of reciprocity and w h y this often led to "socio-political 
dysfunctions" i n Greco-Persian affairs. Chapter Six w i l l examine Athenian 
dealings w i t h Thrace. I t w i l l look at the Thracian version of gif t -giving 
(which was both supplicatory and prospective in character) and show how 
this affected the Athenian response to the Thracians, particularly in regard 
to their awards of citizenship to the Odrysian kings. Finally, Chapter Seven 
w i l l look at the dealings of Philip of Macedon wi th the Greeks. I w i l l argue 
that Phi l ip manipulated the Greeks' cultural expectation of reciprocal 
relationships i n order to foo l them into believing they were in a 
relationship w i t h h im, then abused their trust. I t w i l l be suggested that 
many of the events of Philip's reign can be explained i n terms of Philip's 
exploitation of the friendship ethic. 
The two most important points, I think, that w i l l be raised by this 
thesis, are, f i r s t ly , that personal friendships, and particularly personal 
friendships abroad, were fundamental to inter-po//s affairs in the f i f t h and 
four th centuries BC; and, secondly, that reciprocity - "giving for a return" -
is cul tural ly defined. What this dictum meant differed f rom society to 
society, and culture to culture. This affected the way in which cross-cultural 
friendships worked, or d id not work, as the case may be. Because the Greeks 
failed to realise this, and respond to it , they experienced failure upon failure 
i n international affairs, and, ultimately, defeat at the hands of PhiUp of 
Macedon, who understood this all too well . 
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Chapter Two: The Official Representatives 
npo^evoi 
The only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson Friendship 
In the years between 435 and 336 BC, the Greek wor ld was a volatile 
hotbed of war and dissension. In their struggles for dominance and power, 
the more powerfu l states - first Athens and Sparta, then Thebes as well -
w i t h their retinues of allies kept Greece in a nearly continual state of 
instability. What is more, the smaller states tended to look towards the more 
power fu l ones for help i n their wars against each other, and civi l wars 
ensured that local politics were as volcanic as interstate relationships. The 
political persuasion of a polis could change as rapidly and as constantly as its 
relations w i t h its neighbours. 
W i t h i n this intensely poli t ical context, there are a number of 
questions which we should ask when considering how Greeks interacted 
w i t h one another i n the political f ield. Most basically, we should consider 
what mechanisms there were, both formal and informal , through which 
states were able to keep in contact and deal wi th one another. What was the 
place of personal friendships, both at the level of kinship and at other 
levels? H o w d i d men strike the balance between ideology and "personal" 
politics? In what way d id personal friendships, and particularly friendships 
w i t h those abroad, affect one's loyalties? What was the place of hetaireiai 
and pol i t ica l groups i n interstate relations? A n d to what extent d id 
interpersonal relationships act against the interests of the polis? 
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I n this chapter, we w i l l deal w i th one of these questions, and look at 
the insti tution of Tcpo^evia, a formal relationship between an individual and 
a state which the Greek poleis had developed for conducting diplomatic 
negotiations between states, and at jcpo^evoi, those specially appointed men 
who served as resident "sympathisers" for the patron state in their own 
polis. 
npo^evla and Sevia 
From at least the seventh century,^ the Greek states had established 
an ins t i tu t ional i sed and poli t icised version of the ancient ^evia 
relationship, that is Jtpo^evia, whereby men who were citizens of the state in 
which they lived were appointed by another state to act as representatives of 
the appointing state.2 Herman writes, "Proxenia was a communal invention 
using as a model xenia."^ Thus, these were men who acted on an official 
level to provide the services one might expect f rom a local ^evoq. However, 
unl ike ^evia, which was a personal connection between individuals , 
Ttpo^evia existed between an individual and a state.* 
^ ML 4: this is the cenotaph of a Corcyraean jtp6^evoq, a Menecrates of Oeanthea. Meiggs and 
Lewis comment on the "fascinating tension between its Homeric echoes and the political 
circumstances of a new age, Sojioq or a form of it four times repeated, and above all the 
npd^Evoq, the earliest known to us". 
2 Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 4-7; Herman Ritualised Friendship 130-42; M.B. Walbank 
Athenian Proxenies 1-9; Adcock & Mosley Diplomacy in Ancient Greece 11; Wallace 
Phoenix 24 (1970) 189-208. 
3 Herman Ritualised Friendship 132. 
A rather striking exception is the grant of npo^ma made by Mausolus of Caria to all the 
people of Cnossus (Homblower Mausolus M7 = Labraunda III 40), probably in the 350s (see 
Homblower Mausolids 40). This is not true jcpo^evia but is playing a different kind of game 
within the rules of npo^evia in the fifth and fourth century, and anticipates the purely 
honorific proxeny grants that were made in the Hellenistic period. It looks very much like a 
grant of citizenship (compare the citizenship grants made by the Athenians to the Plataeans 
and Samians: see Chapter One 51 n. 3), although there was no such thing as citizenship of 
Caria. Mausolus may he misinterpreting a Greek institution (see Chapters Five, Six & Seven 
for these kind of cultural misimderstandings), or may be being very clever and making a 
statement which does actually anticipate later grants of Tipo^evia as a pure honour without a 
duty to be performed, or may simply be making do with the Greek institutions which are 
available. In any case, this is very unusual and outside the normal bounds of proxeny grants. 
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Like ^evia, Ttpo^evia was often established, at least in the first instance, 
on a quid pro quo basis, and grants were sometimes made for services 
rendered to the state,^ and the principal duty of the Tipo^evoq, once 
a p p o i n t e d , was to look after the interests of the nominating state and 
visi t ing citizens of that state.2 For example, i n 427, the Corcyraean hostages 
taken i n the naval battles off Sybota were released after their Corinthian 
Tcpo^evoi had supposedly pledged eight hundred talents as surety for them 
(though, in fact, the Corcyraeans had been bribed to bring Corcyra over to the 
C o r i n t h i a n s ) . 3 Again , the newly made Tipo^evoq of the Athenians, 
Nymphodorus , brought Sitalces, the Thracian king, and Perdiccas, the 
Macedonian king, into an alliance w i t h the Athenians,* and some of the 
jipo^evoi of the Athenians at Mytilene, being of the opposite faction to the 
those leading the rebellion, informed the Athenians of the revolt at 
Mytilene i n 428.5 
There are even examples of ;cp6^£V0i who actively support their 
honouring polis, when this is in direct opposition to the policy of their own 
state. For example, during the Third Sacred War, the Tenedian Ttpo^evoq of 
^ See for example: W. 39,40,44,49. 
2 Mosley Envoys and Diplomaq/ 4-5. 
3 Th. 3.70.1; see also Th. 1.55.1. The nationality of the np6^evoi is not agreed by all. If, as 
Kagan {The Archidamian War 175-6) does and I think is more natural to the sense, one 
understands the 7cp6^EV0i to he Corinthian, this is a straightforward example of how the 
Corcyraean representatives in Corinth helped the Corcyraeans in need (albeit T(p X(57(p 
rather than T(p efrycj)). It would presumably mean that the Corinthians were privy to the plot 
against their patron state, but since the Corcyraean prisoners were the "foremost cihzens" in 
Corcyra, this is not exceptional. Other scholars (Gerolymatos Espionage and Treason 64-70; 
Losada The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War 96-8) have taken the Jtp6^evoi to be 
Corcyraeans, and have used this as evidence for the clandestine work of the fifth column in 
Greek societies. One difficulty with this thesis is that Thucydides attributes no such part to 
the Jcp6^EV0i, and, except for their part in raising bail for the the prisoners, does not mention 
them again in relation to the cor^piracy. If one is to argue the point of view of ideology and 
faction, either interpretation could be true: Corinthians helping their Corcyraean friends or 
Corcyraeans helping their patron state. 
4 Th. 2.29.4-7. 
5 Th. 3.2.3; Arist. Pol. 5.1304 a 9-10; see also Gerolymatos Espionage and Treason 53-8. Note, 
however, that one of the Mytilenean jtp64evoi who gave information to the Athenians later 
repented and went to Athens with others to try to persuade the Athenians that there was no 
cause for alarm (Th. 3.4.4); cf. M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 200-1. 
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the Boeotians made a contribution to the Boeotian war f u n d , despite his 
city's "unwavering loyal ty" to Athens.^ In 349/8, an Athenian taxiarch, 
Mantitheus, collected money in Mytilene f r o m the Athenian npo^evoc, 
there, Apol lonides , and f r o m the Athenians' (j)iAx)i there,2 al though 
Mytilene was also under the control of the tyrant, Cammys, who was an 
enemy both of Athens and of Mantitheus.^ 
As a counter-example, however, Callias, the Athenian Ttpo^evoq of the 
Spartans, though he had served on a number of embassies to Sparta,* 
effectively led the Athenian hopUtes against the Spartans at Corinth in 390.5 
In return, the Ttpo^evoq not only enhanced his personal status wi th in 
his o w n community , but also privileges were often extended to the 
honorand by the honouring state, which included assurances of protection 
f r o m harm, access to the courts, or simply an invitation to a meal in the 
prytaneion.^ The position of 7tp6^evo<; also had other benefits for the 
honorand. For example, Nicias of Gortyn was able to use his influence wi th 
the Athenians to persuade them to sail against Cydonia.7 
npo^evoi were also sometimes used by their own state as ambassadors 
to the state which awarded the Ttpo^evla, presumably because they would 
receive a more sympathetic hearing.^ For example, the Spartan Lichas son of 
Arcesilaus, ;cp6^evo<; of the Argives, was sent twice to Argos as presbeutes,^ 
and, i n the same way, i t was the Spartan Ttpo^evoq at Plataea, Lacon son of 
1IG vii 2418.14-15 (= Tod 160); see also Tod's commentary to the text. 
2 Dem. 39.17 (for the date), 40.34,36. 
^ Dem. 40.37. Note that Mantitheus' father had been honoured by Mytilene previously, so 
was an "appropriate" choice for this mission: see also Chapter Four below. 
4 See Chapter Four 163^. 
^Xen.Hell. 4.5.13. 
6 See for example, W. 29,45,64. 
7 Th. 2.85.5; see Davies Democracy 71. For supposed difficulties with this passage, see 
Homblower Comm 366; M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 174-6; Gerolymatos Chiron 17 
(1987) 80-5 contra Connor i4//iH 1 (1976) 6 M . 
8 Cf. Chapter Four 108. 
9 Th. 5.22.2; 5.76.3. For a more detailed discussion of ambassadors and their foreign 
connections, and Lichas in particular, see Chapter Four 159-77 l)elow (Lichas: 174). 
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Aiemnestus, who was appointed as spokesman before the f ive Spartan 
5iKaaxai.i 
Ilpo^evoi could also provide hospitality for ambassadors visiting a 
state. For example, the Spartan ambassadors to Athens in 378 stayed at the 
home of their npo^evoq, Callias.2 The efforts of a Jtpo^evoq d id not always 
ensure the success of a diplomatic mission, however. Xenophon tells how 
Agesilaus ignored the Boeotian ambassadors i n 391 when they came for 
peace, even though Pharax, their Tipo^evoc;, was standing beside them in 
order to introduce them.3 
npo^evoi could also be used as intermediaries i n f o r m i n g 
relationships between states. For instance, Thucydides writes that in the 
summer of 431 the Athenians made Nymphodorus, the brother-in-law of 
Sitalces of Thrace, a Ttpo^evo^ though they had previously considered him 
as TtoTx^LioqA The Tipo^evia was granted as a purely poUtical expedient in 
order that the Athenians could then fo rm an alliance through h im wi th 
Sitalces,5 but he also brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas of 
Macedon and Athens.^ Another example, perhaps, of a npo^evoc, being used 
as a "go-between", though in a slightly different way, is Strophacus, the 
Ttpo^evoq of the Chalddians at Pharsalus and one of Brasidas' eTcixTiSeioi, who 
accompanied Brasidas through Thessaly when he went to Thrace at the 
invitat ion of the Chalcidians.^ npo^evoi who were influential i n their own 
communities could also serve to keep the more far-f lung parts of Greece 
fa i th fu l to their honouring dty. For instance, the Sicels and Geloans were far 
1 Th. 3.52.5. For the origin of the Tcpo^evta, see Hdt. 9.72.2; Homblower Comm. 444. 
2Xen.He// . 5.4.22. 
3Xen.HeH. 4.5.6. 
4 Th. 2.29.1. See Graham }HS 112 (1992) 66. 
5 Th. 2.29.1. Homblower (Comm. 286) suggests that Thucydides himself, given his specialist 
knowledge of the north Aegean region and the expansive style in which he recounts the 
events, may have been involved in promoting the Ttpo^evia. 
6 Th. 229.6. 
7 Th. 4.78.1. At least Thucydides thinks it worthwhile to point out that Strophacus was the 
np6^evo<; of the Chalcidians. 
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more eager to go over to the Spartans once Archonides, who was a ^xkoq of 
the Athenians^ and may have been an Athenian Ttpo^evoq,^ was dead. 
Appointment of Ilpd^evoi 
There seem to be a number of ways i n which a man could be 
appointed as Ttpo^EVoq. Firstly, Tipo^evia, like ^evia could be inherited f rom 
father to son,3 and perhaps originated f r o m an earlier e-uepyecrta to the 
conferring state.* For example, the progonoi of Sthorys, possibly of Thasos, 
were Ttpo^evoi of the Athenians,^ and Apollodorus son of Empedus of 
Selymbria was made Tcpo^evoq as his father had been.^ Callias, the Athenian 
Ttpo^evoq of the Spartans, says that not only he has held the Tipo^evia, but 
also his father's father, who received it f r o m his father.'' I t is also 
noteworthy, however, that Alcibiades did not inherit his family's hereditary 
Ttpo^evia w i t h the Spartans, which his grandfather had renounced, though 
Alcibiades tried to reactivate it by courting (GepaTceiJCOv) the prisoners f rom 
Pylos.8 
In Sparta, Herodotus says, the king appointed the Jtpo^evoi of other 
states.9 This is, at best, unusual, as it is usually the prerogative of a polis to 
award its own Tipo^eviai in other states, and it seems unlikely as a way of 
accounting for all Ttpo^eviai in Sparta, given the basic understanding of the 
Ttpo^evia relationship: that is, mutual ^evia-like sympathy, though on a 
polis rather than a personal scale, between the awarding state and the 
1 Th. 7.1.4. 
2 IG ii2 32; Dover H C T 4.379-80, M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 354-8. The 
naturalisation of Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, was probably for this purpose (Th. 2.29.5, cf. 
67.2); see Hornblower Comm. 288-9; Osborne Naturalization 3.26-7, see also Osborne 
Naturalization 3.29-30 for naturalisation of Tharyps of Molossia for similar purposes. 
3 M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 7; Herman Ritualised Friendship 135, 137. 
* M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 5. 
5 W. 78; see also W. 15,25. 
6 W. 86. 37,44-5. 
7Xen.He// . 6.3.4. 
8 Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2. 
9 Hdt. 6.57.2. 
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honorand. A n d , after all , Lichas the Spartan Jip6^ev0(; of the Argives did 
have men in Argos, who were e7axTi5eioi to the Spartans, w i t h whom he 
was able to work closely: perhaps they were even ^evoi, though Thucydides 
does not say so.^  Indeed Plato has Megillus, the hereditary Spartan npo^evot; 
for the Athenians, talk about the affection even children must feel for the 
state they are to represent as 7ip6^evoi.2 Mosley has explained this 
discrepancy, point ing out the importance of the kings and their ^evia 
relationships in providing hospitality,3 by arguing the Spartan king did not 
appoint all Tipo^evoi, but merely supplemented the arrangements made by 
other states.* However, i f Herodotus is right, and the kings d id in fact 
appoint all Jipo^evoi, this might explain the relatively small number of 
Tipo^evoi who are known and seem to be involved in Spartan interstate 
relations.5 
In Athens, the method of appointing jupo^evoi to other states was 
more f i r m l y i n the public domain, since jcpo^evoi could be appointed 
directly by the assembly at the nomination of a citizen.^ Herman claims that 
"the most natural person" to make such a recommendation was a ^evoc;, and 
that "to the users of the language i t simply seemed self-evident that 
^ Th. 5.76.2-3. As will be argued below, however, they would not need to have such a 
particular connection with Lichas. 
^ Plato Laws 1.642 b-d. 
3 On the importance of the personal connections of the kings, see also 89-94 below. 
^ Mosley Athenaeum n.s.49 (1971) 433-5; cf. Cartledge C(3 n.s. 32 (1982) 251. 
5 See also 64-5 below. 
^ See for example, W. 39; Herman Ritualised Friendship 137. See also Peithias the 
Corcyraean eGeXoTipo^evoq of the Athenians (Th. 3.70.3). Hornblower suggests that he was a 
voluntary npo^evoq and so called in order to distinguish him from a hereditary npo^zvoq 
{Comm. 468); see also Rhodes (Thucydides III 229-30) who suggests that either the previous 
npo^evoq had died and Peithias stepped into the breach and/or he had not been appointed 
Tipo^evoq by the assembly, though one should expect there to have been a Ttpo e^voq in Corcyra 
since 433. Davies (Detnocracy 70) translates e0eXortp6^evo<; as a "self appointed" rcpo^evot;. 
Whatever his actual status, the Corcyraeans at least felt that the Athenians should know 
what had happened to Peithias (Th. 3.71.2), which suggests that the "protection" clauses of 
regular proxeny decrees applied to Peithias in spirit, even if there was no actual decree to 
ratify this for Peithias himself. 
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proxenia implied xenia."'^ This is diff icul t to test as so few of the proposers of 
decrees are known or can be restored w i t h any degree of certainty. One 
secure name we do possess is Thrasycles, who proposed the TCpo^evia of 
Asteas of Aleia.2 The decree is securely dated to 421/O,^ and Walbank 
suggests that the context is the negotiations that led to the Peace of Nicias 
and that the Thrasycles of the decree is the Thrasycles who swore the oath to 
the Peace.* Walbank suggests that the nature of Asteas' service was 
hospitality to the embassy negotiating the Peace and the ensuing alliance,^ 
point ing out that Aleia lies on the overland route to Sparta.^ I f this is so, it 
may be possible to conjecture that Thrasycles and Asteas were ^evoi. 
I n 418, just as the Argives and Spartans were about to join i n battle, 
Alciphron, the Argive 7ip6^ev0(; for Sparta, went wi th Thrasyllus to Agis, the 
Spartan k ing and came to terms for a truce, though the rest of the Argive 
camp was unaware of it.7 Gerolymatos argues that this episode shows the 
development of icpo^evoi into ad hoc diplomatic envoys.^ Herman,^ in his 
interpretation of the incident, claims that the key to this peculiar situation 
was Alciphron's icpo^evia, and suggests that, f i rs t ly, Alciphron and Agis 
were ^evoi and, secondly, Thrasyllus and Alciphron belonged to the same 
pro-Spartan faction. "They therefore prevailed upon Agis, who represented 
the Spartan end of the network and happened to be, at the same time, the 
leader of the Peloponnesian army, to do his best to avert the battle -
1 Herman Ritualised Friendship 139^0; see also Herman CQ n.s. 39 (1989) 87, though the 
specific argimient here seems improbable and built on too many uncertainties and assumptions 
(see Homblower Comm. 365) contra Marek Die Proxenie 134 who argues that proxeny grants 
served the political interests of the community and were largely independent of private 
interests. The answer, as I will argue below, lies somewhere in between these two extremes. 
2 W. 49. 
3 W. 49.6-7. 
* M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 279; see also 276. 
5 See W. 49.9-12. 
6 M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 279. 
7 Th. 5.59.5 
8 Gerolymatos Espionage and Treason 116. 
^ Ritualised Friendship 146. 
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explaining, probably, that such a battle would run against his own interests, 
too. A n d as a favour to a xenos, Agis averted the battle."^ 
As an explanation of this d i f f icu l t episode,^ this is rather neat, but, I 
think, assumes too much. First of all, Thucydides does not say that Agis and 
Alc iphron were ^evoi. If they were, one might expect h im to describe their 
relationship in these terms, rather than as the more distant jcpo^evia, and, as 
I have argued above, i t is too simplistic to assume that every Jtpo^evia has a 
^evia behind i t ; but simply because Agis d i d make terms wi thout the 
sanction of the assembly, does not necessarily mean he was doing a ^evoc; a 
favour. Agis ' position i n Sparta is an interesting one: he was a king who 
seemed w i l l i n g to test his own power and make decisions on his own 
init iat ive, as he d i d in his command at Deceleia, and who was in conflict 
w i t h the ephors.3 One could easily imagine that i f , according to his 
judgement, victory was not certain, he wou ld have made terms. I t is 
interesting that the Spartan response to his actions was to curb his powers 
fur ther and reproach his judgement by appointing symbouloi wi thout 
whose permission he was not able to leave the city w i th an army.* 
One could imagine, however, that at this late stage in the f i f t h century 
the recommendation of a ^evoq would not be necessary for an award. If the 
demos could recognise a benefaction of an individual , any member of the 
assembly w o u l d be able to stand up and nominate h im, though, again, this 
could have been a ^evoc; where there was one. But there may sometimes 
have been no ^evoi to call upon. For instance, i f Corcyra really had kept 
herself to herself, there may have been no Athenian connections in Corcyra 
1 Ibid. 
2 See also Andrewes H C T 4.82-3; Kagan The Peace of Nicias 99-102. 
3 Note also that Alcibiades f)ersuaded Endius to send the ships to Chios and come to terms 
with Tissaphemes in order that he should reap the glory rather than Agis (Th. 8.12.2). 
* Note, however, the possible emendation of Th. 5.63.4: jidXew^ noXeiaicu; Haasse, supported by 
Andrewes (HCT 4.91-2): more appropriate with dotdYav and to what Agis had done in 418. 
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before Corcyra's approach to Athens in 433.^ In all probability, there was a 
pre-existing ^evia in some instances, but in others jtpo^evia was granted to 
f i l l a poli t ical need, as w i t h Nymphodorus of Abdera, or to recognise a 
benefaction. 
npo^evia as an Effective Relationship in Inter-state Politics 
One cannot deny that the Tipo^evia relationship had a degree of 
importance i n the late f i f t h and early fourth centuries as a means of forming 
contacts between states; the examples of the Spartan Lichas, and the 
Athenians, Alcibiades and Callias, acting as ambassadors have already been 
given. However, despite the fact that we have the names for a large number 
of Ttpo^evoi f r o m decrees, in our literary sources we hear of relatively few of 
them actively involved in the dealings between states, and this seems to be 
as true for one polis as for another.2 Four Spartans are known to have held 
proxenies i n this period: Megillus, Lichas, Clearchus and Pharax. Megillus 
may have taken part on an embassy to Athens i n 408/7,3 Lichas was the 
ambassador to Argos i n 421 and 418,* Clearchus was harmost of his 
"honouring state" (I use this advisedly in the Ught of Herodotus' assertions 
concerning the appointment of Spartan itpo^evoi), Byzantium,^ and Pharax 
represented the Boeotians in Sparta.^ Three of these four held magisterial 
positions awarded, apparently, on the basis of their connections, but these 
were not the only "appropriate" magisterial appointments that were made. 
1 This may be part of the answer to the Corcyraean eOeXo7ip6^evo(;, Peithias (see 61 n. 6 above). 
2 See Appendix A: Literary Flpd^evoi. However, see Mosley {Envoys and Diplomacy 6), who 
vmtes: "The actual known instances where proxenoi gave help to states which they 
represented are but few in number, but the importance attached by states to their proxenoi 
may he confirmed by the lengths to which they are prepared to go to secure the safety of their 
representatives." 
3 See Appendbc C: Spartan Presbeis 370. 
* See Chapter Four 174. 
5 See Chapter Four 149-50. 
6Xen.He/Z. 4.5.6. 
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Endius son of Alcibiades was appointed to numerous embassies to Athens 
on the basis of his ^evla wi th the family of Alcibiades son of Cleinias.^ 
In Athens, although Callias son of Hipponicus does represent Athens 
on three embassies to Sparta, he also leads the army against Sparta.2 
Alcibiades' lapsed Tupo^evia w i t h Sparta is pointedly not made use of, and 
Lacedaemonius son of Cimon is sent on a mission which was allegedly 
designed to embarrass h im because of his Spartan connections.^ 
There were many occasions when states interacted through the 
medium of individuals to fo rm alliances, incite revolts, and so on, other 
than through Jtpo^evia. As we w i l l see i n the fo l lowing chapter, such 
interstate relationships could also be conducted through the medium of the 
in fo rmal contacts of (})iX,oi and ^evoi. A n d there were also other official 
channels - the strategoi, presbeis and other magistrates - through which 
states interacted. Sometimes these utilised the formal contacts of Jtpo^evia, 
but, as often as not, informal relationships were employed, and we w i l l 
consider in Chapter Four the appointment of magistrates i n the poleis and 
consider to what extent they were affected by personal connections. 
1 See Chapter Four 173^. 
2 See above 58. 
3 Plut. Per. 29.1-2; but there is no evidence that Lacedaemoiuus inherited his father's pro-
Spartan attitude. 
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Foreign policy demands scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a 
democracy; on the contrary, it calls for the perfect use of almost all those 
qualities in which a democracy is deficient. Democracy ... cannot combine its 
measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are 
qualities which are more characteristic of an individual or an aristocracy. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859. 
Ilpo^evia was not the only way of maintaining contacts between 
poleis. As wel l as the official representatives, the Tcpo^evoi, there were the 
unoff icial contacts: k in and colonists, political sympathisers and ^evoi. This 
chapter w i l l attempt to consider the informal mechanisms that existed 
through which interstate relations were conducted, looking at personal 
relationships - racial kinship l inks, poli t ical groups^ and ind iv idua l 
friendships - and their role in determining and carrying out foreign policy; 
and, then, to draw some conclusions about the way in which interpersonal 
relationships affected interstate politics i n the Greek wor ld i n the years 435 
to 336 and compare the ways in which the different states, particularly 
Athens and Sparta, conducted their political relationships w i t h one another. 
The Greeks and their ^ihn 
Personal friendships played an important part in the formation and 
prosecution of foreign policy and poUtical activity abroad. This operated on a 
number of levels, and various types of personal relationships could be 
exploited i n interstate affairs: racial kinship, poli t ical and ideological 
sympathies, as well as private ^iXia networks, such as hetaireiai and ^eviai. 
The events that took place after the Peace of Nicias provide a good 
il lustration of how a variety of personal friendships could affect interstate 
1 On the nature of hetaireiai see Chapter One 27-8. 
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politics. I f we focus on these years, we can see how almost all the different 
kinds of ^ikia connections could be employed in inter-po/zs matters. It w i l l 
be usefu l to look at a narrative sequence of events, placing these 
relationships in a context, before we turn to study the many other examples 
of these f r iendship ties i n the century between the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War and the death of Philip. 
After the Peace of Nicias 
A great deal has been written in past years describing the events after 
the Peace of Nicias in terms of internal tensions between oUgarchs and 
democrats i n Argos, war parties and peace parties.^ There is no denying that 
there was a body of men in Argos who were democrats and another who 
were oligarchs; Thucydides tells us so. But he does not tell us this until the 
narrative concerning Argos is almost finished. Whether these men were 
democrats or oUgarchs is not immediately important. What is at the heart of 
Thucydides' description of the events after the Peace of Nicias is personal 
politics, where individuals and their connections make policy.2 It was more 
a matter of whom they knew than of what their political ideology was. 
Cleobulus, Xenares and the Boeotians 
Thucydides writes that after the conclusion of the f i f t y years' peace, 
the Cor in th ian ambassadors, who were unhappy w i t h the Spartan 
settlement, went to Argos and suggested to some of the Argive magistrates^ 
1 See for example, Kagan AJP 81 (1960) 291-310; id. CP 57 (1962) 209-218; Kelly CP 69 
(1974) 81-99; cf.WesUake^/P 61 (1940) 413 n. 3; id. CQ n.s. 21 (1971) 315-25 (= Stwdies 
84-96); Seager CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 249-69. 
2 For a partial recognition of this, see Kelly CP 69 (1974) esp. 93; see also id. Historia 21 
(1972) 159-169. 
3 Tc5v ev TcXa ovxcov as interpreted by Andrewes H C T 4.23; contra Griffith Historia 1 
(1950) 237 who translates this as "certain important Argives" - which bears shghtly 
different connotations. 
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that they should f o r m an aUiance among the Peloponnesian states.^ The 
Arg ive magistrates, i n turn, persuaded the boule and the demos of the 
Argives to elect men w i t h whom any state that was wi l l ing ,^ except the 
Athenians and the Spartans,^ could negotiate for an alliance.* So the Argive 
alliance was set up, and the Mantineians were the f irs t to join.5 The 
Corinthians d i d not attach themselves to the alliance straight away, 
however, but only after the Spartans had tried to interfere.^ It seems that the 
Corinthian ambassadors approached the Argives on their own initiative, 
and had then to persuade their own polis to agree.^ The Corinthian 
ambassadors may or may not have been personal ^iXoi of the Argive 
magistrates,^ but the point is that a group wi th in the polis was prepared to 
act i n a personal capacity to manipulate pubUc matters, and that the initial 
offer to the Argive magistrates was made at a personal level. 
Over the summer Elis, Corinth, and the Chalcidians also joined the 
alUance, though the Tegeates would not, and the Boeotians prevaricated 
(though they d id agree to accompany the Corinthians to Athens and to help 
in the Corinthian negotiations for a truce).^ Relations between Athens and 
Sparta also worsened,!^ and, in the fo l lowing winter, some of the new 
ephors at Sparta were opposed to the Peace.^^ A conference was held in 
1 Th. 5.27.1-2. For the possible Corinthian motives, that is, to try to renew the Archidamian 
War, see Westlake AJP 61 (1940) 413-21. The Mantineians, not the Corinthians, were 
actually the first in joining the alliance with the Argives (Th. 5.28.3-29.1). 
2 This had all been part of the Corinthian plan (Th. 5.27.2), which was accepted almost 
unaltered: see Kagan Peace of Nicias 37-8. 
^ Only the demos of the Argives could ratify an alliance with either Athens or Sparta (Th. 
5.28.1). 
4 Th. 5.28.1. 
5 Th. 5.28.3. 
6 Th. 5.30.5. 
7 See Kagan Peace of Nicias 37. 
^ Probably not in this case, since t»oth held official positions - though certain (t)iXoi may well 
have helped to bring the meeting about (compare the Mytilenean supporters in Athens who 
helped the Mytilenean ambassadors gain an audience with ol ev xeXei [Th. 3.36.5]). 
9 Th. 5.31.1, 6, 32.3-4, 6. For an analysis of what the Corinthians were up to, see Kagan Peace 
of Nicias 44-5. 
10 Th. 5.35.2. 
" Th. 5.36.1. 
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Sparta at which embassies f rom the Athenians, Boeotians and Corinthians 
were present, though nothing was achieved.^ 
Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who particularly wished to 
br ing the Peace to an end, and their ^iXoi,'^ made private proposals to the 
Boeotians to join the Argive alliance.^ Plutarch actually states that the ^ih^i 
were a group k n o w n to be inclined towards the Boeotians (xd5v 
PoicoTiaCovxcov):* individuals exploiting personal sympathies to influence 
public politics. 
The Argives also had Boeotian aspirations. As the Boeotian 
ambassadors were on the way home f rom the conference i n Sparta, two 
high-ranking Argives met them and also suggested that the Boeotians join 
the Argive coalition, though the Argives were not intending to give the 
alliance a pro-Spartan direction.^ The Boeotians were pleased, since the 
Argives happened to want the same thing as their (j)iA,oi at Sparta had done,^ 
and, on the ambassadors' return, the boeotarchs were pleased also, as their 
Spartan ^iXoi seemed to want what the Argives did.7 The arrangements 
came unstuck, however, as the council of the Boeotians would not agree to 
an alliance w i t h Corinth on the grounds that i t wou ld be overtly anti-
Spartan, since they d id not know that i t was Cleobulus and Xenares and 
their (^iXoi who had suggested i t , or that the intention was to align the 
alliance w i t h Sparta.^ Thucydides suggests that i t was important that the 
1 Th. 5.36.1. Kagan {Peace of Nicias 51) suggests that the conference was convened 
"presumably to try once more to achieve a general acceptance of the peace." 
2 There is, perhaps, a question whether they were personal <t)iXoi to these particular men, or 
simply looking to the interests of the Boeotians and/or Corinthians in general. Probably the 
latter in the light of Plut. Mc. 10.7. 
3 Th. 5.36.1-37.1; Xenares was probably the more important of the two, despite the order of 
their names at 36.1 - note that they are switched about at 37.1 (Andrewes H C T 4.38). 
* Plut. Mc. 10.8; see also Th. 5.38.3 (here described as "Cleobulus and Xenares and the ^ikoi") 
and Th. 5.46.4 (xcSv Tcepi x6v SevctpTi). 
5 Th. 5.37.2. 
6 Th. 5.37.3. 
7 Th. 5.37.4. 
8 Th. 5.38.3. 
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Boeotian council should be aware (as i t was not)i that i t was actually their 
sympathisers i n Sparta, and particularly those associated wi th Cleobulus and 
Xenares, who had proposed the alliance. The point to be gained f rom this for 
our purposes is that contacts were made through private representations of 
men who were ^iXoi f r o m political groups i n each polis which were 
"fr iendly" to each other. This serves to illustrate the ways that the system of 
br idging between political groups in two poleis could work, although it is 
shown not work ing here. The leaders of one political group made contact 
w i t h the leaders of another like-minded political group, in order that they 
might put into action a joint policy. 
Alcibiades, Argives and Spartans 
A f t e r the pro-Boeotian group in Sparta had fai led to effect the 
Boeot ian/Argive alliance, the Spartans made a private alliance w i t h the 
Boeotians on the condition that the Boeotians returned Panactum and the 
prisoners to the Athenians.^ A t the beginning of the fo l lowing spring, 
however, the Argives, now afraid of being alienated,^ sent envoys, who they 
thought wou ld be 7tpoa(l)iX£axaxoi to them, to Sparta as quickly as possible to 
make peace.* 
Meanwhile, the Athenians and the Spartans were now quarrelling 
over Panactum,5 and there were those in Athens who wished the Peace to 
be broken and were eager for an Argive aUiance.^ Alcibiades son of Cleinias 
1 Thucydides does not go very far towards explaining why this apparentiy simple 
misunderstanding was not cleared up: he claims that the boeotarchs simply thought the boule 
would simply follow their lead (Th. 5.38.3). Seager (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 257-8) suggests that 
the boeotarchs needed to keep their true intentions secret in order to deceive the Argives. 
2 Th. 5.39.2-3. The Atheniaits would only restore Pylos to the Spartans if they, in turn, 
received back Panactum. 
3 Th. 5.40.1-3. 
* Th. 5.40.3-41.3. On the whole question of the appointment of ambassadors and other 
magistracies for their "friendliness", see Chapter Four below. 
5 Th. 5.42.2. 
6 Th. 5.43.1-2. 
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was one of these,^ and he sent private messages to Argos for the Argives to 
come as quickly as possible (he had ^evoi there),2 and invite the Athenians 
into an alliance.^ Thucydides says that Alcibiades genuinely thought it was 
better to side wi th the Argives, but that he was also opposed to the treaty 
w i t h the Spartans because the Spartans had negotiated the treaty through 
Nicias and Laches.* This was a blow to Alcibiades' pride, as the Spartans had 
apparently overlooked h im because of his youth, and had not honoured his 
hereditary jcpo^evia w i t h Sparta.^ Alcibiades' grandfather had renounced 
this Tipo^evia, but Alcibiades had tried to renew i t by paying court 
(9epa7iei3cov)6 to the Spartan prisoners f rom Pylos.^ 
When the Argives realised that the alliance had been made between 
Boeotia and Sparta without the Athenians' knowledge, they gave no more 
thought to their ambassadors in Sparta but turned their attention to 
Athens.8 Since they believed that Athens was not only a democracy, as they 
themselves were, but that she also had been (t)iA,i0(; for a long time and 
w o u l d f i gh t w i t h them if they became involved in war,^ they sent 
ambassadors at once.^o The Spartans, afraid that the Athenians would make 
an alliance w i t h the Argives in their anger over Panactum and the Boeotian 
^ Th. 5.43.2. 
2 See 102 below. 
3 Th. 5.43.3. 
* Th. 5.43.2. 
5 Th. 5.43.2. 
^ There is a collection of "buzz" words which can indicate "friendly" activity. Gepaireijeiv 
(when it means "to pay court to") is one of these, and often relates to the activities which 
precede a (^ikia relationship, that is, those activities that one hopes will be recognised as a 
Xapiq. Of course, this refers to less personal, and probably more unequal relationships. 
XopiCeaOai (cognate of xdpiq) is also significant and indicates, as one would expect, that the 
XCtpic, is being performed, and that the relationship is being entered into. This may seem a 
very stiff use of the language, and the context must always determine the meaning, but these 
are important pointers to "friendship texts", and I will generally indicate when they are used 
in the sources. 
7 Th. 5.43.2; see also Th. 6.89.2; Plut. Ale. 14.1. 
8 Th. 5.44.1. 
9 Th. 5.44.1. 
0^ Th. 5.44.2. 
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alliance, also quickly sent ambassadors to Athens, choosing men who 
seemed to be e7nx'n6eioi to the Athenians.^ 
When the Spartan ambassadors addressed the boule, they said that 
they had come w i t h f u l l powers.2 Af ra id that i f they said this to the demos 
the Athenians might be persuaded and reject the Argive alliance,^ 
Alcibiades played a trick on the Spartan ambassadors - even though one was 
his own ^i\oq, Endius* - by convincing them not to tell the assembly the 
extent of their remit, then denouncing them 
But the decree ra t i fy ing the Argive alliance was never made, on 
account of an earthquake,^ and, on the next day, Nicias seized the 
oppor tuni ty and urged the Athenians to become i^ihii of the Spartans, 
proposing that an embassy be sent to Sparta w i t h himself as one of the 
ambassadors.^ The Spartans, however, refused to give up their alliance wi th 
the Boeotians, since ol Ttepi xov Eevdpri xov e(})Opov had secured control in 
Sparta.8 The Athenians f lew into a rage and made an aUiance w i t h the 
Argives, w h o happened to be present and whom Alcibiades brought 
forward.^ 
The events after the making of the Peace highlight the role that 
individuals could play and the importance they could have in determining 
the course of events, and in forming and implementing foreign policy. The 
poUtical group of Xenares in Sparta, through private negotiation wi th other 
1 Th. 5.44.3. 
2 Th. 5.45.1. 
3 Th. 5.45.1. 
4 For the ^evia, see Th. 8.6.3. 
5 Th. 5.45.2-4; Plut. Ale. 14.7-12. On the difficulties with this episode, see Endnote 2. 
6 Th. 5.45.4. 
7 Th. 5.46.1; note that not only had the Spartan ambassadors been with Nicias (was he then 
acting as their jtp6^evo<;?), he had also shown pro-Spartan tendencies on other occasions; on 
this, see Chapter Four 162. 
8 Th. 5.46.4. 
9 Th. 5.465. 
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individuals i n Boeotia, tried to make a connection between the Spartans and 
the Boeotians. Other Argive individuals tried to f o r m an alliance wi th 
Sparta; then, when this d id not work, sent as ambassadors to Sparta the men 
who seemed the "most fr iendly" to the Spartans, to try to form an alliance 
there. I n turn, Alcibiades in Athens exploited all his private connections to 
discredit the Spartan ambassadors and to make an alliance wi th Argos. 
What is more, i t was not always those i n off ic ia l positions who 
influenced the direction of foreign relations. Alcibiades worked privately 
through his personal relationships to form the Argive alliance. Similarly, it 
is not clear whether the Argives who met the Corinthians and Boeotians 
"on the road" were official representatives of Argos, but probably not. 
Finally, even the regularly appointed officials d id not feel i t necessary 
to work through the off ic ial channels. Cleobulus and Xenares, though 
ephors, were not fol lowing a plan approved by the assembly of the Spartans, 
but were acting on their own initiative. How much one could circumvent 
off ic ial procedure would depend, of course, on the particular state and on 
the individual ' s position wi th in the state. The boeotarchs apparently felt 
that the council w o u l d fo l low their lead in decision-making, though this 
turned out not to be the case. This places the picture of foreign relations in a 
different l ight . Rather than seeing events completely in terms of politics, 
party and internal dissension (though that is not to say that these things 
were not influential) , we should also look at the individuals and the part 
they played in inter-po/zs affairs, and the way they played it . 
Similar patterns to these are apparent throughout the hundred years 
under discussion i n this thesis. The next section w i l l consider such "non-
off ic ia l" personal contacts under three broad headings: f irst ly, racial kinship 
l inks; secondly, sympathy groups; and, f ina l ly , personal friendships, 
i n c l u d i n g hetaireiai, pol i t ical groups, and the private friendships of 
individuals and of the Spartan kings in particular. It w i l l compare the extent 
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to which different poleis made use of personal friendships, particularly 
Sparta and Athens, and, f inally, draw conclusions about the way different 
states conducted their international affairs. 
Racial Kinship 
On a broadly state level, members of the same racial group were 
counted among one's kin . Such kinship connections, distant as they were, 
could have a important effect on foreign policy.^ The Greeks were not 
averse to using the argument of kinship i n their dealings wi th other states, 
and claims of k in could be used to try to draw states into alliances or procure 
their assistance in war. For instance, after Argos had gone over to Sparta in 
the winter of 418/7,2 the Spartans also tried to bring Perdiccas of Macedon 
into alliance w i t h them.^ Thucydides says that he d id not rebel f rom the 
Athenians straight away, but considered i t when he saw that the Argives 
had seceded, because he himself was of Argive ancestry.^ Again, Syracuse 
sought aid at Corinth in 415 on account of their kinship.5 In the summer of 
411, some Methymnian exiles brought f i f t y hoplites (who were 
7rpoaexaipiaxoi)6 f rom Cyme, and mercenaries f rom the mainland to attack 
Methymna and bring about the revolt of Eresus.^ Thucydides says that 
1 Though contrast Th. 7.57.1. 
2 Th. 5.80.2. 
3 Th. 5.80.2. 
^ Th. 5.80.2. For Perdiccas' motives and his seeming fickleness, see Cole Phoenix 28 (1974) 
55-72. As Andrewes (HCT 4.146) notes, "Considerations of race and origin are often advanced 
by ancient authors as motives for pxjlitical action, and they may have been more effective 
than we are inclined to imagine: Thucydides certainly suggests that the attitude of Argos 
helped to determine that of Perdiccas, though there can have been few other occasions when 
Argos was relevant to his designs." 
5 Th. 6.88.7. Corinth was also the mother-city of Syracuse, so the kinship link was relatively 
strong. 
^ Andrewes thinks that the description of the soldiers as TtpoaexaipiOTOi "probably 
distinguishes these men as volunteers T^rought in as companions in the enterprise' from the 
hired men next mentioned" (HCT 5.345). They were possibly, then, troops who were recruited 
through personal contacts of the exiles (compare the Corinthian, Aristeus, whose army 
consisted of a large body of men who had joined out of <^iXia for him; Th. 1.60.2). 
7 Th. 8.100.3. 
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Anaxarchus, the Theban, commanded them "because of kinship" ( K a t d x6 
^-uyyeveq).! 
The kinship l ink could also be expressed in terms of "Ionian" and 
"Dorian" affinities.^ Though the connection was weak, this racial tie could 
be used as a means of canvassing for support. Towards the end of the 
summer of 427, when the Leontines and the Syracusans were at war wi th 
one another, the Leontines sent to Athens and tried to persuade them to 
send ships both on the basis of their "ancient alliance" and because they 
were Ionian.^ Thucydides says the Athenians responded by despatching 
ships and men to help them, using their kinship as a pretext (olKeiOTTixoq 
7ipo<t)daei), but actually wishing both to prevent corn being brought to the 
Peloponnese, and to see whether they could gain control of Sicily.* Likewise, 
when the Athenians decided to undertake the campaign in Sicily in 415, 
their objectives were not only to conquer the whole of Sicily (in fact, this 
was, according to Thucydides, the dXT|9eaxdiT| np6^am<0, but also to help 
their kinsmen and allies;^ and when the Athenian generals were trying to 
d r u m up support i n Sicily and southern Italy later in the campaign, they 
used the claims of kinship as an argument: Thucydides says that they were 
unable to persuade the Rhegians, though they were kinsmen of Leontines 
and ETaxTiSeioi of the Athenians.^ Indeed the kinship l ink w i t h fe l low 
lonians, though rather tenuous, may have been one of the f ew real 
connections left between Athens and their Sicilian "cousins". Racial kinship 
1 Th. 8.100.3. The kinship link originated in the founding of Methymna by the Boeotians (Th. 
7.57.5; cf. 8.5.2). 
^ The Greeks had a professed disHke of fighting against their own radal group. One of the 
themes of Thucydides' list of the allies at Syracuse at 7.57.1-59.1 is that lonians were ranged 
against lonians and Dorians and against Dorians. For the contrast and traditional hostility 
between the racial groups, see Th. 1.124.1,5.9.1,6.80.3,82.2, 8.25.3-5 (see also Dover H C T 
4.220). 
3 Th. 3.86.1-3. 
4 Th. 3.86.4. 
5 Th. 6.6.1. 
6 Th. 6.46.2. 
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could be invoked as a valid relationship, or at least a good excuse, on the 
basis of which one polis could involve itself i n the affairs of another. 
Sympathy and Ideology 
I t cannot be denied that there could be elements in the various poleis 
which were simply "pro-democratic" or "pro-oligarchic", and that this could 
be important in determining the actions of political groups. For example, in 
365, when there was civi l unrest in Elis, Xenophon writes that those about 
Charopus, Thrasonides and Argeius (oi Tcepi Xdpojtov xe m i GpaacoviSav 
K a i 'Apyeiov) were trying to lead the state into 5Ti|ioKpaxta, while those 
about Eualcas, Hippias and Stratolas (oi Jtepi Ex)dh:av xe K a i ' IjtTuav Kai 
Expax6A,av) were trying to bring i t into oXiyapxia.^ There was the concept of 
sympathy w i t h a political ideology.2 
But there were also groups who were not so much "democratic" or 
"oligarchic" as fr iendly to another leading state, such as Athens or Sparta.3 
The emphasis was not on revolt, for example, to change the political 
ideology of the state, so much as to align the state w i t h , say, Athens or 
Sparta, and to put the leaders of that sympathy group into power. But these 
"sympathies" were not necessarily based just on opportunism or power-
mongering, but sometimes on a genuine conviction that the state would be 
benefited by the patronage of that particular polis. For example, at Megara in 
424, Thucydides writes that the people in the d t y were being pressed both by 
the Athenians who invaded their territory each year, and by their own exiles 
^Xen.Hell. 7.4.15. 
2 See, for example, Th. 5.31.6,44.1: the Boeotians not wanting an alliance with Argos because 
she is democratic; Argos wanting an alliance with Athens because she is democratic. 
However, because of the nature of such groups, they could never he so rigidly defined or their 
memtiership as secure as in modem political parties: see Rhodes "The 'Acephalous' Polis?" 
[unpublished]. 
3 Xen. Hell. 6.3.4. Of course, there were also poleis who sought the help of Athens or Sparta 
precisely Ijecause they did represent democracy and oligarchy respectively (cf. Th 3.82.1). 
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in Pegae.i As a result, the (^iXoi of the exiles in the city urged the citizens to 
receive back the exiles.^ The leaders of the demos, on the other hand, 
became frightened, and made overtures to give up the city to the Athenian 
generals, since they thought that this would be the least dangerous course of 
action.3 But the whole plan went astray, when the Athenians only managed 
to take the long walls, falling back on Nisaea in the hope that Megara would 
soon surrender, i f that was under siege.* 
A t this point, Brasidas, who had been in the region of Sicyon and 
Cor in th making preparations for his northern campaign, sent to the 
Boeotians for help and went to Megara wi th a select group of his own men.^ 
The two factions in the city were afraid: one that he would bring in the 
exiles and drive them out, and the other, that the demos might attack 
them.6 Neither faction would admit Brasidas, but both decided to wait and 
see what w o u l d happen.^ In the end, there was no battle between the 
Peloponnesian and Athenian forces, but the ^ikoi of the exiles in Megara 
took heart and opened the gates to Brasidas and his men, while those who 
had negotiated w i t h the Athenians were cowed.^ Neither group were 
particularly interested in democracy or oligarchy. Rather they looked for that 
help which they believed would most further their own interests, which 
they probably identified wi th those of their polis. 
Similarly, i n Thebes in 395, there were two political groups: oi Jiepi 
Leontiades, and ol ;iepi Ismenias.^ Those wi th Leontiades were sympathised 
w i t h the Spartans, but those w i t h Ismenias were accused of atticising 
^ Th. 4.66.1. 
2 Th. 4.66.2. 
3 Th. 4.66.3. 
4 Th. 4.66.3-69.1. 
5 Th. 4.70.1-2. 
6 Th. 4.71.1. 
7 Th. 4.71.2. 
8 Th. 4.73.4. 
^Hell.Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Channbers) 20.1. 
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(dxxiid^eiv), because of their support for the demos when i t had been 
removed f r o m power, although they d id not in fact sympathise w i t h the 
Athenians.1 While the group led by Ismenias may have cared more for the 
support of the demos than for Athens, i t wou ld appear that Leontiades' 
group identif ied itself more wi th Sparta than wi th oligarchy as such.2 Yet 
both groups were probably pursuing what they perceived to be the best 
interests of their group, and probably they themselves ident i f ied the 
interests of their group w i t h the interests of the polis. But what was in the 
interests of the polis was not always self-evident, and their opponents might 
equally sincerely believe that they had given the interests of their group 
pr ior i ty over the interests of the polis. 
Personal Friendship 
Before turning to the specific instances of personal friendships in 
inter-polis affairs, we need to clear the ground about how personal 
friendships operated in the political arena. As has been discussed in Chapter 
One, political activity in the poleis operated on vertical and horizontal axes. 
The horizontal axis represents the l ink between equals, particularly ^evoi, 
whereas the vertical axis extends down f rom the leading pohtical figures to 
their actual and potential supporters. A l l f u l l citizens, by definition, held the 
franchise, so all citizens had the power to affect policy by casting their vote 
in one way or another; so much is obvious. Herman has concentrated on 
the relationship of leading figures wi th their exaipoi at home and their ^evoi 
abroad, and has contrasted these upper-class relationships w i t h a demos 
which he regards as being outside them.3 He has then supposed that a 
1 Hell.Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; cf. (Bartoletti) 18.1 = (Chambers) 21.1. 
2 See also McKechnie and Kern Comm. 161-2. 
3 Herman Ritualised Friendship esp. 150-6; cf. id. PCPS n.s. 36 (1990) 91-4. 
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leader's loyalty to his upper-class friends would conflict w i t h his loyalty to 
his po/is.i As he writes. 
I n sum, throughout its history, the Greek w o r l d was torn by 
conflict between upper-class factions who derived their power and 
resources f r o m foci of power which lay outside its boundaries. 
Networks of alliances l inked factions f r o m several cities and 
radiated f r o m the great empires located at the fringes of the wor ld 
of cities, creating a system of external friendships that could offer 
rewards - wealth, fame, position - even more tempting than 
those of the city itself. It was a system which had not changed 
significantly since the days of the epos .... By the same token, 
however, there emerged a class of men who, unl ike the 
aristocracy, the rich and their clients, were free of such ties of 
dependence and uninvolved in the alliance system.2 
This class-based dichotomy is, i n my view, a mistaken step in Herman's 
argument, and i t is at this point that we must take essentially different 
paths. Firstly, many of the men who were not political leaders were, to a 
greater or lesser extent, committed to fo l lowing one of the leaders and 
caught up i n their leader's network of connections. Secondly, while the 
leaders needed to w i n the votes of the citizens in the assembly, the citizens 
in the assembly were glad to make use of the leaders' connections for the 
city's benefit.3 Thirdly, there were those i n the emergent class of powerful 
non-aristocrats who sought to fo rm personal cormections of their own on 
an international level. Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, Phormio son of 
Asopius and Iphicrates son of Timotheus, all noui homines,"^ made 
personal friendships abroad which they exploited for the benefit of the state 
1 Herman Ritualised Friendship esp. 156-61. 
^Ibid. 155-6, see also 130. 
3 Compare Amheim, who writes concerning Athens: "the masses were not only prepared to 
choose noble leaders, but they valued birth as such ... For, to put it in a nutshell, demoaatic 
Athens was simultaneously anti-aristocratic in government and aristocratic in ethos" 
(Amheim Aristocracy in Greek Society 156). Herman himself {PCPS n.s. 36 (1990) 92) 
admits that the community was prepared to hamess these aristocratic connections, but at a 
frice. On Demosthenes: Davies APF 112-3; on Iphicrates (in the tradition, his father was a 
cobbler): Plut Mor. 186 f; Suidas s.u. Iphicrates (I 772); Davies /IPf 248-9. Phormio's 
antecedents are unknown, but he is not knovm to belong to the propertied classes. 
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as wel l as themselves.^ Finally, upper-class connections were not inherently 
opposed to the interests of the state.2 Indeed, men often persuade 
themselves that they have no conflict of loyalty, but that what is good for 
themselves and their friends is good for the state as a whole; and what is 
good for the state as a whole is in fact a question on which the citizens may 
legitimately disagree. 
Political groups and political sympathisers f rom different poleis could 
be l inked by ties of personal and individual friendships. As we saw above, 
these personal ^iXiai, often by their nature ^eviai, could fo rm a bridge 
between a group in one polis and another polis itself, or a l ike-minded 
group in another polis. Individuals were able to mobilise their political, or 
politicised, groups by making contact w i th another individual i n another 
state, usually his (t)iXoq, who was then able to mobilise his own political 
group.3 Demosthenes declared in 351 when he was pleading the case of the 
Rhodians, that 
I w o u l d never have said these things, i f I thought i t wou ld 
advantage the demos of the Rhodians alone, for I am neither the 
jcpo^evoq of the men, nor am I the private ^evoq of any individual 
among them.* 
Though Demosthenes claims he is neither their jipo^evoq nor their ^tvoq, he 
implies that this is the role a Ttpo^evoq or ^evoq could be expected to play; that 
they could be expected to form the link between poleis. 
^ See Chapter Four. Though, of course, there were others (Qeon, for example) who pointedly 
did not attempt to form such connections: see Connor New Politicians esp. chapter 3. 
2 For a full discussion of this, see Endnote 4. 
3 On the mobilisation of political groups by an individual, see Th. 8.48.4, 54.4 (where 
^wcojiooia = exaipeia). 
* Dem. 15.15. Compare Herman {Ritualised Friendship 140) who cites this passage for a 
different purpose and infers, erroneously, that this implies a link between jcpo^evia and ^evia. 
There may well be a connection in many cases between the two (see Chapter Two), but this 
passage suggests almost a contrast between them: Demosthenes says that he is neither one nor 
the other; he has no link with the Rhodians at all. 
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There are many examples f r o m many poleis of individuals using 
their personal connections i n various ways.^ In 431, Nauclides and oi |iex' 
auxou betrayed Plataea to the Thebans through Eurymachus the son of 
Leontiades.2 Although there is nothing specifically to imply any connection 
between Naucleides and Eurymachus, a ^evia relationship would be an 
obvious point of contact between them.3 
Hermocrates of Syracuse was also a man wi th connections which he 
was prepared to use both in his own interest and i n what he probably 
perceived to be the interest of the state. His career in Syracuse was chequered 
and his position there was never entirely secure. His first known election as 
general was at the time of the Athenian attack on Syracuse,"^ though he was 
later deposed on account of the defeat at Epipolae.^ He was influential in 
413, but does not appear to have held office then.6 He was elected general 
again i n 412,7 and was possibly re-elected in 411, but was banished probably 
in mid-summer of this year.8 
Hermocrates was not without networks of friends both at home and 
abroad. I n Syracuse itself, Hermocrates belonged to an hetaireia, some of 
1 For a "special relationship" between Sparta and Samos in the archaic period which 
probably arose out of ^Evla connections between aristoaats, see Cartledge CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 
243-65. 
2 Th. 2.2.2-3. 
3 Eurymachus' family had a history of treacherous dealings with other states. Leontiades, 
the father, brought Thetjes over to Persia at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.233.1-2; cf. Aristophanes of 
Boeotia FGrHist 379 F 6. On the reconciliation of these two sources, see Gonune H C T 2.3 n.l), 
and Eurymachus' son, also Leontiades, surrendered the Cadmeia to the Spartans in 383-2 BC 
(Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-36; Plut. Pelop. 5.1-3; cf. Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; 
Bmce Comm. 111-2). Gomme writes: "A long-lived and mischievous family" (HCT 2.3-
4),3and Kagan {The Archidamian War 46), that he was " a man well suited to the task, 
being one of a line of traitors and scoundrels." It n\ay be that Eurymachus' pro-Spartan 
tendencies made him seem a suitable and approachable go-between for the Plataean 
conspirators, so there may he no need for a personal connection, but it shll prompts the question 
why he was specifically chosen, and specifically named by Thucydides. 
4 Th. 6.73.1. 
5 Th. 6.103.4. 
6 Th. 7.21.3, 73.1-3; Dover H C T 4.396. 
7 Th. 8.26.1. 
8 Th. 8.85.3; see Appendix B: Military Commanders of other States (Syracuse) 350 n. 1; cf. 
Xen. He//. 1.1.27. 
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whose members he used to trick the Athenians besieging the city.^ 
Xenophon also elaborates on Hermocrates' personal following in the army 
and relates how he used to gather together his ejueiKeoxaxoi at dawn and in 
the evening and instruct them in what he was going to do and say, and 
taught them oratory.2 Hermocrates also had a personal ^iXia with 
Pharnabazus,3 from whom he obtained money "before he asked for it",* 
with which, with the help of his ^i'koi at home, he tried to take Syracuse.^ 
Just as Alcibiades utilised friendship networks at home and abroad to try 
and effect his homecoming,^ so did Hermocrates. 
Again, the father of Jason of Pherae had been a ^ikoq to the Thebans, 
while Jason himself was Tcpo^evoq.^  After Leuctra, the Thebans sent for Jason 
to help in case they decided to make an attack on Sparta.^ Although he came 
with men and ships, he dissuaded them from the campaign, and made a 
truce with Sparta on their behalf^ - though this was probably intended to 
further his own interests rather than the interests of Thebes.^o 
In Sicyon in the winter of 367/6, Euphron, the most influential of the 
citizens with the Spartans, wished to become most influential with their 
enemies, because of the Spartans' arrogance.^^ Accordingly, he told the 
Argives and Arcadians that, if the the richest men remained in control of 
Sicyon, the city would go over to the Spartans when the chance arose; but if 
there was a democracy, the city would remain true to them, and he would 
1 Th. 7.73.3. 
2 Xen. Hell. 1.1.30; on Xenophon's eulogy of Hermocrates and its Socratic quality, see Krentz 
Comm. 104. 
3 Diod. 13.63.2. 
4 Xen. Hell. 1.1.31; cf. Diod. 13.63.2. 
5 Diod. 13.63.3. 
6 See 200-3 below. 
7 Xen. He//. 6.4.24. 
8 Xen. He//. 6.4.20. 
9 Xen. He//. 6.4.22-25. 
10 See Tuplin The Failings of Empire 118. 
" X e n . He//. 7.1.44. 
82 
Chapter Three: The Unofficial Contacts 
rally the city as a pistis for them if they would support him.i So the Argives 
and Arcadians lent him their help, and Euphron announced to the citizens 
in the presence of the Argives and Arcadians that the government was to 
become a democracy.2 He and his son were chosen among the new 
commanders, and Xenophon says that Euphron made some of the 
mercenary troops maxoi straight away by treating them well.3 He seized the 
property of those whom he banished for laconising, and made himself a 
tyrant.4 The alUes allowed him to do this, Xenophon reports, both because 
he used his money to their advantage and because he eagerly accompanied 
them with his mercenary army when they went to war.5 
These were all individuals who were prepared to form and use 
personal connections for their own ends and the perceived ends of their 
state. Although there is evidence of many poleis making use of such 
relationships, the degree of exploitation of these connections seems to have 
varied from polis to polis. In particular, there seems to be a striking 
difference between the use of such connections in Sparta and Athens, our 
two best attested poleis.^ Cleobulus and Xenares should have had more 
success with the Boeotians because of their Boeotian connections. It was 
because communications broke down that their plans went astray. 
Sparta 
Just as in the rest of Greece, the ethic of helping friends and harming 
enemies was fundamental to Spartan thought, and the Spartans publicly 
1 Xen. Hell. 7.1.44. 
2 Xen. He//. 7.1.45. 
3 Xen. He//. 7.1.45-6. 
4 Xen. He//. 7.1.46. 
5 Xen. He//. 7.1.46. 
6 This perhaps should not be surprising since the demos in oligarchic Sparta was made up of a 
privileged minority, whereas in demoaatic Athens the demos encompassed a larger spectrum 
of the community. 
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espoused a policy of helping ^iXoi for help received. Dercylidas said to the 
people of Abydus in 394, 
O men, now i t is possible for you, although you were formerly ^iXoi 
for our city, to seem euepyexai of the Spartans. For being fa i thfu l 
(jriaxoi) i n good fortune is not wonderful , but whenever people 
remain steadfast i n the misfortunes of their <t)Uoi, this is 
remembered for all time.^ 
Yet Sparta not only had a policy of helping (^ikoi but, as a state, tended 
to conduct her interstate affairs through those in the cities who were i^iXoi, 
and lent assistance to those who were sympathetic to her. For example, in 
412, Alcibiades and Chalcideus were sent by the ephors to Chios, where they 
brought about a revolt.^ When discussing the earlier Athenian mistrust of 
Chios before the revolt, Thucydides does refer to ol KOXKOI and ol 6X,iY0i in 
Chios,3 but, later in 412, the point is not so much that i t was the oligarchs 
who colluded w i t h Alcibiades and Chalcideus, but that these two negotiated 
w i t h Chian conspirators, who were ol 6X,iY0i.* Thucydides writes: 
Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized all they met so 
that news of their approach might not precede them. After they 
had attacked Corycus on the mainland and deposited the 
prisoners there, they made contact wi th some of the Chians who 
were conspiring w i t h them. The Chians told them to put in 
wi thout giving notice of their arrival to the city, they arrived at 
Chios imexpectedly. A n d the many (ol noXXoi) were amazed and 
in a state of consternation. I t had been arranged by the few (ol 
oXiyoi) that there happened to be a meeting of the boule. Since 
speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades to the effect that 
many ships were on the way and they did not elucidate the news 
about the blockade of the ships in Speiraeum, the Chians and 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.8.4. Compare here the Spartan response to Cyrus' request for help on the basis 
of his former aid to the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 3.1.1). 
2 Th. 8.11.3-12.2. On the Chian government prior to the establishment of the oligarchy by 
Pedaritus in 412, see Jones Athenian Democracy 67-8, 69; Bradeen Historia 9 (1960) 265; 
Bruce P/ioenix 18 (1964) 276; Andrewes C4H 465; HCT 5.22; Forrest BSv4 55 (1960) 180; 
Quinn Historia 18 (1969) 22-30; Kagan The Fall of the Athenian Empire 43. 
3 Th. 8.9.3. 
* Th. 8.14.1-2. They may have also been personal coimections of Alcibiades, but as we shall 
see, could have as easily been friends of Sparta. For Aldbiades' supposed cormections in 
Chios: Plut. Ale. 12.1, Satyrus ap. Athen. 12.534 d, [Andoc] 4.30 and 103 below. 
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Erythraeans detached themselves from the Athenians straight 
away.^ 
We also have independent evidence for Spartan ^i'koi in Chios, for an 
inscription recording contributions to the Spartan war fund, probably dating 
to about 427,2 records a contribution by "the exiles of the Chians who were 
^iXoi of the Spartans" (xoi (^evyovxec, xov Xiov xoi (^iXoi xov 
[AaKe5a]iM.oviov).3 Whoever they were, the group of Chians in 412 must 
have had contact with Alcibiades and Chalcideus to coordinate their arrival 
with the meeting of the boule.'^ It was then left to the persuasion and deceit 
of Alcibiades (it is not surprising that friends of Alcibiades should have been 
oligarchs) and Chalcideus to bring the Chians over, which they did with 
surprising ease considering the conspirators' initial fear that "the 
multitude" would be hostile if told of the plans to revolt.^ Indeed, as Quinn 
points out, it was probably the assurances of the coming Peloponnesian fleet 
that brought them over.^ 
In 418, the e7axTi5eioi of the Spartans in Tegea sent a message to Sparta 
to report that the city had all but gone over to the Argives and her allies,^ 
and Thucydides says that, in the winter of 418/7, the men in Argos who 
were e7CixT]6eioi of the Spartans wished to overthrow the demos.^ Again, in 
374, some of the (j)iXoi of the Spartans in Corcyra revolted against the demos 
1 Th. 8.14.1-2. 
2 See also Th. 3.30-31, when a secret group of conspirators from Ionia make overtures to 
Alcidas. 
3 Loomis The Spartan War Fund esp. 46-7; see also Barron Chios 101; Quinn Athens and 
Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 478-404 BC 40. 
4 For the need for the coincidence of the Spartans' arrival with the meeting of the boule, see 
Quinn Histona 18 (1969) 24-5. 
5 Th. 8.9.3. 
6 Quinn Histono 18 (1969) 24-5, 27, 28 on Th. 8.14.2. 
7 Th. 5.64.1; cf. the revolt of the Mytileneans (Th. 3.2.3; Arist. Pol. 5.1304 a 9). 
^ Th. 5.76.2-3. But when, in 417, a counter-revolution took place, Thucydides says that the 
Spartans did not come, though their (t)iA,oi kept sending for them (Th. 5.82.3). 
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and sent to Sparta for help, and Sparta responded by sending triremes under 
the command of Alcidas.^ 
Even less subtle than these are the Spartans' methods in 386, when 
they wished to punish the Mantineians for their unfaithfulness during the 
Corinthian war. Diodorus writes that when the Spartans decided to make 
war on the Mantineians, they immediately set about stirring up trouble in 
the cities and established factions in them through their i5ioi (t)iXoi.2 
Even more interesting is the Spartan interference in Phleius. After 
the Mantineians had been punished, the Phleiasian exiles, since they 
thought the time was right, went to Sparta and said that, while they had 
been in Phleius, the city had received the Spartans wi th in the city and the 
people had taken part in campaigns wi th them, but after the exiles had gone, 
the Phleiasians would no longer have anything to do wi th Sparta.3 
So the ephors responded by sending to the Phleiasians and saying that 
the exiles were (^iXoi of the Spartans and so should be returned to the city.* 
The Phleiasians were afraid that there were some wi th in their walls, both 
those who were kinsmen of the exiles and well-disposed to them, and 
others who were keen for a change of government, who would betray the 
city to the Spartans.^ So, because of their fear, the Phleiasians voted to recall 
the exiles and return their property to them, rather than face Spartan 
intervention.6 
Later, however, because Agesipolis had marched north to Olynthus 
and because they believed that Agesilaus would not march out against them 
1 Diod. 15.46.1-2. 
2 Diod. 15.5.1-2; cf. Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-3. 
3 Xen. Hell. 5.2.8. Notably, however, the Spartans had not chosen to restore the exiles when 
the Phleiasians summoned the Spartans to protect the city from the attacks of Iphicrates 
during the Corinthian War, even though, Xenophon says, the Spartans were well-disposed to 
the exiles (Kainep EiJV0iKd5(; zxovxec, xolq ^vjdaiv) (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15). 
4 Xen. He//. 5.2.9. 
5 Xen. Hell. 5.2.9. 
^ Xen. Hell. 5.2.10. 
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(since this wou ld mean that both kings would be away f r o m Sparta at the 
same time), the Phleiasians decided not to act justly to the exiles.^ As a 
result, the exiles and their supporters went to Sparta to complain about their 
treatment.2 The denouement finally came when Agesilaus, who had ^evoi 
among the exiles,3 marched on the city, laid i t under siege, and, when the 
city surrendered, set up a commission to draw up a new constitution and 
settle the affairs i n the city.^ The friends of Sparta f inal ly won through 
Spartan aid. 
These groups of ^iXoi were not always just indefinable gatherings of 
pro-Spartan sympathisers, but some can actually be identified as definite 
poli t ical groups w i t h leaders we can name. For example, in the winter of 
412/1, Hippocrates, a Spartan, sailed f rom the Pelopormese to the Hellespont 
w i t h ten Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoreus 
and two colleagues.^ Dorieus, originally a Rhodian, had been expelled f rom 
his own city dur ing a conflict and had subsequently become a citizen of 
T h u r i i . 6 The Spartans had i t i n mind to sail to Rhodes, since they had 
received overtures f rom the 5\)vax(6xaxoi there (a group who are identified 
in the revolt of 395 by the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia as the Diagoreioi)7 and 
cause them to revolt f r o m the Athenians.^ Though Thucydides does not say 
so, Dorieus was probably one of the party which sailed f rom Cnidus to 
1 Xen. Hell. 5.3.10. 
2 Xen. He//. 5.3.11. 
3 Xen. Hell. 5.3.13 and see 93 below. 
4 Xen. Hell. 5.3.14-7, 21-5. Note also that, although the Phleiasians tried to surrender to the 
authorities in Sparta, Agesilaus' (|)iAoi at home ensured that Agesilaus himself would make 
all decisions regarding the Phleiasians (Xen. Hell. 5.3.24): further evidence that Spartan 
foreign policy was influenced by personal politics. 
^ Th. 8.35.1. On Dorieus, see Appendix B: Commanders of Other States (Thurii) 352. 
6 Xen. Hell. 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7.1-6; Homblower Comm. 389-91; Krentz Comm. 87; cf. Th. 3.8.1; 
Andrewes H C T 5.77. 
7 He//. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 15.2 = (Chambers) 18.2; see also Andrewes (HCT 5.91): "The word 
[SwaToaxaTOi] does not by itself identify these men as oligarchs, but in the context this is 
inevitable". 
8 Th. 8.44.2-3. 
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Rhodes and helped to bring them overA Xenophon certainly implies that he 
was present after the fall of the city when he says that Dorieus sailed from 
Rhodes to the Hellespont.^ Diodorus adds that Mindarus, on hearing a 
group of Rhodians were gathering together to stage a counter-revolution, 
despatched Dorieus to Rhodes with his thirteen ships.^ In their dealings 
with other states, the Spartans used every connection at their disposal. 
There are other similar examples: in 377, Xenophon writes that those 
about Hypatodorus (ol Jtepi ' T7iax65copov), ^iXoi of the Lacedaemonians, had 
control of Tanagra.4 In 371 the Tegeans followed Archidamus zealously 
since those with Stasippus (o'l Ttepi Etdcn.7i7iov) were still alive and 
XaKCOViCovxeq and clearly in control.^ In the following year, oi Tcepi Callibius 
and Proxenus were making efforts for the unification of all Arcadia,^ while 
o'l Tcepi Stasippus made it their policy to leave the city undisturbed.^ A battle 
took place between the two groups, and of those with Stasippus about eight 
hundred fled to Sparta.^ Just as the Spartans had political groups in their 
ovm city, such as that led by Cleobulus and Xenares, so they were in contact 
with such groups in the other poleis, and it was through these groups which 
were sympathetic to the Spartans that the Spartans were able to interfere in 
the politics and policies of these states. PoUtical persuasion could clearly be 
important, but this was not always the primary concern. Personal 
relationships could be influential, perhaps even more so, as well. 
1 David Eratios 84 (1986) 161. 
2Xen. He//. 1.1.2. 
3 Diod. 13.38.5. 
4Xen.He// . 5.4.49. 
5Xen.He// . 6.4.18. 
^ For the founding of Megalopolis, see Diod.15.59.1 (noting the mistake of Lycomedes "the 
Tegeate", for Lycomedes, the "Mantineian": see Underhill Comm. 256); Paus. 8.27.1-8; Plut. 
Pelop. 24.8. 
7Xen.He// . 6.5.7. 
8Xen.He// . 6.5.7-10. 
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Spartan Kings and their <|)tXoi 
As we have seen, contact with poUtical groups and the hke could and 
often did take place through the agency of private individuals. As 
prominent members of the upper class, the Spartan kings in particular had 
friendships abroad. Mosley notes that the kings could have "obligations of 
hospitality to specific states or their leaders and rulers", stemming from the 
practice of cementing alliances by a personal relationship of ^evia.^ Coupled 
with this, they still held some influence on policy in Sparta,^ and it was 
obviously still considered a worthwhile thing to be the friend of a king. 
Archidamus 
That the friendships of the Spartan kings could at least be perceived to 
influence the way that they acted, is demonstrated by the events 
surrounding the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431. Thucydides 
writes that Pericles suspected that Archidamus, the Spartan king, who also 
happened to be his ^evo(^ might leave his fields unravaged during the 
invasion, either because he wished to gratify (xapii^eaeai) Pericles in private 
or even because the Spartans had commanded him to in order to make 
Pericles unpopular.3 Therefore, before the Peloponnesians launched their 
attack on Attica, Pericles announced to the assembly that Archidamus was 
his ^evoq and made over his land as public property so that he might not 
come under suspicion.^ When, in fact, the Spartan army under 
Archidamus' command were on the point of attacking Attica, they delayed 
about Oenoe on the border of Attica and Boeotia.^ Thucydides goes on: 
^ Mosley Athenaeum n.s. 49 (1971) 434. This makes Agesilaus' refusal to make a ^evia with 
the Persian King in 386, which Xenophon reports, even more pointed (Xen. Ages. 8.3-4; cf. 
PlutMor. 213 d). 
2 On the powers of the Spartan kings, Lewis S&P 43-9 contra de Ste. Croix Origins of the 
Peloponnesian War 138-49. 
3 Th. 2.13.1. 
4 Th. 2.13.1. 
5 Th. 2.18.1-2. 
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Archidamus received considerable blame for it, since he 
seemed even in the mustering for war to be soft and 
e7UX7i6eiO(; to the Athenians, and not eagerly encouraging 
them to go to war. When he had collected together an army, 
he was slandered because of the waiting about on the Isthmus 
and the leisurely progress on the march, and particularly for 
the hold-up at Oenoe, for the Athenians brought everything 
inside during this time. The Peloponnesians thought that if 
they attacked quickly they would have taken them when they 
were still outside, if it were not for his delays. Thus the army 
was angry with Archidamus during the siege. Archidamus 
held his hand, as it is said, since he expected the Athenians, 
while the land was still untouched, to yield in some way and 
shrink from allowing it to be cut up.^ 
While most commentators see this dilatoriness on the part of Archidamus 
as part of his general moderate attitude to war,2 Herman argues that 
Archidamus' motives in this episode are founded on his ^evia with 
Pericles.3 But although it is true that Thucydides did have in mind the 
^evia relationship between the two men, he does not mention it here, and, 
so far from thinking, or guessing as Herman would have it, that this was 
the real cause for Archidamus' slowness, he tries to distance himself from 
this idea. In fact, by putting the accusation of sympathy for Athens in the 
mouths of the Peloponnesians he seems to be indicating that he himself 
does not believe in itA In fact, Thucydides goes on to suggest another reason 
why Archidamus delayed, a reason unconnected with his ^evia but 
consistent with his original reluctance: Archidamus hoped that the 
Athenians would not allow their land to be ravaged.^ It must be noted, 
however, as Herman does point out,^ that it was believed by both the 
^ Th. 2.18.3-5. For the varied vocabulary describing his dilatoriness, see Gomme HCT 2.69. 
2 Kagan The Archidamian War 50; Lewis S&P 46-7. 
3 Herman Ritualised Friendship 143-4. 
4 See Hornblower Comm. 271-2. 
^ Th. 2.20.1-5. On the use of (bq liyzxai to show "that the expectations on which it 
[Archidamus' dilatoriness] was said to have been based were, though unfulfilled, by no means 
unreasonable": Westlake M«e?«osyne 30 (1977) 345-62, esp. 352. 
6 Herman Ritualised Friendship 143-5, 159-60. 
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Spartan army and by Pericles that this relationship could have affected 
Archidamus' actions, that the tie of ^evia could override that of state.^  
Agis 
Agis also seemed to have direct contacts abroad through personal 
friends. Xenophon tells us that when Agis attacked Elis in 402, o'l Tcepi 
Xenias tried to bring the city over to the Spartans.2 Pausanias provides the 
information that Xenias and Agis were also ^ evoi.3 
Pausanias 
In 403, Pausanias, the king, marched out against Athens, after the 
Thirty at Eleusis and the Three Thousand in the city had sent to Sparta for 
help against the demosA Although Pausanias did mount an attack on those 
in the Peiraeus when his original attempts to persuade them to disperse had 
failed,^ Xenophon claims that he was sympathetic to them,^ and that he sent 
to them secretly and advised them to send ambassadors to himself and the 
ephors, giving them instructions on what to say.7 In Lysias' On the 
Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias, the speaker says that 
Pausanias' sympathy for those opposed to the oligarchy was aroused when 
Diognetus, the brother of Nicias, reminded Pausanias of his bonds of (^iXia 
and ^evia by placing the grandson of Nicias on his knee.^ As a result, the 
^ However, see Endnote 4. 
2 Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31, esp. 27-9. 
3 Paus. 3.8.4. 
4 Xen. Hell. 2.4.28-30. Lysander had also arranged for himself to he sent as harmost and his 
brother, Libys, as Nauarchos (Xen. Hell. 2.4.28). 
5 Xen. He//. 2.4.31-4. 
^ Xenophon says that he only went to the point from which the battle-cry is given, but he did 
this so that it might not be apparent that he was evjievi^*; to them (Xen. Hell. 2.4.31). 
7 Xen. He//. 2.4.35. 
® Lys. 18.10-1. This clearly suggests a ^evia between Nicias and Pausanias (see also Herman 
Ritualised Friendship 181), but the origins of the relationship are obscure, though perhaps 
it was a product of the negotiations for the Peace of Nicias in 421 with Pleistoanax, the 
father of Pausanias. 
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speaker says, Pausanias rejected the ^evia of the Thirty, and accepted those of 
Diognetus.i 
Agesilaus 
Agesilaus also had and made use of both hereditary and newly 
formed connections. For example, in 395 Agesilaus sent word to the cities 
and islands on the coast to build triremes, and the private citizens did this, 
wishing to do him a favour (xapi^ea6ai).2 Again, in 386, when the Spartans 
decided to punish the Mantineians, while Diodorus tells us that they set up 
factions in the city,3 Xenophon says that they decided to attack it.* Agesilaus 
requested that he be relieved of the command since the city had served his 
father many times in the war against the Messenians.^ Agesipolis therefore 
led the army, though his father Pausanias was well-disposed ((j)iA,iKd)q e^eiv) 
to the leaders of the demos in Mantineia.^ When the city was taken, those 
who were "argolising" (dpyoXi^ovxcov) and the leaders of the people thought 
they would be put to death, but Pausanias negotiated with Agesipolis and 
secured their safety.^ Here we are presented with two sides of the same coin: 
the king with connections who is able to "beg off" in order to avoid a 
conflict of duty; and another, less influential king, whose connections could 
not influence his actions in the first instance, but was still able to allow 
mercy at the end. From this incident we can see the importance of such 
1 Lys. 18.12. 
2 Xen. Hell. 3.4.28. Compare, however, the treatment of Agesilaus and Lysander in 396 by the 
cities in Asia Minor. Agesilaus was greatly put out that people paid court (GepOOTeiScov) to 
Lysander rather than himself. He responded by publicly humiliating Lysander and sending 
him away to the Hellespont (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7-10; Plut. Ages. 7.1-5). 
3 See 86 above. 
4 Xen. Hell. 5.2.1, 3; Diod. 15.5.2^. 
5 Xen. Hell. 5.2.3. Agesilaus is referring to the Third Messenian War of 464 (see Underhill 
Comm. 179); on Agesilaus and the Mantineians, cf. Xen. Hell. 6.5.3-i. For other possible 
connections between Agesilaus' family and a family in Mantineia, see Tuplin L C M 2 (1977) 
5-10. 
6 Xen. He//. 5.2.3. 
7 Xen. He//. 5.2.6. 
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connections, though it also produced difficult conflicts and tensions as to 
which obligations were the greater.^ There is an addendum to this story, 
however: when the Spartans decided to make an expedition against the 
Mantineians in 370, Agesilaus, who had been sent to them in 371 to 
negotiate with them (though unsuccessfully),^ did not quibble, but marched 
against them.^ The Mantineians had pushed too far for any "hereditary 
feeling" to endure. 
Agesilaus also had ^evoi in Phleius. As we have already seen, in 381, 
Phleius refused to grant any rights to the exiles, so the ephors decided to 
attack.4 Xenophon reports that Agesilaus was not displeased, since o'l nepi 
Podanemus were ^evoi of his father and were then among the restored 
exiles, and o'l d[i^i Procles the son of Hipponicus were ^evoi of his own.5 
AgesipoHs 
Despite his apparent lack of influence, it was clearly still felt to be 
profitable to form a connection with Agesipohs. In 381, when Agesipolis was 
sent to Olynthus on the death of Teleutias, horsemen from Thessaly also 
went who wished to become known to him.6 Presumably, this was a 
connection which the Thessalians expected might be useful later on. 
Qeombrotus 
Cleombrotus was at least thought to have sympathies for Thebes, and 
not without cause. In the winter of 379/8, Cleombrotus was sent out against 
Thebes after the liberation of the Cadmeia.7 He set up camp in Theban 
1 On the questions of loyalty and patriotism, see Endnote 4; for general comments on the 
conflicting obligations by Agesilaus to the Persian, Phamabazus, see Xen. Hell. 4.1.34. 
2 Xen. Hell. 6.5.4-5: he was thought to be a naxpiKoq <t)iAxx; to them. 
3 Xen. He//. 6.5.10-20. 
4 Xen. He//. 5.3.10-13. 
5 Xen. He//. 5.3.13. 
6 Xen. He//. 5.3.8-9. 
7 Xen. He//. 5.4.13-14. 
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territory, but, after about sixteen days, fell back on Thespiae, where he left 
Sphodrias with a garrison, and returned home.i Again, in the spring of 376, 
since Agesilaus was i l l and so was unable to lead the now annual raid on 
Boeotia, Cleombrotus was sent.2 When he came to Cithaeron, he sent his 
peltasts ahead, but they were repelled by Thebans and Athenians who 
occupied the heights.^ After this rather paltry attempt, he concluded that he 
was unable to cross Cithaeron and turned back.* In 371, after the general 
peace was made, the Spartan assembly sent word to Cleombrotus to attack 
Thebes, if the Thebans did not leave the Boeotian cities independent.^ The 
<j)iA,oi of Cleombrotus warned him that unless he expelled the Thebans, he 
would risk the extreme penalty at the hands of the Spartans; but his ex6poi 
declared that he would now make it clear whether he cared for the Thebans 
as it was said.^ Xenophon says that, when he heard this, Cleombrotus was 
eager to go to war;7 though, ironically, he led them to his death at Leuctra.8 
Yet the Spartan Kings were not the only Spartans to have 
international connections which could be exploited. Individual Spartiates 
had ties of (^ikia and ^evia with other Greeks in other states which they 
were more than will ing to use if the opportunity arose. For example, 
Brasidas had e7ax'n5eioi in Pharsalus in Thessaly whom he called upon 
when he was making his way north to the Chalcidians in 424.9 Endius son 
of Alcibiades was the ^evoq of Alcibiades son of Cleinias, and was used on a 
^ Xen. Hell. 5.4.15-16. Diodorus (15.29.5) gives the main responsibility for Sphodrias' attack 
on the Peiraeus to Cleombrotus. 
2 Xen. He//. 5.4.58-9. 
3 Xen. He//. 5.4.59. 
4 Xen. He//. Xen. He//. 5.4.59. 
5 Xen. He//. 6.4.3. 
6 Xen. He//. 6.4.4-5. 
7 Xen. He//. 6.4.6. 
8 Diod. 15.55.5; Xen. Hell. 6.4.13-i. 
9 Th. 4.78.1. Thucydides even gives us their names: Panaerus, Dorus, Hippochides, Torylaus 
and Strophacus who was npd^evo^ of the Chalcidians. Thessaly had a reputation for being 
difficult territory to cross without an escort: see Th. 4.132.1-2. 
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number of diplomatic missions to Athens.^ When, according to Diodorus, 
Lysander planned to do away with the hereditary kingship and, instead, to 
make it an elected post from all the Spartiates, he sought the support of 
Delphi through bribery.2 When he met with no success, he travelled to 
Cyrene and tried to bribe the oracle there, since Libys, the king of those parts, 
was a t,evoc, of his father.^ Many others had connections which then 
influenced their selection on certain missions, such as Clearchus the son of 
Ramphias to Byzantium or Dercylidas to Abydus."^ 
Sometimes we can follow the making of such connections. For 
example, in 421, after the Peace of Nicias had been concluded with the 
Athenians, the Spartans sent Ischagoras, Menas and Philocharidas as 
ambassadors to Thrace to tell Clearidas, the young archon in the area,^  to 
give up Amphipolis.6 But Clearidas did not give up the city, thus gratifying 
(xccpi^oiievog) the Chalcidians.^ By doing them a favour, he would bring 
them into his debt, for one never knew when such a connection would be 
helpful. Similarly, one of the first things Lysander did on his arrival in Asia 
Minor as Nauarchos in 407 was to establish new friendship networks 
among the cities there.^ When Lysander returned to Asia Minor with 
Agesilaus in 396, Plutarch writes that his reputation and influence in 
Ephesus were problematic for him, since a crowd was always visiting him, 
accompanying him and paying court to him (jtdvTCOV TiapaKoXo-oOoiJvxcov 
1 See Chapter Four 173^. 
2 Diod. 14.13.2-3. 
3 Diod. 14.135-6. Diodorus also tells us the interesting piece of information here that 
Lysander's brother had been named Libys after his father's ^ evoq. On this name-sharing, 
compare Endius the son of Alcibiades, the ^evoq of Aldbiades the son of Cleinias; see also 
Herman Ritualised Friendship 19-22; id. CQ n.s. 39 (1989) 83-93 (though here Herman 
bases too much on apparent name exchange). 
4 See Chapter Four below. 
5 On his position, see Parke JHS 50 (1930) 42-3. 
6 Th. 5.21.1. 
7 Th. 5.21.2. 
^ For a full discussion, see Chapter Four below on Spartan Nauarchoi 155. 
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Kca Qepane\)0\x(o\ eKeTvov).i This did him little good in the eyes of 
Agesilaus, who began ignoring Lysander's advice and neglected those who 
sought his help through Lysander.2 As a result, Lysander told his ^iXoi ihat 
they were being dishonoured because of him and advised them to go to the 
king and pay court to him (Sepajte'DEiv) and those more influential than 
himself instead.^ The friendship of an influential man was an important 
thing, both to him who gave and him who received. 
From this survey of the Spartans and their overseas coimections, it is 
clear that friendship networks were an important factor in the way they 
dealt with the world. Through their friends and sympathisers abroad, the 
Spartans meddled in the affairs of other states and brought about revolts, 
such as those at Tegea and Argos, or, at least their ^iXoi in these states felt 
the confidence to bring about revolution -with, promises of Spartan backing. 
At least some of these were contacts brought about through personal 
relationships between individual Spartans, whether king or commoner, and 
individuals in the poleis: Brasidas had his mxiiSeioi in Pharsalus, Agesilaus 
his ^evoi in Phleius. However, difficulties could sometimes arise when 
there was a perceived clash of loyalties. One could too easily be accused of 
working in the favour of one's ^ikoi in another state, especially in 
hindsight.* It was a difficult line to tread. Sometimes such accusations could 
be justified, but not always. Some were able to excuse themselves from this 
conflict of obligation, others simply had to juggle their various 
responsibilities as best they could. 
^ Plut. Ages. 7.1-2; Xenophon declares that it came to the point that Agesilaus appeared to be 
the man in private station and Lysander the king (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7); cf. Tuplin The Failings of 
Empire 57. 
2piut.>i^es. 7.4-7. 
3 Plut. Ages. 7.8. 
* Similarly, officials who failed on their missions could also be accused of receiving bribes: 
see Chapter Five 216; cf. Chapter Seven 267-74. 
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Athens 
The Athenians also made use of personal friendships, though, it 
would seem, to a lesser degree than the Spartans did. This should not 
surprise us, as the style of politics in Athens was more corporate and demos-
centred than in the non-democratic poleis. None the less, personal 
friendships played a part. For example, there was a group in Chios who were 
pro-Athenian. In his discussion of the political groups in Chios in 412, 
Quinn writes that it is wrong to think of these as a democratic party, and 
that "it is possible that some or all of these Chians were democrats, but it is 
equally possible that they were simply a group of men who foresaw defeat at 
the hands of the Athenians and were afraid of any retribution that might be 
visited upon the city"A This may be so, but it is also possible that they may 
have had specifically Athenian connections. 
There was certainly a group in Chios which had specific ties to 
Athens. The leader of this "pro-Athenian" group was Tydeus son of Ion, 
and there is evidence to suggest that this may have been a hereditary 
connection.2 Barron observes that in the Ionian settlements of the Asia 
Minor coast, there was an interest in the "myth-historical" basis of their 
kinship, which "differed in detail from place to place and time to time", but 
is attested in Chios in the naming of Ion of Chios, born a few years before 
480.3 We know that Ion of Chios was present when Sophocles visited Chios 
in connection with the revolt of Samos in 440/39.^ In the winter of 425/4, 
the Athenians suspected the Chians of being about to revolt, so made them 
exchange pisteis and take down their walls.^ Barron asks: who warned 
Athens and who negotiated the pisteis?^ A decree of 425 survives in which 
1 Quinn Historw 18 (1969) 28. 
2 Th. 8.38.3. 
3 Barron Chios 91. 
4 lon fGrHis i 392 F 6; Barron Cftibs 101. 
5 T h . 4.51.1. 
6 Barron CWos 101. 
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Athens honours two Chians for services rendered and refers to 
maintenance of pisteis.^ The two Chians are Philippus and 'Ax [—].2 Meritt 
suggested "Achilles", but heroic names are noticeably rare in the f i f th 
century, in Chios as elsewhere.3 Barron suggests the Chian family in which 
heroic names were revived, that of Ion and Tydeus, and says that "it cannot 
be altogether fanciful to suggest that the loyalist of 425 with the most heroic 
of all names was an elder son of the same father [as the loyalist of 412], Ion."* 
Consequently, there may have been a long-term connection between the 
family of Tydeus son of Ion and the Athenians. One should also notice the 
description of the followers of Tydeus as oi fi£xd TuSeox; xov "Imvoq,^ which, 
as we have seen above,^ probably identifies them as a political group. 
Tydeus, being a friend of Athens, would have his own band of sympathetic 
friends in Chios whom he could motivate to pro-Athenian activity. 
Athens, or Athenians, also probably had connections in Thebes in the 
370s. In 379/8, when the Thebans ousted the Spartans from the Cadmeia, 
since they were expecting a large army from Sparta, they sent to Athens 
reminding them that they had helped to restore the demos of the Athenians 
when they were enslaved by the Thirty.^ According to Diodorus, the 
Athenians voted at once to send out as large an army as possible as they 
wished both to pay back the favours they owed (djco5i5o\)(; xdq xap\xa<^ and 
to win over the Boeotians.^ Though Xenophon's account is rather different. 
^ IG ^ 70 (though note Lewis' reservations: "Non cum Meritt consentimus hie de Chiis vel 
etiam de Chio quodam necessarie agi, si quidem Chii hie solum exemplum status, qui 
Achlilli]? datur, praebent."). 
2 / G i3 70.6-9; see also Meritt Hesperia 14 (1945) 115-9, esp. 118. 
3 Meritt ibid.; Barron Chios 101. 
^Ibid. 102. 
5 Th. 8.38.3 
^ Note also that Tydeus and his band were put to death en' dxtiKian^ (Th. 8.38.3). 
7 Diod. 15.25.4. 
8 Diod. 15.26.1. 
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since in his version the help the Athenians gave was unofficial,^ the point 
remains that support of a kind was offered to the Theban exiles out of 
sympathy for the Theban cause. 
Individual Athenians also had connections with states, individuals 
and pressure groups within states, which were used as the need arose. For 
example, there was a group of Athenians in Athens with Mytilenean 
sympathies, of whom Diodotus son of Eucrates was probably one,2 who 
worked to have the decree for the death of the Mytileneans reconsidered;3 
and it was through men in Syracuse with whom he was in contact and who 
regularly reported to him that Nicias hoped in 413 to bring about the 
downfall of that city.^ 
Conon and Euagoras 
Conon son of Timotheus is another example of an Athenian whose 
private connections influenced interstate policy, through his friendship 
with Euagoras of Salamis. Euagoras himself had had earlier contacts with 
Athens, as he was granted citizenship in a decree variously dated between 
411 and 407, possibly in connection with negotiations with Tissaphernes.^ 
He also supplied a grain shipment to Athens in 407, when the Spartans were 
trying to cut off the supply routes from the north.^ After the defeat at 
Aegospotami in 404 Conon fled to Euagoras.7 Diodorus says this was on 
^ Xen. Hell. 5.4.10,12; see Cawkwell CQ n.s. 23 (1973) 56-8 (who prefers Diodorus' version); 
BuckAHB 6 (1992) 103-9 (who prefers Xenophon supplemented by Deinarchus (1.38-9) over 
Diodorus). 
2 He spoke on behalf of the Mytileneans in the assembly which revoked the decree for the 
massacre at Mytilene (Th. 3.41.1). 
3 Th. 3.36.5. 
4 Th. 7.48.2, 73.3. 
5 / G i 3 113; Costa HIS torn 23 (1974) 45-6; Osborne NafHra/izahon 1.31-33; 2.22-4; Krentz 
Comm. 179. 
6 Andoc. 2.20. 
7 Xen. He//. 2.1.29. 
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account of his ^iXia with him,^ so the friendship could have its roots in 
Euagoras' earlier associations with Athens. 
The connection continued. Conon married a Cypriote woman, 
perhaps a relative of Euagoras,^ by whom he had a son.3 His association 
with Pharnabazus may well have originated in his relationship with 
Euagoras (Euagoras at least provided the greatest part of the force, according 
to Isocrates),* and the Athenians voted both Conon and Euagoras special 
honours for Pharnabazus' assistance in rebuilding their long walls.^ In 
addition, Conon tried to arrange the marriage alliance between Euagoras 
and Dionysius of Syracuse, in an attempt to detach the Syracusan tyrant 
from Sparta.6 
Thrasybulus and the Thracians 
As wi l l be suggested in Chapter Four, Thrasybulus of Steiria may 
have had Thracian connections which influenced his selection to the board 
of strategoi between 410 and 407. In addition, D.F. Middleton has suggested 
that Thrasybulus effected his pro-democratic coup in 404 with the help of 
Thracian forces.7 He suggests that the type of fighting involved was 
Thracian,8 and that, in a decree honouring the heroes from Phyle,^ the 
name of one of the honorands, Gerys, is Thracian, and the name 
Bendiphanes "is an open statement of an association with the [Thracian] 
^ Diod. 13.106.6; cf. Isoc. 9.53. 
2 Davies APF 508. 
3 Lys. 19.36. 
* Isoc. 9.56; cf. Diod. 14.39.1; Dem. 20.68. 
5 Paus. 1.3.2; Isoc. 9.56-7; Dem. 20.68-70; IG ii^ 20 (for later corrections, additional fragments 
and comments, see Lewis & Stroud Hesperia 48 (1979) 180-93, esp. 186-7). 
^ Lys. 19.19-20; see also Costa Historia 23 (1974) 51-2. For the ambassadors involved in this 
mission, see Chapter Four 163. 
7 CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 298-303; see also Herman Ritualised Friendship 153. 
8 Middleton CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 299; see also Xen. He//. 2.4.12,15, 25,33 (compare Th. 7.27.1); 
on peltasts, see: Anderson Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon 112-4. 
9 IG ii2 10 + Addendum 665 = Tod 100 + IG ii2 2403 + SEG 12.84; Osborne Naturalization 
1.37-41. 
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goddess."! Middleton claims that this confirms that at least individual 
Thracians were present in the democratic forces at Peiraeus, and from this 
concludes that, 
A combination of the evidence from names with the known 
location of the Bendideion and certainty that a style of fighting 
compatible wi th Thracians was employed by some of 
Thrasyboulos' troops makes stronger the possibility of such a 
Thracian group.2 
Thrasybulus maintained his contacts with Thrace. In 390, on an expedition 
to the Hellespont, he reconciled the Thracians, Medocus and Seuthes, and 
made them friends and allies of the Athenians, since he thought that if they 
were ^iXoi they would pay more attention to the Athenians.3 
Alcibiades 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias belongs in a category almost of his own. 
Though Athenian, and for some time the darling of Athens, by 415 he was 
in Sparta advising the Spartans how best to defeat the Athenians. He had 
many friends across the Greek world, and many friendships which he was 
prepared to use to help the Athenian cause at some times, the Spartan cause 
at others, but his own at all times. Whereas Pericles was willing to lay aside 
the claims of personal connections, as part of the "new style" of politics,^ 
Alcibiades worked vigorously within the "old aristocratic" networks of ^iXoi 
1 Middleton CQ n.s.32 (1982) 300; see Hereward BS>1 47 (1952) 117. Middleton (CQ n.s. 
32 (1982) 299) also suggests that the situation of the Bendideion, temple of the Thradan 
goddess, Bendis, in the region of Mimychia, makes it "tempting to suggest that this part of the 
Peiraeus was an area where those Thracians who had settled in Athens might live, in much 
the same way as the Plataeans did elsewhere, even if their residence was not concentrated 
there." 
2 Middleton CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 300. 
3 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; cf. Diod. 14.94.2. 
4 For example, his ^evia with king Archidamus (Th. 2.13.1; cf. Plut. Per. 7.5: he allegedly 
gave up public associations with his <t)iAx)i; see also Connor New Politicians 121-2). 
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and ^evoi abroad.^ Alcibiades' pohtics was personal, with the emphasis on 
creating and exploiting personal connections for state (and personal) gain. 
Alcibiades and Argos 
Alcibiades seems to have established his public career in Athens by 
making and using his personal connections in Argos. Thucydides tells us 
that he had ^evoi in Argos,2 and that the Argives and Mantineians joined 
the campaign to Sicily in 415 on account of their friendship for him.3 
Although Alcibiades was born with many advantages which would 
naturally launch him in a political career, he used his Argive connections as 
a vehicle for making himself a leading political figure in Athens by bringing 
about an alliance with the Argives and continuing to support them and 
represent them when war was breaking out again with the Spartans.* 
Alcibiades and the Spartans 
Argos was not the only state where Alcibiades had the benefit of 
personal connections. At Sparta, Endius son of Alcibiades was his ^evog^ 
and his grandfather had been the Spartan Jipo^evoq in Athens, a connection 
which his grandfather had renounced, but Alcibiades tried to re-establish in 
the 420s.^  When events turned sour in Athens for Alcibiades in 415 and he 
was forced to escape from the Athenians, he first turned to Cyllene in Elis, 
but then went to Sparta and sought a refuge there.7 In addition, it was on 
account of Alcibiades' encouragement that the Spartans decided to support 
^ Cf. Herman Ritualised Friendship 116-8. 
2 Th. 6.61.3. 
3 Th. 6.29.3; cf. 6.61.5. 
* For a full discussion of Alcibiades and his Argive connections, see Chapter Four 117-8. 
5 Th. 8.6.3. 
6 Th. 5.43.1, 6.89.2. 
7 Th. 6.88.9. Note, however, the alternative tradition in Isoc. 16.9 and Plut. Ale. 23.1-2 that 
Alcibiades had gone to Argos first (an appropriate place, as we have seen), but was forced to 
go to Sparta when the Athenians demanded that the Argives give him up. 
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Tissaphernes' and the Chians' request for help in 412 rather than that of 
Pharnabazus.! When the Spartans hesitated over actually despatching this 
expedition,2 Alcibiades pressed Endius and the other ephors not to shrink 
from the expedition since he would easily persuade the cities because he was 
more trustworthy (juaxoxepoQ), and urged Endius to take the credit.3 
Andrewes writes that Alcibiades had "confidence in his persuasive powers 
as great as ever",'^  but this was no empty boast. He was eTnxiiSeioc; to the 
leading men in Miletus,^ and was said to have friends in a number of other 
Greek cities in Asia Minor, including Chios.^ 
Alcibiades and Pharnabazus 
Alcibiades not only made use of hereditary connections, but he was 
also not averse to forming new relationships on his own initiative. 
Although he was unsuccessful in his attempt to form a formal friendship 
with the Persian, Tissaphernes, he did manage to estabUsh a friendship with 
Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Xenophon says that 
Alcibiades and Pharnabazus exchanged oaths through their representatives, 
declaring that they had made a "common oath" (KOIVOV opKov) and "private 
pledges of faith with each other" (iSiQc d>AriX,oiq nictexq).'^ According to 
Nepos, when Alcibiades withdrew from the Chersonese after Aegospotami, 
he went, firstly, deep into Thrace, and then to Pharnabazus, "whom 
1 Th. 8.6.3. 
2 Initially t>ecause of an earthquake (Th. 8.6.5), then the news of the trouble at Speiraeum 
disheartened them (Th. 8.10.1-4, 11.3). 
3 Th. 8.12.1-2. 
4 H C T 5.25. 
5 Th. 8.17.2. 
6 Plut. Ale. 12.1, Satyrus ap. Athen. 12.534 d, [Andoc] 4.30; although these are probably 
romanticised, they still doubtless contain the essence of truth; see Andrewes H C T 5.26: "there 
is no difficulty believing that the Ionian cities paid court to him in the days of his power at 
Athens." 
7 Xen. Hell. 1.3.12. It is perhaps noteworthy that one of Alcibiades' representatives was his 
cousin, Euryptolemus, who was also among his political <j)iA,oi (Xen. Hell. 1.4.19). Alcibiades 
was master of the art of using all his personal connections, whether at home or abroad. 
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Alcibiades so caught by his charm, that no one could surpass him in 
friendship (amicitia)", and who gave him Grynium, a fort in Phrygia.i 
Alcibiades' friendship with Pharnabazus proved ill-founded, however, as 
Pharnabazus organised Alcibiades' death a few years later.2 
Alcibiades and the Thracians 
Alcibiades, like other Athenians,^ also had ties with the Thraceward 
district and the Thracians. He had made use of Thracians in his army in 409 
when he laid siege to Byzantium,^ and when the Athenians were at 
Lampsacus in 404, Alcibiades, once again exiled from Athens, came from his 
castle in the Chersonese to warn the Athenians of their position.^ Diodorus 
claims that Alcibiades offered to bring land troops from Thrace from 
Medocus and Seuthes, saying that they were ^iXoi to him.^ 
Alcibiades was a man of infinite resource, who freely made use of his 
personal connections in the interests of Athens (or whichever polls was 
currently granting him residence) as well as himself, and was always keen to 
form new relationships and renew old ones when the opportunity arose. 
Thus, fresh from his failed approaches to Tissaphernes, he seized the 
opportunity for exchanging private pledges of faith with that other Persian, 
Pharnabazus. In the same way, it is perfectly in character that, when the 
Athenians once more grew disillusioned with him, he turned to his 
overseas friends again. Just as he had gone to Endius and Sparta in 415, he 
^ Nepos, Ale. 9.3. 
2 Diod. 14.11.1-4; Plut. Ale 39.1-7. On the different accounts of Alcibiades' death, see Ellis 
Aleibiades 95-7. 
3 Notably Thucydides son of Olorus and Thrasybulus son of Lycus. 
4 Diod. 13.66.4. 
5 Xen. Hell. 2.1.25. Nepos claims that Alcibiades had three forts in the area (Ale. 7.4); cf. 
Xen. Anab. 7.3.19, which must be an oblique reference to Alcibiades. 
6 Diod. 13.105.3; cf. Plut. A/c. 36.6-37.3; Lys. 10.5-7; Nepos/l/c. 7.5,8.2-3; Krentz Comm. 176 
(who believes in Diodorus' Thracian troops). In support of Diodorus' version of Aegospotami: 
Ehrhardt Phoenix 24 1970 225-8; for a more even-handed treatment: Strauss A]P 104 (1983) 
24-35. 
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went to his Thradan ^iXoi in the Chersonese in 406. What is more, when it 
seemed the time was right to curry favour again with the Athenians, he 
offered to use the troops of his Thracian to help Athens, as he had 
done before. It is ironic that he finally met his end at the hands of one of the 
friends he had made. 
When Greeks deal with Greeks 
In the Greek world, inter-personal relations played a part in 
implementing and, to some extent, determining foreign policy. Racial 
kinship, or supposed kinship, could provide a good excuse for entering into, 
or being drawn into, the affairs of another polis. Political groups could 
appeal for help to the major powers in their internal revolutions because of 
their personal sympathies, and personal friends, such as ^evoi, could form 
the link between a polis and a political group, or any two such groups. 
This was a phenomenon which occurred in many Greek 
communities, yet one gains the impression, though it is difficult to quantify, 
that it was more marked in Sparta than in Athens. In Sparta, it seems, the 
"smoke-filled room" of nepotism and personal intrigue was the venue for 
the formation of foreign policy. What was important was who one's friends 
were. In Athens, personal friendships were used to a lesser degree as a 
means of effecting international negotiation, but when they were used they 
were used overtly by the demos. This difference in political "style" wi l l be 
investigated further in Chapter Four in terms of magisterial appointments 
in the poleis. 
Such relationships could also create tensions and conflict between 
loyalties. The Greeks themselves were only too well aware of the conflicting 
obligations to ^iXoi and the state, and to (j)iAx)i of different states, particularly 
when they were at war together. What has sometimes been mistaken as 
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irony in the shifting of (\)ikia relationships,^ may reflect a Greek ambiguity 
when dealing wi th these confused and, i n some ways, artificial 
relationships. The Greeks did believe in these relationships, but were also 
aware of their inconsistencies, and, as is reflected in drama,^ were troubled 
by them. These years of turmoil and upheaval, when so much was changing 
so fast, seem to be rather a period of flvix, with interpersonal relationships in 
interstate affairs were being tested against the needs of the day. Sometimes 
they were found to be wanting, but often they could be used for the state and 
by the state. 
1 See Wilson G&i? 36 (1989) 147-51. 
2 See esp. Euripides' Hecuba. 
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Friendship is a disinterested commerce between equals; love, an abject intercourse 
between tyrants and slaves. 
Goldsmith The Good-Natured Man 
The general trends which were described in the last chapter are also 
reflected in the domestic politics of the Greek poleis in the appointment of 
magistrates to overseas posts. The overseas friendships of individuals could 
affect their selection for overseas appointments, though, again, the degree to 
which this occurred varied from state to state. If one considers the 
differences in appointment patterns in Athens and Sparta as the two best 
attested states, one sees that Sparta tended to appoint more men than 
Athens to overseas posts because of their personal connections with the 
state to which they were being sent. 
This chapter wi l l look at the incidence of this phenomenon in the 
magisterial appointments of the city-states, considering the selection of 
military commanders, ambassadors, oath-takers and other miscellaneous 
positions. It will consider how often personal connections affected selection 
for overseas posts and offer suggestions about how these results can be 
explained in terms of the appointment procedures and the style of political 
activity in the state concerned. Finally, a comparison wil l be drawn between 
the relative frequency of this phenomenon in Athens and Sparta. 
The statistics to be given below are of limited reliability. We do not 
know all the office-holders in Athens or elsewhere, and some of those 
whom we do know may have had foreign connections which are not 
attested. Equally, we do not know how large a pool of men with foreign 
connections there was in Athens or in any other state (though we may guess 
that in Athens after fif ty years of the Delian League there was no shortage of 
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such men). Nevertheless, the difference which wil l emerge between Athens 
and Sparta is striking, and in view of the shortage of evidence for Sparta, the 
true difference is likely to have been even greater. 
The first question is why an individual's personal connections abroad 
could be a determining factor in magisterial appointments. One can easily 
understand why ambassadors would seem to be more appropriate if they 
had connections in the state to which they were being sent, for not only 
would they have a more sympathetic reception, but they could more easily 
secure an introduction to the governing powers. For example, it was 
through their Athenian sympathisers that the Mytileneans gained a hearing 
in the Athenian assembly and managed to have the sentence of death 
repealed.^ 
The point of military commanders with personal connections abroad 
is not so obvious. However, the role of generals in the field did not simply 
entail directing battles, but could involve ad hoc diplomacy of various kinds 
required by the exigencies of the situation, in which personal relationships 
could be an advantage, and sometimes the distinction between the role of a 
general and the role of an ambassador becomes unclear. The duties 
performed by military commanders where inter-personal relations would be 
advantageous included, for example, the collecting of troops, as when 
Demosthenes used his connections with the Acamanians and Messenians 
as a means of acquiring more troops;^ making new or renewing old treaties 
and alliances, as when the Spartan Chalcideus made the treaty with 
Tissaphernes in 412;^  bringing about the revolt of cities, for example, Nicias' 
1 Th. 3.36.5. 
2 Th. 3.107.1,4.9.1, 30.3,36.1,41.2, 7.31.5; compare Th. 6.29.3. 
3 Th. 8.17.4. On these treaties, see Chapter Five 180-90,189 n. 3. 
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attempts to cause a revolt in Syracuse through his contacts there;^ 
impromptu diplomatic negotiation, as when Alcibiades negotiated a 
settlement with the people of Selymbria in 408 which was later ratified at 
Athens;^ or other services in the field, as when Brasidas secured an escort 
through Thessaly by sending a message to his personal contact at Pharsalus.^ 
The origin of these connections wil l only be discussed incidentally in 
those cases where it is known, as, for the most part, it is only relevant to this 
present discussion that a connection seems to exist; how it came about is 
only of secondary importance. It should be noted, however, that there are a 
number of ways that personal connections could be made. Firstly, personal 
friendships could be hereditary. Endius' ^evia wi th Alcibiades^ and 
Megillus' Tcpo^evia with Athens provide two examples of this.^ Secondly, 
they could be personal connections formed in a private capacity in the 
present generation, such as the attempted friendship between Agesilaus and 
Pharnabazus negotiated through the medium of their common friend, 
ApoUophanes of Cyzicus.^ Thirdly, the cormection could be formed through 
contacts made on official missions. The connection of Phormio, the 
Athenian, wi th the Acarnanians, and almost certainly a particular 
Acarnanian family, probably arose out of the alliance he made between 
Athens and the Acarnanians sometime in the 430s.7 Since the Spartans were 
known for their dislike of travelling,^ the Spartan connections in the 
Hellespont probably came about through missions to the region in the 
1 Th. 7.48.2; cf. 7.73.3. 
2 Plut. Ale. 30.2-10; IG 118 (= ML 87). 
3 Th. 4.78.1. 
4 See 175-6. 
5 Plato Laws 1.642 t>-d. 
6 See Chapter Five 203-6. 
7 See below 111-3. 
8 Dercylidas was thought to be a notable exception (see 150-1 below). 
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current generation, though Clearchus' Tipo^evia with Byzantium may have 
been hereditary.^ Likewise, the official business of the Delian League in the 
f i f th century must have brought many Athenians into contact with people 
and states they had not encoimtered before. Connections could also be made 
through trade,2 or travelling to the panhellenic festivals. What is important 
is that connections were made between individuals, which, though 
essentially private in nature, played a significant part in public affairs, so 
that the public and the private were inextricably intertwined. 
Military Commands 
Athenian Generals 
Most magistrates in Athens were elected by lot; there were only three 
popularly elected magistracies in which outside influences, such as foreign 
connections, could be a determining factor in an appointment: generals, 
ambassadors and oath-takers.^ 
The strategoi at Athens were the group of popularly elected mihtary 
commanders. Annual elections were held in the spring and ten generals 
were elected to the board.* Further votes were held as the need arose to 
decide which generals should be sent on a given campaign.^ Although 
many of the strategoi were undoubtedly elected for their military prowess or 
1 On Qearchus, see 149-50 below. 
2 On the connection between trade and jcpo^evia, see Amit Athens and the Sea 128-35. 
3 Oath-takers will not be classified simply among the ambassadors, but as a separate 
category. Not all those who negotiated treaties were elected to receive the oaths. On some 
occasions, the generals received the oaths, as was the case in 357/6, on others the same men 
who negotiated the terms were elected again, as was the case in 346, but sometimes another 
group was elected, perhaps even made up from among both the board of generals and the 
negotiating embassy, as perhaps occurred for the Peace of Nidas in 421. On this see also 
MosleyPCPS n.s.7 (1961) 59-63. 
* [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.2,44.4, 61.1. For a more detailed explanation of the election of generals 
at Athens, see 126-43 below. 
^ See, for example, the sequence of elections which sent Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus to 
Sicily in 415 (Th. 6.8.2; IG i^ 93 [= ML 78 b]). 
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personal influence in Athens, there is evidence to suggest that some, at 
least, of the strategoi were elected to the board because of their specialist 
interest or personal connections in a particular area. That is not to say that 
one's international cormections were always utilised, but that in some cases 
they were. The catalogue below includes a selection of those generals from 
the years 435 to 336 who seem to have personal relationships which 
influenced election in a particular year.i Some clearly have formal ties of 
TCpo^evta or ^evia; others are more loosely connected, and for some the 
suggestion that there may be a personal link can only be inferred. 
Phoimio son of Asopius and Asopius son of Fhoimio 
Phormio is first known to have served as a strategos in 440/39.2 At 
some time probably in the 430s,3 the Ambraciots expelled the 
Amphilochians from Amphilochian Argos.^ Thucydides says that the 
Amphilochians put themselves into the hands of the Acarnanians, and 
both then appealed to the Athenians for help, who responded by sending 
their general Phormio and thirty ships.^ It was after this that the alliance 
between Athens and Acarnania began,^ and, apparently, an ongoing 
relationship between Acamarua and Phormio himself. 
At the end of the summer of 431 there was once again trouble in this 
^ For a complete list and discussion of all possible and probable cases in these years, see 
Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi. 
2 Th. 1.117.2. 
3 The date of the expedition and alliance is controversial. Hammond (Epirus 496-7) places 
them before Pericles' campaign of the 450s, and Gomme also (HCT 2.416) favours a date in the 
450s or 440s. Likewise, Salmon (VJealthy Corinth 422-3), who sees the alliance as an 
attempt by Athens to apply pressure to Corinth, would date it between 454 and 446. Rhodes 
(Thucydides II 248), however, thinks it should be placed "a few years t»efore the outbreak of 
the Peloponnesian War." Homblower (Comm. 353-4) sees the episode as "relevant to the 
build-up of tension between Corinth and Athens" and thinks a date in the early 430s best (see 
also id. Greek World 88-9), as does Lewis (CAH 145 n.llO). 
4 Th. 2.68.6. 
5 Th. 2.68.7. 
6 Th. 2.68.8. 
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region, when the Ambraciots and as many of the barbarians as they could 
raise attacked Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia.^ In the 
winter of 430^ the Athenians sent Phormio to Naupactus to keep watch in 
case anyone sailed in or out of Corinth or the Crisaean Gulf.3 It would 
appear from the way that Thucydides uses the one event - that is the trouble 
in Amphilochian Argos - as the backdrop for the other - Phormio's 
despatch to Naupactus - that one is expected to infer their causal 
relationship. Because Phormio has had positive dealings previously with 
the region, he is sent there again as one who is, at the least, in sympathy 
with the people there.* 
Again in the following summer, when the Ambraciots and 
Chaonians with the help of the Lacedaemonians made advances against 
Acarnania, the Acarnanians appealed to Phormio to come to their aid, 
though he refused not unreasonably to leave Naupactus unguarded.^ Yet, in 
that winter, after the Lacedaemonian fleet had dispersed, Phormio did then 
make a largely successful campaign in Acarnania before returning in the 
spring to Athens.^ 
Even after Phormio himself was unavailable, either through death or 
perhaps through disqualification for election, the connection between the 
Acarnanians and the family of Phormio continued. In the following 
summer, when the Acarnanians requested that "either a son or kinsman" {f\ 
mov fi ^Dyyevfj) of Phormio be sent to them, the Athenians despatched his 
1 Th. 2.68.1. 
2 Phormio was also strategos in 432/1 and served at Poteidaea (Th. 1.64.2; cf. 2.29.6,58.2; 
3.17.4; Diod. 12.37.1; Isoc. 16.29). 
3 Th. 2.69.1. 
4 See also Jacoby Supp. 1131. 
5 Th. 2.81.1; cf. 80.1 
6 Th. 2.102.1,103.1. 
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son, Asopius, as strategos in command of thirty ships.i 
What is more, in about 400, the Athenians passed a decree 
reaffirming Athenian citizenship for Phormio, the Acamanian, which he 
had inherited from his grandfather.2 Sevta relationships were often marked 
by giving the name of one's ^evoq to one's son.3 It seems reasonable to infer 
from the citizenship grant to the Acarnanian that Phormio, the Athenian, 
formed a ^evia relationship with an Acarnanian, probably at the time the 
alliance was made. So it would appear that there was a strong personal tie 
between Phormio, the Athenian strategos, and an Acarnanian family, 
making him a suitable choice for an appointment to this area. 
Hagnon son of Nicias 
Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria,^ of tribe I I I , was also one of the 
generals in Samos in 440/39, where he is first known to have served as 
strategos with Phormio.^ In 437/6 Hagnon was sent to Thrace as oikistes of 
Amphipolis, thus establishing a personal connection with the city which 
was maintained until Brasidas took Amphipolis in 424.6 Then in 431/0 
Hagnon was sent v^th Cleopompus son of Cleinias to lay siege to Poteidaea, 
being, as Hornblower remarks, "something of a northern expert".7 This 
expedition began in the summer of 431, and Hagnon returned with the fleet 
^ Th. 3.7.1; see also Homblower Comm. 387-8. Asopius was killed on this campaign (Th. 
3.7.4). 
2 IG ii2 237.15-21 (= Tod 178); see Osborne Naturalization 3.44 . 
3 On this, see Herman Ritualised Friendship 19-21. In this way names would be passed dovm 
the generations. A notorious example from the fifth century is Alcibiades son of Qeinias of 
Athens and his Spartan ^tvoq, Endius son of Aldbiades. 
4 The demotic is inferred from that of his son Theramenes: see esp. Pesely Athenaeum 67 
(1989) 191-209. 
5 Th. 1.117.2; see Fomara Generals 49-50; Develin Officials 91. 
6 Th. 4.102.3, cf. 5.11.1. 
7 Th. 2.58.1; Homblower Comm. 329. 
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about forty days later in the new archon-year of 430/29, after the start of the 
new strategia for that year, and presumably remained in office.^ In 429 
Hagnon was again to be found in Thrace with Sitalces, acting as hegemon, 
probably of the Athenian troops which were expected.^ Hagnon's last known 
involvement in international affairs was when he appears as one of the 
signatories to the Peace of Nicias in 422/1.3 
Hagnon's international career centred on Thrace. Having a strong 
connection with the Thraceward parts as the founder of Amphipolis, he was 
an obvious choice for a general to work in this region, where he was 
prominent from 431 to 429. 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna (tribe IX) probably first 
held the strategia in 427/6.* Late in the archon-year of 427/6 Demosthenes 
and Procles were sent on an expedition around the Peloponnese.^ Early in 
the new archon-year of 426/5,^ their first action was to ambush and to 
destroy a Leucadian garrison in Ellomenus,^ before marching on Leucas 
with the help of all the Acarnanians (except Oeruadae), and the Zacynthians, 
1 Th. 2.58.3; see also Gomme HCT 2.164; Fomara Generals 54-5; Develin Officials 119. For 
discussion of the year of office for the strategoi, see Pritchett A]P 61 (1940) 469-474, contra 
Mayor/HS 59 (1939) 45-64. 
2 See discussion 133-4 below. 
3 See also Andrewes & Lewis /HS 77 (1957) 177-80. 
* There are two possibilities. Since the spring elections for the year 426/5 had already taken 
place, either he was a regularly elected general for the year 427/6 and had already been 
elected for the year 426/5, so had been sent out on a campaign late in the year in the 
knowledge that it would continue into the next year, or he was elected in ttie spring of 426/5 
and sent out early as one of the incoming generals on a campaign that would continue into the 
new year. 
5 Th. 3.91.1. 
^ Demosthenes was definitely a general in this year: see Lewis/HS 81 (1961) 119-20; Rhodes 
Thucydides 111 255 contra Fornara Generals 57-8; Develin Officials 127. 
7 Th. 3.94.1. 
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Cephallenians and Corc5n-aeans.i 
The Acarnanians wished to wall in the city, but Demosthenes was 
persuaded instead by the Messeiuans of Naupactus to attack the Aetolians.2 
Though Demosthenes' main reason for being won over to the Messenian 
plan was perhaps that this would provide him with a route to Boeotia,^ he 
was also persuaded by the X^pi^ this would bring for the Messenians. By 
acceding to their wishes, albeit pleasing to himself, and so performing a 
Xdpiq for the Messenians, Demosthenes was laying the building blocks for a 
relationship with them which was to bring him returns later on. However, 
when Demosthenes sailed on to SoUium and made his plans known to the 
Acarnanians, they, in a f i t of petulance, remained behind because he had 
refused to gratify them.4 In the end, the attempt on Aetolia was disastrous, 
and Demosthenes remained at Naupactus rather than go home, for, 
Thucydides says, he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had 
happened.^ 
It is probable that he was deposed before the end of the year 426/5,^ 
though he remained at Naupactus and called on Acarnanian troops when 
he heard of the impending attack of the Spartans.^ The Acarnanians came, 
though reluctantly, and the Spartans withdrew.^ When, in the same winter, 
the Ambraciots made an attack on Amphilochian Argos, the Acarnanians 
called on Demosthenes to be the hegemon of the allied Acarnanian and 
1 Th. 3.94.1. 
2 Th. 3.94.2-3. 
3 This has been much discussed: see most recently Rhodes Thucydides III 252. 
4 Th. 3.95.1-2. 
5 Th. 3.96.1-98.5. 
6 See Th. 4.2.4: Demosthenes is described as idiotes though it is still in the archon-year 
426/5; see Jlhodes Thucydides lU 255; Lewis/HS 81 (1961) 119-20; contra Gomme HCT 
3.437-8; Fomara Generals 57. 
7 Th. 3.102.3. 
8 Th. 3.102.3-7. 
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Amphilochian army, as well as summoning the two Athenian generals 
who happened to be off the coast of the Peloponnese.i Demosthenes arrived, 
significantly, with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian 
bowmen.2 Despite these unpromising beginnings, it would seem from later 
events that this was also the start of a continuing relationship between 
Demosthenes and the Acarnanians. For when in 424/3 Demosthenes was 
strategos once more in Naupactus, engaged in negotiations for revolution in 
Boeotia, he recruited troops from among the Acarnanians and other aUies 
there.3 
Demosthenes also developed a strong Messenian connection. At the 
beginning of the following summer, after his return from Acarnania, 
though now idiotes, Demosthenes was given the use at his disaetion of the 
forty ships which were sent to Sicily with the elected strategoi, Eurymedon 
and Sophocles.* Thucydides writes that as they were sailing about Laconia 
on the way to Corcyra, Demosthenes requested that they put in at Pylos.^ But 
the two generals were unwilling, though in the end they were forced to do 
this because of a storm.^ Again, when Demosthenes wished to fortify the 
place (for, Thucydides writes, this was the reason he had sailed with them), 
Eur)anedon and Sophocles were reluctant, as they thought there were other 
headlands along the Peloponnesian coast which he could fort ify if he 
wished to put the city to the expense.^  However, Thucydides says, this place 
seemed better than any other to him not only because there was a harbour 
1 Th. 3.105.3,107.2. 
2 Th. 3.107.1. 
3 Th. 4.76.1-2, 77. 
* Th. 4.2. 
5 Th. 4.3.1. 
6 Th. 4.3.1. 
7 Th. 4.3.1-3. Note, however, that Thucydides may have exaggerated the reluctance of 
Eurymedon and Sophocles to make the success at Pylos appear more accidental than it 
actually was. 
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but also because it was the ancient home of the Messenians, which they 
regarded as their fatherland.^ Later, after Pylos was fortified, other 
Messenians, who happened to be present, were brought in as hoplites.2 
Demosthenes was able to exploit his earlier favour for them, and it seems a 
reciprocal relationship had followed. He did what they wished at Leucas, so 
they provided troops and ships for him. In addition, Thucydides makes it 
plain that Demosthenes intended to fortify Pylos when he left Athens, and 
states twice that this place was once part of Messenia. By choosing Pylos 
from among other places which would be equal in terms of their other 
advantages, as Sophocles and Eurymedon point out, Demosthenes chose the 
place which would gratify the Messenians and ensure their assistance. 
Demosthenes was strategos again in 414, when he went once more to 
Acarnania on his way to Sicily, taking up Cephallenian and Zacynthian 
hoplites and sending for the Messenians from Naupactus.^ What is more, in 
the catalogue of Athenian allies at Syracuse, Thucydides writes that some of 
the Acarnanians came for pay, but the majority were allies because of their 
^ikia for Demosthenes and good-will (e-ovoia) for the Athenians.4 
Demosthenes provides us with an example of a man who, i t seems, in order 
to facilitate his role as general, first formed and then continued to exploit 
personal relations he had made in an international context. 
Alcibiades and Aigos 
Alcibiades had ^evoi in Argos,^ and his early magisterial career 
centred upon Argos. In 420 he was instrumental in forming an alliance 
1 Th. 4.3.3,41.2. 
2 Th. 4.9.1; see also 4.41.2. 
3 Th. 7.31.2. 
4 Th. 7.57.10. 
5 Th. 6.61.3. See also Chapter Three 102. 
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between Athens and Argos, and was subsequently elected to the board of 
generals for 420/19.^ In 419/8, as a regularly elected general and in concert 
with the Argives, he marched into the Peloponnese.2 Later in the same year 
he was sent to help the Argives at Epidaurus.3 In 418/7 he was sent with the 
Athenian forces to Mantineia to help the Argives, perhaps as a strategos, but 
certainly as presbeutes.^ And when, in this year, Lichas the Spartan jcpo^evoq 
of the Argives arrived in Argos with proposals for peace, Thucydides says 
that he was hindered by the presence of Alcibiades.^ In 417/6, after an 
attempted coup in Argos, the Athenians sent Alcibiades to Argos with 
twenty ships to take into custody as many of the Argives as still seemed to 
be suspicious and looking to the interests of Sparta,^ and in 415 Thucydides 
says that the Argives and Mantineians took part in the war against Sicily 
because of Aldbiades.7 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus^  
Perhaps there is little that can be said conclusively about Iphicrates, 
but the evidence perhaps suggests that his election in the 380s and again in 
the mid-360s and his subsequent despatch to the north (though these were 
by no means the only commands he held in his long career) may be 
attributed to his connections with the northern kings. 
Iphicrates' origins may have been humble, and his father is known in 
the tradition as a cobbler.^ Despite this, he inherited, or, more probably 
1 Plut. Mc. 10.9; see Th. 5.43.1^7.12, esp. 43.2; for chronology, see Andrewes HCT 4. 69. 
2 Th. 5.52.2. 
3 Th. 5.53. 
* Th. 5.61.2; perhaps also to be restored in IG i^ 370.17 (= ML 77). See also Appendix B: 
Athenian Strategoi 313 n. 2. 
5 Th. 5.76.3. 
6 Th. 5.84.1. 
7 Th. 6.29.3. 
8 On Iphicrates' relations with the Thracians, see Chapter Six 232-4. 
9 Plut. Mor. 186 f; Suidas s.v. Iphicrates (I 772); Davies APF 248; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1367 b 17-8; 
PlutMor. 187 b. 
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developed on his own account,^ coimections with the royal families of the 
north, becoming the adopted son of Am5a\tas, the Macedonian king,2 and 
marrying the daughter or sister^ of Cotys, one of the kings of Thrace, in the 
380S.4 
Iphicrates' first known command (though possibly not as a strategos), 
probably from 393 until 390,^  was at Corinth, where he was in charge of 
mercenary forces,^ which may have been recruited in Thrace by Conon.^ In 
389, the Athenians sent Iphicrates to the Chersonese against the Spartan 
Nauarchos,^ Anaxibius, and Iphicrates eventually ambushed him at 
Abydus.9 It may well have been desirable to have someone in this sensitive 
regionio with the right kind of cormections, and, indeed, Iphicrates seems to 
have lent assistance to the Thracian, Seuthes I I , while in the area.i^ 
From 368 to 365, Iphicrates again served in the north, this time 
against Amphipolis.^2 Once again, while he was in the region, he assisted in 
the local monarchic disputes, driving out Pausanias, the pretender to the 
Macedonian throne, at the request of Eurydice, the wife of the dead king 
1 Rehdantz (Vitae Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei Atheniensium 29) conjectures that 
Iphicrates had a family connection with Thrace, and both Parke (Greek Mercenary Soldiers 
52) and Davies (APf 249) tentatively support this. Yet there is no reason to suppose that 
Iphicrates did not form these relationships on his own initiative. He was not the only nouus 
homo of the fourth century: Chares son of Theochares is probably also a self-made man who 
created his ovm destiny. In the fifth century, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes seems to be 
another who established his credentials by launching his career from the north-west; cf. 
alxjve. 
2 Aeschin. 2. 28. 
3 See Davies APf 249. 
4 Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.131 a-f; Nepos Iph. 23.4. On the date, see Davies 
APf 249. 
5 See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 321. 
6 Xen. Hell. 4.4.9; Diod. 14.86.3. 
Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers 50-1; see also Nepos Iph. 1.3-4. 
81 am using Nauarchos/Nauarchoi to refer to the supreme command of the fleet, and nauarch 
to refer to the subordinate commander of a squadron of ships. 
^ Xen. Hell. 4.8.33-9. 
10 See Chapter Six 223-5. 
^'^ Nepos Iph. 2.1. 
12 Dem. 23.149; Aeschin 2.27; Nepos Iph. 3.2. Aeschines implies he was elected sp)ecificaUy 
for this campaign (exeipoxovnaotv 'AOrivaioi oxpatTiYOV bi A|i(])i7toXiv 'I^iKpaniv), though he 
is probably referring to the votes which appointed the members of the annual board of 
generals to specific commands. 
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Amyntas.^ When the Athenians replaced h im w i t h Timotheus,^ he retired 
to Cotys and the Thracian court, where he gave Cotys his help against the 
Athenians .3 I t is not possible to prove that Iphicrates was elected to the 
board because of these northern connections, yet his associations w i t h these 
northern kingdoms, though they may indeed have been formed w i t h his 
own interests more than w i t h the interests of Athens i n mind,^ may have 
seemed convenient to his fe l low countrymen at the time when war was 
clearly brevdng in these northern parts. 
Charidemus son of Philoxenus 
Charidemus was a Euboean f rom Oreus,^ and was granted Athenian 
citizenship, probably i n 357/6, as a return favour to the Thracian king, 
Cersobleptes, after the conclusion of the peace wi th Chares.^ He served as an 
Athenian general i n 351, perhaps continuing into 350, and i n 349/8.7 
Charidemus' early career was chequered, and shows more his propensity for 
looking to his own survival than any loyalty to a king or country. He had 
served as a mercenary commander in the north, f i rs t w i t h Iphicrates at 
A m p h i p o l i s , ^ then w i t h Cotys against the Athenians,^ before joining 
Timotheus at Amphipolis.^o After he had been discharged f rom Timotheus' 
1 Aeschin. 2.26-9. 
2 Dem. 23.149. 
3 Dem. 23.130; see also Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers 127. 
^ Iphicrates went so far as to fight with Cotys, his ?father/brother-in-law, against the 
Athenians (Dem. 23.130), in an ultimately misguided and ill-judged loyalty to his royal 
relation. 
5 Dem. 23.213 
^ Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers 132; Davies APF 571; see also Appendix B: Athenian 
Strategoi 327 n. 2. On the treaty, see Dem. 23.167-76. 
7 See Develin Officials 310, 312-3. Note, however, that Develin's conjectured strategia in 361 
is unlikely to be correct; see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 327 n. 2. 
8 Dem. 23.149. 
9 Dem. 23.131-2. 
He was captured by Timotheus on his way from Cardia to Amphipolis to help them 
against the Athenians. Timotheus, in his extreme need, we are told, took him into his service 
(Dem. 23.150). 
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service, he hired himself and his troops out to Memnon and Mentor, the 
sons-in-law of Artabazus, who were gathering troops to release their father-
i n - l a w . i But when he found the cities of Scepsis, Cebren and I l i u m 
unguarded, he captured them.2 On his release, Artabazus collected an army 
and came against h i m , so Charidemus turned to the Athenians and 
promised i n a letter that he would hand over the Chersonese to them i f they 
came to his aid.^ Yet when Artabazus unexpectedly let Charidemus go, he 
crossed to the Chersonese and once more entered the service of Cotys, and 
la id siege to the last remaining Athenian strongholds in the Chersonese.'* 
On Cotys' death, Charidemus remained i n the service of Cersobleptes, 
married his sister, and continued to make war on the Athenians unt i l peace 
was at last successfvdly negotiated in 357.5 
Charidemus was undoubtedly a man w i t h strong northern 
connections, though rather dubious loyalties. In 351, the Athenians sent 
h i m to Thrace to meet the expected attack of Phihp, though the expedition 
was abandoned when news came that Philip was either i l l or dead.^ Again, 
i n spring 348, when the Chalcidians sent to Athens for help, Philochorus 
says they despatched Charidemus, their general i n the Hellespont (xov ev 
'E?iX,ria7t6vTCOi GxpaxriYOv).^ I t is Ukely that he won election and the 
Hellespont command through his northern expertise. 
Three main factors emerge f r o m this discussion. Firstly, strategoi 
could be elected because of their personal connections. The ethos of personal 
1 Dem. 23.154. 
2 Dem. 23.154-5. 
3 Dem. 23.155-6. 
4 Dem. 23.157-8. 
5 Dem. 23.129,163-7, 169-74; IG ii^ 126 (= Tod 151); see also Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers 
130-2. 
6 Dem. 3.5. 
7 Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 50. 
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friendships abroad developed out of ancient aristocratic networks of ^evia, 
but, i n the f i f t h and four th centuries, non-aristocrats, such as Demosthenes 
and Iphicrates, and even naturalised citizens, such as Charidemus, were able 
to develop personal connections abroad and use them as a means of 
acquiring high office. This implies that the demos was wi l l ing , at least to 
some extent, to work through connections of this k ind , and that these 
connections were not perceived to be, by their nature, opposed to the 
interests of the demos. 
Secondly, i f one looks at where the strategoi whose connections were 
utilised were sent, i t w i l l be noticed that personal connections consistently 
influenced election when the theatres for the war were at the fringes of the 
Greek wor ld , particularly the north-west and the Thraceward parts. Contrary 
to the general opinion that special competencies were only regularly given 
to particular generals in the latter part of the fourth century, Fornara argues 
that i t was after the defeat at Syracuse and the revolution i n 411 that 
instances occur of "the apportionment of particular commands to certain 
generals", and cites as examples of this movement the practice of assigning 
particular generals to Naupactus and Thrace.^ He writes: "The oligarchic 
movement probably had something to do w i t h the new system of 
apportionment apparently adopted, for i t is a notable step away f rom the 
thoroughly democratic procedure of election of generals without regard to 
prospective duties."^ 
Two comments should be made in response to Fomara's assessment 
of the situation. Firstly, the apportionment of commands to Thrace and the 
north-west demonstrably pre-dates the disaster i n Sicily. For example, 
Phormio held the command at Naupactus in 430/29 and 429/8 and was 
succeeded in his command in 428/7 by his son Asopius. Eurymedon son of 
1 Fomara Generals 79-80. 
2/hid. 80. 
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Thucles served on campaigns to Corcyra and Sicily in 427/6, 426/5, 425/4, 
414/3 and 413/2. Hagnon was active in Thrace in 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8, 
Thucydides son of Olorus i n 424/3, and Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus in 
414/13 and 411. What is more, all these men appear to have been elected to 
these commands because of their personal connections w i t h the area. But 
this specialisation by region is not quite the same thing as the specialisation 
of functions of Athenaion Politeia 61.1.^ The emphasis is on a different 
aspect of the command: i n the Athenaion Politeia the emphasis is on the 
funct ion of the office and there is a specific post to be f i l l ed each year, 
whereas here the point is that the link is w i t h a particular region and that 
no one place regularly had to have, by constitution, a strategos appointed to 
i t . 
This suggests the second point, which is a theme which w i l l be 
developed throughout this thesis: that i t was easier to deal w i th states and 
poleis on the fringes of the Greek wor ld by means of personal connections. 
As w i l l be seen in the fol lowing chapters, the Athenians did not always deal 
w i t h these outlying communities as successfully as they might have done. 
But they d i d attempt to deal w i t h societies who were not institutionalised i n 
the same way as they were by personal rather than institutional means. 
The th i rd point that arises f r o m this discussion of the Athenian 
generals is that, although the Athenians d i d sometimes use personal 
connections as a basis of selection, they d id not do this in every case, or even 
i n most cases. The table below gives a hst of all strategoi who seem to have 
been elected on the basis of their connections:^ 
1 Fomara sees these long-term commands to Thrace and Naupactus as the foreniiuier of 
commands such as e7d xfiv x^pov, for example {ibid. 79-80). On [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.1, see 
Rhodes Comm. 678-9. 
2 For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi. 
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Athenian Strategoi with relevant connections 
(These are marked with t in Appendix B. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B)^ 
Strategos Connection Years of 
Relevant 
Appointment 
?Diotimus son of Strombichus Corcyraeans/Southern Italy 433/2 
Hagnon son of Nicias Thrace/Amphipolis 431/0,430/29, 
429/8 
Phormio son of Asopius Acarnanians / Naupactus 430/29,429/8 
Asopius son of Phormio Acarnanians 428/7 
Demosthenes son of Acarnania /Messenians (427/6), 426/5, 
Alcisthenes 425/4,414/3 
Eurymedon son of Thucles Corcyra (427/6), 426/5, 
425/4,414/3 
?Pythodorus son of Isolochus Sicily/Southern Italy 426/5 
Lamachus son of Xenophanes Black Sea area 425/4,424/3 . 
Thucydides son of Olorus Thrace 424/3 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias Argos 420/19,419/8, 
417/6 
?Laches son of Melanopus Sparta 418/7 
Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus Thrace (414/3), 411 
(under 400) 
Conon son of Timotheus Naupactus/Acarnania (414/3), 411 
(under 5000) 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus Thrace (410/9), 409/8, 
408/7 
Phanosthenes (from Andros, Andros 407/6 
but naturalised Athenian) 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus Thrace 389/8,388/7, 
367/6,366/5, 
365/4 
Timotheus son of Conon Corcyra / Acarnania / satraps 375/4,374/3, 
of Hellespontine Phrygia 367/6,365/4 
Aristophon son of Ceos 363/2 
Aristophanes 
351/0,350/49, Charidemus son of Philoxenus Thrace 
349/8 
Phocion son of Phocus Byzantium 340/39 
^ ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 
0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or estabUshed in this year, but there 
is no evidence that it aheady existed. This year will not be included in the statistics. 
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Out of three himdred and sixty-two individual attested appointments in the 
years of this study, only for ty, about eleven per cent, show any sign of 
having been made on the basis of personal connections.^ Of course, other 
cases may have been affected by personal connections of which no evidence 
survives - but the same can be said of Sparta, where the proportion of 
appointments which appear to have been affected by personal connections is 
much higher.2 Al though personal connections are an influence i n the 
election of generals which must be taken into account, they are obviously 
not the only criterion for selection. 
What other factors affected selection? Obviously men w i t h mili tary 
prowess, established mil i tary careers, personal influence and charisma, men 
such as Pericles, Alcibiades, Iphicrates or Chares, secured election more 
readily than those without. However, there seems to be an element of the 
"democratic spiri t" i n each man having his turn i n the strategia. Fifty-eight 
out of the n ine ty- f ive attested generals d u r i n g the years of the 
Peloponnesian War (excluding 411), the best attested years, are known to 
have served on the board of generals only once.^ Fourteen of these were 
prevented f r o m serving a second time either through death, exile, or some 
other misfortune. Only fifteen men are known to have served on the board 
fo r fou r years or more, and twelve of these were eventually ki l led or 
otherwise prevented f r o m serving on the board again. So most known 
generals served for less than four years, and the bulk of these for only one 
year, and the majority of these are not known to have died in battle. There 
are a large number of men who served as strategoi wi thout , seemingly. 
^ There is no point in calculating more precisely when the evidence is so far from complete. 362 
is the total of appointments listed in Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi as possible or certain 
(excluding the italicised "unofficial positions" on 312, 318-9). 
2 See 152-3 below. 
^ For a sununary of the strategoi during the Peloponnesian War, the years they served, and 
the reason (when it is knovra) for not being re-elected, see Appendix F: Strategoi During the 
Peloponnesian War. 
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developing their mil i tary career. Like the archons and petty magistrates 
chosen by sortition, are they simply having their turn? 
H o w do we reconcile all these factors wi th what we know about the 
actual procedure of appointing magistrates? Is i t possible to reconstruct a 
way of doing things that takes all this into accoimt and is consistent w i t h the 
other evidence for the election of generals? 
Election of Generals 
I t is known f r o m the Athenaion Politeia that, unlike most other 
magistrates, the ten strategoi at Athens were elected by show of hands in the 
ecclesia, originally one f rom each tribe, but later dTidvtcov.i It is thought 
that, as an interim change to non-tribal representation, the tribal system of 
election was modif ied at some point around the mid- f i f th century^ so that a 
single tribe could elect more than one representative in any one year. I t used 
to be assimied that nine generals were elected by tribe, and the tenth chosen 
f r o m all tribes.^ This tenth general was supposedly given extraordinary 
powers over his colleagues, as a axpaxriyoq ccjcdvxcov, either to provide a 
commander-in-chief or chairman of the board, or to confer a special honour 
upon someone, or to allow another member of Pericles' tribe to stand as 
well.4 The formulation of this theory of a axpaxriyoq d;cdvxa3v was largely 
due to the fact that the earliest certain cases of double representation 
invo lved a doubl ing w i t h Pericles. The f i rs t example of such double 
1 [Arist] Ath. Pol. 22.2, 44.4, 61.1. 
2 If the evidence of Plut. Cimon 8.8 is to he accepted, any modification of strictly tribal 
representation probably postdates 469. 
^ See for example, Hignett A History of the Athenian Constitution 348-54. 
•* As summarised by Fomara Generals 21; see for example, Hignett A History of the Athenian 
Constitution 352; Jameson T.AP>1 86 (1955) 63-87; Dover/HS 80 (1960) 61-77; Lewis/HS 81 
(1961) 118-123 (though Lewis concedes that "few would wish to admit that 'double-doubles' 
are impossible" [118 n. 7]). 
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representation may have been as early as 460/59,1 but i t at least occurred in 
441/0 when Pericles son of Xanthippus, of Cholargus, and Glaucon son of 
Leagrus, of Cerameis, both represent Acamantis.2 Glaucon and Pericles again 
both represent their tribe i n 439/8,3 in 435/4^ and in 433/2.5 In 432/1^ and 
possibly 431/O^ Carcinus son of Xenotimus, of Thoricus, was paired wi th 
Pericles. According to this view, these were the only cases of double 
representation before Pericles' death, and the only other certain occurrence 
of double representation was i n 407/6, when Alcibiades was doubled wi th 
Adeimantus f r o m tribe V.^ Thus i t was assumed that no tribe could supply 
more than two generals i n a single year and that only one tribe in each year 
could supply two generals, one of these being a cxpazT{ybc, kb, ocjtdvTCOv.^  
Tribal elections 
However, in recent years this view has come under serious attack. 
Fornara rejects outright this theory and the limitations i t imposes upon the 
mult iple election of generals f rom one tribe, f inding instances f rom 433/2 of 
double-doubles and even a triple representation f rom one tribe.io He goes so 
far as to claim that the tribal basis for election was completely abandoned at 
some time between 469/8 and 460/59.11 The fact remains, however, that not 
all his demotics and tribal affiliations i n these crucial cases are secure, and 
1 Fomara Generals 19, 44. For an attempt to place this even earlier (in 479/8), see Bicknell 
Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy 101-10. 
2 See Androtion FGrHist 324 F 38. For problems raised by the eleventh name on Androtion's 
list and further references: Jacoby Supp. 1148-50; Fomara Generals 49; Develin Officials 89. 
^ Pint Per. 16.3; 7G i^ 48.44 (= ML 56.30); see Fomara Generfl/s 50; Hignett A History o/f/ie 
Athenian Constitution 349. 
4 Per. Per. 16.3; 7G i^ 464.105. 
5 Plut. Per. 16.3; JG i^ 364.19-20 (= ML 61). 
6 Th. 2.13.1, 23.2. 
7 Th. 2.31.1; Fomara Generals 53. 
8 Hignett A History of the Athenian Constitution 349. 
^Ibid. 354. 
10 Fornara claims, rather strongly, that, "They are make-shifts supporting a make-shift 
theory": Generals 22-27,51 (433/2), 52 (432/1), 53 (431 /O), 57-8 (426/5). 
11/bid. 22-7. 
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there are a number of years during the Peloponnesian War, and even as late 
as 357/6, when, despite possible doubles, there appears to be a relatively 
even spread of representation across the tribes. 
If one considers years in the period 435 to 336 where seven or more 
generals are known, one finds that the number of tribes covered is more 
than would be likely i f selection was purely random. For example, in 433/2 
there are nine known strategoi representing at least seven and perhaps eight 
of the ten tribes, and in 424/3 there are nine strategoi f rom at least seven 
tribes. Similar tribal distributions are evident throughout the years of the 
Peloponnesian War.^ I n the four th century, there are few years when 
enough of the strategoi are known, but in 357/6 there are eight known 
generals representing seven tribes; again too many, one would suppose, for 
a random spread across the tribes. Thus i n years between 435 and 357 when 
we have a high proportion of the strategoi and their demotics are known, 
there is also a high coverage of tribes. We know that tribally based elections 
were abandoned by the time the Athenaion Politeia was written,2 but the 
earhest date for non-tribal election must post-date 357/6. I t seems clear, 
therefore, that in this period, although there may have been no limitation 
on the number of doubles in any one year, the election of generals remained 
tribally based.3 
Modified Tribal Election 
Despite the fact that the election of strategoi seems to have been still 
largely by tribe, the system of election was modified at some point in the 
f i f t h century so that double representation of a single tribe could occur, at 
^ See also 425/4,414/3,410/9. 
2 [Arist.] Alh Pol. 61.1: XeipotovoOai 5e KOI xac, icpoi; tov noXe^iov apxac, (XTidoaq, 
oxpaxTiYoxx; 8eKa, Tip^ TEpov ixev d(])' <eKaox-(\q> ^\)Xi\q eva, vw 8' anavxm. 
3 See Rhodes GR&BS 22 (1981) 130. This is not to say, however, that the sfrate^os elected 
from a tribe led a contingent in battle from the corresponding tribe: see Hammond CQ n.s. 19 
(1969) esp. 113-4 (= Studies in Greek History esp. 350); cf. Rhodes Comm. 264. 
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least throughout the period of Periclean dominance, and even double-
doubles seem likely. 
Doubles and the alleged azpaxr\ybq e£ (XTtdvTcov 
It has been argued by Hignett, among others,i in an attempt to explain 
the double representation of tribes that the innovation of electing a second 
general f r o m any one tribe was "introduced dur ing the ascendancy of 
Perikles to overcome the diff icul ty created by his continuous tenure of the 
strategia for several years ... As long as he monopolized the representation 
of Akamantis on the board, other candidates f r o m his tribe, however 
wor thy , w o u l d f i n d the strategia barred to them" and "the choice in any 
particular year of a single general dTidvxcov was simply an expedient to 
surmount the di f f icul ty created by the continuous re-election of Perikles."2 
He also argues that Pericles was given exceptional powers in the early years 
of the Peloponnesian War, on the grounds that Thucydides describes him as 
dtKaxoq amoq in 431.3 
Dover has convincingly argued against this last contention.^ While 
not questioning whether there could be one or more doubles in a year, he 
effectively demonstrates that, i f there was election drnvxcDV, it conferred 
no special authority on the man so elected. More recently, scholars have 
tr ied to account for the doubles by looking at vot ing procedure, and 
reconstructing a voting procedure which might allow the election of two 
men f r o m one tribe. 
1 Eg. Wade-Gery Essays in Greeit History 115; Jameson 86 (1955) 63-87. 
2 Hignett A History of the Athenian Constitution 352. 
^Ibid. 248-9 on Th. 2.13.1. 
4 Dover/HS 80 (1960) 62-77; contra Bloedow C/iiron 11 (1981) 71; cf. Harding/Inrfrofion 
and the Atthis 145-6. 
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Pierart &c Hansen 
We know f r o m the Athenaion Politeia that strategoi were elected by 
the assembly and that the presiding officials "judged the show of hands" 
(xdq xeipoxovtoq Kpivo-oaiv).! Some have taken this to mean that the hands 
were counted precisely.2 Others have seen that the verb [Kpiveiv] "has added 
point, i f ... votes were not precisely counted when taken by show of hands."^ 
This second alternative is more reasonable given difficulties of counting 
such large numbers.* This would exclude any suggested method for election 
which requires an accurate count of votes.5 I f we assimie that the votes were 
estimated, the easiest method of determining selection would be by making 
a choice between two alternatives.^ 
Pierart has suggested a system whereby tribes were called up one at a 
time and nominations put forward for candidates.^ Votes wou ld then be 
invi ted both for and against each candidate i n turn. I f the majority voted 
against, the candidate would be defeated and they would then move on to 
the next candidate for that tribe. The process would then be repeated unt i l 
one candidate was successful.^ This would mean a tribe might not be 
represented i f no candidate was able to achieve a positive majority. In the 
period when there had to be one strategos representing each tribe, the 
candidates f r o m those tribes which failed to approve a candidate would 
have to be voted on again unt i l one was elected. After tribal election was 
modi f ied , however, Pierart suggests that the vote was then taken on the 
1 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 44.4, 61.1 (election of generals), 44.3 (Kpivav). 
2 Boegehold Hesperffl 32 (1963) 366-74. 
^ Rhodes Comm. 535; cf. Hansen The Athenian Democracy 147-8. 
4 Cf. Hansen The Athenian Ecclesia <1> 207-26. 
^ Eg. Staveley in Ancient Society and Institutions 275-88. 
6 Rhodes GR&BS 22 (1981) 132. 
7 Pierart BCH 98 (1974) 125-46. 
^ However, notice a decree from Delphi in 160/59, which says that officials are elected 
according to who gets the largest number of votes (SJG ^ 671 .B = Fouilles de Delphes 
III.iii.239, 14-9 [wath improved restorations by Wilhelm Griechische Inschriften rechtlichen 
Inhalts2 51-2 = id. Akademieschriften zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde 3.445-6]). Delphi 
was a much smaller state. 
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pool of all those candidates who were unsuccessful i n the first ro imd unt i l 
enough had gained a majority so that the f u l l board of ten was made up. 
Hansen, while agreeing i n essence w i t h this system, suggests that 
candidates were proposed one by one and the assembly voted for or against 
that candidate. 
As soon as ten candidates had secured a majori ty, any new 
candidates could only be proposed in opposition to one of those 
already elected, and the vote was between those two. I f the new 
opponent got the major i ty , he ousted his opponent. The 
proceedings were terminated as soon as no more candidates come 
[sic] to the fore. I f a board had to comprise one representative f rom 
each tribe, the process was possibly as follows. A candidate f r o m 
tribe I was proposed, and the people voted for or against him. The 
f i rs t candidate to get a majori ty was elected unless a named 
opponent to h im was proposed, in which case the vote was a vote 
between the two of them. When no more candidates were 
proposed, the people proceeded to the next tribe, and so on.i 
Both theories do account for a tribally based system and work equally 
wel l i f more than one general is required f r o m some tribes to make up the 
number, but both fa i l to meet all the requirements which the evidence 
demands. There is a fundamental problem w i t h both these solutions. 
Pierart's system assumes that, i f there are two generals elected in a tribe, one 
of the generals was elected in preference to the other; that one is, in effect, a 
second choice. That neither of the strategoi in a double was elected as second 
choice can be shown f rom the careers of Phormio and Hagnon, about whose 
activities i n the years 431 to 429 we know a reasonable amount. 
Phormio and Hagnon 
There are twenty years over the period 435 to 336 when doubles seem 
to have occurred.2 In the years where doubles are attested w i t h reasonable 
1 Hansen The Athenian Democracy 235. 
2 435/4,433/2,432/1,431 /0,430/29,429/8,426/5,425/4,424/3,423/2,418/7,414/3,407/6, 
373/2,372/1,357/6,356/5,349/8,338/7. 
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probability, there are seventeen years in which Pericles was not on the board 
of strategoi. There are five years i n particular, 430/29, 429/8, 426/5, 425/4, 
and 424/3,1 in which there are doubles which do not appear likely to be the 
result of a desire to elect one general to a privileged position.2 
In 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8 Phormio son of Asopius and Hagnon son 
of Nidas were colleagues on the board of generals, as well as probably being 
fe l low tribesmen. There are two problems in connection w i t h Phormio and 
Hagnon: f i rs t ly , Phormio's demotic, and secondly, the question of Hagnon's 
axpaxriYia i n 429/8. 
Phormio son of Asopius probably came f rom the deme Paeania, and 
so tribe I I I . The evidence for the demotic comes f r o m a fragment of 
Pausanias which records how Phormio withdrew to the deme Paeania to 
live ,3 and there has been lively debate as to whether this indicates that this 
was his deme.4 The demotic is perhaps supported by IG i ^ 48,5 i f the 
restoration by Wade-Gery of the oath-takers at Samos is accepted.^ Jacoby 
thinks that such a reading of Pausanias is correct but has diff icul ty w i t h the 
doubles such an assignment wou ld entail wi th Hagnon, though this is his 
only doubt .7 Fornara argues that one can infer the demotic w i t h "great 
l ikel ihood" f r o m Pausanias, given that the main argimient against i t is the 
"orthodox" theory of representation,^ and Whitehead concurs.^ Lewis has 
reservations about the demotic which, despite his disclaimer, centre largely 
1 338, though the only fourth-century example that is not excluded by these criteria, should 
also be omitted as it may belong to the period when elections were ctncxvTajv. For the 
peculiarities of this year, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 330 n. 1. 
2 This excludes years when Chares, or Iphicrates, for example, could have been the 
privileged man in a pair. 
^ Paus. 1.23.10. 
^ Eg. Jacoby Supp. 1127 contra Hignett A History of the Athenian Constitution 350-1; cf. 
Harding Androtion and the Atthis 146. 
5 = M L 56.28 and see esp. their commentary on 153. 
^ See Jacoby loc. cit. 
7 Ibid. 
^ Fomara Generals 77-8; Develin Officials 91. 
9 Whitehead The Demes of Attica 325 n. 126. 
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upon the question of double-doubles.^ I f we are prepared to admit that 
double-doubles might be possible, i t then looks probable that Phormio was 
f r o m tribe I I I . Hagnon's demotic, on the other hand, presents no problems, 
as i t can be inferred f r o m that of his son, the oligarch, Theramenes.2 Thus i t 
w o u l d seem that, i f we accept the evidence of Pausanias, Phormio and 
Hagnon came f rom the same tribe. 
Phormio and Hagnon were both strategoi in 431/0 and 430/29, and 
probably i n 429/8, but the strategia of Hagnon in 429/8 has been questioned. 
A t the beginning of the winter of 429, Sitalces, the Odrysian king of the 
Thracians, went to war against Perdiccas, the king of the Macedonians, in 
fu l f i lmen t of a promise he made to the Athenians.^ He took w i t h h im 
Amyntas son of Philip of Macedon, Athenian presbeis "who happened to be 
present for this reason", and Hagnon as hegemon, presumably to lead the 
Athenian troops who were expected.* This apparently means that Hagnon 
was one of the strategoi elected for this year, given that he was expecting to 
lead Athenian troops, but not all agree.^ 
Al though Thucydides describes h im as hegemon rather than using 
the technical term strategos, i t is not an unreasonable guess that, because of 
his specialist knowledge and connection w i t h the area,^ he had been sent 
ahead of the troops by the assembly wi th the Athenian presbeis to help wi th 
their negotiations and was to later lead the army. They had been appointed 
1 Lewis JHS 81 (1961) 118-19 & n. 7; see also Hignett A History of the Athenian Constitution 
350-1. More recently, Mattingly is not willingly to accept Paeania as Phormio's deme 
(Antichthon 25 (1991) 20 & nn. 103,107). 
2 See esp. Pesely Athenaeum 67 (1989) 191-209. 
3 Th. 2.95.1-2. 
* Th. 2. 95.3. Though in the end, the Athenians lost confidence in Sitalces and did not send 
them (Th. 2.101.1). See also Gomme H C T 2.241. 
5 See for those who do regard Hagnon among the generals for this year: Rhodes Thucydides II 
263; Da vies APF 228; Develin Officials 121. Those who do not: Fornara Generals 55; 
Hanunond CQ n.s. 19 (1969) 120 (= Studies in Greek History 360). 
^ See discussion 114-5 above, although, admittedly, it was Phormio who had previously 
dealt with Sitalces (Th. 2.29.6). At this time, however, Phormio was engaged at Naupactus 
(Th. 2.102-3), his specialist area. 
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by the Athenians for the very purpose of joining the expedition against 
Perdiccas, and so i t is likely that Hagnon was sent as strategos also. There is 
l i t t le to suggest, as Hammond supposes, that Sitalces may have "intended to 
impose Hagnon as commander on the as yet unassigned Athenian force, 
which the Athenian Assembly was proposing to vote no doubt w i th its own 
chosen generals for the campaign."i Thucydides makes i t clear that, at the 
t ime Hagnon and the ambassadors were in Thrace, the Athenians f u l l y 
intended to send a fleet and troops as wel l (e6ei ydp K a i xovq 'AQr[vaiovq 
vaxfoi x£ Kai axpaxiqt ox; Kkeicxi} ha xouq XaA,ia5£a^ 7capaYeveaGai),2 so 
presumably they had appointed Hagnon to lead them. Therefore i t would 
seem high ly l ikely , almost to the point of certainty, that Phormio and 
Hagnon both belonged to tribe I I I and formed a double in 431/0, 430/29 and 
429/8 . However the likely reasons for the election of either Hagnon and 
Phormio, as w i l l be suggested below, were not to privilege one over the 
other or over their colleagues, but because of their suitability for the task 
required. 
In 426/5, Hipponicus son of Callias is doubled wi th Aristoteles son of 
Timocrates.3 Hipponicus' demotic of Alopece is certain, which places him in 
tribe XA Aristoteles as general has been restored in 7G i ^ 366.6, where the 
deme is given as Thorae. As Wade-Gery asserted,^ and Lewis later agreed,^ 
this is almost certainly right. I t would seem, then, that there is a strong case 
for arguing for a double in tribe X in this year. 
But could either Hipponicus or Aristoteles have plausibly been 
elected oxpaxriyoq dTtdvxcov? Lewis writes, " I f this case of double 
1 Hammond CQ n.s. 19 (1969) 120 (= Studies in Greek History 360). 
2 Th. 2.95.3. 
3 On Aristoteles' status in this year (which I see no reason to doubt), see Appendix B: 
Athenian Strategoi 310. 
4 Lewis }HS 81 (1961) 120. 
5 Wade-Gery JHS 50 (1930) 292. 
6 Lewis JHS 81 (1961) 120-1; see also Gomme H C T 2.417-8. 
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representation is accepted, i t is nearly fatal to any theory which regards the 
practice as maintained for the purpose of being fair to the second man in a 
tr ibe."! 7he Aristoteles who probably was strategos 431/0 and certainly was 
i n 426/5,2 is probably also to be identified wi th the hellenotamias of 421/0, 
and the Aristoteles who was a member of the Thirty,^ but this would not 
raise h im to the calibre of a Pericles. Likewise, though Hipponicus was of a 
distinguished family,* he is only known to have held pubUc office twice: as 
secretary i n 444/3 and as strategos in 426/5.^ Neither of these men suggest 
themselves as having been specially elected over and above their 
colleagues.^ 
In 425/4 and possibly in 426/5 ,Lamachus son of Xenophanes and 
Sophocles son of Sostratides may form a double in tribe V I . The evidence for 
Sophocles' tribal affiliation is problematic as i t is based upon the list of the 
Thir ty given at Xen. Hell. 2.3.2. Although Loeper originally postulated that 
the list was i n tribal and even tri t tyal order,^ Whitehead has since raised 
doubts concerning the question of tribal trios, though he is prepared to 
accept that the list may be in tribal order.9 Although I agree in principle wi th 
Whitehead that the Athenians may not have felt themselves obliged to 
appoint three of the Thirty f rom each tribe, i t remains possible that they did . 
1 Lewis /HS 81 (1961) 121. 
2 / G i3 366. 6; Th. 3.105.3. 
3 ATI list 34; Xen. Hell. 2.3.2; see Lewis /HS 81 (1961) 120-1; on strategia in 431 /O, see 
Develin Officials 118. As Levds points out, if one believes in trios in tribal order in the list of 
the Thirty at Xen. Hell. 2.3.2, this would place him in Antiochis, tribe X. On this see 
Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 310 n. 1. 
* He was from a extremely wealthy family, inherited the dadouchia from his father 
(Andoc. 1.115), and married the ex-wife of Pericles (Plato Protag. 314 e; see Davies A P f 262-
3). 
5 I G i3 455.5; Th. 3.91.4; see also Davies APF 262-3. 
6 Note that Nicias was on the board of generals for this year. Lewis (/HS 81 (1961) 121) 
suggests Hipponicus as the axparnYO^ k% dTidvTCOV, but he was not influenced by Dover's 
article, which was published in the preceding year; ultimately, he only comes down on the 
side of Hipponicus because of his family connections. 
See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 310. 
8 Loeper ]M(R)I 305.5-6 (May-June 1896), Otd. kl. Fil. 90-6, 97-101 (my knowledge of this is 
based on Whitehead's article). 
9 JHS 100 (1980) 208-13. 
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and (whether or not they did) that the Ust is in tribal order. The argument 
tends to be circular and the evidence circumstantial, but i n 414/3 Charicles, 
whose tribe is also derived f rom Xenophon's list, may have served as suffect 
i n place of Lamachus.^ I t is not unreasonable, I think, to conjecture that 
Sophocles was f r o m tribe V I , and that he and Lamachus formed a double in 
these years.2 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes and Thucydides son of Olorus appear 
to f o r m a double i n 424/3. MacDowell has now shown that Nicostratus 
ZKaiiPcoviSiiq of Aristophanes Wasps can be identified wi th Nicostratus son 
of Dieitrephes, the general of 424/3,3 and so was a fe l low tribesman of 
Thucydides son of Olorus when they were on the board of generals in 424/3. 
Thucydides is not known to have been strategos i n any other year, and 
because of his failure to save Amphipolis in this year he was exiled f rom 
Athens .4 The career of Nicostratus, on the other hand, was longer than 
most,5 as he held the strategia i n 427/6, 425/4, 424/3, 423/2 and 418/17.6 He 
was obviously a man of competence, as his success i n bringing the warring 
factions of Corcyra to a settlement indicates.^ However, his career is not 
otherwise noted for its brilliance, as he shares commands w i t h the more 
distinguished Nicias i n 425/4, 424/3 and 423/2.^ He does not present an 
outstanding figure such as Pericles, and would not have been elected to a 
special position over and above his colleagues. The very fact that he had 
1 See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 315 & n. 2; on tribe: 310 n. 1. 
2 Note, however, the objections by Lewis to this identification of the tribe (JHS 81 (1961) 
121), which are based on the very fact that he would form a double with Lamachus. If we 
allow doubles, then we can allow this. 
3 See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 309 n. 2. 
4 Th. 5.26.5. 
5 Of generals from the same period, Pericles was exceptional for holding the strategia for at 
least twenty-two years (though not all in succession), Phormio for seven years, Demosthenes 
for six years, Hagnon for five years. 
6 Th. 3.75.1; 4.53.1, 119.2,129.2, 5.61.1. 
7 Th. 3.75.1. 
^ Nicostratus was killed at the battle of Mantineia in 418, his only subsequent known year 
serving on the board (Th. 5.61.1,74.3). 
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served for two years before being doubled wi th Thucydides in 424/3 would 
suggest that Thucydides was the extra in that year and, as has already been 
poin ted out, he had probably not served before. I t is unl ike ly that 
Thucydides was selected for his personal eminence so much as for his 
Thracian connections.^ 
Admit tedly, these doubles are not without their problems. Yet i f they 
are to stand - and the doubles of Phormio and Hagnon, Nicostratus and 
Thucydides and Hipponicus and Aristoteles look almost certain - then there 
is nothing which would characterise any of these men as a strategos selected 
over his colleagues. Indeed there seem to have been other good reasons to 
elect Phormio, Hagnon and Thucydides. 
Double-doubles 
The most telling evidence against the position of a GXpaxriYOc; 
ctTcdvicov wou ld be the existence of double-doubles. I t is diff icul t to maintain 
that one person was granted special privileges above his colleagues because 
he was specially elected, i f i n fact more than one tribe was i n this special 
position of being doubly represented. Unfortunately, the three cases where 
double-doubles seem to have occurred, in 432/1, 431/0 and 426/5, have all 
been questioned and none can be irrefutably proved.^ But while there is 
positive evidence i n favour of the tribal assignments, the main argument 
tell ing against them is the theory of only one double i n a year. For example, 
Eucrates' demotic for 432/1 also seems very reasonable, though i t still admits 
^ See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 312. 
2 There is a fourth possibility in 433/2, but I do not think the grounds for attaching 
Archestratus to Phlya are anything like certain. Archestratus was the son of Lycomedes (Th. 
1.57.6). A Lycomedes son of Aeschraeus is connected with Phlya (Plut. Them. 15.3; cf. Hdt. 
8.11.2). Qeomedes son of Lycomedes ahnost certainly belongs to Phlya (see IG 370.31-2), so 
the argument depends on Archestratus and Qeomedes being brothers, which Hignett {A 
History of the Athenian Constitution 350) doubts, though Fomara (Generals 78 & n. 13) 
thinks the evidence of the inscription "should be decisive." 1 am not convinced: Lycomedes is a 
common name in Athens, and appears in a number of tribes. If he does come from Phlya, he 
would be doubled with Proteas son of Epicles (Th. 1.45.2). 
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of some doubt,^ and the tribal affiliation of Sophocles son of Sostratides, and 
Lamachus' strategia in 426/5, are not certain.2 Nevertheless, if we accept that 
there is a high probabili ty, as demonstrated above, that Phormio and 
Hagnon were fellow-tribesmen, we are forced to accept as the corollary of 
this that there was at least one double-double, i n 431/0: Phormio and 
Hagnon, and also Pericles and Carcinus. 
I t is important to note that the instances of double representation 
part icularly involve certain tribes, or indeed certain men, and there are 
tribes which for runs of years seem unable to produce an attested general.^ 
This raises the possibility that for a number of years some of the tribes may 
have been unable to produce candidates strong enough to w i n election.^ For 
example, i f we turn to the years of the Peloponnesian War (though 
excluding 411 as an abnormal year), tribe I had no known representative 
between 432/1 and 426/5, and again between 424/3 and 413/2 (though there 
is the possibility that i t was represented in 414/3), tribe IX is represented 
seven times and only by Demosthenes, and tribe V I I I is represented only 
four times and has no representative on the board between 433/2 and 414/3. 
Again, although tribe I I I is strong in its provision of strategoi between 432/1 
and 422/1 , i t does not provide a known candidate between 421 and 412. It 
seems that, whi le some tribes were notoriously weak at p rov id ing 
representatives, others were compensating for this shortfall. It may wel l 
^ Doubled with Proteas son of Epicles (Th. 2.23.2). For demotic, see PCG Aristophanes 149 (= 
Kock 143); Fornara Generals 76 & n.l , 77; Develin Officials 102 contra Hignett A History of 
the Athenian Constitution 350. 
2 See 135-6 above. 
^ For a summary of tribal representation during the years of the Peloponnesian War, see 
Appendix F: Strategoi During the Peloponnesian War. 
4 There is also the possibility that the generals who represented certain tribes did not figure 
enough in the events of the day to appear in the sources. It is probably a combination of both 
factors which produces the results we have. However, the years of the Peloponnesian War 
are well documented years, so particular gaps in attested tribal representation are more 
significant. 
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have been that double-doubles were not only possible, but were necessary in 
order to maintain a f u l l board of ten strategoi. 
Fornara's triple and double in 432/1, however, is less than sure, since 
i t depends on a very insecure tribal identification. Fornara places Callias son 
of Calliades i n tribe V I I , creating a triple representation for that year. He 
claims, "That Callias son of CaUiades is the same person as Callias son of 
Calliades Ai^cove-uq ... is more likely than the current theory about election 
djtdvxcov, and that is the only objection to the identification."^ However, 
Lewis cites an example of a CaUias son of Calliades f rom Paeania (III) f rom 
an inscription dating to about 320,2 and on this basis Develin has not given 
Callias a demotic "as the commonness of the name makes that 
speculative."3 
Yet Pierart's theory that one man in a double was elected as a second 
choice is also untenable. Hagnon and Phormio provide a good illustration 
of this. In 432/1, Phormio had been the elected candidate for tribe I I I . When 
the crisis came up in the north Phormio was sent w i t h 1600 troops.^ 
However, i n the fol lowing year, Hagnon, a specialist in Thrace, was elected 
to the generalship. In the summer of 431/0 Phormio was still in the north, 
and Thucydides writes that he joined forces wi th Perdiccas, after the alliance 
was formed w i t h Sitalces, king of the Thracians, and marched against the 
Chalcidians.5 In the summer of 430, but before the beginning of the new 
archon-year, Hagnon was sent to Poteidaea.^ On his arrival, Phormio had 
^ Fornara Generals 53. 
2 Lewis Hesperia 28 (1959) 215 (253), 228; id. /HS 81 (1961) 118. 
3 Develin Officials 101. It should perhaps be pointed out that if Callias were to belong to III, 
it is then possible that he is forming another double with Phormio, who almost certainly 
came from Paeania (see also Bicknell Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy 108-9). 
Despite the fact that there is no certain evidence for a triple, there is no reason why they 
could not exist on the model for electoral procedure suggested below. 
4 Th. 1.64.2, 65.2; cf. Diodorus who claims that Phormio was sent as a replacement for Callias, 
who had died (Diod. 12.37.1). 
5 Th. 2.29.6. 
6 Th. 2.58; Develin Officials 117. 
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already withdrawn.^ This might suggest that Hagnon was elected specifically 
for the campaign in Thrace. A t the elections of 431/0, Phormio was, in effect, 
the sitting candidate. He would probably be re-elected, according to Pierart's 
system, as the first choice. This would make Hagnon, the northern expert, 
second choice. I t seems preferable to assume that the assembly elected 
Hagnon alongside of Phormio, being well aware of the difficulties in Thrace 
and his expertise. 
Hagnon's campaign at Poteidaea continued into the new archon-year 
of 430/29.2 His election for this year must have taken place not long before 
his departure in the summer of 430 (at the end of the archon-year 431/0). 
That the election of new generals must have pre-dated his despatch (though 
preparations for the expedition could well have begun before the election) 
suggests that he was elected w i t h the campaign to Poteidaea and its 
continuation into the new year i n mind, this being the first Athenian action 
after the elections of 430. He must have been elected in the f u l l knowledge 
that the campaign, which was sent out so late in the previous archon-year, 
w o u l d still be in progress; that is, he must have been a "first choice". But 
Phormio does not seem a likely "second choice", as we next hear of him 
when he is sent in the winter to Naupactus, a strategically important place, 
and an area w i t h which Phormio had special connections.^ Similarly, in 
429/8, Phormio was at Naupactus and Hagnon in Thrace.^ Both remained 
in the regions wi th which they were specially competent to deal. Both have 
the appearance of having been elected to their commands because they were 
the ones suited to them. Under such circumstances it is anomalous to speak 
of f i rs t and second choices. Both these men must have been elected by a 
system which allowed the right man to get the job. 
1 Th. 2.58.2. 
2 Gomme H C T 2.164; Develin Officials 117; Fomara Generals 53-4. 
3 Th. 2.69.1. 
4 Th. 2.80.4, 83-95, 102-3, (for difficulties with Th. 2.95.3, see 133-4 above). 
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This gains extra support f r o m the election of Asopius the son of 
Phormio i n 428/7. Presumably because Phormio was no longer available, 
the Acarnanians requested that either a son or a kinsman of Phormio be 
sent to them. The Athenians complied and sent Asopius.^ Apparently, the 
electoral system was such that Asopius' election could be assured. I f 
nominations were called f rom the floor at the assembly, as they wou ld be 
under the Hansen system, and i f other candidates were permitted to stand 
against an already successful candidate, there does not seem to be a high 
enough p robab i l i t y that the "appropriate" person w o u l d secure 
appointments. 
To summarise the points made so far, there are a number of criteria 
which need to be met i n any reconstruction of the election of strategoi at 
Athens. Firstly, the generals could be elected because of their specialised 
knowledge or connections which would make them appropriate for a 
particular command when i t was known that such a command wou ld be 
necessary i n the coming year. Secondly, whi le tribal representation in 
election was maintained for the most part, any system of election must also 
allow for doubles or even double-doubles. Thirdly, as a corollary to this, 
some tribes could also be unrepresented. Finally, neither candidate in a 
double was necessarily privileged over the other. So how might the strategoi 
at Athens have been elected? 
One possibility is that there was a pre-selection of candidates made by 
the tribes themselves.2 The tribe wou ld choose f r o m w i t h i n their own 
number candidates they considered suitable for election, and a tribe wi th 
two strong candidates could put forward both of them. This model has two 
1 Th. 3.7.1. It is interesting that the Athenians, before the end of the previous archon-year 
and probably around the time of the spring elections, were preparing another fleet to sail 
around the Peloponnese under Qeippides. This, however, was diverted to Lesbos (Th. 3.3.1-
2). 
2 Bicknell (Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy 105-6) has suggested a similar system 
of tribal pre-selection, though I am less convinced concerning his "alternates". 
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main attractions as far as the evidence is concerned. The first argument is 
f r o m an analogy in the selection for magistracies, such as the archonship 
chosen by sortition. The Athenaion Politeia attributes to Solon a system of 
pre-selection i n the tribes,^ and, i n a controversial passage, writes of pre-
selection i n the demes.2 
Secondly, one can imagine that powerfu l individuals w i th in tribes 
were able to amass enough of a fol lowing wi th in the tribes to secure this 
pre-nomination. Rather than simply selecting candidates f r o m the floor, the 
tribe w o u l d put forward their selection of suitable candidates. The function 
and importance of hetaireiai and groups modelled on the hetaireiai i n 
politics and political activity has already been discussed.^ Although there 
has been debate about how extensively, and i n what ways, such political 
influence was exercised in Athens, there is evidence for the importance of 
tribes and demes, and i t might be easier to advance the cause of a particular 
candidate through a tribal pre-selection than i n an assembly attended by 
several thousand citizens. 
This leaves one dif f icul ty which still must be accounted for, and that 
is double representation. I f we are not going to have a system of election 
where one candidate is elected in a first round and one as a second choice, 
there seem to be two alternatives. 
The f irs t possibility is that a tribe w i t h two strong candidates put 
forward both in the hope that another tribe would be unable to produce any 
candidate. But this does not necessarily work, for i t would depend on the 
order i n which strategoi were elected. For example, i f generals were elected 
i n tribal order, the assembly would know that there were no candidates for 
tribe I , for example, i f they were then to elect two f r o m tribe I I ; but they 
1 [Arist] Ath. Pol. 8.1. 
2 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.5; see Rhodes Comm. 272-4; Whitehead The Demes of Attica 271-77. 
3 See Chapter One 27-8,27 n. 5,46-7. 
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could not know in advance to elect two strong candidates in tribe I I i f there 
were a dearth of candidates f rom tribe I I I . 
The second possibility is that one of the candidates in the double may 
have persuaded another tribe, who d id not have a candidate, to nominate 
h im. The other side of this, and perhaps the most likely, is that a tribe who 
could not put forward a candidate may have asked someone f rom another 
tribe to represent them.i This might be plausible seeing that there are a 
number of tribes who do not seem able to produce a successful candidate 
f r o m among their own ranks, and might be achieved through exploiting 
wider fr iendship networks; and i t is credible that, when the Athenians 
decided to modi fy the tribal principle, they decided to modify i t in this way. 
This model does not answer all the questions. For i t does not explain 
whether tribes put forward a number of candidates, or whether the assembly 
was given no choice but merely "rubber-stamped" the tribal nominations; 
and we simply do not seem to have the evidence to resolve this. However, 
what I have t r ied to suggest is that, i n the l ight of the election of 
"appropriate" men as generals, i t is necessary to re-think the problem and 
construct a model which allows for this possibility. 
1 Jones {Athenian Democracy 127) first suggested a system like this, and was followed by 
Bicknell {Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy 104-7). There may be a parallel for 
this among representatives on the council of five hundred. Sealey {Demosthenes and His Time 
145) suggests as an explanation for Demosthenes' term on the council in 347/6 (Aeschin. 3.62): 
"It could happen that a deme did not have enough volunteers to fill its seats in the council 
and invited an outsider to one of its places." There is an interesting parallel to this tribal 
double representation in a late fourth century inscription from the sanctuary of the Cabiri on 
Lemnos outside the city of Hephaestia (see Accame 4^5^ 4^ 4 19-21 = n.s. 3-5 (1941-3) 76-9). 
Nine proedroi are elected, and there should be one from each of the ten tribes except the 
current prytany, as in Athens (Lemnos was for much of its history an Athenian deruchy). Of 
the nine, however, two are from one tribe, Pandionis, and none are from Erechtheis. This was 
an assembly of initiates (3-4), and Accame suggests the regular assembly of Hephaestia with 
non-iiutiates excluded. One could suppose that there were no bouleutai from Erechtheis who 
were initiates, so the vacancy was filled by a second man from Pandionis. 
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Sparta Non-royal Commands 
Personal overseas connections also seem to have influenced the 
appointment of Spartan non-royal commanders. This w i l l be considered in 
two general categories: f i r s t ly , harmosts, archons and commanders of 
squadrons, troops and ships; and, secondly, the regularly appointed annual 
Nauarchoi.'^ Al though the appointment procedures for both these categories 
of officer are parallel,2 the number of foreign posts prompted by foreign 
friendships varies significantly and they must be explained i n different 
ways. 
Selection of Spartan Non-royal Military Commanders 
Spartan mili tary magistrates seem to have been selected i n either of 
two ways.3 Firstly, i t was dearly the right of the supreme commander of the 
expedition, whether the King or the Nauarchos, to appoint subordinate 
commanders. For example, Brasidas appointed Polydamidas as archon of the 
Mendaeans and Scionians in 423.* Likewise, Agis sent for Alcamenes son of 
Sthenelaedas and Melanthus to be the archons for Euboea.^ Eteonicus was 
sent by the Nauarchos, Astyochus, to Antissa and Methymna as archon,^ 
and lef t by Callicratidas, when he was Nauarchos, as archon at Mytilene.^ 
Appointments could also be made through formal procedure at 
Sparta, though i t is unclear whether this was direct appointment by the 
ephors or election by the assembly. Xenophon tells us that Agesilaus 
received orders d%6 xwv OIKOI xeXwv (probably the ephors),^ that he was to 
have control of the fleet and to appoint as nauarch whomsoever he 
1 Though on the regularity of the appointment, see Appendix B: Spartan Nauarchoi 331 n. 1. 
2 Hodkinson in War and Society in the Greek World 160. 
3 See especially Hodkinson War and Society in the Greek World 159-61. 
4 Th. 4.123.4,129.3. 
5 Th. 8.5.1-2. 
6 Th. 8.23.4. 
7Xen.He// . 1.6.26. 
8 On this expression, see Andrewes H C T 4.23. 
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wished . 1 Similarly, Eudamidas asked the ephors to allow Phoebidas, his 
brother, to bring troops to him at Olynthus.2 Xenophon says that Dercylidas 
was replaced as harmost of Abydus through no fault of his own, but that 
Anaxibius negotiated to become harmost there because the ephors were his 
(t)iXoi.3 This suggests that i t was the prerogative of the ephors to make such 
decisions about leadership, or that they played an influential part i n the 
decision-making process. Finley claims, highlighting the position of elites in 
Spartan society, that the "primary principles of selection were appointment 
and cooptation" and that only the ephors and the gerousia were elected in 
open compet i t ion .4 However, as Lazenby points out, at least for the 
Nauarchoi, the annual tenure of the position implies election.^ 
Other passages, however, suggest that selection was made by the 
assembly of the Lacedaemonians. For example, CalUcratidas, i n response to 
the p l o t t i n g of the fr iends of Lysander, said to an assembly of 
Lacedaemonians that he had been sent by the state to command the fleet 
(vKO x-qq Ko'kEOiq ha xac, vaQc, m^L^Qeiq).^ This may mean no more than 
ratification by the assembly of a decision made by the ephors, or that the 
Spartan assembly voted on a list prepared by the ephors.7 Perhaps the 
solution is selection by the ephors and ratification of the choice by the 
assembly. 
The circumstances of Anaxibius' appointment as harmost at Abydus 
lead us to the next point. As Hodkinson has shown, whatever the 
1 Xen. Hell. 3.427; see also Plut. Ages. 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6. 
2 Xen. Hell. 5.2.24. For a different account of the story (reversing the roles of the brothers) see 
Diod. 15.19.3, 20.3. 
3 Xen. He//. 4.8.32. 
4 Finley Economy and Society in Ancient Greece 29; see also Hodkinson Chiron 13 (1983) 263. 
5 Lazenby Spartan Army 23. 
Xen. Hell. 1.6.5; see also Xen. Hell. 4.8.20. 
See Finley Economy and Society in Ancient Greece 33, whose views on the probable docility 
of the Spartan assembly are approved by Lewis S&P 38; though, as Lazenby notes, the 
opposite may equally be true: that the impression that the ephors decided the appointment 
may indicate no more than their influence in such appointments {Spartan Army 23). 
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procedure, appointees were drawn f r o m the Spartan elite,^ and private 
influence and patronage could play a part in securing appointment.2 
Lysander, a mothax,^ was of noble birth, being a Heraclid, though his family 
was impoverished.'* Cartledge attributes Lysander's rise to high office to the 
patronage of the kings. He suggests that Lysander, given his mothax status 
and his intimate connections wi th Agesilaus, may have been launched on 
his public career under the patronage of Archidamus I I and that Agis may 
have inherited h i m as a client f rom his father.^ Cartledge then concludes 
that "Lysander's appointment as nauarch presumably therefore had the 
support of Agis , i f indeed i t was not actually made on Agis ' personal 
recommendation."^ Using the "network" i n a similar way, Agesilaus is said 
to have been responsible for the Nauarchy of Teleutias, his brother,^ and 
Lysander to have arranged for himself to be sent as harmost against those in 
Peiraeus, and for his brother, Libys, to be Nauarchos of the fleet.^ Hodkinson 
writes that. 
The roles of patronage and inherited social status w i l l have been 
an important reason for the tendencies ... towards the l imitation 
of access to foreign commands and the iteration of posts for those 
few men who were selected.^ 
I n his examination of Spartan non-royal mi l i t a ry appointments, 
Hodkinson has noted three important elements: f i rs t ly , that there were a 
1 Hodkinson War and Society in the Greek World 157-9. 
^Ibid. 161. 
3 Phylarchus FGrHist 81 F 43; Aelian VH 12.43. The mothakes are a group whose exact 
definition is unknown, but probably covered a large group of different types of classes, ranging 
from nothoi to the poor sons of Spartiates; see Lotze Historia 11 (1962) 427-35; Lazenby 
Spartan Army 19-20; Cartledge Sparta and Lakonia 314-5. 
4piut. Lys. 2.1; see also Krentz Comm. 134. 
^ Cartledge Agesilaos 79; cf. de Ste. Croix Origins of the Peloponnesian War 145, 147. 
^ Cartledge Agesilaus 79; on patronage in Spartan society, see Hodkinson Chiron 13 (1983) 
263-4. 
Plut. Ages. 21.1; Cartledge Agesilaos 145-6; see also Hodkinson War and Society in the 
Greek World 161. 
^Xen.Hell. 2.4.28. 
^ Hodkinson War and Society in the Greek World 161. 
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l imi ted number of men who served on commands abroad; secondly, that 
those who were appointed to foreign commands often served abroad for a 
number of years; and, thirdly, that they were men f rom the highest stratum 
of Spartiate society.^ There was, however, a fourth factor which influenced 
selection for commands: foreign friendships. 
Harmosts & Archons 
Below are set out the best examples of harmosts, archons and 
squadron commanders who seem to have gained appointment because of 
their personal connections.2 
Brasidas 
Brasidas son of Tellis^ first appears in Thucydides when he came to 
help against an Athenian attack on Methone i n Messenia.'* He was elected 
eponymous ephor for the year 431 /O,^ perhaps as a reward for his successes 
at Methone.6 He served i n a number of other positions i n the fo l lowing 
years: as one of three symbouloi to Cnemus i n 430/29,^ as a single 
symboulos for Alcidas in 427^ and as a trierarch at Pylos in 425.^ 
I n 424, we f i n d h im preparing an army for Thrace around Sicyon and 
Corinth. io Brasidas' position i n Thrace is interesting. His ostensible motive 
was the liberation of Hellas f rom the Athenians.^i Parke suggests that his 
'^Ibid. 153-9. 
2 For a complete list, see Appendix B: Harmosts & Archons. 
3 Tellis was on of the signatories to the Peace of Nicias and subsequent alliance (Th. 5.19.2, 
24.1). 
4 Th. 2.25.2; Diod.12.43.2. 
5 Xen. He//. 2.3.10. 
6 PL 177. 
7 Th. 2.85.1. 
8 Th. 3.69.1. 
9 Th. 4.11.4. 
10 Th. 4.70.1. 
11 Th. 4.85.1,86.1; see also Lewis S&P 68-9. 
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role was essentially that of harmost.i Thucydides gives two reasons for his 
selection to this command: first ly, because Brasidas himself wanted to go, 
and, secondly, because the Chalddians were eager for h im to come (a-uxov xe 
Bpa(ji5av poD^oiievov \idh.Gia AaKe5ai|i6vioi anioxEiXav 
(jipo'oQ'o\ir\Qr[oav 5e K O I ol XaA,ia5fi(;)).2 As Hodkinson points out, despite 
his earlier b r i l l i an t career, which " w o u l d seem to be an excellent 
demonstration of the significance attached to personal merit in the choice of 
Spartiate leaders", Brasidas was not sent through the positive choice of the 
Spartans.3 Brasidas was also known to have emxiiSeioi i n Pharsalus, w i t h 
whose escort he crossed Thessaly.4 Hodkinson suggests that Brasidas' 
advancement may have depended partly on hereditary factors, saying that: 
"One's suspicions are, however, aroused by the fact that Brasidas had friends 
i n Pharsalos i n Thessaly i n 424."5 This is perhaps supported by the fact that 
not all who wanted to cross Thessaly were able to do so as easily.^ 
However , the request of the Chalcidians was possibly a more 
important consideration. Although Thucydides says nothing directly about a 
personal connection between the Chalcidians and Brasidas, he perhaps 
implies this when he says that the Chalcidians were eager for h im to come, 
and presumably, they had sent ambassadors to Sparta requesting his 
despatch. Though he is not known to have had a prior connection wi th the 
Chalddians, he does have friends as far north as Pharsalus and the origin of 
this friendship is also obscure. 
1 Parke JHS 50 (1930) 42. 
2 Th. 4. 81.1. 
3 Hodkinson CWroM 13 (1983) 261. 
4 Th. 4.78.1 
5 Hodkinson C;«ro« 13 (1983) 263. 
6 Th. 4.132.1-2. 
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Cleaichus son of Ramphias 
Clearchus son of Ramphias followed a career based upon Byzantiimi. 
Al though i t is unknown whether his family was otherwise connected wi th 
the Byzantines, i he was the Spartan Tcpo^evoq of Byzantium .2 In 412 
Thucydides says that he served as a commander i n the Hellespont.^ In 411, 
he was sent to Phamabazus i n the Hellespont w i t h ships,* and in 410 King 
Agis thought i t best to send him, as the 7tp6^evo<; of Byzantium, both to 
Byzantium and to Chalcedon to try to prevent the corn supply getting to 
Athens.5 I n 408, Clearchus was the harmost i n Byzantium.^ 
There are two versions of what Clearchus d i d after the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. Xenophon writes that Clearchus persuaded the 
Spartans that the Thracians were harming the Greeks in Asia Minor , and so 
set sail to make war upon the Thracians l iving about the Chersonese and 
Perinthus.7 Al though the ephors changed their minds after he had gone and 
tried to tu rn h i m back f r o m the Isthmus at Corinth, he d i d not pay any 
attention to them, but kept sailing for the Hellespont.^ I n 403, Cyrus 
befriended h im, gave h im a thousand darics for an army and made him his 
^evoq, and Clearchus used the Chersonese as his base, making war upon the 
Thracians un t i l C J T U S summoned him for his Persian campaign.^ 
Diodorus ' account is rather different. He says that the Byzantines, 
owing to internal trouble and a war wi th the neighbouring Thracians, asked 
the Spartans to send them a commander, and Clearchus was despatched.! o 
However, Diodorus reports, he set himself up in the city as a tyrant, exiling 
1 AndrewesHCT 5.21. 
2 Xen. He//. 1.1.35. 
3 Th. 8.8.2. 
4 Th. 8.39.2, 80.1. 
5 Xen. He//. 1.1.35. 
6 Xen. Hell 1.3.15-20; Diod. 13.66.5-6. 
7 Xen. Anab. 1.1.9, 2.6.2-5. 
^Xen.^lnflfe. 2.6.3. 
9 Xen. Anab. 2.6.4-5; cf. Polyaenus 2.2.6-10. 
10 Diod. 14.12.2. 
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some citizens and putt ing others to death for their money, and establishing 
a large mercenary army.^ When the Spartans heard, they sent ambassadors 
to h i m ordering h im to behave, and then sent troops against h im under the 
command of Panthoidas.2 Since Clearchus d id not think that Byzantium 
w o u l d remain f r iendly after his treatment of the citizens, he moved to 
Selymbria, and f inal ly escaped to Cyrus, who provided h im w i t h money for 
mercenaries.3 Whichever way one reads the story,4 Clearchus still had on-
going connections w i t h the Byzantines which seem to have led to his 
selection for office there i n 412,411,410,408 and possibly 403.5 
Dercylidas 
Xenophon describes Dercylidas as a very resourceful man (|idA,a 
|j,r|xavr|xiK6(^^ and a man who l iked foreign travel i^ikoKobiwioq).'^ 
Dercylidas' career seems to be linked wi th Abydus.^ In 411 he was sent wi th a 
small force to cause the revolt of Abydus,^ and he was also the harmost of 
Abydus dur ing the Nauarchy of Lysander in 407.10 From 399 to 397 he 
commanded the Spartan forces i n Asia Minor,^'^ perhaps remaining i n Asia 
after the end of his command as one of Agesilaus' symbouloi in 396.^2 He 
commanded again in 394, after he had been sent back to the Hellespont by 
1 Diod. 14.12.3. For Clearchus' reputation for harshness, cf. Xen. Anab. 2.6.6-13. 
2 Diod. 14.12.4. 
3 Diod. 14.12.5-9. 
4 I do not think the two stories are entirely incompatible (see Grote History of Greece 8.310 n. 
3), though the anonymous author in R E (vol. 11 (1922) col. 576) treats them as two separate 
series of events with Xenophon's account preceding that of Diodorus. 
^ Though, if we believe Diodorus, his treatment of the Byzantines might well lend suppxjrt to 
Herodotus' assertion that the king appointed Spartan rtpo^evoi (see Chapter Two 60-1). 
^ Xen. Hell. 3.1.8. See also EphorusfGrHist 70F71:T^V yap ov6ev ev xcp xpoTicp AOKCOVIKOV 
o\)5 ajtXouv, dXXa TcoXh TO novovpYov KOO. TO ©ripidaSa;. 8i6 Kod, 2Xau(t)ov aurov oi 
AaKe8ai^6vioi Jtpo(JTiY<ipewv. 
Xen. Hell. 4.3.2. 
8 Cf. Andrewes H C T 5.149. 
9 Th. 8.61.1. 
1 0 Xen. He//. 3.1.9. 
1 1 Xen. Hell. 3.1.8, 3.2.6. 
1 2 Xen. He//. 3.4.6; cf. Xen. He//. 3.4.2; Plut. ^^es. 6.5; Lys. 23.4. On the status of the Thirty 
as symbouloi, see Appendix E : Other Magistracies 390 n. 2. 
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Agesilaus,i and, basing himself at Abydus,2 he rallied at Sestus and Abydus 
the Spartan harmosts who had been ejected by Conon and Pharnabazus 
f r o m the cities after the battle of Cnidus.^ I t is d i f f icu l t to say whether a 
connection w i t h Abydus preceded the revolt of 411, but i t looks i f he may 
have had a connection w i t h the city f rom that time on. Given his other 
qualifications, this connection almost certainly earned h im the post of 
harmost at Abydus and may have been a factor i n his selection for other 
Asian commands.4 
Eteonicus 
According to the received text of Xenophon, Eteonicus was harmost 
of Thasos, but was expelled along w i t h the Spartan sympathisers in the 
summer of 410.^ Some have questioned the reliability of the MSS, however, 
and many have accepted Kahrstedf s emendation of Thasos to lasos on the 
grounds that this was a city i n Tissaphemes' satrapy, and he was accused of 
being involved in the coup.^ Krentz, however, argues in favour of keeping 
the text on the grounds that Lysander later sent Eteonicus to the Thraceward 
region after the battle of Aegospotami, where he was said to have brought 
over everything there to the Peloponnesians,^ saying that this assignment 
"could be explained by Eteonikos' experience in the area."8 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.3.1-3. 
2 Xen. He//. 4.8.3. 
3 Xen. He//. 4.8.3-6. 
4 See Westlake {Historia 35 (1986) 413 (= Studies 245)), who writes that Dercylidas had 
"considerable experience in Asia" prior to being given the command of the expeditionary 
forces in the 390s. 
5 Xen. He//. 1.1.32. 
6 Meiggs The Athenian Empire 577-8; Krentz Comm. 105. 
Xen. Hell. 2.2.5. 
^ Krentz Comm. 105; compare Hodkinson (War and Society in the Greek World 156) on 
Eteoiucus: "a kind of all purpose, often subordinate commander, loyally performing a variety 
of services." 
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The selection for office on the basis of foreign connections was not 
confined to these four examples. Below is a table of all harmosts and 
archons who seem to have won selection on the basis of their connections. 
Harmosts & Archons with relevant connections^ 
(These are marked with t in Appendix B. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B)^ 
Harmost/Archon Connection Years of 
Relevant 
Appointment 
Brasidas son of Tellis Thraceward parts 424 
?Pasitelidas son of Agesander Thraceward parts 423 
?Xenares son of Cnidis Boeotia 420/19 
Clearchus son of Ramphias Byzant ium 412,411,410, 
408 
Eteonicus Thraceward parts (412), 410,405 
?Pedaritus son of Leon Chios 412 
Dercylidas Abydos (411), 407,399, 
394 
?Leon Chios 411 
?Agesandridas Thraceward parts 408 
?Herippidas Thebes (399), ?382-
379 
?Eudamidas Olynthus 382 
?Phoebidas Olynthus 382 
For the harmosts and archons, eighteen of the ninety-six attested 
appointments, that is about nineteen per cent, seem to display connections 
of this k i n d which affected their selection.^ Al though this is not an 
enormous proportion, and a number are not secure, i t is significantly higher 
than is found for the Athenian mil i tary appointments, and, owing to the 
^ In contrast to Athenian strategoi, who have to be re-elected annually, 1 have only counted 
the first year of selection for continuous appointments. 
2 ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 
0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there 
is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics. 
^ Again, there would be no point in a more precise calculation. 96 is the total appointments 
listed in Appendix B: Spartan Harmosts & Archons as possible or certain. An appointment 
continued beyond one year is counted as a single appointment. Men listed as second- or third-
in-command on 336 are not included. 
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dearth of Spartan prosopographical information, probably under-represents 
the t r u t h to a greater extent than the f igure for Athenian mi l i t a ry 
appointments. 
I t is not surprising that one finds men appointed for their foreign 
friendships wi th in this context of social connections. First of all, i t was, by 
the nature of the institution, the men of the social elite who had ^evoi 
overseas. Secondly, one can glimpse how these appointments could be made 
w i t h i n this nexus of relationships, where high-level friends help high-level 
friends to high positions; but even more, this is happening wi th in a society 
where such high-level friendships abroad are also considered important, 
and so easily become one of the criteria for appointment. The fact that the 
man w i t h connections wi th Abydus or Byzantium was generally given the 
post there also goes some way towards explaining why there was such a 
select group of men sent abroad. One of the criteria for the selection was 
their foreign friendships. 
Nauarchoi 
The same cannot be said for the Nauarchoi, particularly in the f i f t h 
century. As w i l l be argued below,^ Antalcidas was selected as Nauarchos in 
the year 388/7 because the Spartans thought this would please the Persian 
satrap, Tiribazus,^ but this is almost an isolated example. Lysander 
represents the only other naval commander who was selected because of his 
connections, but this was in his year as epistoleus, when he could not be re-
elected as Nauarchos. That does not mean that foreign personal friendships 
were not important for such a command. In fact, the charge was made by the 
allies on the appointment of Callicratidas that often, in place of men who 
were suitable ( d v i ' ejtixriSeicDv yiyvoiievcov) and just coming to understand 
^ Chapter Five 213. 
2Xen. He//. 5.1.6. 
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naval matters and who knew wel l how men must be dealt w i t h , the 
Spartans ran the risk of disaster by sending men who were inexperienced in 
naval matters and who were ignorant of the people i n that place (dyvcoxaq 
loiq EKEDA Just how important foreign connections could be is highlighted 
by the careers of three of the Nauarchoi - Astyochus, Lysander and 
Callicratidas - and i t w i l l be instructive to look briefly at the terms of office 
of these men to see how they tried, or d id not try, to use foreign friendships. 
Astyochus 
Though apparently incompetent in his leadership,^ Astyochus tried 
to propagate a personal friendship wi th Tissaphernes and Alcibiades (who 
was w i t h Tissaphernes at the time and was supposed to have great influence 
w i t h the Persian).^ Whether he ultimately intended to exercise such a 
friendship for the benefit of Sparta is unknown. Perhaps, Lewis suggests, 
Pedaritus d id not think so since he wrote to Sparta to accuse Astyochus of 
doing wrong.4 
I t is unclear whether Astyochus was involved in the making of the 
second treaty w i t h Tissaphernes,^ but he is later found to be ingratiating 
himself w i t h the Persian satrap by betraying the letters of Phrynichus to 
Alcibiades, and, on this basis, allegedly trying to attach himself for personal 
gain to Tissaphernes, thus causing fr ict ion between himself and his men.^ 
Nevertheless, whatever the truth of the accusations, i t seems that once the 
mood in Sparta had turned against Tissaphernes, Astyochus, who does not 
seem to have obtained any significant gain by the contact and could only 
1 Xen. Hell. 1.6.4 (The text is corrupt, but the meaning is dear enough). 
2 Lichas was given the power to replace him if he thought it necessary (Th. 8.39.2). 
3 For the apparent friendship of Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, see Chapter Five 200-3. 
4 Th. 8.38.4; Lewis S&P 96. 
5 Andrewes H C T 5.79; Wilamowitz-Mollendorff Hermes 43 (1908) 598-9. 
6 Th. 8.50.2-4, 83.3; Lewis S&P 98-9; for an analysis of this episode, see Westlake ]HS 76 
(1956) 99-104. 
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lose by further contact w i t h h im, i was more than wi l l i ng to jettison the 
fr iendship by backing Hermocrates' accusations against Tissaphernes in 
Sparta.2 
Lysander 
Almost as soon as he had succeeded to the Nauarchy in 407/6, 
Lysander formed a private friendship wi th Cyrus, the son of the Persian 
King , and this was one of the most successful Greco-Persian friendships of 
the period.3 Yet Lysander also established other friendship networks in Asia 
Minor . Diodorus writes that, after visiting Cyrus at Sardis, Lysander's next 
act as Nauarchos was to go to Ephesus and, calling together the most 
inf luent ia l men of the cities,'^ divided them into hetaireiai, and promised 
that, i f he was successful, he would put each in charge of the cities.^ I t was 
through this means, Diodorus claims, that these men gave greater assistance 
than was needed by competing w i t h each other, and Lysander was quickly 
supplied w i t h all the equipment necessary for prosecuting the war.6 It was 
also these ^iXoi of Lysander who plotted against Callicratidas^ and, on his 
death, sent to Sparta asking for Lysander's return.^ Lysander's success in his 
Nauarchy was based upon his willingness to initiate such friendships abroad 
w i t h Greek and barbarian alike, exploiting these networks for his own ends 
as, no doubt, his newly-made friends also did for theirs. 
^ Lewis S&P 113-4. 
2 Xen. Hell. 1.1.31. On Astyochus' feebleness and incompetence (or at least Thucydides' 
portrayal of him as such) see Westlake Individuals in Thucydides 290-307. 
^ See Chapter Five 212-3. 
4 From Xenophon, we know that these included men not only from Ephesus, but also Chios and 
the other allies in Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. 2.1.6). 
5 Diod. 13.70.4. 
^ Diod. 13.70.4; Plut. Lys. 5.5-6; on difficulties with chronology, see Krentz Comm. 137. 
7 Xen. He//. 1.6.4. 
8 Xen. He//. 2.1.6. 
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Call icratidas 
Callicratidas held the Nauarchy between Lysander's two terms of 
office. i Diodorus says of h im - though his tone is generally more favourable 
to this young commander - that he was inexperienced of foreign peoples 
iovKCd xcov ^eviKc3v r\Qm j iempa|i£V0(;),2 and this fact is reflected i n his 
dealings w i t h the Persians and the peoples of Asia Minor . For, unlike 
Lysander, he was unable to secure the help of the people of Ephesus and the 
other cities which supported Lysander, and instead was actively hindered by 
them.3 I n addition, he was not prepared to wait upon Cyrus, but declared 
instead that the Greeks were fools to pay court to barbarians for money, and 
that he wou ld do his best to reconcile Athens and Sparta, i f he were to arrive 
home safely.4 When Cyrus sent h im troops for use i n the battle which was 
to take place at Mytilene and a personal gift , he apparently declined the gift , 
saying that there was no need for a private friendship between himself and 
Cyrus.5 I t was this attitude to foreign friendships that largely marked the 
difference between the Nauarchies of Lysander and Callicratidas.^ 
But w h y were the Nauarchoi not, for the most part, selected according 
to this principle? In the early years of the war, when Spartan experience of 
the sea was l imited, there must have been diff icul ty f inding candidates wi th 
suitable experience. Brunt has pointed out the inferior experience and 
training of the Peloponnesian fleet compared to the ships of Athens,^ and 
Sealey has argued that the Nauarchy did not become a regular office w i t h 
^ Though note that Lysander's second term of office was not as Nauarchos (Xen. Hell. 2.1.7; 
Diod. 13.100.8). 
^ Diod. 13.76.2, noting, however, that it is Callicratidas' moral characteristics that Diodorus 
applauds. 
3 Xen. He//. 1.6.4. 
4 Xen. He//. 1.6.7; Lewis S&P 117. 
5piut.Mor. 222 e; Krentz Comm. 150. 
^ For a further discussion of the relationship between Callicratidas and Cyrus, see Chapter 
Five 210-1. 
Brunt Phoenix 19 (1965) 259-60. 
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annual tenure unt i l approximately 409, when large fleets were operating for 
long periods of time at a great distance f rom Sparta.^ I n this way the problem 
came to perpetuate itself, for un t i l the Spartans were regularly able to 
maintain a fleet where men could, in turn, gain leadership experience, the 
d i f f icu l ty of selecting suitably qualified men remained. 
Hodkinson suggests a tension between birth and merit as the factors 
influencing a man's career, contrasting the brilliant i f somewhat slow rise of 
Brasidas w i t h the undistinguished career of the Nauarchos, Alcidas.2 
However , naval abil i ty does not seem to have been a distinguishing 
characteristic of the Nauarchoi of the earlier years of the war when Spartan 
experience at sea was limited.^ Three of the Nauarchoi i n the years 435-404 -
Cnemus, Alcidas and Astyochus - were thought to have conducted 
themselves so badly that symbouloi were sent to them to advise them.4 n 
perhaps wor thy of note that of the symbouloi we know, Brasidas, a man of 
k n o w n energy and ability, was one of the three sent to Cnemus and the 
single symboulos sent to Alcidas,^ and Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a well-
respected Spartiate who had served as an ambassador,^ was sent to 
Astyochus.7 Men of talent and experience in warfare and diplomacy, though 
admittedly not i n naval matters, were used to supplement the shortcomings 
of their commanders. 
I n later years, the Nauarchoi were men of mil i tary experience who 
had held a number of commands both on land and sea. Pollis held the 
1 Sealey Klio 58 (1976) 335-58; see also Andrewes H C T 5.454-5. 
2 Hodkinson Ozfron 13 (1983) 260-3. 
3 Hodkinson C;iiro« 13 (1983) 261-2; d.Lazenhy Spartan Army 20. 
^ Th. 2.85.1, 3.69.1, 76, 8.39.2; compare the symbouloi sent to Agis (Th. 5.63.4); on symbouloi, 
see below 182-3,389-90 (Appendix E) . 
5 Th. 2.85.1, 3.69.1. 
^ See Lewis S&P 97, who writes of Lichas: "the wealthiest man in Sparta, a member of the 
gerousia of long standing, seasoned by diplomatic negotiations at least with Argos, and 
provided, it might be hoped, with useful relationships with foreigners won by his generosity 
to visitors to Sparta"; see also Ijelow on Spartan presbeis 174. 
Th. 8.39.2. Note that the team of advisers with Astyochus were even given the power to 
depose him, if they thought it necessary, and put a certain Antisthenes in his place. 
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Nauarchy i n 396/5, perhaps also in 376/5, and was epistoleus for Podanemus 
i n 393/2.1 Similarly, Teleutias served in a number of commands on land 
and sea, as wel l as doing his tour of duty as Nauarchos, probably in 390/89.2 
The case of Lysander and then, later, Antalcidas suggests that selection on 
the basis of foreign friendships could be an influencing factor i n the 
selection of Nauarchoi, even i f was not i n all appointments. In the earlier 
years, however, one wonders about the accusation of the lonians - that the 
Nauarchoi were men who were inexperienced i n naval matters and who 
were ignorant of the people - and one might suppose that the Spartans were 
not really interested in naval matters themselves or the commanders. I t was 
not un t i l Lysander and Cyrus transformed the Spartan fleet into a force to be 
reckoned w i t h that Spartans really concerned themselves w i t h its fo rm or 
leadership. 
Military Appointments in Other States 
We know very little about military appointments in states other than 
Athens and Sparta, and we have a very small number of names of 
commanders. But we know that these states also had and made use of their 
overseas connections; Hermocrates of Syracuse and his fr iendship w i t h 
Pharnabazus has been discussed i n the previous chapter. 
There is also an example of a Corinthian strategos who won his 
command because of his fore ign fr iendships. Aristeus the son of 
Adeimantus led the Corinthian contingent sent to Poteidaea after the revolt 
i n 432.3 That he was a man of influence i n Corinth is attested by the fact that 
most of the soldiers f rom Corinth fol lowed h im wi l l ing ly and not least out 
1 See Appendix B: Spartan Nauarchoi 333,335 & n. 1. 
2 See Appendix B: Spartan Nauarchoi 334-5, 334 n. 2, Harmosts & Archons 342,343. 
3 Th. 1.60.2. See also Westlake CQ 41 (1947) 25-30; de Ste. Croix Origins of the 
Peloponnesian War 211-2. 
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of a ^iXia for him.^ He was an "appropriate" choice as commander for a 
campaign to Poteidaea, as Thucydides also writes that he was always 
ETcirnSeioq to the Poteidaeans.2 Moreover, when he had given up hope of the 
rescue of Poteidaea, Aristeus escaped but remained among the Chalcidians 
and negotiated w i t h the Peloponnesians about bringing relief to the city.3 In 
the other poleis as wel l , foreign friendships could affect appointment to 
foreign commands. 
Presbeis 
As noted above,"^ one would expect personal connections to be an 
influencing factor i n the selection of ambassadors. Selection for a presbeia at 
Athens was by popular election, a process which automatically favoured the 
upper classes^ and a fact reflected i n how few of the most prominent 
politicians fai led to take part in embassies.^ Similarly at Sparta, presbeis 
were chosen f r o m among the privileged families of the Spartiates.'' 
There was the expectation that a city w o u l d be represented on a 
presbeia by men of repute. Isocrates wrote that "the Athenians sent to the 
more factionalised [of the cities] those of the citizens w i t h the greatest repute 
among them".^ Herodotus says that Megabazus sent as messengers the 
seven Persians who were SoKijicoTaTOi after himself,^ and Diodorus writes 
that the Spartans sent as ambassadors to Athens i n 369 the most illustrious 
(e7a(t)aveaxaxoi) men.io 
1 Th. 1.60.2. His father, Adeimantus, commanded the Corinthians in 480: Hdt. 859.1-61.3, 
94.1-3; schol to Th. 1.60.2. 
2 Th. 1.60.2. 
3 Th. 1.65.1. 
4 108 above. 
5 Herman PCPS n.s.36 (1990) 93; d. Ober Mass and Elite 15. 
^ Adcock & Mosley Diplomacy in Ancient Greece 158. 
Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 52. 
Sjsoc. 12.164. 
9 Hdt. 5.17.1. 
10 Diod. 15.67.1. 
159 
Chapter Four: Magisterial Appointments 
Wealth was a desirable attribute also.^ For example, Tellias, 
ambassador to Centoripa, was the richest man in Acragas,2 and Aneristus 
and Nicolaus, Spartan envoys to Persia, were f r o m families of noble birth 
and great wealth.3 Plutarch also advises that one should take a good orator 
as one's colleague on an embassy,"* and Gorgias, the rhetorician, was sent on 
a mission to Athens on the grounds that he was the most able of all the 
Leontines.^ 
Personal connections could also play an important part i n the 
selection. The main qualification for prospective ambassadors could be that 
they were pleasing and "fr iendly" (eTUXiiSeioq) to the state to which they 
were being sent.^ For example, the Argives sent Eustophus and Aeson to 
Sparta to make a treaty w i t h the Lacedaemonians i n 420 on the grounds that 
they seemed to be ;cpoa(|)iA£axaxoi to the Spartans.^ In 346, the Thebans sent 
an embassy of Philip's ^evoi to Macedon.^ I n 426, the people of Heracleia 
Trachinia sent as a presheutes to Sparta one Teisamenus.^ H o r n b l o w e r 
suggests that he may have been chosen deliberately because of his name in 
order to excite Spartan sympathies,^^ since the Spartans had brought the 
bones of the mythical Teisamenus, son of Orestes, f r o m Helice to Sparta.^i 
In the four th century, Aeschines rejects Demosthenes' claim to have made 
1 Though elective magistracies were paid at higher rates than those chosen by lot: see Ar. 
Acham. 66, 90, 596-617; Jones Athenian Democracy 49. 
2 Diod. 13.83.1-4. 
3 Th. 2.67.1; Hdt. 7.134.2. 
4 Flut. Mor. 819 c; cf. Phaeax son of Eristi-atiis, ambassador to Italy and Sidly in 422 (Th. 
5.4.5), of whom it was said OK; 'kakdv apxczoc^ a&mwiaxoc, XEYEIV ( P C G Eupolis 116 = Kock 
95). 
5 Plato Hipp, maior 282 b; Diod. 12.53.2; cf. Prodicus, Plato Hipp, maior 282 c. 
^ Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 44-5. 
7 Th. 5.40.3. 
8 Dem. 19.140. 
9 Th. 3.92.2. 
10 Comm. 504; id. ^lAOAAKQN 151-2. 
11 Paus. 7.1.8. Leahy suggests that the Spartans engineered this so that, after their similar 
success at bringing Tegea into alliance with the bones of Orestes, they might bring Helice into 
an alliance and that the other Achaean states might follow (Leahy Historia 4 (1955) 30-
4). The attempt, however, seems to have failed. 
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the alliance w i t h Thebes i n 338 on the strength of their sympathy for him^ 
saying that i n the past many men "who were particularly intimate w i t h 
them (oi i idXiaxa olKdcoc; eKeivoiq SiaKEi^evoi )" , had been sent to Thebes 
wi thout making them friends of the Athenians.2 Mosley writes that, since 
ambassadors were wealthy and poli t ically inf luent ia l , they frequenUy 
developed contacts abroad on a personal level, as w e l l as obtaining 
appointments as Ttpo^evoi.^ Herman, on the other hand, reverses the order 
of this, claiming that: 
factually and conceptually private alliances and inter-state treaties 
were inextricably woven - so much so that i t sufficed to mention 
the one to imply the other. Inter-state treaties, as we l l as the 
diplomatic moves that preceded them, went hand in hand w i t h 
the alliances out of which they sprang.^ 
Yet is this a general truth? Did all interstate negotiations always presuppose 
personal connections? Was this true for all states? If we compare trends in 
Athenian and Spartan appointments once more, we w i l l see that there is a 
marked difference i n the extent to which personal connections appear to 
have been influential i n determining selection.^ 
Athens 
I f we turn first to Athens, we can see that there were clearly instances 
where selection seems to have been influenced by an individual ' s 
connections.^ A n d , as w i t h the Athenian strategoi, ambassadors w i t h 
1 Demosthenes was the Theban itp6^Evoc, (Aeschin. 2.141,143). 
2 Aeschin. 3.137-9. Mosley notes (Envoys and Diplomacy 59) that it is "in the case of Thebes 
that individual Athenians are known to have the strongest connections with the state to 
which they were sent." 
3 Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 44. 
4HermanPCPS n.s.36 (1990) 94. 
5 See Mosley TAP>1 96 (1965) 262. 
^ Mosley notes (Envoys and Diplomacy 58): "Frequently envoys did have specific connections 
with the state to which they were being sent, and many instances may be cited." That 
connections did sometimes play a part cannot be refuted; that this was a "frequent" 
phenomenon is not so dear, as will he shown. 
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personal connections were often sent to those states on the edges of Greek 
influence where there was a greater emphasis on personal politics.i Listed 
below are some of the best examples f rom the years 435 to 336: 
Nicias son of Niceratus 
Nicias was one of the three generals who swore to the armistice wi th 
Sparta i n 423.2 The Spartans also conducted their negotiations for peace in 
421 through Nicias and Laches, to the disgust of Alcibiades, who was trying 
to renew his ancient connections wi th Sparta,3 and Nicias is known to have 
had a ^evia w i t h the family of Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, the Spartan 
k ing , perhaps as a result of these negotiations.^ I n addition, when the 
Spartan envoys tried to prevent the Argive/Athenian alliance supported by 
Alcibiades i n 420, Thucydides' narrative makes i t clear that the Spartans 
again were work ing pr imar i ly through Nicias.^ What is more, after the 
earthquake prevented the Athenians making the alliance w i t h the Argives, 
Nicias persuaded the Atheriians to send ambassadors to Sparta, wi th Nicias 
himself as one of them.^ Given his recent relations w i t h Sparta, he was a 
suitable choice.^ 
1 Humphreys The Family, Women and Death 26-7. 
2 Th. 4.119.2. 
3 Th. 5.43.2. 
4 Lys. 18.10. The point is that Pleistoanax was also an oath-taker to the Peace of Nicias and 
subsequent alliance (see Appendix D: Oath-takers 380, 382). Events suggest that the 
connection may pre-date these negotiations, however, and may have, in fact, been used to 
further them. 
5 Th. 5.45.3. Given that the ambassadors who came to Athens in the summer of 420 to stop 
Athens forming an alliance with the Argives were said to be ejan^5eioi of the Athenians, and 
that the Spartan ambassadors who came seem to have been working particularly through 
Nicias, we might guess that either Leon or Philocharidas had some personal connection with 
Nicias, since Endius was the i,evoq of Alcibiades (Th. 8.6.3). Philocharidas seems a likely 
candidate since he was an oath-taker for the armistice with Athens in 423 and swore to the 
Peace in the following year. In both cases he would have been directly involved with Nicias 
in the negotiations (see Th. 4.119.2, 5.19.2, 24.1). 
6 Th. 5.46.2. 
See Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 59. For the Spartans' general regard for Nicias, see also 
Th. 7.86.3-4. 
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Aristophanes son of Nicophemus 
Aristophanes had connections w i t h Cyprus through his father 
Nicophemus (who lived there w i t h his Cyprian wife and their children),^ 
and eagerly supported the interests of Cyprus and Euagoras, king of Salamis, 
i n Athens. When Conon wanted to send someone to Sicily, probably in 
394/3, to persuade Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, to make a marriage 
alliance w i t h Euagoras,2 Aristophanes offered himself and went w i t h 
Eunomus, the (^iXaq and ^evoq of Dionysius.^ In a delicate matter such as this 
and so in t imate ly concerned w i t h Euagoras, Aristophanes was an 
appropriate choice, just as Eunomus was. 
As further evidence of his Cyprian interests, in 390/89 Aristophanes 
entertained the presbeis f r o m Cyprus,^ who had come to seek Athenian 
assistance for Euagoras, and supplied them wi th a large amount of money in 
addit ion to the fleet despatched by the Athenian assembly.^ He was then 
elected as an ambassador to Euagoras; a suitable appointment.^ However, his 
connection w i t h Euagoras also had its price. When the expedition was 
captured by Teleutias on its way to Cyprus, the Athenians in anger recalled 
Aristophanes and his father, Nicophemus, and they were executed without 
trial.7 
Callias son of Hipponicus 
Callias son of Hipponicus was the hereditary Ttpo^evoq of the Spartans 
in Athens, which honour, he boasted, his grandfather had received f rom his 
1 Lys. 19.36, 44; cf. Isoc. 9.57; see also Davies APf 200-2. 
2 Lysias writes that the primary purpose was to detach Dionysius from Sparta and make him 
the (^ihx, and o\)pp.axoc, of Athens. 
3 Lys. 19.19-20. 
4 Lys. 19.27. 
5 Lys. 19.21, 43, cf. 24-7. 
6 Lys. 19.23. 
7 Xen. Hell. 4.8.24; Lys. 19.7. On their execution, see Pritchett The Greek State at War II 25; 
Seager JHS 87 (1967) 113-4. 
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fa ther . 1 His grandfather had served on an embassy to Sparta i n 446 to 
negotiate to secure peace,2 and Callias himself entertained the Spartan 
ambassadors i n his role as Jipo^evoq in 379/8.3 Despite the rather cautious 
political stance of his family,4 Callias served on three embassies to Sparta to 
try to make an end of the war, one of these being i n 371 when he made a 
conciliatory speech before the Spartan assembly for peace.^ His selection was 
obviously based upon his Spartan link. 
Thrasybulus son of Thrason 
Aeschines describes Thrasybulus son of Thrason as a man trusted in 
Thebes as no other (dvfip ev ©T[^ai(; laoxevQeiq ox; ovbeic, exepoc^.^ He was 
probably the maternal uncle of Thrason of Erchia^ (the Athenian jtpo^evoq 
of the Thebans),^ and was accused of raising a revolution i n Boeotia and 
robbing the Athenians of that alliance.^ He was elected as ambassador to 
Thebes i n 378/7 presumably because of his cormection.io 
The fo l lowing table sets out all Athenian ambassadors who seem to 
have been elected on the basis of their connections. 
1 Xen. Hell. 5.4.22, 6.3.4. 
2 Diod. 12.7.1. 
^ Xen. Hell. 5.4.22. 
4 See Davies APP 259-63. 
5 Xen. Hell. 6.3.2, 4. Note, however, that he did lead the Athenian army against Sparta at 
Corinth in 390 (See Chapter Two 58). 
^ Aeschin. 3.138; see also Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 59. 
7 Davies APP 238^0. 
8 Aeschin. 3.138. 
9 Lys. 26.23. 
10IG ii2 43.77 (= Tod 123); cf. Aeschin. 3.138. 
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Athenian Presbeis with relevant connections 
(These are marked with t in Appendix C. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix C)l 
Presbeutes Connection Years of 
Relevant 
Appointment 
Nicias son of Niceratus Sparta 420/19 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias Argos 419/8 
Archeptolemus son of Sparta 411 (under 
Hippodamus 400) 
Ant iphon son of Lysonides Sparta 411 (under 
400) 
Euryptolemus son of Peisianax Pharnabazus 409/8 
Aristoteles son of Timocrates Sparta 404/3 
Aristophanes son of Euagoras of Cyprus 394/3,390/89 
Nicophemus 
394/3 Eunomus Dionysius of Syracuse 
Conon son of Timotheus Persia 393/2 
Callias son of Hipponicus Sparta 387/6,375/4, 
372/1 
Thrasybulus son of Thrason Thebes 378/7 
Pyrrhander Thebes 378/7 
Aristophon son of Thebes ?? 
Aristophanes 
Leodamas son of Eristratus Thebes ?? 
Demus son of Pyrilampes Persia ?? 
Aristodemus (of Metapontum Macedon (348/7), 347/6, 
but working for Athens) 343/2 
Phrynon Macedon 347/6 
latrocles son of Pasiphon Macedon 347/6 
Ctesiphon Macedon (348/7), 347/6 
Aeschines son of Atrometus Macedon 346/5,346/5, 
338/7 
Demosthenes son of Thebes 339/8 
Demosthenes 
Demades son of Demeas Macedon 338/7 
Thrason Thebes ?? 
Archedemus of Peleces Thebes ?? 
1 ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 
0 indicates that a coimection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there 
is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics. 
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Of the one hundred and sixty-three known appointments, thir ty , about 
eighteen per cent, are of men for whom specific connections are attested; not 
a large part of the total appointments.i Conversely, not all those w i t h 
personal connections w i t h a particular state were appointed to all the 
embassies to that particular state, nor d id i t restrict their appointment on 
embassies to other states.2 For example, Mosley cites Callias son of 
Hipponicus, who d i d not take part in the peace negotiations wi th Sparta of 
392/1.3 Demosthenes is another who served on a large number of embassies 
to the Peloponnese, Byzantium and Macedon, but is only known to have 
gone to Thebes once, though he was their 7rp6^evo<;.4 
So what other factors could affect selection? Political aff i l iat ion was 
sometimes a factor.^ A notable example is the ambassadors of 372/1 who 
were sent to Sparta to make peace.^ Callias son of Hipporucus, the first of the 
three speakers, was the hereditary icpo^evoq of the Spartans, as we have seen 
above.7 The second speaker, Autodes, made a speech which would not have 
fo imd favour w i t h the Spartans.^ Callistratus, the third speaker, was looking 
for a compromise between the two states.^ Thus, on this particular embassy, 
all the colours of the political spectrum were represented. 
There were sometimes also a number of ambassadors on a single 
embassy f r o m an identifiable political group in Athens. For example, in 
1 These figures can only be approximate owing to the nature of the evidence. 
2 Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 58-9. 
^Ibid. 59. 
4 See Develin Officials for Demosthenes' particular embassies. 
5 Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 59-60; id. TAPA 96 (1965) 263-6. 
6 Xen. Hell. 6.3.2-17. For a likely emendation of the text, see Tuplin L C M 2 (1977) 51-6 
(which I have accepted in Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis 359 n. 1). See also Mosley TAPA 96 
(1965) 264-5; id. PCPS n.s. 8 (1962) 41-6. Compare this embassy with the generals chosen for 
the expedition to Sidly in 415, each of whom represented a different political group. 
7 Xen. He//. 6.3.4. 
® Davies (APF 161) makes Autocles a member of a consistently anti-Spartan family, but the 
revision of Tuplin (loc. cit.). which Rhodes finds "attractive" (CAH V I ^ 579 n. 55), would 
eliminate this link. 
9 Xen. He//. 6.3.10-7. 
166 
Chapter Four: Magisterial Appointments 
409/8, Euryptolemus, the cousin of Alcibiades and one of his mTTi5eioi,i and 
Mantitheus, who was also associated wi th Alcibiades,2 went on an embassy 
to Persia w i t h Pharnabazus.3 In 346, Philocrates and Demosthenes, and 
Nausicles and Aeschines, who seem to be pairs f rom two political groups 
(whatever their differences later on), were all elected for the embassy to 
negotiate peace w i t h Philip.^ This suggests the influence of those specific 
groups i n the assembly at that time.5 
These results are intelligible in terms of what we know or can deduce 
about the way political groups worked in Athens^ and the nomination and 
election of ambassadors. The actual procedure for election seems to have 
varied to a large extent f rom case to case and may have been affected by the 
particular requirements of particular cases. The first step in the selection of 
an embassy was to decide the number of envoys which was to be appointed,7 
then how the nominations were to be taken: whether the candidates were to 
be drawn f r o m all citizens,^ or whether there were to be any Umitations on 
nomination, such as age restrictions or selection f rom a particular board. 
1 Xen. Hell. 1.4.18-19; Thompson TAPA 100 (1969) 583-86; BickneU Athenaeum 53 (1975) 
177; see also Appendix C: Athenian Fresbeis 356 & n. 1. 
2 He escaped with Alcibiades to Clazomenae after being imprisoned by Tissaphemes (Xen. 
Hell. 1.1.10). 
3 Xen. He//. 1.3.13. 
4 See Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis 362-3 and Chapter Seven 253 below. 
^ It is noteworthy that four of the other members of the embassy to Philip had some kind of 
personal connection with him, however tenuous. 
^ See Chapter One 27-8,46-7. 
7 : G i3 61.16-18 (= M L 65);/G ii2 16 b.10-13 (= Tod 103.17-20);/G ii2 204.5-6; see Rhodes 
GR&BS 22 (1981) 130. 
8 I G ii2 31.17 (= Tod 117), IG ii2 116.21-2 (= Tod 147); IG ii^ 360.36-7, 555.18-9, 653.43^; see 
Kienast2?E Supp. 13 (1973) col 527; Mosley WS N.F.6(1972) 141. 
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such as the bouleA In some cases i t could be delegated to the boule to elect 
t h e m . 2 The election itself was conducted by a show of hands in the 
assembly.^ 
Most known Athenian embassies i n the f i f t h and four th centuries 
were made up of two, three, f ive or ten men 4 Mosley claims that, 
ordinarily, only one man was elected f rom each tribe when there was more 
than one envoy to be elected.^ This is rather d i f f icu l t to assess when our 
knowledge of whole embassies is so incomplete, and embassies that were 
elected f r o m two separate groups, such as the citizen body and the boule,^ 
could not easily have a tribal basis, nor does there seem to be the need. In 
any case, we do have examples of embassies which are obviously not based 
upon tribal representation.^ In 384/3, the five-man embassy to receive the 
oaths of the Chalcidians was doubly represented in tribe X, as was the 
embassy to Byzantium in 378/7. Large embassies of ten suggest tribal 
representation,^ and the possible board of negotiators among the oath-takers 
for the Peace of Nicias and alliance wi th the Spartans may well be tribally 
^ See, for example, IG 61.16-7 (= M L 65); Sinclair Democracy and Participation in Athens 
32; five to be elected from the boule and five ft-om all citizens: / G ii^ 16 b.10-2 (= Tod 103.17-
20); Dem. 18.164-5 gives two examples of decrees where ambassadors were limited to the 
houle, but the decrees in the speech On the Crcnm are regularly thought to be inauthentic; 
see, for example, Goodwin Demosthenes. On the Crown 351. 
2 / G vP-16 b.10-1 (Tod 103.18-19);/G ii^ 5485-6. 
2 Aeschin. 2.18. 
^MosleyTAPA 96 (1965) 255,258-60. 
5 Mosley WS n.f.6 (1972) 140; cf. Kienast i?E Supp. 13 (1973) col. 528. 
6 S e e / G ii2 16 (= Tod 103). 
Mosley himself discusses these (WS n.f. 6 (1972) 141-2) but is not convincing. He begins his 
argument from the principle that the rubric "from all Athenians" must have some equivalence 
with the statement made by [Aristotle] that the strategoi were elected "from all" (Ath. Pol. 
61.1: see 126 above), but surely the ' A0r|vaicov djcdvxcov of the inscripdons is a contrast to 
the other kinds of limitations which could be placed upon selection (whether age or 
membership of the boule), and not referring to tribally based election. 
^ But see also Tupl inLCM 2 (1977) 54-5. 
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represented,! but the only embassy where we know a reasonable number of 
the ambassadors and their tribes,^ the first embassy of 347/6 to Macedon, has 
tribe V represented twice, and tribe V I represented three times. This could be 
explained away i f one argued that tribal representation had been abandoned 
by this time, as i t possibly had been in the election of strategoi,^ but without 
more positive evidence for tribal election of embassies, the case is diff icult to 
argue. 
Nominat ion for election seems to have taken place on the assembly 
floor. In his speech On the Embassy , Aeschines writes: 
When these things had been said, Philocrates proposed the 
decree to elect ten men as ambassadors, who would discuss 
peace w i t h Philip and things of common advantage to the 
Athenians and to Philip. Ten men were elected by show of 
hands; I was nominated by Nausicles, and Demosthenes, 
who now brings charges against Philocrates, was nominated 
by Philocrates himself. Demosthenes was so eager for the 
business that he put forward a proposal in the boule, so that 
Aristodemus might be our fellow-ambassador without harm 
to himself, to elect ambassadors for the poleis in which i t 
was necessary for Aristodemus to compete, who w o u l d 
intercede over the penalties on his behalf.^ 
As this demonstrates, members of the same political group were able to 
nominate each other: Nausicles nominated Aeschines,^ and Philocrates 
nominated Demosthenes. I t is not surprising then that there are often 
clusters of different political groups represented on embassies. I t was also 
possible for an indiv idual to nominate himself. For example, Xenophon 
writes that Theramenes offered himself in the assembly to go to Lysander to 
! See Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis for the year 422/1; though it is by no means certain that 
they were negotiators. 
2 The embassy of 372/1 to Sparta displays too many diffiailties with names and demotics to 
be of use for itds pmpose; see Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis 359-60,359 n. 1. 
3 See Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 330 & n. 1. 
4 Aeschin. 2.18-19. 
5 For their friendship, see Aeschin. 2.184. 
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f i n d out the Spartans' intentions for the city,! and, i n 420, Nicias offered 
himself as an ambassador to Sparta.2 Often, however, ambassadors were not 
k n o w n to have had relevant connections but were either men who were 
we l l k n o w n public figures, such as orators:^ Demosthenes, Lycurgus or 
Aristophon of Azenia; or men who are otherwise unknown: Lycaethus who 
went to Sparta i n 371 or Ameiniades son of Philemon, ambassador to 
Sitalces i n 430. 
The passage in Aeschines highlights another point: that the actual 
process of nomination appears to have taken place at the same meeting of 
the assembly at which nominees were voted onA Sinclair, fo l lowing Briant, 
argues that the normal procedure followed was that, after the init ial decree 
by the assembly f ix ing the number of envoys and any special requirements, 
the boule was left to consider nominations and present a list to a subsequent 
meeting of the assembly. The passage f rom Aeschines does not seem to bear 
this out. Rather, i t deals w i t h a normal probouleuma i n favour of 
A r i s t o d e m u s . 5 There is no mention made of the boule pu t t ing forward 
names for the consideration of the assembly. 
Sinclair goes on to say: 
That meeting 'voted' or 'appointed' the envoys. Acceptance of the 
names recommended by the Boule was probably usual, but i t was 
not automatic ... the chief value of the Boule's role was that i t was 
f u l l y informed about relations w i t h foreign states and i t could 
consider the question in detail i n the light of the debate in the 
Ekklesia, but w i t h less restrictions in terms of time, weighing the 
various considerations - the qualifications, experience and 
availability of particular individuals (especially the mover of the 
decree) and the range of opinions on relations w i t h the state 
concerned.^ 
l X e n . H e « . 2.2.16. 
2 See 162 above. 
^ This seems particularly true of the mid-fourth century. 
4 Pierart BCH 98 (1974) 130-139 contra Briant REA 70 (1968) 7-31; Sinclair Democracy and 
Participation in Athens 99. 
SKienastRE Supp. 13 (1973) col. 526. 
^ Sinclair Democracy and Participation in Athens 99-100. 
170 
Chapter Four: Magisterial Appointments 
Al though the Aeschines passage may be a narrative shorthand and not 
concerned w i t h correct procedure, i t does not bear this picture out. On the 
contrary, i t w o u l d seem that on most occasions there was a lack of 
consideration about who wou ld be suitable, except i n the most l imited 
sense. Sometimes the man w i t h the right personal or political associations 
was elected, but not always. This is what one would expect i f the assembly 
were both to nominate and elect candidates and i f the means of nominating 
candidates was so variable. One would expect a larger cross-section of the 
citizen body to be represented. Therefore the inconsistency of the electoral 
procedure at Athens seems to justify the results we have. I t was the men of 
distinction, wealth and ability, generally men wi th public careers who were 
easily seen and ident i f ied, who were selected. Equally, other citizens, 
depending on what special limitations might be required, might f i n d 
themselves representing Athens abroad on diplomatic missions. Not all 
embassies, or even most, were selected because of private friendships and 
connections; there were also other factors involved. 
Sparta 
I n Sparta, Mosley points out that one criterion for selection was 
evidently an attempt to maintain continuity of service between a particular 
ambassador and a state, and that selection could be made on the basis of 
personal ties.i Yet this can be taken a stage further, as those who do serve as 
ambassadors to a particular state more than once are often also known to 
have personal cormections w i t h that state, so that both appear as two parts of 
the same phenomenon. The f o l l o w i n g table sets out a l l Spartan 
ambassadors who seem to have been selected because of their connections: 
Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 51. 
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Spartan Presbeis with relevant connections 
(These are marked with t in Appendix C. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix C)^ 
Presbeutes Connection Years of 
Relevant 
Appointment 
?Melesippus son of Diacritas Athens (432/1), 431 
Aneristus son of Sperthias Persia 430 
Nicolaus son of Bulls Persia 430 
Athenaeus son of Pericleidas Athens 423 
Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas Athens (422/1), 421, 
420,408/7 
Ischagoras Thraceward parts 421 
Lichas son of Arcesilaus Argos 421,418/7 
Leon son of Anticleidas Athens 420 
Endius son of Alcibiades Athens 420,410, 
408/7 
Gylippus T h u r i i 414 
?Pasippidas Persia 408 
Megi l lus Athens 408/7 
Aristomenidas Thebes 396 
Antalcidas son of Leon Persia (393/2), 387/6, 
375,367 
Etymocles Athens (378/7), 
370/69 
Ocyllus Athens (378/7), 
370/69 
Agesilaus Mantineia 371 
?Euthycles Persia 367 
Lysander son of Aristocritus Dionysius of Syracuse ?? 
Twenty-six out of a total of seventy attested appointments, about thirty-
seven per cent, appear to have been selected on the basis of a personal 
connect ion - a markedly higher number than fo r the Athenian 
ambassadors, and all the more startling since we know so l i t t le about 
! ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 
0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there 
is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics. 
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Spartan affairs, i Below is set out a selection of the Spartan ambassadors who 
seem to have connections w i t h the state to which they are being sent: 
Aneristus son of Sperthias and Nicolaus son of Bulis 
Aneristus and Nicolaus were sent to Persia i n 430 along wi th other envoys 
f r o m Sparta, Corinth, Tegea and Argos (though the Argive was acting in a 
private capacity), seeking finance for the war w i t h Athens.^ Their selection 
for this mission does not seem to have been indiscriminate. I n 480, both of 
their fathers, Sperthias son of Aneristus and Bulis son of Nicolaus went to 
Persia to offer their lives to the Persian King i n atonement for Persian 
envoys who had been killed.^ Far f r o m putt ing them to death, however, 
Xerxes decided to show greater mercy than the Spartans had displayed, by 
sparing them.4 Although they possibly had no connections w i t h Persia or 
Persians before this episode,^ some kind of bond at least seems to have been 
formed as a result of their action, so that their sons are then seen to be 
appropriate envoys to gain a sympathetic hearing at the Persian court. In the 
end, Aneristus and Nicolaus d id not arrive at the King's court, but were 
handed over to the Athenians by the Thracian, Sadocus, and were put to 
death.6 
Endius son of Alcibiades 
Endius was the ^evoq of the Athenian Alcibiades.'' In 420, the Spartans 
sent to Athens Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius because they seemed to be 
ETnrnSeioi to the Athenians,^ and the basis for this, at least i n the case of 
^ The figures can only be approximate owing to the poor nature of the evidence. 
2 Th. 2.67.1; Hdt. 7.1372-3. 
3 Hdt. 7.133-6. 
4 Hdt. 7.136.2. 
^ Though they may have had a ^evta connection with Hydames (Hdt. 7.135.1). 
6 Th.2.67.2-4; Hdt. 7. 137.3. 
7 Th. 8.6.3. 
8 Th. 5.44.3. 
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Endius, was presumably personal connection wi th individual Athenians.^ 
Again, i n 410, Endius was sent as the leader on a mission to Athens after the 
battle of Cyzicus to sue for peace.2 Since his earlier ambitions to collaborate 
w i t h Athens' recalcitrant Asian allies and Persia, fostered by Alcibiades,^ had 
come to nothing, Lewis asks the question: "Is he now returning to sponsor 
the o ld Athens-Sparta collaboration, or is he simply here as an Athenian 
specialist?"^ Whatever the answer to the former, the latter at least appears 
to be true. I n 408/7, we probably f i n d Endius in Athens once more, w i t h 
Philocharidas and Megil lus, who is probably to be identif ied w i t h the 
Athenian Ttpo^evoq,^ to ransom the prisoners of war.^ This is clearly an 
instance when Athenian expertise is being used. 
Lichas son of Arcesilaus 
Lichas son of Arcesilaus was the Argive TCpo^evot; in Sparta.^ He was 
an Olympic victor^ and was one of the symbouloi to Astyochus in 412/1 and 
renegotiated the treaty w i t h Tissaphernes.9 He was sent to Argos in 421 to 
renegotiate the Argive alliance,!^ and again in 418 to negotiate for alliance.!^ 
Clearly his selection for these Argive embassies was dependent upon his 
jtpo^evia. 
! For a rather tentative suggestion of a personal relationship between Philocharidas and 
Nidas son of Niceratus, see 162 n. 5 above. 
2 Diod. 13. 52.2. 
3 Th. 8.12.1-3. 
4LewisS&P 114 n. 44. 
5 See Appendix C: Spartan Presbeis 370. 
^ Androtion FGrHist 324 F 44. On the emendation which produces the names of the three 
ambassadors, see Jacoby Supp. 1152-3. 
Th. 5.76.3. His family also seems to have had connections wdth Thasos: see Cartledge L C M 
9 (1984) 102. 
8 Th. 5.50.4; Xen. Hell. 3.2.21; Paus. 6.2.1-3. 
9 Th. 8.39.2, 43.3-4,52; cf. 57.1, 84.5,87.1. 
10 Th. 5.22.2. 
11 Th. 5.76.3. 
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Aristomenidas [Aristomelidas] 
Aristomenidas was one of the five dikastai sent f rom Sparta to try the 
Plataeans i n 427^  - an occasion when a pro-Theban may have been desirable 
- and an ambassador to Thebes i n 396.^ Pausanias describes h im as "being 
fr iendly" (exeiv eTnxriSeici^;) to the Thebans, and Mosley writes that his place 
on the panel of judges at Plataea "gave h im as good a claim as anyone to go 
to Thebes i n 396, especially as Pharax, who was the Theban proxenos, was on 
service away f r o m Sparta at the time."^ 
Selection for presbeia in Sparta 
There seem to be two ways i n which presbeis could be appointed, 
depending on whether the appointment was made on the f ield of battle or 
was by a formal election i n the assembly of the Spartans. Ordinari ly, i t 
seems, ambassadors were appointed by the assembly, probably after a 
resolution had been drawn up by the ephors.^ Xenophon v^ites that when 
the representatives f rom the Peiraeus came to Sparta in 404 to make terms, 
"after they had heard all of them, the ephors and the assembly ( ol eKKXritoi) 
sent f i f teen men to Athens."^ The decision does not seem to have rested 
w i t h the ephorate alone, but i n combination w i t h the assembly, as at 
A t h ens . 6 I t is not k n o w n how one was nominated, but i t is not 
inconceivable, given their powers, that the ephors put together a list which 
merely had to be ratified by the assembly. The importance of a "personal 
1 Paus. 3.9.3; cf. Th. 3.52.2-3. 
2 Paus. 3.9.3. 
3 See also Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 52. 
4KienastJ?E Supp. 13 (1973) col. 526. 
5 Xen. Hell. 2.4.38; see also Xen. Hell. 3.2.23. 
^ Cf. Xen. Hell. 5.2.9, where the ephors are said to have sent the embassy. This is probably 
analogous to passages such as Plut. Per. 29.3, where Pericles is said to have done tliis or that, 
as if on his own initiative (perhaps also Th. 2.22.1). This amounts to a kind of shorthand, 
where the figure or figures who have influence in the decisions are said to have made them, 
whereas in fact the final decision was ultimately the prerogative of the assembly. 
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style" in Spartan politics has already been discussed,i and one could easily 
imagine that the "appropriate" man or his hetaireia might be able to apply 
to or exert their influence upon members of the ephorate to have their 
names included, or indeed that the ephors themselves could hand-pick the 
men w i t h the right k ind of qualifications. 
In the f ie ld , i t seems that the power to select envoys rested wi th the 
king, whose prerogative it was to lead the army. Xenophon explicitly states 
in his treatise on the Spartan constitution, when discussing the power of the 
k ing in the f ield, that "the sending of embassies, both friendly and hostile, is 
also the king's prerogative" (TO |ievxoi TcpeaPeiaq d7t07t£|i7iea6ai Kai ^xhxaq 
Kai TcoJieiitaq, xoxtx ' av ^aailAoiq).^ However, some have found such a 
statement inconsistent w i th the usual powers of the ephors in diplomacy, 
leading Weiske to emend a"6 to ou^ But the emendation is unnecessary. 
Hami l ton , i n his discussion of this passage, cites a number of instances 
when Agesilaus, leading the army, both sent and received envoys,^ and we 
need look no further than Book I I of Thucydides to f i n d an instance when 
Archidamus sent Melesippus son of Diacritas to the Athenians wi th a final 
warning immediately before his first invasion of the plains of Attica.^ There 
are also parallels among the military commanders and harmosts who are 
appointed as the need arises.^ It would be a simple enough choice to make, 
1 See above esp. 105-6. 
^ Xen. Lac. Pol. 13.10. 
3 For argument against emendation, see Hamilton Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan 
Hegemony 47 n. 39. It should be noted that Michell, though he does not discuss this passage, 
has a different view of the two ephors who accompanied the king while he was on a 
campaign. While Hamilton {ihid. 45-6) claims that "they did not interfere with his exercise 
of military command" and they "merely observed matters, unless the king invited them to 
contribute advice" (see Xen. Lac. Pol 13.5), Michell {Sparta 127) writes that "Once war was 
declared the powers of the ephors became greater... When one of the kings went on campaign, 
two of the ephors accompanied him, like the political commissars of Soviet Russia." 
4 y4gesi7flMS and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony 46-7. 
5 Th. 2.12.1. 
^ One such example is particularly pertinent. When, in 394, Dercylidas brought to Agesilaus 
news of the victory in mainland Greece, Agesilaus sent Dercylidas himself back to the 
Hellespont to spread the report. Not only was he the "appropriate" man, as Agesilaus tells 
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as long as the king was given the right information, perhaps even f rom the 
ephors who were there to advise him. 
Thus the elections are consonant w i t h and provide no di f f icu l ty for 
the conclusion that, at Sparta, election to the position of presbeutes seems to 
have been influenced by personal, even hereditary, connections. This is 
consistent w i t h the style of politics prevalent i n Sparta i n the f i f t h and 
four th centuries, where personal connections were all-important. In so far 
as Sparta is concerned, there was a relationship on a personal level behind 
many diplomatic advances, and this is reflected in the types of men who 
were elected to conduct them. 
Oath-takers 
Those who were involved i n the swearing of oaths, as opposed to the 
ambassadors who received the oaths of the other party, were, in most cases, 
a different group f r o m those who negotiated the treaties.^ Those who swore 
the oaths, the "oath-takers", were generally the domestic officials of the polis 
who swore on behalf of the whole polis.'^ In Athens, for example, the boule 
and the generals were usually among those designated to swear.^ During the 
period of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the members of the synedrion 
of the allies were also required to swear.^ I n 367, i n the alliance between 
Athens and Dionysius of Syracuse, Dionysius himself as we l l as the 
magistrates, the boule, the strategoi and the trierarchs swore on behalf of the 
Syracusans.5 The main objective seems to have been to obtain the best 
him, because he actually took part in the battle, but he was also a man who seems to have 
had links v^ dth Asia Minor and Abydus in particular (Xen. Hell. 4.3.1-3). 
1 Mosley PCPS n.s.7 (1961) 59-63. 
2 See Adcock & Mosley Diplomacy in Ancient Greece 216. 
3 See Appendix D: Oath-takers; see also Rhodes The Athenian Boule 43-4. 
4 See, for example, JG ii^ 48.14-5 (= Tod 122); on oath-takers for the Second Athenian 
Confederacy, see also Cargill The Second Athenian League 102-9. 
5 Tod 136.35-7 (= IG ii^ 105 + 523). 
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possible representation of the polls. So in 408, in the treaty Alcibiades made 
w i t h the Selymbrians, those who swore were the strategoi, the trierarchs, 
the hoplites and any other Athenian who was present.i 
Generally, the actual men who swore the oaths remain unknown to 
us, though, as rare exceptions, Thucydides gives us the names of all those 
who swore to the armistice wi th Sparta i n 423,2 and the Peace of Nicias and 
alliance w i t h Sparta i n 421.3 Sometimes lists of names of oath-takers 
appended to decrees have been preserved, or partially preserved,4 so that, on 
the decree recording the alliance between Athens, Perdiccas I I of Macedon 
and Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis, we have a detailed list of Perdiccas' family who 
swore the oaths,^ and we have a list of Thessalians who swore to a treaty 
w i t h Athenians i n about 361/O.^ 
Because of this lack of evidence, i t is diff icul t to say very much about 
the selection of particular individuals as oath-takers, and comments must 
again be confined to Spartan and Athenian examples, though even here 
little real difference can be discerned. 
There is some evidence fo r selection on the basis of foreign 
connections, however. For example, i n 423 Nicias swore to the armistice 
w i t h Sparta as one of the Athenian strategoi, as well as to the Peace of Nicias 
i n 421. His possible connection w i t h Sparta has already been noted above.^ 
Al though the primary criterion in both cases was probably his position as 
strategos, his selection f rom among the members of the board may have 
1 IG i3 118.28-30 (=ML 87); see also Appendix D: Oath-takers 384 n. 1. Compare Chabrias in 
363/2 who swore to the people of lulis in Ceos on behalf of the Athenians (IG ii^ 111.17-18 
Tod 142]) when he came to them after a revolt 
2 Th. 4.119.2. 
3 Th. 5.19.2, 24.1 
4 Though it seems more usual on the whole, at least in Athens, to record the names of 
ambassadors sent to receive the oaths. 
S / G 1^75. 
6 / 0 ii2 175. 
7 See 162 above. 
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been because of his personal interests. This is supported not only by the fact 
that he was a primary figure in the negotiations for the peace and gave i t his 
name, but by the fact that Laches,^ who was also involved in the armistice, 
as the proposer of the decree,^ also appears as an oath-taker for the peace and 
the alliance, probably as one of the generals. 
I f one turns to Spartan oath-takers, the results are more promising. 
Two of the three Spartan oath-takers for the armistice of 423 have known 
Athenian connections. Apart f rom his suggestive name,^ Athenaeus son of 
Pericleidas had other links w i t h Athens, as his father had been the 
ambassador sent to Athens i n the third Messenian war to ask for help.'* 
Then, i n 423, Athenaeus appeared himself as an oath-taker, and was the 
Spartan representative sent to Brasidas in Thrace w i t h the terms of the 
agreement.^ Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas, another of the oath-takers of 
423 and also of 421, served on embassies to Athens,^ and was reputed to be 
ejnTn5£iO(; to the Athenians.^ Again i n 396, when Tissaphernes and 
Agesilaus swore to a treaty, Dercylidas, who had recently himself exchanged 
oaths w i t h Tissaphernes,^ appears as one of the oath-takers representing 
Agesilaus.9 However, i t should be noted that the oath-takers for the Peace of 
Nicias included the two kings, probably the five ephors, and ten others. 
Likewise, a Spartan decree possibly restoring to the Delians their control of 
the sanctuary on Delos about 403 is followed by the names of the two kings 
^ For his possible Spartan connections, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 313 & n. 3. 
2 He does not appear to have been a general in this year, so would have been discounted from 
selection as an oath-taker on this basis. 
3 See Gomme H C T 3.604; compare Lacedaemonius, the son of Gmon, who was named for his 
father's philo-Laconian j)ersuasion (Plut. Cimon 16.1). Cf. Kagan Outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War 267-8. 
4 Plut. Cimon 16.8; Ar. Lysis. 1138-41 (described here as iKtv!\<:^. 
5 Th. 4.122.1. 
^ See Appendix B: Spartan Presbeis 368. 
7 Th. 5.44.3. 
8 Xen. He//. 3.2.19-20. 
9 Xen. He//. 3.4.5-6. 
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and the f ive ephors, who were probably the oath-takers.i The extent to 
which "appropriate" connections could be used was thus l imited. The ten 
men who receive the oaths for the Peace of Nicias and alliance appear in a 
more interesting l ight as the only group out of the seventeen oath-takers 
w h o could have been selected for their connections, but only one, 
Philocharidas, shows any evidence of being selected for the connection.2 
There is not enough evidence to make a comparison between Athens 
and Sparta, but i t may be noted that for both poleis, those who swore to the 
Peace of Nicias and the alliance - almost wi thout exception our largest 
groups of named oath-takers - are not notable for any known personal 
connections w i t h the other state. A l l that can be said, i t would seem, about 
Spartan and Athenian oath-takers is that w i t h i n the more general and 
representative selection of public officials, individuals w i t h personal 
connections could sometimes be chosen among the oath-takers. 
Other Magistracies 
Oikistai 
Alcidas 
I n his time as Nauarchos, he was notable, l ike his predecessor 
Cnemus, for his t imidi ty , dilatoriness and incompetence.3 However, despite 
his apparently poor showing as Nauarchos, i n 426 he was one of the oikistai 
1 Inscriptions de Delos 87 (= Tod 99). It is not clear whether these are oath-takers or not, 
though it seems less likely that they are included for dating purposes, since it is normal 
Spartan practice to use only the eponymous ephor to date decrees (cf. Th. 5.19.1; 8.58.1). The 
names are, however, appended in loruan (presumably by the Delians) though the rest of the 
decree is in Laconian, which may alter the way we should interpret them. 
2 Indeed, the connection may have arisen from this office. 
3 See Westlake Individuals in Thucydides 142-7; Homblower Comm. 400 [who describes him 
as a "disastrous figiire"]; Hodkinson Chiron 13 (1983) 261; see also Lateiner GR&BS 16 
(1975) 175-84, who shows how Thucydides uses similar language to link thematically 
Cnemus and Alcidas, and highlight his censure of Spartan faintheartedness; for a more 
favourable view of Alcidas, see Roisman Historia 36 (1987) 385-421, who defends Alddas as 
prudent rather than slow and cowardly; cf. Badian ]HS 107 (1987) 23. 
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of Heracleia in Trachinia.^ As Hornblower notes he was "not a man whose 
performance i n the East Aegean waters in the earlier part of the book [Bk 3] 
was so brilliant as to prepare us for his further employment in this way".2 
So w h y was he given this appointment? Westlake claims that the 
position was a sinecure,^ and Gomme that he was "rewarded wi th an easy 
post i n the aristocratic manner: perhaps as a compromise between Brasidas 
and his political enemies."'* Roisman^ argues that he was sent there as the 
expert i n maritime warfare, given that the colony was intended as a naval 
base,6 though this seems unlikely since his period of service there was so 
short.'' Hornblower, however, argues that his appointment was due to his 
Heraclid associations.^ Diodorus claims that the Spartans decided to make 
Trachinian Heracleia a great city "both by reason of kinship and Heracles, 
who was an ancestor of theirs" (Kai 5id xfiv aDyyeveiav Kai 6id xov 
'HpaKAia, Ttpoyovov ea\)xd)v ovxa).^ "Kinship" presumably refers to the 
Spartans' alleged kinship w i t h the Dorians of neighbouring Doris; as for 
Heracles, Hornblower points out, one of the names of Heracles was Alcidas, 
and "what was more appropriate than for the Spartans to send a real-life 
Alcidas to bring the colony luck?"^o However, perhaps we can press this 
further and say that by creating the added impression of a kinship link, the 
tie between the colonists and the mother city was made even stronger. 
1 Th. 3.92.5. 
'^0IAOAAKQN 151-2. 
3 Individuals in Thucydides 147. 
4 H C T 2.395. 
5 Roisman His/orifl 36 (1987) 385-421. 
6 Th. 3.92.4. 
7 Th. 5.51.2-52.1; Graham Colony and Mother City 38-9. 
8 Homblower 0IAOAAKnN 151; id. Comm. 506-7. 
9 Diod. 12.59.4. 
10 Homblower 0IAOAAK£2N 151-2. 
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Spartan Symbouioi 
The symbouloi were men appointed to oversee events and advise 
commanders i n the f ie ld . i As discussed above, the symbouloi tended to be 
men of ability, such as Brasidas, or of age and diplomatic experience, such as 
Lichas, and were generally chosen more for their skills than their 
connections. Yet Ischagoras, who was sent to Thrace w i t h Ameinias and 
Aristeus in the summer of 423 "to oversee the affairs of the Spartans",2 was 
also sent to Thrace as a presbeutes in spring 421 to tell Clearidas to hand 
over Amphipo l i s to the Athenians,3 so already has or else develops a 
connection w i t h the area. Lysander, one of the thirty sent in 396,4 had ^iXox 
among the Greeks of Asia Minor and had had great success on his 
campaigns i n the area.5 This may have influenced his selection, though 
Xenophon gives Lysander the credit for prompting the expedition to Asia 
on the grounds that he wished to re-establish his decarchies.^ Antisthenes 
and Aracus, two of the symbouloi to Dercylidas i n 398,^ had prior 
experience i n the Hellespont:^ Antisthenes in the winter of 412/1;^ and 
Aracus had served as Nauarchos (though only in name, not i n deed) in 
405/4,10 and was to be presbeutes in the winter of 370/69." Of the thirty 
who succeeded Lysander's contingent in the fol lowing year, Herippidas had 
m i l i t a r y experience,i2 and Xenocles and Scythes were to serve as 
1 On symboM/oi, see Cartledge/l^esi/flos 212; Westlake Hisfon'a 35 (1986) 417n. 33(= 
Studies 257 n. 33); Hodkinson Chiron 13 (1983) 268; Pritchett Greek States at War II 36-8; 
for a different view of their role, see Roisman Hision'fl 36 (1987) 419-21. 
2 On his status, see Appendix E: Other Magistracies 389 n. 1. 
3 See Appendix C: Spartan Presbeis 368. 
4 On their status as symbouloi, see Pritchett Greek States at War II 37-8. 
5 See above under Nauarchoi 155. 
6 Xen. He//. 3.4.2. 
7 Xen. He//. 3.2.6. 
8 See Westlake Hisfonfl 35 (1986) 417 n. 32 (= Sfurfies 257 n. 32). 
9 Th. 8.39.1-2, 61.2. 
10 Xen. He//. 2.1.7. 
11 Xen. He//. 6.5.33. 
12 Harmost of Heracleia Trachinia in 399 and, later, of Thebes in the period when the 
Spartans held the Cadmeia (see Appendix B: Spartan Harmosts & Archons 341, 343); took 
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ambassadors to Thessaly in 394/3.^ Ramphias, the symboulos to Thrace in 
summer 422, had also been an ambassador to Athens in 432/1.2 By the 
nature of the position, one would expect men of experience - whether this 
was in terms of military or diplomatic skill , or even knowledge of an area 
and connections w i t h the people - so i t would not be surprising i f some 
f r o m among the symbouloi were selected for their foreign friendships. 
Magisterial Appointments and Foreign Friendsliips. 
Appointment to a whole range of magisterial appointments could be 
affected by one's foreign friendships. Not only could men be selected as 
foreign diplomats because of their personal connections, but also as military 
commanders, on land and sea, and oikistai of new colonies. The continual 
selection of the same men can also be explained on this basis, as men wi th 
connections w i t h another state were often sent to that state more than once. 
Yet this was not the only criterion for selection, and the proportion of 
appointments made on this basis varied f rom state to state. 
A comparison of the relative percentages of appointments on this 
basis in Athens and Sparta is very interesting. We do not know all the men 
who were appointed to magistracies in this period, and we probably do not 
know all the foreign connections, but the difference between Athens and 
Sparta is so striking that it is unlikely to be due to the chance of available 
evidence. This difference is also consistent w i t h the patterns discussed in 
Chapter Three: that there is a tendency for Spartans to make a greater use of 
their foreign friendships than Athenians. I n mil i tary appointments, the 
Athenians elected about eleven per cent of their strategoi for their overseas 
over the command of the fleet on the death of Podanemus in 393/2 before the arrival of the 
epistoleus, Pollis (see Appendix B: Spartan Nauarchoi 333 & n. 2). 
1 Plut. Ages. 16.5. 
2 Th. 1.139.3. 
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friendships, whereas about a quarter of the Spartan harmosts and archons 
(laying aside the Nauarchoi) were influenced by this. Among the 
ambassadors, a magistracy where one would expect to find relatively high 
percentages, only eighteen per cent of Athenian ambassadors as opposed to 
the thirty-eight per cent of Spartan ambassadors gained selection because of 
their overseas connections. 
This is not to say that all men with connections undertook 
magistracies directly related to their connections, or that these were the only 
magistracies they performed. Alcibiades did not take part in the negotiations 
with Sparta in 421, despite the lapsed ;tpo^evia which he wanted to renew.^ 
The only thing we know about Boeotius, the Spartan, whose name clearly 
implies Boeotian Unks, is that he served on an embassy to Persia.2 But we do 
not know what other embassies he may, or may not, have served on: such is 
the nature of the evidence. Not all those with connections used them, nor 
were all those with connections used. Indeed, it is impossible to know how 
many men did have private connections: again, the evidence simply fails 
us. What we can say is that there was a predisposition, more marked in 
Sparta than in Athens, to select men because of their connections, and this 
points to the meshing of the public and the private in the Greek world. 
The difference in the proportions of foreign friendships affecting 
foreign posts also highlights some more significant points about the styles of 
political activity in Athens and Sparta and the ethos which underpinned 
their versions of oligarchy and democracy respectively. Spartan political 
activity was clearly conducted within the framework of personal 
connections, and this is not inconsistent with an oligarchy of elites. It was 
easier to take account of relevant connections when appointments were 
^ Th. 5.43.2. 
2 Xen. Hell. 1.4.2; cf. Libys, the brother of Lysander, whose name implies Libyan connections, 
is only known as the Nauarchos of 403 (Xen. Hell. 2.4.28). 
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made ad hoc, as was the case with Sparta's non-royal commanders, than 
when there was a regular annual election, as was the case with Athens' 
strategoi. The same kind of personal associations which secured the acquittal 
of Sphodrias in 378^ could also procure the election of magistrates. Personal 
friendships with men in other states, such as ^evia and Ttpo^evia, form part 
of this same pattern, and so it is not surprising that these were also exploited 
and one finds the Tipo^evoq of a particular state serving as the magistrate to 
that state, or ^evoi in different states acting as the mediums of interstate 
diplomacy. 
In Athens, the case is different. Athens was a democracy, and, as such, 
had supposedly undermined the power of the aristocracy. "Suitable" 
appointments seem to have been made far less often in Athens than in 
Sparta - although there must have been many Athenians with overseas 
connections after half a century of the Delian League. Nevertheless, 
"suitable" appointments were sometimes made. Despite what has been said 
above about annual elections, the Athenians would know to some extent 
where they were likely to need generals in the coming year, so relevant 
connections could be taken into account in giving particular postings to 
men already elected as generals, and in the ad hoc appointment of 
ambassadors. Thus it would seem that the demos was willing to work to a 
limited extent through the aristocratic ethos of friendships and networks of 
friends, to harness its potential for their own ends, rather than to work 
against it. The age of the aristocrat may have been passing away, but it had 
not yet out-lived its usefulness to the Athenian demos. 
Particular problems could arise when the Greeks had to deal not only 
with their fellow Greeks but with non-Greeks, and these will be discussed in 
the following chapters. 
1 Xen. Hell. 5.4.25-33; Diod. 15.29.5-6; Plut. Ages. 25.1-10. 
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Chapter Five: Persia and the Greeks 
Then the king placed Daniel in a high position and lavished many gifts on him. 
He made him ruler over the entire province of Babylon and placed him in charge 
of all its wise men. 
Daniel 2.48. 
Relations between the Greeks and the Persians were constantly 
changing throughout the late fifth and early fourth centuries, as Persia 
supported first one then the other of the major Greek powers. Though 
relegating the Persians to the category of barbaroi,^ the Greek world 
continued to look for the support of the King in their wars against each 
other. The ultimate success of the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War was 
largely dependent on the friendship they contracted with Persia. Likewise, 
the impetus for the Corinthian War in the 390s came with Persian gold, and 
the earlier Common Peace treaties in the fourth century were made with 
Persian backing. 
Nevertheless, Greco-Persian relations were never without their 
difficulties, and a number of questions need to be asked. For example, when 
an ancient writer claims that a Persian and a Greek were (t)lX,oi, what would 
the Persian have understood by this?^ The question is important when one 
is trying to understand the treachery of Persians. Despite the familiar 
"friendship" terms used by andent authors, with the concepts of reciprocal 
relationships and the expectations of a just return that they impUed for the 
Greeks, individual Persians appear to be singularly faithless and unreliable 
1 For the connotations of "otherness" and inferiority attached to such an appellation from the 
fifth century onwards, see Starr Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975) 50; Baldry The Unity of Mankind 
in Greek Thought 22-4; Bacon Barbarians in Greek Tragedy passim; Starr Awakening of the 
Greek Historical Spirit 49-56. 
2 Just as "friend" is an inadequate rendering of the term ^ iloq into English, the question needs 
to be asked what a Persian would mean if he called someone a friend. 
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in maintaining their end of the bargain. The dcTuiaiia of Tissaphernes has 
often been noted,^ displayed most prominently by his treachery towards the 
commanders of the Greek mercenary army.2 Pharnabazus, also, though 
often contrasted with the treacherous Tissaphernes as a faithful Persian,^ 
proved untrue to the Spartan Anaxibius when someone more useful came 
along.4 The rules of friendship as understood in the Greek world do not 
necessarily seem to hold true when Greeks are dealing with Persians: 
Persians do not seem to have the same expectations of the relationship as 
the Greeks do and, as a result, often seem tmscrupulous and treacherous.^ 
This chapter v^ dll attempt, firstly, to give an overview of Greek contact 
with Persia during the period; secondly, to consider Persian gift-giving and 
how this may have affected the Persians' dealings with the Greeks; thirdly, 
to look at the individual cases of Greeks and their Persian friends; and, 
finally, to draw some conclusions about the way in which the Greek world 
was able to interact with the Persian empire, and the reasons for both the 
difficulties with the relationship and the successes. 
Greek contacts with the East 
435-404 
Persia provided the economic backing necessary for Sparta to bring 
the Peloponnesian War to an end and secure her domination in Greece. 
^ Starr Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975) 51; Hirsch The Friendship of the Barbarians 21-9; Lewis 
S&P 151. On Tissaphemes' high-handed treatment of the Greeks, see also Westlake CQ n.s. 
35 (1985) 51-2 (= Studies 174); id. Historia 31 (1981) 257-79 (= Studies 289-309). 
2 Xen. Anab. 2.5.27-6.1; 3.2.4. 
3 Hirsch The Friendship of the Barbarians 22; Starr Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975) 51. Note, 
however, Phamabazus' claim at Xen. Hell. 4.1.32. 
4 Xen. Anab. 7.1.2, 2.7; see Cook The Persian Empire 210. 
5 Although there may be superficial similarities to Greek friendship relationships in the 
ritual of Persian and other non-Greek friendship ceremonies (see Herman Ritualised 
Friendship 44 fig. 9, 51 fig. 4), this thesis will argue that the attitudes to the relationship 
and expectatioiis of it, and so the relationship itself, were profoundly different from one 
culture to the next. 
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From the resources of the Peloponnesian League alone, the Spartans were 
unable to maintain a fleet for long enough periods to train rowers and 
develop new strategies adequate to deal with the Athenian fleet.^ The only 
clear way that sufficient funds could be amassed was through contracting a 
friendship with Persia, a policy difficult for the Spartans, who, Lewis writes, 
held the conviction "that for more than a hundred years they had stood for 
the integrity of all Greek cities against Persia."^ 
Despite this, Archidamus suggested in 432 that Persia should be 
approached for money and ships.^ Indeed, in 431 both the Athenians and 
the Spartans were contemplating Persian aid,"* and in 430 an embassy from 
the Peloponnesian League was sent to Persia,^ though this party was 
intercepted by the Athenians at the Thracian court of their ally, Sitalces.^ 
Again, in the winter of 425/4, one of the Athenian generals arrested a 
Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, on his way to Sparta with a message from 
the Persian King, declaring he did not know what the Spartans wanted, for 
although they had sent many embassies to him, none had said the same 
thing. 7 Athenian ambassadors accompanied Artaphemes to Asia, but, when 
they heard at Ephesus that the King had died, the Athenians returned 
home.8 But the cost of Persian support was the cities in Asia Minor; a heavy 
price for the "liberators" of Greece which they were not yet prepared to pay.9 
Perhaps about 423, the Athenians contracted a "<j)iXia for all time" 
with the Persians - the Peace of Epilycus.^o In 413/2, however, Tissaphemes 
Brunt Phoenix 19 (1965) 259-60. 
2 Lewis S&P 62. 
3 Th. 1.82.1; Lewis S&P 63. 
4 Th. 2.7.1; Lewis S&P 64; Brunt loc. cit. 
^ On the Spartan members of this contingent, Aneristus and Nicolaus, see Chapter Four 173. 
6 Th. 2.67.1-4; Lewis S&P 64. 
7 Th. 4.50.1-2; Lewis S&P 64 n. 93. 
8 Th. 4.50.3. 
9 Brunt loc. cit.; see also Lewis S&P 65-8. 
Andoc. 3.29. The Peace itself is confirmed by an inscription honouring Heradeides of 
Qazomenae. On the restoration and joining of the inscription (IG i^ 227 and IG ii^ 65), see 
M.B. Walbank Z P E 48 (1982) 261-3; id. Z P E 51 (1983) 183-4. Wade-Gery (HSCP Supp. I 
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and Pharnabazus made independent approaches to Sparta promising 
Persian support,^ and Sparta was ready to relinquish her high moral 
position and accepted the offer of Tissaphernes.2 After the revolt of Chios 
and Miletus, the first treaty with Persia was made,^ though the Spartans 
grew discontented with this treaty and a second was made.* However, after 
the eleven symbouloi assigned to assess the performance of Astyochus, the 
current Nauarchos, had arrived, Lichas son of Arcesilaus, the leader of the 
team, repudiated the first two treaties, claiming that the clauses dealing v^th 
the King's territory would enslave all the islands, Thessaly, Locris and 
everything as far as Boeotia, and that, "instead of freedom, the Spartans 
would impose upon the Greeks Persian rule."^ Tissaphemes was offended 
and departed in anger.^ 
Alcibiades defected from the Spartans to Persia, and was acting as an 
adviser to Tissaphemes; he approached the Athenians and suggested that, if 
they overthrew the democracy and took him back, he could obtain 
Tissaphernes' support for Athens.'' When negotiations with the Athenians 
broke down, Tissaphernes made a third treaty with the Peloponnesians.^ 
This third treaty declared: "All the King's land in Asia belongs to the King" 
(1940) 127-32 = Essays in Greek Histon/ Oxford 1958 207-11) argues for a date in 424/3, but 
it appears from Babyloruan evidence discussed by Stolper (AMI 26 (1983) 223-36) that it 
may be hard to fit a treaty with Darius 11 into that year (cf. Lewis C A H 422 n. 132). 
Other suggestions are: 425/4: Murison Phoenix 25 (1971) 24-6,30; 424-18: Thompson Klio 53 
(1971) 119-24; 422/1: BlamireP/ioe«ix 29 (1975) 21-6; just before 415: Raubitschek GR&BS 5 
(1964) 155-7 (= The School of Hellas 6-8). 
1 Because of Athens' support for Amorges (Andoc. 3.29)? Andrewes {Historia 10 (1961) 3-4) 
thinks Andoddes is right, but Westlake {Phoenix 31 (1977) 319-29 (= Studies 103-12)) and 
Kagan {The Fall of the Athenian Empire 29-32) place the change in Persian policy t)efore the 
change in Athenian policy. 
2 Th. 8.5.4-6.2. 
3 Th. 8.17.4-18.3. The main thrust of the treaty was that the cities of Asia Minor should stop 
paying the Athenians tribute, and , as Lewis writes, for Tissaphemes it was "an essential 
preliminary to their starting to pay him, a fX)int on which the treaty has nothing to say" 
(S&P 90-1). On the status of the successive treaties, see Andrewes H C T 5.142-6. 
4 Th. 8.29, 36-7. 
5 Th. 8.43.3. 
6 Th. 8.43.4. 
7 Th. 8.45.1-46.5; 52.1, 56.2-4. 
8 Th. 8.57-8. 
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(Xcopav xfiv PaaiAicoc;, 6ar| zr\c, 'Aaiaq eaxi, PaciXfcoq eivai).^ This, coupled 
with Lichas' statement that it was necessary for the Milesians and other 
peoples in the King's country to be dependent on Tissaphernes in a 
reasonable way and serve him until the war should come to a good 
conclusion, amounted to the handing over of Asia to the King.2 
In the following years down to the fall of Athens and the end of the 
Peloponnesian War in 404, Spartan/Persian relations see-sawed. 
Tissaphernes continued to show himself unreliable in his maintenance of 
the Peloponnesian fleet, and until 407 the Athenians continued to hope that 
they could obtain his support; in 411 Mindarus, the incoming Nauarchos, 
headed for the Hellespont, where Pharnabazus was offering assistance.^ In 
407, Xenophon reports the return of a Spartan embassy from Persia, which 
was led by Boeotius, and claimed that they had received everything they 
wanted from the King.4 Lysander, the most successful Nauarchos of these 
years, struck up a personal friendship with the Persian, Cyrus, as well as 
with the leading citizens of the cities in Asia Minor;^ this brought Lysander 
the resources he needed for ultimately winning the war. 
^ Th, 8.58.2. 
2 Lichas' statement: Th. 8.84.5. See also Lewis S&P 107 & n. 100; see also Brunt Phoenix 19 
(1965) 263. It is unclear, however, what exactly the position of the Greek cities in Asia was 
after this treaty: see Lewis S&P 110-4; Andrewes CAH 478. 
3 Th. 8.99; Diod. 13.38.4-5; see also Th. 8.87; Xen. Hell. 1.1.14, 24-5. It does not seem, however, 
that Mindarus was averse to accepting Tissaphernes' help when it was offered (Diod. 13.45.6, 
46.6,49.4; for Pharnabazus as an error for Tissaphernes in Diodorus, see Lewis S&P 113 n. 42), 
though associations with Tissaphemes were now frowned upon at Sparta (Xen. Hell. 1.1.32; 
see also Krentz Comm. 106). 
4 Xen. Hell. 1.4.2-3. Lewis (S&P 124-5) sees in this a fourth treaty with the King in which 
the autonomy of the Greek states was secured. Kagan (The Fall of the Athenian Empire 332 n. 
28) rejects this, as does Tuplin (Achaemenid History II 133-53), but Andrewes {CAH 489) 
writes that: "Xenophon says nothing of any further concession, but the form of the 
negotiations suggests that the doubtful status of the Greek cities was now regulated: they 
were to be autonomous while they paid tribute to Persia." 
5 Diod. 13.70.3-4; Xen. Hell. 1.5.1-7, 2.1.6; Plut. Lys. 5.5-6. 
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404-386 
In the next period of Greco-Persian relations, Sparta changed in her 
attitude to the King and pursued a course of open hostility, first of all in 401 
by backing the attempted coup of Cyrus.^ On the death of Cyrus, 
Tissaphernes was sent as satrap to the provinces Cyrus had previously ruled 
and demanded straight away that all the cities should be subject to him.2 
Consequently, the Spartans sent Thibron in open was against Tissaphernes 
after an appeal for help by the Asiatic Greeks.3 Finding Thibron 
unsatisfactory, the Spartans sent Dercylidas to take over the command of the 
army in 399.* Perhaps in 397, Timocrates, a Rhodian, was sent to the Greek 
cities, probably by Pharnabazus, with gold to incite war against the Spartans.^ 
In 396, Agesilaus, the Spartan king, was sent to lead the Spartan forces 
in Asia when reports reached Sparta that Tissaphernes and the King were 
assembling a fleet of Phoenician ships.^ During the years of Spartan activity 
in Asia, a series of truces was made in which the Spartans promised to 
withdraw if the Persians left the Greek cities autonomous,7 but these came 
1 Xen. Hell. 3.1.1; Diod. 14.19.2, 4, 21.2; Lewis S&P 138 & nn. 14, 16; Dandamaev A Political 
History of the Achaemenid Empire 286. On Cyrus' mercenary army, see 213-4 below. I accept 
the chronology of Funke {Homonoia und Arche passim) for the years 404-386. 
2 Xen. Hell. 3.1.3; Diod. 14.26.4, 35.2; see also Lewis S&P 119 n. 78,138-9; cf. Andrewes 
Phoenix 25 (1971) 208. On the status of Tissaphernes, see Westlake Hisfona 31 (1981) 257-
8,262 & n. 16 (= Studies 289-90,293, 307 n. 16). 
3 Xen. Hell. 3.1.4; Diod. 14.36.1; Lewis S&P 139. On why the Spartans went to the aid of the 
Asiatic Greeks, see Hamilton Sparta's Bitter Victories 107-9, 111-2; Westlake Historia 35 
(1986) 406-10 (= Studies 240-3). On the Greeks in Asia, see Seager & Tuplin JHS 100 (1980) 
141-54. 
4 Xen. Hell. 3.1.8; Diod. 14.38.2; Lewis S&P 139-40. 
5 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1-25; Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 7.2, 5 = (Chambers) 10.2, 5, which claims 
that Phamabazus sent Timocrates to Greece with the gold in 397 (not Tithraustes and not in 
395, as in Xenophon's account). This finds support at Polyaenus 1.48.3, though Paus. 3.9.7-8 
agrees with Xenophon in making Tithraustes the author of the mission: see Bruce Comm. 58-
60. Note that the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia indicates that the cities were 
already spoiling for war with Sparta: Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 7.2 = (Chambers) 10.2. 
6 Xen. Hell. 3.4.1, 3, 5; Diod. 14.79.1-3; Lewis S&P 141-2 & n. 45; Dandamaev A Political 
History of the Achaemenid Empire 287. Note also the influence of Lysander in this phase, 
and his relationship with Agesilaus: Xen. Hell. 3.3.3, 4.2, 4.7-10; Plut. Lys. 22; cf. Diod. 
14.13; Hamilton Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony 7-9, 16, 19-20, 27-30, 32-7; 
Gray The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 46-9. 
7 For example: 397 - Xen. Hell. 3.2.20; Diod. 14.39.6; 396 - Xen. Hell. 3.4.5. 
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to nothing, and Agesilaus was recalled to the war at home.i In 394, 
Pharnabazus, together with Conon the Athenian, who was in command of 
the Persian fleet, sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and drove out the 
Spartan harmosts, after defeating the Spartans in a naval battle, then crossed 
to Laconia and made raids along the coast.2 
At this point, Sparta looked like winning neither the war in Asia nor 
the Corinthian War, so tried to get a settlement instead.^ Having discovered 
that the Persians, through Pharnabazus, were funding the rebuilding of the 
walls at Athens and maintaining their fleet, the Spartans decided to send 
Antalcidas to inform Tiribazus, the King's general,^ of this in the hope of 
bringing him over to their side and making peace between Sparta and the 
King.5 Ambassadors from Athens, Boeotia, Corinth and Argos also came to 
the talks, which broke down when the Athenians, Thebans and Argives 
refused to agree.^ Tiribazus did not think it was safe to support the Spartans 
openly without the King's approval, but gave money to Antalcidas in secret, 
so that a fleet might be manned,^ and imprisoned Conon.^ Another attempt 
at peace was made later the same year in Sparta, but, although this time the 
terms were more favourable for the Greeks, the negotiations failed.^ The 
King, moreover, maintained his anti-Spartan stand, and, when Tiribazus 
went back to the court, he sent Struthas to take care of the places by the sea.^ o 
^ Xen. Hell. 4.2.2. 
2 Xen. Hell. 4.8.1, 7. For Phamabazus, Conon and Euagoras of Cyprus: Chapter Three 99-100. 
3 Lewis S&P 144. 
4 Underbill {Comm. 157) writes that, as the satrap of Western Armenia during the retreat of 
the Ten Thousand (Xen. Anab. 4.4.4) and one of the royal benefactors (Diod. 15.10.2-4), he 
seems to have succeeded Tithraustes as satrap of Ionia (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28) and as commander 
of the Persian forces in Asia Minor. 
5 Xen. He//. 4.8.12. 
6 Xen. He//. 4.8.13-5. 
7 Xen. He//. 4.8.16. 
8 Xen. Hell. 4.8.16; Isoc. 4.154; Diod. 14.85.4. 
^ Andoc. 3 passim; Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 149; see Ryder Koine Eirene 31-3. For a 
different view, see Badian in Georgica 25-48, esp. 26-34. 
10 Xen. Hell. 4.8.17; Diod. 14.99.1. 
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Athens, although the King was her (^iXoq, began sending aid to Euagoras 
who was now making war on the King, and made an alliance with Egypt.^ 
In 388/7, the Spartans made Antalcidas Nauarchos,^ and sent him on 
an embassy to the King.3 He made terms and returned with Tiribazus.^ 
With the help of Tiribazus and Antalcidas' ^evoq E K nakaiov, Ariobarzanes, 
Antalcidas now took control of the sea.^ The Athenians and the Argives 
were now also eager for peace, and in 386 the King's Peace was made.^ The 
cities in Asia and Clazomenae and Cyprus were given up to the King, and 
all the other Greek cities, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, were declared 
independent.7 Sparta had again conceded the Greeks in Asia to the King -
this time finally - in order to buy supremacy in Greece.^ 
386-362 
In about 380, despite the Common Peace agreement and their new 
pro-Persian stance, Diodorus records that Sparta made an alliance with Glos, 
the Persian admiral, who was in revolt against the King.9 In the second half 
of the 380s, the Egyptian king, Acoris, fought against Persia, and enlisted the 
services of the Athenian, Chabrias.^o Pharnabazus was appointed as the 
commander of the King's forces, and sent ambassadors to Athens to 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.8.24; Ar. Plutus 178; Diod. 14.98.3; see also Lewis S&P 147 n. 73. 
2 Xen. He//. 5.1.6. 
3 Diod. 14.110.2-3. 
4 Xen. He//. 5.1.25. 
5 Xen. He//. 5.1.28. 
6 Xen. Hell. 5.1.29, 31; Diod. 14.110.4. 
7 Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. In a recently discovered inscription, we have evidence suggesting that one 
Ionian state, Erythrae, did not want to be handed over to Persia (SEG 26 1282). 
8 See Ryder Koine Eirene 36, 39. 
9 Diod. 15.9.3.3-5. Glos supposedly offered them large sums of money and made many other 
great promises (Diod. 15.9.4), and the Spartans, according to Diodorus, were seeking a 
plausible excuse for making war on Artaxerxes since they were unpopular in Greece for 
l)etraying the Asiatic Greeks (Diod. 15.9.5). Glos and his son, Tachos, soon died, however, and 
the alliance was never implemented (Diod. 15.18.1, 19.1). Homblower {Greek World 203) 
writes that this is "a curious but not incredible episode"; cf. Ryder CQ n.s. 13 (1963) 105-9. 
Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 70), though he does not seem to doubt Glos made the offer of an 
alliance, finds it impossible that the Spartans accepted. 
0^ Diod. 15.29.1-2. Chabrias was back in Athens to be elected general in 379. 
193 
Chapter Five: Persia and the Greeks 
denounce Chabrias, and asking to be given Iphicrates.^ The Athenians, 
according to Diodorus, were eager to gain the favour of the King and 
Pharnabazus, and so recalled Chabrias from Egypt and despatched 
Iphicrates.2 In 375, another Common Peace was concluded among the Greek 
states on the initiative of the King,3 supposedly so that he could acquire 
Greek mercenaries for his war against Egypt.^ 
In the winter of 369/8, Ariobarzanes sent Philiscus of Abydus to 
Greece with large amounts of money to make peace.^ When the Thebans 
would not agree that Messene should be under the control of the Spartans, 
Philiscus collected a large mercenary army so that he might make war on 
the Spartan side.^ Because of this support, Sparta's position was improved, 
and she remained a threat to Thebes.7 
In 367, another peace conference gathered at Susa.^ Pelopidas, the 
Theban, won the King's favour, but terms were laid down that were 
unacceptable to most of the Greeks. In 367/6, Athens and Sparta retaliated by 
joining in support of the rebel satrap, Ariobarzanes, though the Athenian 
general, Timotheus, was sent with orders not to break the Common Peace.^ 
Another attempt at peace was made in Greece in 366/5,^0 but, despite 
1 Diod. 15.29.3 
2 Diod. 15.29.4. 
3 Diod. 15.38.1; Philochorus FGrHist 328 F151 (see also Jacoby Supp. 1522-3). Antalcidas, the 
Spartan, was again involved in the negotiations in Persia (on tf\is, see 217 below). Diodorus 
(Diod. 15.50.4) also claims that the King was involved in the peace settlement of 372/1 (cf. 
Xen. Hell. 6.3.2-20; Plut. Ages. 27.5-8.4), but this is probably a confusion with the peace of 
375: see Ryder Koine Eirene 124-5; Jacoby Supp. 1522-3. On Antalcidas' possible presence at 
the Persian court in 371 (though this is unlikely), see Ryder Koine Eirene 127. 
^ Ryder accepts that this may well have been the King's actual motive {Koine Eirene 58). 
^ Xen. Hell. 7.1.27. 
6 Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; see also Ryder Koine Eirene 79-80,134-5. 
7 See Homblower Greeit World 229: he thinks Sparta "remained a threat to Thebes". 
8 Xen. Hell. 7.1.33^0; Plut. Pelop. 30.1-8; Diod. 15.76.3; see Ryder Koine Eirene 80-2, 136. 
9 Timotheus: Dem. 15.9; Isoc. 15.111; Nepos Tim. 1.3; Agesilaus: Xen. Ages. 2.26; Nepos Tim. 
1.3; see also Homblower Greefc World 230-2, 237; id. Mausolus 172-4,198,201. 
10 Xen. He//. 7.4.6-11. 
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Diodorus,! the King was not involved.2 In the following years, Persian 
involvement in Greece diminished as the focus of attention changed to 
Macedon. 
362-344 
After Mantineia, Agesilaus went to Egypt to command the mercenary 
forces of the Egyptian rebel king, Tachos, against Artaxerxes.^ Chabrias, the 
Athenian, commanded the naval contingent, but was not sent officially by 
Athens. 4 
Greek involvement with dissident satraps continued into the 350s. In 
355, Chares, in order to raise money, joined Artabazus, the satrap of 
Hellespontine Phrygia, when he revolted from the King, and defeated the 
King's army.5 Artabazus, paying back the favour, gave him a large sum of 
money as a gift ('Apxdpa^O(; djto5i8oi)(; xi\c, ETjepyecRa*; xdpixaq eScopiiaaxo 
7cXfj6o<; xpTi|idxcov)6, from which he bought provisions for the whole army.7 
The King, however, sent ambassadors to Athens to denounce Chares, and 
threatened to join Athens' allies in their war against her.8 According to 
Diodorus, it is this which led the Athenians to bring their war with the 
allies to an end.^ In 353, after the retraction of Athenian assistance. 
1 Diod. 15.76.3. 
2 Ryder CQ n.s. 7 (1957) 199-205; id. Koine Eirene 137-9 contra CawkweU CQ n.s. 11 (1961) 
80-6. 
3 Diod. 15.92.2-3. 
4 Diod. 15.92.3; see also Homblower Greek World 237. Note that the Greeks, including the 
Athenians (the inscription comes from Argos, but the reply to the satraps is in Attic), refused 
any official help to the satraps in an inscription possibly dating to 362/1 (Tod 145). 
5 Diod. 16.22.1. 
^ This clause is loaded with now familiar "friendly" language. As we shall see below, it is 
probably significant that the Persian "gave gifts" (eSfflpT^aaxo) to the Greek as a means of 
"repaying the xopiTC*;". 
7 Diod. 16.22.1-2. 
8 Diod. 16.22.2. 
9 Diod. 16.22.2; cf. 34.1; schol. Dem. 3.31,4.19; see Homblower Greeit World 242-5. 
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Artabazus asked the Thebans for help, and they sent Pammenes and five 
thousand soldiers.^ 
In 344, the King once more planned a campaign against Egypt, and 
sent envoys to all the Greek states inviting them to take part.2 The 
Athenians and Spartans declined,3 though they reaffirmed their (^ikia with 
the King, whereas the Thebans, Argives and Asiatic Greeks despatched 
troops.4 In 340, Philip of Macedon moved against Perinthus, and besieged 
the city.5 Perinthus, however, resisted him, receiving reinforcements from 
Byzantium, and, in addition, the Persian King ordered his satraps to the 
assistance of the dty.^ 
Philip, not the Persian King, was the major preoccupation in Greece 
in the period.7 It is not until 337 that Persia figures again in Greek affairs, 
and this time as the victim of Philip's, then Alexander's, imperialism, not 
the protagonist. 
The Greeks and their Persian ^iXox 
Relations between the Greeks and the Persians in these hundred years 
were interlaced with the interactions of individuals. Diplomatic activity 
between Greece and Persia was not conducted, by and large, on a state level, 
but between individuals, and generally individuals with personal 
connections.^ This is only natural, perhaps, when one party was a monarchy 
supported by a hierarchical system of command, but one must then look at 
1 Diod. 16.34.1-2; see also Homblower Greeit World 247. 
2 Compare Diod. 16.44.1, but Diodoms narrates Persia's successful campaign not c. 343, where 
it belongs, but under 351 /O and 350/49. 
3 Philochoms FGrHist 328 F157; [Dem.] 12.6. 
4 Diod. 16.44.1-2. 
5 Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 54; Diod. 16.74.2; on date, see Jacoby Supp. 1331. 
6 Diod. 16.74.3-76.3; Paus. 1.29.10; Arrian 2.14.5. 
Whatever Philip's own intentions were concerning Asia. 
^ A s we have seen in Chapter Four, the Greek states often dealt with those on the fringes of 
their world or outside on a personal level. 
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the nature of the relationship between these individuals and investigate on 
what terms the relationship was founded and sustained. 
Persians and Gift-giving 
Before we move on to looking at specific instances of Greco-Persian 
friendships, we should consider the Persian form of reciprocal giving, and 
how it differed from the Greek exchange. Although the evidence is not as 
abundant as it is for the Greek world, Persian gift-giving is reasonably well 
documented in the ancient sources.^ Not only do we have the Persepolis 
rehef illustrating the gifts that could be brought to the King,2 but a number 
of Greek writers refer to gifts given by the King to others.^ Gifts flowed out 
from the King on special occasions and at feasts,'^ such as the King's 
birthday,^ or on his accession,^ and gifts were a normal part of the 
hospitality offered to ambassadors.7 Careful account was taken of those who 
performed good deeds, and lists of benefactors were kept so that each could 
be rewarded according to his due.^ There was probably a ranking of 
benefactions, and accordingly gifts were given by the King in retum.^ 
1 Though care must tie used when using Greek sources describing Persian customs: see Endnote 3. 
2 Hdt. 3.89-97 distinguishes tribute in cash levied by Darius from gifts given before Darius 
and by peoples outside the satrapies; but the Persepolis reliefs show gifts in kind continuing 
to be brought; cf. Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 263; Sandsi-Weerdenburg Yauna en Persai 149-
50 (who discusses the difficulties of distinguishing tietween "gifts" and "tribute"; Lewis REA 
91 (1989) 227-8. Note that not all gifts received by the King were thought to be of high 
enough value: Hdt. 3.13.4. 
3 There are many examples of this; for a selection: Hdt. 7.26.2,106.1, 116, 8.10.3,120, 9.110.2; 
Ctesias f GrHisf 688 F 15.49; Th. 2.97.4; Strabo c 733 (15.3.17); Plut. Artax. 22.1-2; cf. P. Briant 
Achaemenid History II 5-6. For the kinds of gifts that could he given by the King, see Knauth 
with Nadjmabadi Das altiranische Furstenideal von Xenophon bis Ferdousi 189-95. 
^Esther 2.18. 
5 Hdt. 9.110.2; cf. Plato Ale. 121 c; on the tukta, see esp. Sancisi-Weerdenburg Yauna en Persai 
147-50. 
^Flut Artax. 26.5; Ctesias FGrHist 688 F 15.49. 
7 See, for example, Timagoras, the Athenian ambassador: Plut. Artax. 22.9-12; Pel. 30.9-12; 
see also Perlman GR&BS 17 (1976) 223-33; Lewis i?E>l 91 (1989) 227-235. 
8 Hdt. 3.140,154.1,160.1-2, 6.30.1, 8.85.3, 90.4; Esther 6.1; Th. 1.129.3; see also Sancisi-
Weerdenburg Yauna en Persai 157-8. 
9 Plut. Pelop. 30.7; Esther 6.1-11; Diod. 17.14.2; Hdt. 3.160.2, 7.106.1; see Lewis REA 91 
(1989) 228; Knauth loc. cit. 
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What did the King receive in return? Not only did he receive 
counter-gifts and tribute, but he also secured the loyalty of his subjects^ and 
their military service.2 The function of the gifts was to "fix" the King in his 
regal superiority. As Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out, the man who can 
give away the most valuable gifts is the most powerful man in the 
community, so that those who receive the gifts from the King receive not 
only an object of value, but also status.3 In addition, the King always took 
care to give a gift in return that was of greater value than the gift given, thus 
putting the giver in a state of debt to the King.4 
But how did this kingly gift-giving differ from the Greek version of 
reciprocity? Firstly, and perhaps foremost, the Persian kingdom was just 
that: a kingdom ruled by a monarch whose personal status was almost equal 
to that of the god himself.^ While Greek reciprocity was stabilised by a rough 
equality of exchange among those outside one's most intimate circle,^ 
Persian reciprocity is marked by inequality. The King gave more than 
anyone else, which, by keeping the recipients in his debt,^ created a power 
imbalance in the relationship.^ 
This kind of imbalance had a number of profound effects. Firstly, the 
King was the dominant partner in any relationship and was able to direct 
1 Cf. Kent Old Persian 119 (DB I §8 1.20-4), 132 (DB IV §63 4.61-7). 
2 Homblower Mausolus 157; id. Comm. 373; Briant Achaemenid History 11 5-6. 
3 Sancisi-Weerdenburg Yauna en Persai 146. 
^ See Sancisi-Weerdenburg Yauna en Persai 74. 
^ Cook T^e Persian Empire 132-135. 
^ Even among those relationships which were unequal (for example, between parent and 
child), Aristotle felt that there should be a kind of equality, since equality Cic6Tr\(^ was a 
characteristic of (^Oda (Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1158 b 27-8). 
^ Cf. Sahlins Tribesmen 86-8 (for a summary, see Chapter One 13-7). 
^ This kind of power imbalance is not exclusively Persian, and could also be used in interstate 
politics to assert a state's donunance. Solomon reinforced his superiority over the Queen of 
Sheba by giving her, as a return for her gifts, everything she asked for, and more than she 
had given him (2 Chronicles 9.9-12). Thucydides' Pericles talks about a similar kind of 
"unbalanced relationship" at Th. 2.40.4-5, where Athens by her generosity keeps the allied 
states in her debt (following Hooker's interpretation of this passage {Hermes 102 (1974) 
164-9) contra Mission The Subversive Oratory of Andokides 114-21); see also Makris "The 
Expectation of Charts from the Performance of Liturgies in Classical Athens" [unpublished]). 
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the relationship and to abandon it whenever he wanted to. Secondly, the 
Persian exchange of "gifts" bears different connotations from exchanging 
"favours".^ A gift is quantifiable and a value can be attached to it. A service 
is more ambiguous, and it is more difficult to assess its value. More 
importantly, the value of a service depends on its context, and the value can 
be reassessed when the circumstances change: a service that might be 
important, and hence valuable, today, might be of no worth because of a 
change in circumstances tomorrow.2 It is noteworthy that the Persians laid 
great store by recording benefactions as they were performed, and giving a 
value to them, and there was a set scale of rewards for particular services. 
The Greeks, on the whole, did not have this strict accounting, though they 
certainly expected a roughly equal retum for services, and did place a value 
upon certain services, which were then rewarded by grants of Ttpo^evia or 
citizenship, though even here there were inconsistencies in the type of 
service which were repaid by such honours, particularly over time.^ 
1 See also Chapter One 41-3. 
2 Finley {World of Odysseus 64) writes: "The word 'giff is not to be misconstrued. It may be 
stated as a flat rule of both primitive and archaic society that no one ever gave anything, 
whether goods or services or honours, without proper recomjjense, real or v^rishful, immediate 
or years away, to himself or to his kin. The act of giving was, therefore, in an essential sense, 
always the first half of a reciprocal action, the other half of which was a counter gift." I am 
not trying to deny this basic creed - that the act of giving, whatever the substance of this, was 
the "gift" - but to investigate some of the subtleties of this. 
3 It is difficult to pin down exactly what constituted a service which could be rewarded by a 
Ttpo^evla, as the formulae in the decrees are not always specific concerning the services 
rendered. Among Walbank's collection, however, W. 40 (though heavily restored) may be a 
grant of npo^evia to a man who helped the Athenian army in Sidly (6-7), and W. 44 a grant to 
a (?)family of Illyrians who helped the "demos and the army of the Athenians" (9-10) [cf. 
W. 55,3-5]. W. 47 praises a certain Heracleides (cf. 191 n. 3 ahiove) who assisted the Atheruan 
ambassadors to the Great King (15-8). W. 90 is a grant of Ttpo^evia to Archelaus of Macedon for 
his assistance in ship-building (25-32) [cf. W. 60]. Yet one cannot he too rigid in defining the 
kind of service that would be rewarded by a grant of repo^evia, since they could be used 
prospectively to produce services, rather than as a reward for services (for example, 
Nymphodorus of Abdera [Th. 2.29]), and, as time went on, the grants became increasingly more 
frequent and linked to other honours (see F.W. Walbank The Hellenistic World 148-9), so 
that the honour of npo^ma itself deaeased in value. Qtizenship, on the other hand, as 
Osborne notes {Naturalization 4.186-204), was awarded for a wide range of activities, and 
could he either honorific or practical, depending on whom the grant was made to. This basic 
difference in the award is hest illustrated seen by the grant made by the Athenians to Cotys, 
king of the Odrysians, ([Dem.] 12.9 (for the emendation: Osborne Naturalization 3.49,122); 
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Thirdly, the attitude of the Greeks and Persians to a common 
relationship seems to differ. As we have discussed above,^ as far as Greeks 
were concerned, anyone, whether from within the community or not, could 
enter into a balanced relationship (and the ^evia relationship is the obvious 
point of contact for those from outside the community). But the Persians did 
not necessarily view those outside their community in the same light. In 
fact, they usually seem to act in a negatively reciprocal way (that is: getting 
the most that they could at the least cost to themselves) towards non-
Persians,2 though they could and did enter into reciprocal relationships with 
non-Persians. What is striking is how often these seemingly balanced 
relationships of a kind between Greeks and Persians end disastrously for the 
Greek concerned. The answer must lie in the inherently "unbalanced" 
nature of the seemingly balanced relationship: the Persian is only willing to 
engage in the relationship for as long as it is of service to himself. In effect, 
he is trying to get the most that he can at the least cost to himself: negative 
reciprocity. 
Greco-Persian Partnerships 
At this point, we wi l l turn to the specific instances of Greek and 
Persian friendships and see what information about such relationships can 
be extrapolated. 
Alcibiades and Tissaphernes 
The partnership between Tissaphernes and Alcibiades was never 
actually formalised in a relationship with a clear understanding of the 
Dem. 23.118) with whom they hoped to maintain a friendly relationship (see Chapter Six 
236-7, 240-3 for a detailed discussion of this), and then their later grants of citizenship and 
gold CTOwns to Python and Heracleides of Aenus, who assassinated Cotys, on the grounds that 
they were euepyeTai (Dem. 23.119; cf. 127). 
1 See Chapter One 34-7,40-1. 
2 This matches more closely Sahlins' original model: see Chapter One 15. 
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obligations; Alcibiades' negotiations with the Athenians merely required 
that i t appear that this was so. Citing Th. 8.47.2 i^ov'Xzxai [Alcibiades] ... 
Ka6eXed)v K a i jtapaoxwv Tiaaa(t)8pvTiv ^iXov avxoiq \^)|i7ioA,ixe'6eiv), as 
evidence of ritualised friendship terminology, Herman lists Alcibiades 
among the ^evoi of Tissaphemes and implies that this was a connection of 
long standing.! However, Tissaphernes and Alcibiades were not ^ E V O I , nor 
even ^iXoi, as a Greek would have understood this.^ Rather, Alcibiades, 
though he tried unsuccessfully to establish a permanent connection with 
Tissaphernes, made an appearance of friendship with the satrap in order to 
convince the Greeks. Tissaphernes, on the other hand, was not averse to 
using the connection, such as it was, for his own purposes when the need 
arose and abandoning it when it was no longer useful to him. 
Alcibiades' first known contacts with Tissaphernes are when 
Alcibiades used his influence in Sparta on behalf of the Chians and 
Tissaphernes in 412.3 Alcibiades later fled to Tissaphernes when Sparta 
! Herman Ritualised Friendship 153 & n. 95, 183, where Herman claims that Alcibiades' 
relationship with Phamabazus was the only one he started with a view to co-operation, but 
that " in most cases he availed himself of well entrenched connections". 
2 At face value, the relationship between them might appear to be one of long standing. 
Firstly, Alcibiades' negotiations with Tissaphemes over the assistance to the Athenians 
were based upon an apparent intimacy with him (Th. 8.46.1,47.1, 2,48.1, 52.1,56.2, 82.2). 
Secondly, in 413 the Spartans favoured the appeal of Tissaphemes and the Chians because 
Alcibiades used his influence on their side (Th. 8.6.3: note also Alcibiades' ^evla with the 
Spartan, Endius). Thirdly, Alcibiades' overseas connections were many and various and could 
conceivably have included the Persian satrap. Although Alcibiades Wmself is not known to 
have had earlier dealings with Tissaphemes, it is possible that the connection may have 
been hereditary, for Alcibiades was known to have other <{)iAoi on the Asia Minor seaboard at 
Miletus and Chios (Th. 8.12,17.2; Plut. Mc. 12.1, Satyrus ap. Athen. 13.534 d, [Andoc] 4.30). 
Tissaphernes himself may have had a distinguished ancestry, perhaps being the son of 
Hydames (Tituli Asiae Minoris 144 c 11-2; Lewis S&P 83-4, 83 n. 4; cf. Cook The Persian 
Empire 167; Westlake CQ n.s. 35 (1985) ^ n. 6 {= Studies 177 n. 6)). Although he is said to 
have received his satrapy after the successful quelling of the revolt of Pissouthnes in Sardis 
around 416 (Ctesias FGrHist 688 F 15.53; for chronology, see Levds S&P 80-1 & n. 198), Lewis 
suggests that Tissaphemes may have had estates near Sardis (Lewis S&P 83-4), and 
Xenophon writes that his home was in Caria (Xen. Hell. 3.2.12-3). It is conceivable then that 
there were earlier contacts between the two families. There is perhaps support for this in the 
fact that when the Spartans grew suspicious of Alcibiades and put a warrant out for his 
execution, he fled to Tissaphemes (TTi. 8.45.1). For doubt that Alcibiades was still with the 
Spartans when the warrant was put out for his execution, see Lewis S&P 96 & n. 62, but also 
Andrewes H C T 5.95-6. 
3 Th. 8.6.3. 
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became too hot for him,^ but such retreats to Persians by Greeks were not 
unprecedented.2 In addition, although Alcibiades used a proposed 
friendship between the Athenians and Tissaphernes to bring about his own 
recall to Athens in 411, Thucydides emphasises that, between the two men 
themselves, there was only an apparent intimacy ( m a a i 5' dv evo^ii^e 
|j.dA,iaxa EK xoiomov, e'l TiGGa^ip\r[c, ^aivoixo amm ejaniSeioq cov [Th. 
8.47.1]; ... xa 58 xov Tto'X£.\iox> Tcpwxov e(t>T| ... jt?iet>aou; dx; Tiooa(l)epvTiv 
Ttpd^eiv. K a l djio xauxri*; xi\q eKKkr\(naq e\)Qvq (oxexo, iva boKf\ jcdvxa l^ex' 
EKeivov KOivo-Oaeai [Th. 8.82.2-3]), that Alcibiades magnified his influence 
v^th the Persian (vjieppaXXcov eneyd^Dve xfiv kamov 5'uva|iiv luapd x(3 
TiGaa<t)epvei [Th. 8.81.2]), and that, in fact, his relations with Tissaphernes 
were not secure (ov yap avxro Tcdvt) xd djto Tioaa(l)epvo'U(; j3ePaia fjv [Th. 
8.56.2]).3 
Alcibiades was an adviser to Tissaphernes, and suggested how he 
should conduct the war to Persia's advantage.^ Tissaphemes, at first, acted 
on his advice, and "gave his confidence (idaxK^ to Alcibiades."^ He was 
willing to go along with Alcibiades largely because of the trouble over the 
alliance with the Spartans and, Thucydides writes, "Alcibiades, because he 
was contending for great things, eagerly attached himself to Tissaphernes 
and courted OepaTce-ocov) him."^ This is not the language of an existing ^iXia 
relationship, though it does suggest that Alcibiades was trying to form one. 
Furthermore, Tissaphemes' treatment of Alcibiades was of a courtier, 
a minion, not a (^iXoq, with all the equahty that that would imply. 7 Indeed, 
1 Th. 8.45.1. 
2 For example, Hippias (Hdt. 6.102, 107.1) and Themistocles (Th. 1.137.3-8.2). 
3 See also Lewis S&P 92. 
4 Th. 8.45-i6. 
5 Th. 8.46.5. 
6 Th. 8.52. 
As Cook notes (The Persian Empire 209), in reference to the Spartan/Persian negotiations of 
412/11, "These Persian grandees were men of dignity and noblesse. They were only too easily 
affronted by bluff egalitarian Spartans. So when the grand Athenian aristocrat Alcibiades 
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when Alcibiades did try to cement the relationship and make it a formalised 
friendship by coming to the Hellespont with ^evia and 6(5pa,i Tissaphernes 
responded by not only refusing to receive the gifts, but also imprisoning 
Alcibiades.2 The relationship between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes 
depended on flattery and utility. When Alcibiades wanted Tissaphernes' 
help he took up an attitude of courtly blandishments, but, when he lost his 
usefulness, Tissaphernes simply got rid of him. In order to convince the 
Greeks, however, Alcibiades pretended to an intimacy and ^iXia which did 
not exist. He tried to play the game by double rules and was ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
Agesilaus and Pharnabazus 
Xenophon recounts the meeting of Agesilaus and Phamabazus as a 
charming vignette in his Hellenica.^ As Gray points out, the theme of this 
story is friendship.'* Agesilaus, having been encouraged by Tithraustes to 
lead his army against the country of Pharnabazus,^ came to Dascyleium.^ 
ApoUophanes of Cyzicus, who happened to be an E K nakaxox) tjbioc; of 
Pharnabazus,7 and who had just become a t,i\oc, of Agesilaus, came to the 
Spartan king and told him that he thought he could bring Phamabazus to 
negotiate about a ^xkxa with him.^ Accordingly, Apollophanes brought 
presented himself as an adviser, Tissaphemes was quick to recognise a more congenial spirit 
and perceive the advantage of a two-faced |X>licy 
1 Herman discusses how a compact of friendship was formally concluded by means of an 
initiation ritual, key elements of which were ^evia or 8c5pa, a highly specialised category of 
gift; Ritualised Friendship 58-69, esp. 60. 
" Xen. Hell. 1.1.9. 
3 Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-40. See also Gray {The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 54) who 
writes: "There are elements in the episode right out of the storytelling manner of Herodotus." 
4 Gray The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 52. 
^ Xen. Hell. 3.4.26. 
6 Xen. He//. 4.1.15 
Note how Phamabazus seems to collect Cyzicenes: see also Th. 8.6.1. 
8 Xen. He//. 4.1.29. 
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Pharnabazus to Agesilaus at the appointed place where Agesilaus sat waiting 
with the Thirty on the grass. ^  
There Pharnabazus reminded Agesilaus of his friendship and alliance 
with the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, comparing his honesty and 
trustworthiness with the double-dealing of Tissaphernes.2 Looking around 
at the destruction of Dascyleium, Phamabazus said, "If I do not know what 
is holy or just, teach me how these are the deeds of men who know how to 
pay back xdpixeq."^ Xenophon says that Agesilaus' Spartan advisers were 
ashamed,** and remained silent, but Agesilaus replied by pointing out that 
men in the Greek states also become ^evoi of each other, and are forced to 
fight against each other when their states are at war.^ Phamabazus repUed in 
tum that if the King sent another as general and subordinated him to this 
man, he would become a ^iXjoq of the Spartans; but if the King assigned the 
command to Phamabazus himself, he would prosecute the war to the best of 
his ability.6 Hearing this Agesilaus took hold of his hand and said, 
O best of men, since you are such a man, may you be a ^iXoq to us. 
Indeed I know one thing: that now I wi l l go away from your land 
as fast as I can, and in future, and if there is war, while ever we are 
able to march against another man, we wil l keep away from you 
and your family.'' 
When the meeting broke up and Phamabazus rode away, his son by 
Parapita remained behind and ran up to Agesilaus saying, "O Agesilaus, I 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.1.30. Xenophon tells us that Phamabazus came wearing a robe of great value, 
and when his attendants began laying rugs down for him, he was ashamed to indulge himself 
seeing the simplicity of Agesilaus (ibid.). The image is striking: the young triumphant 
Spartan king not requiring the pretensions of the old Persian lord; see also Gray The 
Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 56. For an analysis of the preliminaries to the making of 
a friendship, see Herman Ritualised Friendship 46-7, 51-2. 
2 Xen. He//. 4.1.32. 
3 Xen. Hell. 4.1.33. It is interesting, even ironic, that this Persian, who on other occasions has 
chosen to forget the friendship of others and has also been engaged in the war against the 
Spartans now complairis that he is being wronged, that his favours are not being returned. 
** On their status, see Appendix E : Other Magistracies 390 n. 2. 
5 Xen. Hell. 4.1.34. See also Endnote 4. 
6 Xen. Hell. 4.1.37; on the (t)i^viida of the Persian, see also S&P 150-1. 
7 Xen. Hell. 4.1.38; compare Homer Iliad 6.224-31. 
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make you my ^evoq.''^ Agesilaus accepted, and the boy gave to him a 
beautiful javelin and Agesilaus gave in return (dvxeScoKev) a bridle;^ then, 
leaping on his horse, the boy followed his father.^ Xenophon also recounts 
how Agesilaus took care of the boy when, later, his brother had deprived 
him of his satrapy and made him an exile.^ 
Taken at face value, this seems fairly straightforward. Pharnabazus 
recognises that he has "paid" favours which ought to be paid back. He 
refuses to engage in a friendship with the Spartan king, but his son does 
enter into a ^evia relationship with Agesilaus. To all intents and purposes, 
there seems to be a perfect understanding between them of the terms on 
which friendships are made. The first question to answer is whether 
Pharnabazus' reaction to Agesilaus is regulated by their relative social 
positions. As Gray points out, Pharnabazus is of inferior social rank to 
Agesilaus the Spartan King and behaves with the deference appropriate 
when a lesser man is addressing royalty.^ A large part of the point of the 
story is the grace and dignity with which Pharnabazus, being of inferior 
status, declines such an offer.^ One is left to wonder how this affects their 
relative positions in the story and their responses to each other. Is 
Pharnabazus' refusal tempered by his relatively lower status? If he accepted 
the Spartan's offer, would he, to his mind, be merely changing one master 
for another? 
Secondly, and more importantly, the type of friendship they are 
discussing is ^evia. Although Pharnabazus begins by saying, in conventional 
Greek friendship-language, that the Spartans have not paid back the xapiXEc; 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.1.39. 
2 For the formulaic ritual of this scene, see Herman Ritualised Friendship 58-9. 
3 Xen. He//. 4.1.39. 
4 Xen. He//. 4.1.40. 
^ Gray The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 54-5. 
^ Gray says that, "A man so moved by the desire for honour could not properly be called a 
slave of the king when he so clearly was his own man and had the freedom of choice his reply 
indicated" (Ibid. 55-6.). 
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they ought, Agesilaus replies by explaining the conflict of loyalties which 
can occur in terms of ^evia relationship. The tone of the story is typically 
Greek, and there is perhaps an inherent anomaly or irony in the fact that the 
egalitarian ^evia is discussed between apparent imequals.^ We have already 
seen how Alcibiades tried to cement his relationship with Tissaphernes 
through ^evia, and the importance of ^evia in Greek relationships with 
Persians is again emphasised here, and is reinforced by the fact that the story 
concludes with the ^evia between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus' son. 
Alcibiades and Pharnabazus 
Not long after his failed attempt to formalise the relationship 
between himself and Tissaphernes,^ Alcibiades succeeded in estabUshing a 
friendship with Phamabazus. Xenophon records that Alcibiades made oaths 
to the representatives of Phamabazus and Phamabazus, in tum, made oaths 
to Alcibiades' representatives, declaring that they had made a common oath 
( K O I V O V opKOv) and private pledges to each other (l5iQt aXXT\koiq maxsK^.^ 
Immediately after this, Pharnabazus went to the Great King, taking 
ambassadors f rom Athens.^ Two of the members of the mission were 
Alcibiades' men: Euryptolemus, who was also one of Alcibiades' 
representatives at the oath-taking, and Mantitheus.^ One might guess that, 
although this is an official embassy of the Athenians,^ it is "Alcibiades' 
mission", engineered by him, or, at least, heavily influenced by him. 
However, just as Tissaphernes had proved treacherous, Phamabazus 
also proved himself a faithless ^iXoq. When, i t must be supposed. 
^ On the one hand, as noted above, Xenophon points out their inequality of rank, though he 
then implies an equal exchange in the relationship. This apparent contradiction may be an 
indication of Xenophon's own confusions regarding Persian society: see Endnote 3. 
2 Xen. He//. 1.1.9. 
3 Xen. He//. 1.3.12. 
4 Xen. He//. 1.3.13. 
5 Xen. He//. 1.1.10. 
6 Xen. He//. 1.3.8. 
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Pharnabazus found Alcibiades to be dispensable a few years later, he 
organised his death. ^  
Hermocrates and Pharnabazus 
The ill-feeling between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus was well 
known:2 the two satraps were often trying to out-bid each other in the right 
to help the Greeks,^ and in 412 the Spartans decided in favour of 
Tissaphernes.4 However, there was hostility between Hermocrates and 
Tissaphemes over the payment of wages,^ which resulted in Hermocrates' 
returning to Sparta and laying charges against Tissaphemes.^ Xenophon 
writes that it was because of this that, when Hermocrates was exiled by the 
new democratic government in Syracuse in 410^ and was preparing to lead 
an army against the city,^ Phamabazus gave him money before he asked for 
it.9 Diodorus, though he does not provide this background to the friendship, 
also asserts that Hermocrates accepted money from Pharnabazus because of 
their ^iXia.^^ It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, that we find 
Hermocrates, though an exile, a member of the embassy which Pharnabazus 
conducted to the King in 408.!^ 
1 Diod. 14.11.1-4; Plut. Ale. 39.1-7. 
2 Xen. He//. 3.1.9. 
3 See, for example, Th. 8.5.4-6.3. 
4 Th. 8.6.3. 
5 Th. 8.85.3. 
6 Th. 8.85.4; Xen. Hell. 1.1.31. 
For problems with chronology, see Krentz Comm. 105. 
8 Diod. 13.75.2-8. 
9 Xen. He//. 1.1.31. See also Chapter Three 81-2. 
10 Diod. 13.63.2. 
11 Xen. Hell. 1.3.13. Because of his status, it is unlikely that he was an official ambassador 
of the Syracusan government. With him, however, was his brother, Proxenus (Xen. Hell. 
1.3.13). It could be that Proxenus was the representative of the Syracusans and Hermocrates 
was present because of this double connection. 
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Anaxibius and Pharnabazus 
Pharnabazus is generally portrayed in both the ancient and modem 
Uterature as more reliable and trustworthy than Tissaphemes.i Whether he 
necessarily was is another matter. His dealings with Anaxibius show a 
certain want of faithfulness, and he is simply prepared to discard the 
Nauarchos when he no longer needs his help. 
Xenophon recounts how Phamabazus sent to the Spartan Nauarchos 
and asked him to carry the remains of Cyrus' mercenary army out of Asia, 
promising to do whatever was needful.2 Anaxibius then called the generals 
to Byzantium, where he happened to be, and promised them regular pay if 
they would bring their army to the city.3 On the arrival of the soldiers, 
however, he refused to pay them, but announced instead that he was 
sending them home and shut them out of the city.4 When news came to 
Anaxibius that the army was breaking up after their departure from 
Byzantium, he was pleased, since he thought that this would particularly 
gratify (xapi^EoGai) Pharnabazus.^ 
While Anaxibius was sailing home from Byzantium, however, he 
met Aristarchus, the successor to Cleander as harmost of Byzantium, at 
Cyzicus, and Aristarchus reported to him that his own successor to the 
Nauarchy, Polus, was almost at the Hellespont.^ Anaxibius then sailed along 
the Asia Minor coast to Parium, and sent word to Phamabazus as they had 
agreed.7 Yet when Pharnabazus learned that Aristarchus had come as 
harmost of Byzantium and Anaxibius was no longer Nauarchos, he ignored 
Anaxibius and began negotiations with Aristarchus about the same 
ISee 187 above. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.1.2. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.1.3. 
'^Xen.Anab. 7.1.7,12. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.2.3A. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.2.5. 
^Xen.Anab. 7.2.7. 
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arrangements for the army.i Anaxibius was nonplussed when the 
relationship was betrayed in this way.2 The relationship which Anaxibius 
thought he had established with the Persian was easily forgotten when 
someone more immediately useful to Pharnabazus appeared. Anaxibius, 
however, in typical Greek fashion, proceeded to betray his betrayer. His 
retaliation followed quickly, as he summoned Xenophon and arranged for 
him to bring as large a part of the army as he could back into Asia.3 
Lysander and Cyrus 
One of Lysander's first acts as Nauarchos was to establish a personal 
relationship with Cyrus, the young son of the Persian King.4 Diodorus 
writes that Lysander, when he was chosen as Nauarchos, sailed to Asia 
Minor.5 When he heard that Cyrus, who had been dispatched by his father 
to join the war with the Spartans, was at Sardis, he went to him and, 
"stirring up Cyrus' youthful enthusiasm for the war", received from him a 
thousand darics for pay for the soldiers.^ Cyrus accordingly told him, 
according to Diodorus, to ask for more without reserve, since he had been 
enjoined by his father to provide whatever the Spartans asked for.7 
Xenophon is more expansive about this meeting, and his language is 
instructive. He writes that C)a-us originally refused the Spartan ambassadors' 
request for more pay, but that after dirmer, after drinking Lysander's health. 
1 Xen. Anab. 7.2.7; cf. 7.2.12. 
2 See, however, Hirsch (The Friendship of the Barbarians 33-4) who, in his analysis of trust 
and deceit as recurring themes throughout the Anabasis , writes that at this point "Xenophon 
does not revive the familiar refrain of Tersian treachery* when the Persian satrap cheats 
Anaxibius of the promised reward. The theme is no longer a concern. And it would appear all 
too hypocritical when seen in the context of so much Greek treachery." 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.2.8. 
4 For the attitude of an earlier Nauarchos, Astyochus, to Persian friendship, see Chapter 
Four 154-5. 
5 Diod. 13.70.1-2; Xen. Hell. 1.5.1. 
6 Diod. 13.70.3. 
7 Diod. 13.70.3. 
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Cyrus asked how he could gratify (%api^oixo) the Spartan.^ Lysander's reply 
was to ask for more pay for the troops.2 
This is the language of friendship-making and marks only the 
beginning of the partnership between the two. When, on the death of 
Callicratidas, the Chians and the other allies sent presbeis to Sparta to ask 
that Lysander be returned as Nauarchos, presbeis and angeloi also went with 
them from Cyrus requesting the same thing.3 Again, when Lysander 
returned to command the fleet in 405,^ he went to Cyrus for money. 
Although Cyrus had already given to the other Nauarchoi all the money he 
had from his father, he still gave him some.^  Then, when a message came to 
Cyrus from his father saying he was i l l , Cyrus sent for Lysander, refused to 
allow him to join battie unless he had more ships, and assigned to him the 
tribute from the cities which were his personally, reminding him of his 
^ikia with the city of the Spartans and his private ^iXia with Lysander 
himself.^ It was largely through this friendship and the unlimited wealth it 
provided that Lysander and the Spartans finally won the war. 
Callicratidas and Cyrus 
As we have already seen,'' Callicratidas, who held the Nauarchy in 
the year between Lysander's terms of office, took a hard line against Cyrus 
and Persian aid. It should be emphasised here that Cyrus tried to form a 
private ^Evia with Callicratidas, though Callicratidas refused. Plutarch writes 
that when Cyrus sent Callicratidas pay for the soldiers and ^Evia for himself. 
1 Xen. He//. 1.5.6. 
2 Xen. He//. 1.5.6; on Lysander's response, see Krentz Comm. 136. 
3 Xen. He//. 2.1.6-7. 
4 According to Xenophon, he was epistoleus, Diodoms says he went as an idiotes. Aracus was 
officially appointed Nauarchos, though subordinated to Lysander's command (Xen. Hell. 
2.1.7; Diod. 13.100.8). 
5 Xen. Hell. 2.1.11; Andoc. 3.29; Isoc. 8.97. 
6 Xen. Hell. 2.1.13-14; Diod. 13.104.3-4. 
7 See Chapter Four 156. 
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CalUcratidas accepted the pay, but declined to make a private friendship 
between himself and Cyrus, sending back the ^evia, and saying that it was 
not necessary for them to have a private friendship, but that the public (^iXia 
with all the Spartans was enough.^ Once more it is the ^evla relationship 
which features in the attempted friendship. 
Cyrus and the Ten Thousand 
Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon a web of ^evia friendships,2 as 
Cyrus enlisted the help of his Greek ^evoi.3 To Clearchus, a Spartan exile, he 
gave ten thousand darics, with which he kept an army in the Chersonese.* 
Aristippus, Cyrus' Thessalian ^evo^ being hard pressed at home, came to 
Cyrus for three months' pay for two thousand mercenaries.^ Proxenus, his 
Boeotian ^evoc;, came to him with as many men as possible, as did 
Sophaenetus, the Stymphalian, and Socrates, the Achaean, these men also 
being his ^evoi.^ 
Others also joined the army or gave their help because of friendship 
connections. For example, Xenophon himself was there because of his ^evia 
with Proxenus, the Boeotian,^ for Proxenus had sent for him and promised 
he would make him a ^iXoc, of Cyrus.^ Similarly, Menon, a Thessalian, was 
a ^iXaq and b,E\oq of Ariaeus, the commander of C J T U S ' barbarian troops.^ 
Thus many of the Greek commanders in Cyrus' army were the ^evoi of 
Cyrus himself and his companions.i° 
1 Plut Mor. 222 e; Krentz Comm. 150; Lewis S&P 117; d . Xen. Hell. 1.6.18. 
2 See also Herman Ritualised Friendship 45. 
3 On Cyrus' army and its recruitment, see Roy Historia 17 (1967) 285-323, esp. 296-309. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.1.9,3.3. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.1.10. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.1.11. 
7 Xen. Anab. 3.1.4, 5.3.5. 
^ Xen. Anab. 3.1.4. 
9 Xen. Anab. 2.1.5; for Ariaeus, see Xen. Anab. 1.8.5,9.31,10.1. 
1^  Another interesting question is whether the separate armies themselves were made from 
personal connections with the individual Greek commanders. Consideration of the profiles of 
the individual commanders put to death by Tissaphernes yields some interesting points. 
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Agesilaus and Spithradates 
Spithradates was a rebel Persian whom Lysander brought back from 
the Hellespont to Agesilaus.i When Agesilaus arrived in Phrygia in 395, 
Spithradates offered to take Agesilaus to Paphlagonia and bring the king of 
the Paphlagonians to a coriference in order to make him an ally.2 Xenophon 
says that Agesilaus went eagerly, as he had long desired that he might detach 
a state from the King.3 Accordingly, an alliance with the Paphlagonian king, 
Otys,4 was made, and Otys, on the persuasion of Spithradates, left behind 
peltasts and cavalry for Agesilaus' use.^  
Agesilaus, "realising the xdpiq of this" (xdpiv ... xo-uxwv £i5ox;), 
decided to arrange the marriage of the daughter of Spithradates to Otys,^ and 
set about persuading Otys of the advantages of such a match, arguing that 
just as Spithradates was a man who could take vengeance on his enemies, 
he was also a man who could benefit (E-UEpyEXEiv) his ^i'Kox.'^ In this way, 
Agesilaus brought Spithradates, a Persian, under the umbrella of the 
friends/enemies dichotomy, making assumptions for the Persian based on 
his own understanding of the relationship. In addition, by counting him 
among his own <t)iA,oi, Agesilaus imputed the same value system to 
Spithradates. 
Qearchus, it seems, was not the man to be able to raise an army of men adhering to him 
personally through ^iXia or ewoia (Xen. Anab. 2.6.13). Proxenus, the Boeotian, however, 
went with Cyrus thinking himself competent both to command and, through friendship with 
the foremost men, to confer benefits (evepyeTfflv). Thus he was capable of commanding the 
KoXjoi and dyaQoi, but was not competent at inspiring fear or respect in the soldiers (Xen. Anab. 
2.6.16-19). This pierhaps suggests that those immediately under his command may have been 
attached to him in some way, but not the ranks themselves. This would follow Cyrus' own 
model. He was directly connected to his immediate commanders, but not to those under him. 
For an analysis of the social structure of the army on the move, see Nussbaum T?ie Ten 
Thousand. 
1 Xen. Hell. 3.4.10. Presumably this was a "gift" to appease Agesilaus after his disgrace. 
^ Xen. Hell. 4.1.2. 
3 Xen. He//. 4.1.2. 
4 O n the difficulty v«th the name, see Underhill Comm. 118. 
5 Xen. He//. 4.1.3. 
^ Xen. Hell. 4.1.4-15. For an analysis of the moral theme of this story, see Gray The 
Character of Xenophon's Hellenica 49-52. 
7 Xen. Hell. 4.1.8, cf. 10. 
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Yet it actually took very little for Spithradates to betray his friendship 
with Agesilaus. When Herippidas captured one of Pharnabazus' outposts, 
wi th the help of Spithradates' men, Herippidas took all the booty 
Spithradates and the Paphlagonians had seized.^ Spithradates and the 
Paphlagonians were angered by this, and, feeling they had been wronged 
and dishonoured, went away to Sardis to Ariaeus, another Persian who had 
revolted from the King.2 Xenophon claims that nothing more distressing 
happened to Agesilaus during the campaign than the desertion of 
Spithradates, his son, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians.^ This is an 
unexpected ending to this episode. The apparent intimacy between 
Agesilaus and the Persian suddenly seems rather flat. The connection does 
not have the strength Xenophon implies. Like Anaxibius, Agesilaus seems 
to be caught unawares. One can only wonder whether these Greeks really 
understood the Persians as they thought they did; and whether Xenophon 
attributes values to the Persians to which they themselves would not 
necessarily subscribe. 
Antalcidas and Tiribazus 
The Spartans selected Antalcidas as the Nauarchos in 388/7, thinking 
in this way particularly to gratify (xapiCeaOai) Tiribazus.4 The connection 
between Antalddas and Tiribazus may well have begun when the Spartans 
leamed that the Persians were funding the rebuilding of the long walls at 
Athens and maintaining the fleet. They thought that i f they informed 
Tiribazus, the King's general, of this fact, they could either bring Tiribazus 
over to their side or at least put a stop to the maintenance of Conon's fleet.5 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.1.24, 26. 
2 Xen. He//. 4.1.27. 
3 Xen. He//. 4.1.28. 
4 Xen. He//. 5.1.6. See Chapter Four 153. 
5 Xen. He//. 4.8.12. 
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So, in 392, they sent Antalddas to Tiribazus to tell him of these things and to 
try and make peace with the King, though this was imsuccessful.i 
During his Nauarchy, Antalcidas went to the King at Susa in another 
attempt at peace.2 Antalcidas returned from the King with Tiribazus with an 
agreement for an aUiance if the Athenians and their allies would not come 
to terms, but peace was made in 386, after he had obtained the necessary 
leverage by gaining control of the Hellespont.3 
Antalcidas and Artaxerxes 
Antalcidas played an important part in the negotiations for the 
Common Peace treaties in which Persia was involved. Not only was he sent 
to Susa in 387, but Philochorus also provides the information that he was at 
the Persian court in 375.'* Indeed, Plutarch says that as long as the Spartans 
were pre-eminent in Greece, Artaxerxes made Antalcidas his ^ivoq and 
called Antalcidas his (^iko<;,^ and tells how Artaxerxes honoured Antalcidas 
more highly than any other Greek by taking a garland, dipping it in 
perfume, and sending it to him.^ 
After the Spartans had been defeated at Leuctra, when they were in 
need of money, they sent Agesilaus to Egypt (in 362) and Antalcidas to Persia 
(in 367);7 Artaxerxes ignored Antalcidas and overlooked him.^ Plutarch 
says that Antalcidas was so ashamed and afraid of the ephors that he went 
home and starved himself to death.^ Although the anecdote itself may not 
be true, its sentiments are clear enough. Antalcidas was the ^EVOC ; of the King 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.8.124 
2 Xen. Hell. 5.1.6, 25; Diod. 14.110.2-3. 
3 Xen. He//. 5.1.25-32. 
^ Philochorus FGrHist 328 F151. 
5piut. Ar/flx. 22.6. 
^PlutArtax. 22.2;Pelop. 30.6. 
7piut. Artax. 22.6. 
^PlutArtax. 22.7. 
^?\ut.Artax. 22.7. 
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and had certain expectations of the relationship. But Artaxerxes did not see 
the relationship in the same light. As soon as it was no longer serviceable to 
himself, he simply abandoned his ^iXo<;, and he had the power to do that. 
The result for Antalcidas was disgrace and death. 
Pelopidas and Artaxerxes 
At the conference of 367 at Susa, Pelopidas was present as the 
representative of Thebes.^ Pelopidas won the King's favour, according to 
Xenophon, because the Thebans alone of the Greeks had fought on the 
Persian side at Plataea, because they had never yet fought against the King, 
and because the reason for the Spartans' war with Thebes was the Theban 
refusal to join them in their campaign against Persia or to allow Agesilaus 
to sacrifice at Aulis.2 
Plutarch writes that the King was pleased with Pelopidas because of 
his reputation and the fact that he had defeated the Spartans in the 
Peloponnese.3 He also thought his proposals were more sure than those of 
the Athenians and simpler than those of the Spar tans.* Plutarch says the 
King did not hide his regard for Pelopidas from the other ambassadors, and, 
although he did not indulge Pelopidas as he had Antalcidas,^ he sent him 
the most splendid and greatest of the customary gifts, and yielded to his 
demands that the Greeks should be autonomous, that Messene should be 
inhabited, and that the Thebans should be the naxpiKOi (t)iXoi of the King.^ 
Plutarch says that Pelopidas went home with these answers, although he 
1 Xen. He//. 7.1.33; Plut. Pe/op. 30.1; Artax. 22.8; cf. Diod. 15.76.3. 
^ Xen. Hell. 7.1.34. 
3 Plut. Pe/op. 30.3-4. 
4 Plut. Pe/op. 30.5. 
5 See above 214-5. 
6 Plut. Pe/op. 30.7; cf. Xen. He//. 7.1.36. 
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had not received any other gifts (5c5pa) than were a token of the xdpiq and 
the King's kindness.^ 
Timagoras and Artaxerxes 
Others of the ambassadors, however, at this peace conference, 
received generous gifts from the King. The Athenians had two ambassadors 
present, Leon and Timagoras.2 Xenophon says that Timagoras supported 
Pelopidas in everything he said, and was put to death on his return home.3 
Plutarch tells a more colourful tale (which is not necessarily true, but well 
reflects the nature of Persian gift-giving). He recounts how the King gave 
Timagoras not only gifts of gold and silver, but also an expensive couch and 
servants to spread it (since Greeks did not know how), eighty cows and 
cowherds (as he needed cows' milk for an ailment), and, finally, litter-
bearers and four talents to pay them.4 Elsewhere, Plutarch adds that 
Timagoras was also sent the most splendid dinner while he was at court, so 
that Ostanes, the King's brother, said, "O Timagoras, remember this table, for 
it has not been adorned for you in this way on slight conditions.''^ Plutarch 
says that this was more a reproach for Timagoras' treachery^ than a 
reminder of the xdpiq.^ The receipt of these gifts caused the death of 
Timagoras on his return home.^ 
1 Plut. Pelop. 30.8. 
2Xen. He//. 7.1.33; Plut. Pe/op. 30.9. 
3Xen.He// . 7.1.35, 38; cf. PlutPe/op. 30.9. 
^ Tint Pelop. 30.10-2. 
^FlutArtax. 22.11. 
6 Plutarch says he had sent a secret message to the King (Plut. Artax. 22.9). 
Flut. Artax. 22.12. 
8piut.Pe/op. 30.9. 
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Agesilaus and Artaxerxes 
Xenophon tells the story of how his hero, Agesilaus, once received a 
letter from the King asking for a ^evia and (t>iUa.^  Xenophon claims 
Agesilaus' answer as a mark of his high-mindedness, since Agesilaus did 
not accept the ^evia of the King, but was content that the King should be a 
^iXoc, to Sparta and show goodwill to Greece.^ Although this is a story 
essentially about the goodness and foresight of Agesilaus in putting the 
interests of Greece above his own possible gain (that is, Xenophon says, he 
was not overcome by the desire for gifts (6(3pa) or the strength of the King)3, 
it points again to the ^evia relationship, and the security that was perceived 
to be inherent in the relationship. The King himself wanted Agesilaus to be 
confirmed as his (|)iAx)q through the ^evia, but Agesilaus laid aside this 
private relationship so that he would not be bound by the obligations of the 
relationship, but could detach as many satraps as possible from the King."* 
The Relationship between Greelcs and Persians 
A number of points arise from this discussion about Greco-Persian 
relationships. Firstly, interstate relations and diplomatic activity with 
Persians took place, by and large, on a personal and individual level: Cyrus 
and Lysander, Cyrus and Clearchus, Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. State 
friendships did take place - Cyrus reminded Lysander that he had a ^iXm 
with the Spartan state^ - yet it was his private friendship with Lysander 
which formed the continuing basis for and drove this state relationship. 
Secondly, the Spartans seem to have formed more personal 
connections with the Persians than the Athenians did, and, on the whole. 
^ Xen. Ages. 8.3; Plutarch gives a version of the anecdote at Mot. 213 d-e. 
2Xen.>lges. 8.3-5. 
Xen. Ages. 8.5. 
4 Xen. Ages. 8.5. Note the "conflict of interests" that Agesilaus is choosing to avoid. 
5 Xen. He//. 2.1.14 
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were far more successful in dealing with the Persians. This is not surprising 
in the light of what we have discussed in earlier chapters about the way in 
which Spartans and Athenians used personal connections in interstate 
affairs. As Lewis has noted, the Spartans were more "like" the Persians, and 
he says: "it was repeatedly found perfectly possible for Greeks, and, I think, 
particularly Spartans, to get on the same wavelength as the Persians with 
whom they came into contact."^ It may, however, be fairer to say that the 
Athenians were more "unlike" the Persians than the Spartans. The 
Athenians, to a greater extent than other poleis in the Greek world, had, in 
the development of their democratic practices, institutionalised many 
aristocratic practices of earlier periods, and much that had occurred on a 
private level in former times was translated to a civic level.^ This does not 
mean that they had lost the facility for dealing with other states through 
individual and personal friendships - indeed, it has already been shown 
that they did tend to deal with those on the fringes of their world in this way 
- but they did not always do so, or even tended not to.3 As we have seen, 
this personal approach was still a stronger feature of Spartan interstate 
relations, and so perhaps the Spartans had more "active" personal 
relationships with Persians which they could call upon,^ as well as the 
propensity to create new ones.^ 
Thirdly, Persians gave gifts in ways and circumstances that the Greeks 
did not understand. For example, the Persian King gave gifts as a normal 
1 S&P 148-52, esp. 151; cf. Hirsch The Friendship of the Barbarians 12. 
2 For example, ^evia became itpo^evia (though this, of course, was not confined to Athens), 
patronage became liturgies. 
^ In fact, as will be shown in the following chapter, one of the features of Athenian relations 
with the Thracian kings was a civic and corporate approach. 
4 That such relationships could, and did, lapse hardly needs to be stated: for example, 
Alcibiades' lapsed Tipo^evia with Sparta (Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2). 
5 Most of the relationships discussed in the previous chapter between various Spartans and 
communities in the Hellespont must almost have originated with that parHcular generation, 
rather than being inherited connections. 
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concomitant of hospitality. This could be, and was, misunderstood by the 
Greeks and considered to be bribery, as Timagoras discovered to his cost.^  
Fourthly, the Greeks felt the moral force of a return of service for 
service, whereas the Persians did not necessarily feel bound in this way, or 
did not value the service in the same way. Phamabazus revalued the service 
performed for him by Anaxibius when the new harmost for Byzantium 
came to the Hellespont. Spithradates no longer felt bound by his 
relationship with Agesilaus after he felt he had been tricked. 
Fifthly, the Greeks had, and could extend to non-Greeks, a formal 
institution that was essentially based on gift-exchange: ^evia. It seems that 
the most successful relationships between Greeks and Persians were ^evtai.^ 
The Persian nobility had many ^evoi among the Greek community. For 
example, Antalcidas was the ^evo(; of Ariobarzanes,^ ApoUophanes was a 
Tzdkaioq ^evoq of Phamabazus,* and Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon 
^eviai. Alcibiades' attempt to form a ^evia with Tissaphemes suggests that it 
was important to him to formalise and validate their relationship in this 
way, just as Tissaphernes' rejection and imprisonment of Alcibiades also 
speaks volumes about the importance of the ritual of ^evia, as does 
Callicratidas' and Agesilaus' refusal to contract ^evtai. 
However, not even formalised friendships could ensure that the 
relationship would work. Pharnabazus, despite his "private oaths" with 
Alcibiades, probably engineered his death. Herman argues that ^eviai 
contracted with those inside the Greek world, and with those outside - non-
Greeks - followed an identical pattern, and that "the non-Greek partners 
^ On this misconception see Lewis REy4 91 (1989) 227-35; on a similar misunderstanding in 
Greco-Macedonian affairs, see Chapter Seven esp. 270-4. 
2 This is perhaps not surprising considering that ^evia was primarily a mode of friendship 
Ijetween individuals who did not belong to the same communities (see Herman Ritualised 
Friendship 31). Note also the added significance of the ambiguity of e^voc;, which can mean 
"stranger". Who was more of a stranger than a Persian? Cf. Chapter One 34-7. 
3 Xen. He//. 5.1.28. 
4 Xen. He//. 4.1.29. 
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seem to have shown as profound an understanding of this pattern as the 
Greek." 1 Yet the basic attitude to the relationship seems to be different for 
the Greeks and for the Persians. 
To begin with, the Greek, by forming a ^evia relationship with a 
Persian, brought the Persian into his network of ^iTuoi; that is, the Persian no 
longer belonged to that amorphous mass of potential friends and enemies, 
but was drawn inside the Greek's friendship network. He then treated the 
Persian in a positively reciprocal way, not as an enemy. The relationship 
between Cyrus and Clearchus, the Spartan mercenary commanders, is 
particularly illuminating. Clearchus tricked his own men, fellow-Greeks, so 
that he might not have to betray his ^ikia with the Persian.2 He had certain 
obligations that he owed his ^evo(;, since he was his ^evoc^ even though he 
was a barbarian. 
Secondly, as we have seen in Chapter One, ^evia, as understood in the 
Greek world, was an egalitarian relationship based upon balanced 
reciprocity: equal gift was given for equal gift, equal service for equal service. 
But this is not necessarily the way in which the Persian viewed the 
relationship. Persian society was a hierarchical society, which was 
reinforced, as we have seen above, by an imbalance of power and imbalance 
of gift-giving. So when the Persian entered the relationship, even of ^evia, 
he did not necessarily view the relationship as an equal one. He could, and 
did, abandon the relationship when it was simply no longer of use to him. 
Thus, Artaxerxes called Antalcidas his e^vo<;, which impUed equality to the 
Greek, but the King had the power, since it was actually an imbalanced 
relationship, to ignore Antalcidas when the Spartans were no longer a state 
to be flattered. 
1 Herman Ritualised Friendship 12. Herman is followed by Hall Inventing the Barbarian 15 
& n . 51. 
2 Xen. Anab. 1.3.5-6; for a full account of this incident, see also Endnote 4. 
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Moreover, the Persians seem to approach these relationships in an 
attitude of negative reciprocity. While the Greek thinks he has drawn the 
Persian inside his friendship network, the Persian is responding as if he 
were still outside, and among the Greek's enemies. For the Persian, the 
Greek is always essentially "outside the community", and the Persian is only 
in the relationship for as long as he can still get something out of it. The 
Greek, on the other hand, can bring the Persian inside his network of 
positive relationships, even though the Persian is non-Greek. The Persian 
feels no obUgation to keep responding in a positive way; the Greek does. 
That is not to say that Greco-Persian ^ eviai could not and did not work. 
Some even seem to have been hereditary.! But it is not surprising that 
relationships between Greeks and Persians often did not work, and often 
ended in disaster for the Greek, as Alcibiades and Antalcidas found out. 
1 ApoUophanes and Phamabazus; Antalcidas and Ariobarzanes. See also Humphreys The 
Family, Women and Death 27. 
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A gift opens the way for the giver 
and ushers him into the presence of the great. 
Prov. 18.16. 
During the fifth and fourth centuries, Athens was greatly concerned 
with events in the Thraceward region and the Thracian Chersonese. This 
led her to follow a policy of trying to form close links with members of the 
Thracian royal households through gifts of citizenship. However, the 
awarding of such honours did not always produce the desired results, and 
even placed Athens in the embarrassing situation of being openly at war 
with her own honorands. On the whole, the manner in which the 
Athenians dealt with the Thracian kings was clumsy and highlighted their 
own weaknesses and insecurities, and it particularly points to their lack of 
sensitivity to a culture not like their own. This Chapter will look at the 
traditional links which existed between Athens and Thrace; at the reasons 
why she sought to maintain links with Thrace and how she tried to do this 
in the late fifth and fourth centuries; then, finally, at some of the ways the 
Athenians misunderstood the Thracians or failed to take account of their 
different culture and how this affected Athens' northern policy. 
Athenian Links with Thrace 
Athens had a tradition of connections with Thrace and the 
Thraceward region which began in the sixth century and continued 
throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, particularly with the Thracian 
royal families.^ Peisistratus, in the sixth century, in his second exile from the 
1 The Thracians themselves claimed to have Athenian connections, through Tereus, but this 
was spurious, as Thucydides hiniself makes clear (Th. 2.29.3; cf. Xen. Anab. 7.2.31). 
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tyranny, is reported by the Athenaion Politeia as first having colonised 
Rhaecelus in Chalddice, then the region about Mt Pangaeus; and Herodotus 
notes that he was able to draw revenue from the region about the River 
Strymon.i The mother of Cimon son of Miltiades was a Thracian princess, 
the daughter of king Olorus, and Thucydides son of Olorus, the historian, 
was connected with the same family.2 Thucydides also owned gold mines in 
Thrace and was known to have influence with the leading men there.3 
Hagnon son of Nidas was sent to Thrace as oikistes of Amphipolis in 437/6, 
and much of his military career centred on the region.* Alcibiades son of 
Cleinias also seems to have had some kind of ties with the Thracian rulers, 
Seuthes and Medocus,^ as did Thrasybulus son of Lycus,^ and it was 
allegedly suggested to him that he should marry the daughter of the 
Thracian king, Seuthes, in order to escape trouble at home.'' Iphicrates son 
of Timotheus did in fact marry either the daughter or the sister of Cotys, the 
Odrysian king,^ and may have had family connections with Thrace 
antedating 393.^ 
The Importance of Thrace 
One need not go far to understand the importance of Thrace to 
Athens and the great Athenian families. In the fifth century, Thrace 
extended from the River Strymon to the Black Sea and from the Danube to 
1 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2.; Hdt. 1.64.1; Rhodes Comm. 207-8. 
2 Plut. Cimon 4.1-2. 
3 Plut. Cimon 4.2; Th. 4.105.1. On Thucydides' strategia in Thrace in 424/3, see Appendix B: 
Athenian Strategoi 312. 
4 For selection as oikistes, see Th. 4.102.3, 5.11.1; for strategiai, see Chapter Four 113-4. 
5 See Chapter Three 104. 
^ See Chapter Three 100-1. 
7 Lys. 28.5-6. 
^ Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.131 a-f; cf. Nepos Iph. 3.4; on tus relationship to 
Cotys as KTiSeaniq, see Davies APP 249. 
9 See Chapter Four 118-20. 
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the Aegean, and Thucydides says the kingdom was greater than ever before 
under Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian king of the Thracians.^ 
Thrace was an important source of natural resources. Not only was 
the Strymonic Plain rich in timber and metals,^ but Thrace was also an 
important source of grain for Athens and the Thracian Chersonese was 
influential in controlling the passage of grain from the Black Sea.^ The 
Athenians had tried to settle colonies and cleruchies in the region from the 
sixth century. The Hellespont region was colonised in the time of 
Peisistratus and his sons and the settlement in the Chersonese was under 
the control of the Philaidae in the late sixth and early fifth centuries. 
Cleruchies were also settled in the Chersonese in the later fifth and fourth 
centuries.^ 
Athens also estabUshed colonies along the Aegean coast, first at Brea, 
perhaps in 446,^  then at Amphipolis in 437/6.7 However, this influence was 
not lasting. In 424, Amphipolis revolted from Athens and set up Brasidas as 
its founder, and Athens never managed to recover it.^ Amphipolis was 
finally taken by Philip in 357, being crucial for his own plans in the north-
east.9 
Yet the Athenians not only tried to maintain their influence in 
Thrace through the establishment of colonies and cleruchies, but they also 
tried to deal more directly with the local monarchs. As has been noted 
1 Th. 2.97.1-2; cf. Hdt. 4.99.1; Diod. 12.50.1-3; Th. 2.29; Casson Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria 
194-5; Cawkwell Philip 43. 
2 Cf. Th. 4.105.1; Hopper Trade and Industry in Classical Greece 166; Ellis Philip U 32. 
3 Hopper Trade and Industry in Classical Greece 72, 74-7; Hornblower Greek World 41, 46; 
for the fertility of Thrace, see Isoc. 8.24; on the need for importing grain to Athens, see Dem. 
20.31; Garnsey Crux 62-75. 
Hdt. 6.34-41; on the Athenian settlement of the Chersonese, see Ehrentierg Aspects of the 
Ancient World 119-28; Graham Colony and Mother City 32-3. 
5 See Plut. Per. 19.1; Diod. 16.34.4; Cawkwell Philip 72. 
^ ML 49; Graham Colony and Mother City 34-5. 
7 See schol. Aeschin. 2.31. 
^ On Athens' obsession with Amphipolis and attempts to recover it: Chapter Seven 247-50. 
9 Diod. 16.8.2-3; Dem. 1.5, 20.63. On the strategic importance of Amphipolis, see Th. 4.108.1; 
Livy 45.30.3; Cawkwell Philip 72-6. 
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above, individual Athenians had family and private connections in the 
Thraceward parts through marriage and presumably other personal ties. In 
the fifth century, however, as I have argued elsewhere, Athens was not as 
likely as other poleis to use her personal connections and, with the rise of 
the demos as an effective political unit, there is a change in Athenian policy 
in Thrace. Rather than individual Athenians having contacts in these parts, 
the Athenians themselves as a polis made contacts with the Thracian rulers 
and awarded them civic honours, thus drawing these Thracian potentates 
into the Greek network of obligation on a state level. 
The Thracians and Gift-receiving 
The Thracians, like the Persians, were a gift-giving culture. Just as 
there was an up-and-down flow of gifts from King to subjects and subjects to 
King in the Persian kingdom, so it was among the Thracians.^ But despite 
general similarities between the two cultures, gift-giving as an institution 
among the Thracians differed in significant ways from gift-giving in Persia, 
and this affected the way in which relationships flowed from the exchange 
and expectations were created by the exchange. 
It has been noted in the previous chapter that gifts were given by the 
Persian King at banquets and feasts.2 Gifts also featured at Thradan feasts, 
but not as tokens given by the king, but rather received by him. Xenophon 
describes a feast of the Odrysian king, Seuthes, to which he was invited.^ It 
was suggested to the guests before the dinner that it was customary for 
1 On Thradan gift-giving generally, see Marazov in The Rogozen Treasure 90-137. 
2 See Chapter Five 197. 
3 Xen. Anab. 7.3.21-33. It is interesting to note that Xenophon called the guests at the feast 
^evoi (22). Xenophon surely cannot mean "ritualised-friends" in the fullest sense, nor 
"strangers". The implication is certainly hospitality, and the usage provides an indication of 
the range of meaning between these two extremes: that is, one does not have to be a stranger, 
nor does one have to Ije a ritualised-friend, in order to be called a ^evo .^ 
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Seuthes to be given gifts (5copeTa6ai) by those he invited to dinner.^ The gifts 
Seuthes was given at this feast included a white horse, a silver phiale and a 
carpet worth ten minae, and each giver drank the king's health.2 Heracleides 
of Maroneia encouraged Xenophon to give generously, as, he said, it was 
worthwhile to honour Seuthes most lavishly, since he would then make a 
return with even more lavish gifts.^ Although it was the same kind of 
imequal exchange as was noted in Persia, the actual process of the exchange 
is reversed. 
The archaeological record supports this pattern. The so-called 
Rogozen Treasure was discovered in north-western Bulgaria in what had 
been the kingdom of the Triballians. Thirteen phialai and one jug are 
inscribed with anthroponyms which are recognised to be. the names of 
Odrysian kings, including Cotys and Cersobleptes.'* A nvmiber of the phialai 
also give a toponym, which has been identified as the source of the vase or 
the metal (for example, KOTTOE E 5 BEO [cat. 28]).5 In this hoard, there are 
five different toponyms assigned to phialai belonging to Cotys.^ The 
Thracian kings did not have one capital city, but several settlements, each of 
which the king was required to visit according to an Orphic kind of ritual.7 
The hoard may then represent gifts given by locals, such as those Xenophon 
describes, as the first part of a redprocal relationship,^ or, as Marazov rather 
Xen. Anab. 7.3.18. 
2 Xen. Anab. 7.3.26-7. On the significance of the white horse, see Fol & Marazov Thrace and 
the Thracians 56-7. 
3 Xen. Anab. 7.3.19-20. Thracian forts featured among the gifts Seuthes promised Xenophon 
(Xen. Anab. 7.3.37; cf. 7.2.36, 3.19, 5.8, 7.50). 
^ On the inscriptions, see Fol Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 33-7; Hind Papers of 
the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 38-48; Painter Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 
73-81; Mihailov The Rogozen Treasure 46-71. 
5 Fol Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 33; Mihailov The Rogozen Treasure 50. 
6 Beus: cat. 28,29,40; Aprus: cat. 30,31; Suthaba: cat. 41; Ergiske: cat. 42,43,46; Geistum: cat. 
45,47. 
7 See Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 31; Fol Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 33; 
Mihailov The Rogozen Treasure 35; Marazov The Rogozen Treasure 105. 
8 Perhaps as a form of tribute or tax: on the merging of "gifts" and tribute, see Chapter Five 
197 n. 2. 
226 
Chapter Six: Athens and the Thracians 
ingeniously suggests, they were gifts given to the king, not as the receiver of 
guests, but as the "dear guest" himself.^ In either case, it is clear that the 
Thracian kings received gifts from the settlements in their kingdom. 
Of course, the Thracian kings gave gifts as well as receiving them. 
This is perhaps the best explanation for the presence of these Odrysian gifts 
among the Triballian hoard: they were given again by the Odrysians to the 
Triballians as one half of the reciprocal exchange.2 
Nevertheless, the Thracian kings placed the emphasis on receiving 
gifts, in the first instance, rather than giving them. This had two main 
effects on the relationship. Firstly, it was essentially supplicatory: the gift-
giver, who was of inferior status, was asking to be brought into a 
relationship by offering a gift, rather than being brought into a relationship 
by being given gifts by someone with superior status.3 This gives the 
receiver, that is, the king, the right to accept or reject the gift, and so accept or 
reject the relationship. It is the status imbalance which creates the power 
imbalance. Secondly, the relationship was generally prospective: the gift was 
given in the hope that at some time in the future it would be returned, and 
returned with interest.^ But again, the power imbalance is important. The 
more powerful partner is able to choose when he wishes to leave the 
relationship, whether it has been fulfilled or not. 
Thus it is clear that, while there are some similarities between Persian 
and Thracian gift-giving, there were also differences which affected the 
1 Marazov The Rogozen Treasure 105. 
2 Ibid. 106, though Marazov's detailed reconstruction of the ritual, wherein visiting rulers 
accompanied the Odiysian rulers on their "royal rounds" of the settlements and received the 
gifts as they entered the city is, I think, unnecessary. Hind {Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian 
Conference 42) suggests that the hoard may also have travelled north "as loot, or as 
possessions of refugees from Philip of Macedon's invasions in 346 or 342." Either of these are 
viable possibilities and should not t»e excluded. 
3 An important parallel is supplication in the Greek world as opposed to ^evia: again 
supplication is asking to be brought inside the relationship, while ^evia is being brought 
inside the relationship: see Gould ]HS 93 (1973) 73-103. 
4 Compare here Xen. Mem. 2.3.11-13 (see Chapter One 10-1). 
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structure of the relationship that was formed. We are then left to ask how 
the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, dealt with this. 
On Misunderstanding the Thracians 
The first question which we must ask is how far they understood and 
could make allowances for a culture which was different from their own. 
The Athenians held the Thracians in contempt for their wildness, 
drunkenness and barbarity,^ yet they still awarded their kings the greatest 
honour that was available to them, citizenship, only to see them disregard 
and abuse it. One is left wondering how far the Athenians understood what 
the Thracians were about. 
The following section will turn to four episodes which serve to 
highlight some of the ways in which the Athenians managed and 
mismanaged their Thracian concerns: Thucydides' account of Thracian 
customs, Xenophon's deaUngs with Seuthes, Iphicrates' support of Cotys 
against his fellow countrymen, and Thucydides' account of Athenian 
involvement in Sitalces' campaign in Macedon. We will then consider how 
Athens dealt with Thrace and tried to keep the Thracian kings loyal through 
grants of citizenship. From this we should see what the Athenians thought 
they were doing, and where they went wrong. 
Thucydides 2.97.3-4. 
Thucydides, in a digression describing the extent of the territory and 
customs of the Thracians, says. 
1 See for example, Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.131 a-f; Dem. 23.114; cf. Xen. Anab. 7.3.21-33; 
Casson Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria 203-4. 
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All the tribute from all the barbarian territory and the Greek 
cities as was paid in the reign of Seuthes,i who was king after 
Sitalces and brought it to its peak, was valued at about four 
hundred talents of silver, paid in gold and silver. Acopa in gold 
and silver no less in value were also contributed and, apart from 
this, brocaded, plain and other furnishings. These were given not 
only to the king, but also to the minor kings and nobles of the 
Odrysians. And they had established a custom opposite to that of 
the kingdom of the Persians - and this was a custom which 
existed for the rest of the Thracians as well - to receive rather 
than to give (it was more shameful for the one who had been 
asked not to give than for the one who had asked not to receive). 
But, nevertheless, the Odrysians carried it to greater lengths, for 
it was impossible to achieve anything unless one gave them gifts. 
Consequently, the kingdom became great in strength. 
As we have seen, Thucydides' assessment that the kings received gifts 
rather than gave them is not accurate.2 Though Thucydides is right in 
emphasising the receiving of gifts, the Thradans also gave gifts. This passage 
points to the profound misunderstanding that the Greeks bore in regard to 
the cultures of their neighbours. Despite the knowledge that one such as 
Thucydides should have had, given his own Thracian connections, even he 
failed to see past the surface appearances. This is indicative of the 
fundamental problem regarding the reciprocity ethic in different cultures: 
although the embedded ideology remained the same, the manifestation 
differed from one sodety to another. As a result, one culture did not always 
understand what another was doing. 
Sitalces 
The Athenian response to Sitalces highlights the general insecurity 
inherent in Greco-Thracian relationships, and the tentative way in which 
the Athenians seemed to approach the Thracians. In 431 the Athenians 
1 Though note the emendation of oaov 7tpoaf[^ctv to oacovnep ^ip^av, which Rhodes includes in 
his text {Thucydides IT): see Gomme H C T 2.244-5. It would then read: "The tribute from all 
the barbarian territory and the Greek cities which Seuthes ruled." 
2 See Hornblower Comm. 372-3; Briant Achaemenid History II esp. 5-6. 
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made an alliance with Sitalces.i One of the aims of the alliance was to make 
war on the Chalcidians and on Perdiccas, though Perdiccas himself was in 
alliance with the Athenians,^ though the campaign did not actually take 
place until the winter of 429/8.3 Yet, although Sitalces took Athenian 
ambassadors with him (who were there for the purpose), and Hagnon^ as 
commander,5 the promised Athenian troops did not arrive. Thucydides says 
that the Athenians did not believe that the Thracians would come, even 
though they had sent gifts (5c5pa) and ambassadors to him.6 Gomme claims 
that this is "not at all surprising mistrust" on the part of the Athenians, "not 
perhaps because Sitalkes had waited two years since the alliance (95.1), but 
because this year he had not moved until winter - an inconvenience for his 
own troops and a greater one for Athens."^ Yet obviously their mistrust was 
ill-founded. Sitalces did undertake the campaign. One suspects that the 
Athenian mistrust was based more on the their own insecurity about how 
one dealt with Thracians, despite the 6d3pa and presbeis. 
Xenophon and Seuthes 
Xenophon in his Anabasis describes his contact with Seuthes as he 
was trying to lead the army of the Ten Thousand out of Thrace.^ Anaxibius, 
the Spartan Nauarchos, had urged Xenophon to collect together the army 
that was then scattered around Perinthus and to take them back to Asia, 
though Seuthes sent a message to Xenophon asking that he bring them to 
1 Th. 2.29.4-5. 
2 Th. 2.29.4; Hammond H M 127-8. 
3 Th. 2.95.1-2. 
4 See Chapter Four 113-4,139^0. 
5 Th. 2.95.3. 
6 Th. 2.101.1. 
^GommeHCT 2.248. 
^ As with Xenophon's descriptions of Cyrus (see Endnote 3), it appears that Xenophon is 
"hellenising" Seuthes. His speeches in the Anabasis, as reported by Xenophon, do not always 
seem to make sense or tally vdth what he actually does. What we have in the Anabasis, I 
think, is Seuthes often acting and reacting as one would expect a Thradan to do, but speaking 
Greek sentiments. 
230 
Chapter Six: Athens and the Thracians 
him.i However, the new governor at Byzantium, Aristarchus forbade the 
army to cross, threatening to sink any ships that set sail, so Xenophon 
dedded to lead the army to Seuthes after all.2 
Xenophon describes his first introductions to Seuthes with colour and 
detail. After the negotiations had been completed for the army to fight with 
Seuthes in order that he might recover his ancestral territory,^ Xenophon 
relates how he was invited to dinner with the king at a nearby village.'* 
When they arrived at the house and were about to go in, Heracleides of 
Maroneia came up to people who he thought could give Seuthes a present, 
saying to Timasion, a Dardanian exile, that "it is customary, whenever 
Seuthes invites people to dinner, for those who have been invited to give 
him a gift (ScopeioSai). If ever Seuthes becomes great, he will be in a position 
to send you home or to make you rich here."^ When Heracleides came to 
Xenophon, he said. 
You are from the greatest city and your name is very great at 
Seuthes' court. Perhaps you will think it worthwhile to receive 
forts and land in this country just as others of your 
countrymen have done. So it is worth your while to honour 
Seuthes lavishly. I advise you since I wish you well. I know 
truly that the more gifts you give (5o)peTv) him, the more you 
will experience good things at his hands.^ 
The emphasis is upon prospective giving, where one gives so that, in the 
future, one may receive much more.7 One gives things to increase the 
power of the Thracian king, who, once he comes into this power, will repay 
in kind. 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.2.8-11. 
2 Xen. Anab. 7.2.12-7; cf. 7.1.5. 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.2.20-3.14. 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.2.15. 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.3.18. 
^ Xen. Anab. 7.3.19-20. 
7 Compare the way Persians give in order that they may bring people under their control 
through the excess of their giving; see Chapter Five 198-9. 
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Indeed, when Seuthes had regained his kingdom, and the 
relationship between himself and Xenophon had soured, Xenophon accused 
him of injustice, saying to him. 
Before I served you, you received me pleasantiy with your eyes 
and voice and gifts of hospitality (^evia) and you could not make 
enough promises of how things would be. But when you have 
achieved what you wanted and have become the greatest I could 
make you, now do you dare to allow me to be dishonoured 
among the soldiers in this way? But indeed, I trust that it wi l l 
seem best to you to repay your debt and that time wil l teach you 
and that you yourself wi l l not bear to see those who have freely 
given to you a benefaction (e-uepyecria) accusing you. So I ask you, 
when you pay back your debt, to be keen to make me such a man 
among the soldiers as you found.^ 
Liberally sprinkled with good Greek morality, this speech still serves to 
highlight the "forward" perspective of Xenophon's giving, and the reasons 
for which i t was given in advance: so that when Xenophon had made 
Seuthes great, the king might then make the return he ought. The 
emphasis, then, is upon an initial giving, and any reward that was 
ultimately given in return was contingent upon this initial gift.^ 
Iphicrates and Cotys 
Dem. 23.129-132. 
I see in regard to Cotys that he was a marriage relative (KiiSecnrni;) 
to Iphicrates in the same way that Cersobleptes was to 
Charidemus, and I see that the things that have been done by 
Iphicrates for Cotys are far greater and worthy of a larger xdpiq, 
than that which has been done by Charidemus for Cersobleptes. 
Let us consider it thus. You know, of course, O men of Athens, 
that Iphicrates had a bronze statue in the city and maintenance in 
the prytaneum, gifts (Scopeial) and other honours, because of 
which he was fortunate. Nevertheless, he dared to fight on 
behalf of Cotys' affairs on the opposite side to your generals in the 
^Xen.Amb. 7.7.46-7. 
2 As Gauthier notes {AncSoc 4 (1973) 13) the relationship between Seuthes and Xenophon is 
not a ^evia in the true (Greek) sense of the word, though he does not go so far in explaining 
why there is a difference. 
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sea-battle, and he placed the salvation of Cotys above the honours 
which existed for himself among you ... But nevertheless, Cotys, 
having been saved by Iphicrates, and having experienced the 
(^i)da of this man, when he thought he was securely safe and 
soimd, did not exert himself to repay the xdcpiQ to Iphicrates, and 
he did not do any kindness to you through Iphicrates, so that he 
might obtain pardon for what had happened, but, quite the 
contrary, he decided that Iphicrates should join him in besieging 
the rest of your strongholds. Although Iphicrates did not want to, 
Cotys, taking a barbarian force and the force collected by 
Iphicrates, and having taken into his hire this very Charidemus, 
attacked your strongholds. He put Iphiaates at such a loss, that as 
a result he went away to Antissa to live and later to Drus, 
thinking that he could not honourably come to you, whom he 
had placed after Thrace and the barbarian, but that it was not safe 
to remain with Cotys, who he saw made so small account of his 
safety. 
The case of Iphicrates and Cotys is indicative of the cultural differences and 
misunderstandings which took place between Athenians and Thracians. 
Iphicrates married either the sister or daughter of Cotys.^ So when Cotys 
became an enemy of Athens, it is not altogether surprising that Iphicrates 
chose the Thracian's side, though this undoubtedly placed him in an 
interesting position: either to betray his ^iXia to his adopted family, who 
were also barbarians, or to betray his own country. 
But while Iphicrates may have felt the pull of these familial 
obligations, Cotys certainly did not. Demosthenes says that having made 
trial of Iphicrates' ^iXia, Cotys was not eager to pay back the xapi(;, but rather 
took advantage of Iphicrates' position. Iphicrates was then reduced to such a 
state that he would not return to Athens, thinking that he could not when 
he had favoured Thrace and a barbarian, yet feared for his safety among 
those whose friendship he had chosen to protect. Things do not look right. 
1 On this see 223 n. 8. This is interesting in its own right. For Iphicrates' son could be, and in 
fact was, maligned for not Ijeing a true Athenian citizen, that is, with two Athenian parents, 
though Cotys and his family may have been granted citizenship ttefore the marriage; see 
Davies APF 250. Note also that Iphicrates was the adopted son of the Macedonian king, 
Amyntas (Aeschin. 2.28), so he had strong "northern" connections; see also Davies APF 250. 
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Iphicrates appears to have badly miscalculated. Cotys does not seem to 
honour the same obligations as him, or feel the same burden towards his 
^iXoi. Perhaps they live by different rules. 
Just as Seuthes proved unreliable in giving his return for Xenophon's 
services, so Cotys did not make the return that was expected for what had 
been given or for what was expected by a Greek of a kinship relationship. 
Though the Greeks feel the great weight of such relationships and 
obhgations, the Thradan kings do not. 
The Thracians and Athenian Citizenship 
In the f i f th and fourth centuries, the Athenians adopted the policy of 
awarding citizenship to the kings of the Odrysians, the most powerful of the 
dynasties which dominated south-eastern Thrace,^ and, occasionally, to 
their commanders or advisers.2 The first such grant was to Sadocus, son of 
Sitalces, and heir apparent to the Odrysian throne at the outset of the 
Peloponnesian War in 431.3 Having first made the brother-in-law of 
Sitalces, Nymphodorus of Abdera, a Kpoijevoq,^ the Athenians despatched 
him to Sitalces to form an alliance, as they wanted him to attack Perdiccas 
and the neighbouring territory to Thrace.5 Then, Thucydides writes, 
Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance between the 
Athenians and Sitalces and had Sitalces' son, Sadocus, made a citizen.^ 
^ On the development of Thracian tribes into political groupings, see Fol & Marazov Thrace 
and the Thracians 149-50. 
2 Note that Athens also pursued this pohcy with other royal families in the north, eg. the 
kings of the Bosporus and Molossia (Osborne Naturalization 3.41-4,49,80,85,87,112-3), 
though, as will be seen, there were differences between the cor^truction of these relationships 
and those with the kings of Thrace. 
3 Th. 2.29.4-5, 67.2; Ar. Acharn. 141-50; cf. Osborne Naturalization 3.26-7. 
On this proxeny, see Chapter Two 59,64. 
5 Th. 2.29.1-4. 
^ Th. 2.29.5; though Osborne (Naturalization 3.27) notes that it is unclear whether the grant 
of citizenship influenced Sitalces, or "whether it merely signifies the conclusion of the pact". 
For the suggestion that Sadocus may have actually exercised his citizen rights, see Ostx)me 
Naturalization 3.27 & n. 39. 
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The purpose of this grant of citizenship was probably twofold: to 
secure the grain supply, and to secure Thracian military assistance.^  Indeed, 
the grant reaped rewards almost immediately. When in 430 Peloponnesian 
ambassadors on their way to Persia to see the King stopped at the court of 
Sitalces to try to persuade him to give up his alliance with Athens, two 
Athenian ambassadors, who were present, persuaded Sadocus to hand the 
Peloponnesians over to them.2 Sadocus agreed, and the Peloponnesians 
were taken to Athens and put to death.3 This award of citizenship was made 
in advance and in anticipation of benefits received.'* From giving such a 
high honour the Athenians expected a just repayment, which Sadocus 
respected. This award of citizenship was to set a pattern followed 
throughout the fourth century, though not necessarily with similarly 
positive results.5 
Sadocus may not have succeeded Sitalces,^ and the kingdom went to 
Sitalces' nephew, Seuthes (I),^ who pursued, it would seem, a more pro-
Macedonian policy, marrying the sister of Perdiccas, Stratonice.^ Though, 
according to Thucydides, Seuthes brought his kingdom to a financial peak,^ 
he focused his expansion upon the Thracian Chersonese and away from the 
south-west and Macedon and the Athenian colonies there.^o 
1 Hopper Trade and Industry in Classical Greece 72; Osborne Naturalization 3.27; cf. Th. 
2.95.2. 
2 Th.2.67.1-2. 
3 Th. 2.67.3-4. 
* Osborne Naturalization 4.188. 
^Ibid. 4.188-9. 
^ Fol (Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference 33-4) suggests that Sadocus may in fact 
have held the Thracian throne, however briefly; contra Archibald CAH VI^ 454. 
7 Th. 4.101.5. On the succession, see Hock Hermes 26 (1891) 82-3; Archibald CAH V l^ 454. 
^ Perdiccas promised Seuthes the hand of his sister complete with a dowry if Seuthes 
persuaded Sitalces to give up his campaign in Macedon (Th. 2.101.5-6); cf. Casson Macedonia, 
Thrace and lllyria 197-8 (though I see no evidence for the claim that Seuthes (I) was 
awarded Athenian citizenship); Hammond H M 104,129,153. 
9 Th. 2.292. 
10 Fol & Marazov Thrace and the Thracians 152. 
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In the 390s the Odrysian kingdom was divided between Medocus 
(Amadocus), the king of the Odrysians, and the archon in the coastal region, 
Seuthes (II ) . i Xenophon writes that, when on his tour of duty of the 
Hellespont in 391/0, Thrasybulus found no opposition, he decided to do his 
city a good turn and reconciled Medocus and Seuthes to each other and 
made them friends and allies of the Athenians.^ When Hebryzelmis 
succeeded to Medocus' throne in the 380s, the Athenians granted him 
honours which had also been granted to his forefathers.^ Osborne recognises 
that "the honours in question are obscure", but hypothesises that, "given 
the regularity with which citizenship was extended to the subsequent kings 
of Thrace, it is a clear possibility that citizenship was involved. The decrees 
for the Bosporan kings, which are cast in similarly vague terms, present a 
clear analogy."^ Since the honours given to Hebryzelmis were also awarded 
to his forefathers, it is a strong possibility that Seuthes and Medocus were 
also given grants of Athenian citizenship. 
Cotys succeeded to the throne in 384/3, and, Osborne notes, was 
probably awarded citizenship soon after.5 But he was not reliably pro-
Athenian, and when he was assassinated in 360, the Athenians honoured 
the assassins. Python and Heracleides of Aenus, with citizenship.^ This 
highlights the ridiculous position in which the Athenians had placed 
1 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26. Hammond (HM 195) claims that the Odrysian kingdom was divided into 
three parts at this stage, and ruled by Medocus (I), Seuthes (11) and Hebryzelmis. However, 
Osborne {Naturalization 3.111), following Tod (comm. on 117) and Hock {Hermes 26 (1891) 
453-462), makes Hebryzelmis the successor of Medocus, as, most recently, does Archibald 
( C A H V l ^ 458). Casson {Macedonia, Thrace and lllyria 199) suggests on the basis of Diod. 
14.94.2, where Medocus and Seuthes are both called kings (MT^5OKOV Kai l£ii9r|v toix; xcijv 
0pQ[Kcov PaaiXEiq auiijidxovK; erton^oaxo), that there may have been a dual kingdom. 
2 Xen. He//. 4.8.26. 
^ IG i f i 31 {- Tod 117); see also Xen. Anab. 7.6.43 for ' A^poC,eX\ir]c^ the envoy, who has been 
identified by some scholars as the Thracian king of the inscription (cf. Casson Macedonia, 
Thrace and lllyria 199). 
^ Osborne Naturalization 3.111. 
^ Osh)orne Naturalization 3.50; for citizenship, see [Dem.] 12.9 (noting also Osborne 
Naturalization 3.122); Dem. 23.118. 
6 Dem.23.127; cf. Dem. 23.119; see also Osborne Naturalization 3.49-50,58-9 (under Python of 
Aenus). 
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themselves by their policy of granting citizenship to these northern kings: 
they found themselves honouring with citizenship those men who had 
killed the man whom they had honoured with citizenship. 
On Cotys' death, the kingdom was divided into three parts ruled by 
Berisades, Amadocus and Cersobleptes.i Osborne notes: "The Athenians 
appear to have tried to maintain relations with all three rival kings, but they 
paid special attention to Kersobleptes whose kingdom included the vital 
Chersonese."2 We know that Cersobleptes was awarded Athenian 
citizenship in about 360,^  that Amadocus probably was, since Teres (his 
likely successor) certainly was,4 and, in view of this, Berisades and his 
successor, Cetriporis, probably were also.^  
The Athenians laid so much importance on keeping Thrace secure 
for Athens that they even went so far as to award citizenship to the Thradan 
commanders of these kings. Thus Simon and Bianor, commanders under 
Medocus, were naturalised citizens.^ Charidemus, Cersobleptes' kinsman 
and general, had probably already acquired citizenship by the time it was 
awarded to Cersobleptes himself,'' but, as Osborne remarks, "in the early 350s 
the importance of relations with Kersobleptes is emphasised by the proposal 
to grant Charidemos inviolability."^ Charidemus, however, though he 
served as a strategos on the Athenian board, was notorious for working for 
1 Dem. 23.8; IG ii2126 (=Tod 151) + ATI U104 T 78 d. 
2 Ost)ome Naturalization 3.59. 
3 Dem. 12.8; 23.141. 
'* This supposes that Amadocus was the father of Teres, a king of Thrace who held Athenian 
citizenship in the 340s, who also had a brother, Amadocus. Simon and Bianor, generals in the 
service of Amadocus (I) were certainly granted dtizenstiip (Dem. 23.12; cf. 23.180), which 
increases the probability that Amadocus was also; for this see Osl)ome Naturalization 3.62 
(under Simon of Thrace), 65-6 (imder Teres son of Amadocus). 
^Ibid. 3.59-60. 
6 Dem. 23.12. 
7 Dem. 23.65, 89,141,145,187,188; Theopompus f GrHist 115 F143; Osborne Naturalization 
3.57-8. 
8 OshKjme Naturalization 3.59. 
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the interests of his master, Cersobleptes, rather than for the interests of 
Athens, and often fought operUy against her.i 
In 357, despite initial difficulties in coming to an agreement,2 the 
Athenians made an alliance with the three Thradan kings.3 On the death of 
Berisades, however, Cersobleptes began to wage war upon the sons of 
Berisades and Amadocus, against the interests of Athens, in order to unite 
the three kingdoms into one.^ He laid siege to the Thasian colony of 
Crenides within the territory of Berisades, which gave Philip of Macedon 
the opportunity to come to the aid of the city and take control.^ In 356 
Cetriporis, the son of Berisades, made an alliance with Athens and the kings 
of Paeonia and lUyria against Philip,^ but Diodorus records that while the 
Thracians, Illyrians and Paeonians were gathering their forces, Philip 
appeared before they had drawn up their battie lines, and forced them to 
join the Macedonians.'' In 353 Philip moved east and came to Maroneia in 
central Thrace, but, although Amadocus prevented him moving further 
eastward, he could not prevent him making contact with Cersobleptes.^ 
Macedonian influence waxed, while Athenian influence waned. 
In 352 the Athenians took Sestus, kiUing the adults and enslaving the 
rest.9 Cersobleptes, now fearful of the Athenians, renewed his alliance with 
Athens and his hostility to Philip, turning over the city of Cardia to the 
^ Dem. 23 passim. 
2 Dem. 23.170-3. 
3 IG ii2 126 (=Tod 151)+ATL H 104 T 78 d; cf. Homblower Greek World 249. 
4 Dem. 23.1-15,179; cf. 103; Griffith H M 248. 
^ Steph. Byzant. s.v. OlXiTntoi; Diod. 16.8.6; cf. 16.3.7. On the probability that it was 
Cersobleptes who was respor\sible for the attack on Crenides, see Griffith H M 247-8; 
Archibald CAH VI^ 465-6. On Philip's timing in his annexation of the city, see Griffith H M 
246-7. 
6 / G i i2l27(=Todl57) + SEG 21250. 
7 Diod. 16.22.3; see also Plut Alex. 3.8; Justin 12.16.6. 
8 Dem. 23.183; though see also Ellis {Philip II 76-7, esp. 77, cf. 80) for his suggestion that 
Chares' presence in the area may also have acted as a deterrent; cf. Griffith HM 264-7. 
9 Diod. 16.34.3. 
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Athenians with promises to regain Amphipolis for them.^ However, 
Amadocus, (Amadocus (I) had probably died, and this was his son, 
Amadocus (II))2 appears to have allied himself with Philip in a war with 
Perinthus and Byzantium against Cersobleptes.^ Cersobleptes, however, was 
defeated by Philip and Amadocus (II), and compelled to send his son to 
Macedon as a hostage.^ Amadocus and Cetriporis also seem to have been 
deposed,^ and Teres (the son of Amadocus) and Cersobleptes were given 
control of Thrace, though they were reduced to vassal status.^ 
In 346 Philip resumed his attack on Thrace and captured a number of 
key forts along the Aegean coast and the Chersonese.^ Cersobleptes tried to 
have himself included among the signatories of the Peace of Philocrates, but 
without success, and he was abandoned by the Athenians and left to the 
mercy of Philip, in spite of his citizen statiis.^ 342 saw a concerted attack by 
Philip on the remaining Thracian kingdoms.^ According to Diodorus, Philip 
overcame the the Thracians and ordered them to pay a tithe to the 
Macedonians,^^ and Cersobleptes and Teres were driven out of their 
kingdoms.! 1 
Athens' attempts at controlling the north-east through the Thracian 
kings had failed, not, in the end, necessarily through her own fault, but 
because the policy she had followed had led to insecurity and weakness. The 
Thracian kings did not always see the awards of citizenship as the Athenians 
1 Diod. 16.34.4; Dem. 23.14; Ellis Philip II 80-1; Griffith H M 282. 
2 Griffith H M 282-3, though Archibald {CAH VI^ 467) assumes that this is still Amadocus 
( I ) . 
3 Schol. Aeschin. 2.81; FGrHist 115 F101. 
4 Aeschin. 2.81 & schol; cf. Griffith H M 283. 
5 Dem. 1.13; Archibald CAHYl^ 467. 
6 [Dem.] 12.8; cf. 10; Cawkwell Philip 44; Archibald CAH Vl2 467. 
7 Dem. 8.64,9.15,18.27,19.150,156,334; [Dem.] 7.36-7; Aeschin. 2.90,3.82. 
8 Aeschin. 2.82-4; 3.73-4; see also Chapter Seven 254. 
9 Diod. 16.71.1. 
10 Diod. 16.71.2. 
11 [Dem.] 12.10. 
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expected and wanted them to; it did not bind them to the Athenians as it 
ought. As Demosthenes himself said: 
O men of Athens, I believe that all who were eager to become 
citizens because they desired our ways and customs, obtain these 
things and live among us and have a share in that which they 
desired. But for all those affected by neither desire nor zeal for 
any of these things, but who love the advantage which they 
enjoy because they seem to be honoured by you, these people, I 
believe - rather 1 know - whenever they see hope of greater 
advantage from another quarter, wil l pay court to (eepaTce-uaeiv) 
this without having given you another thought.i 
Citizenship as an Honour 
But why grants of citizenship? In the first place, there were, broadly 
speaking, two kinds of honours that could be conferred by the demos on an 
individual from outside the community: Jipo^evia and citizenship.2 In the 
f i f th century, grants of Tipo^evia were by far the more common,^ and awards 
of citizenship were relatively rare.* Walbank remarks: "Their rarity is not 
just an accident of preservation: citizenship was the ultimate accolade and 
seldom awarded in the f i f th century while Athens was at the height of her 
power. Only those states whose citizenship was of little or no value to 
outsiders were prodigal in granting in it."^ 
And the Athenians did indeed value their citizenship,^ as is 
evidenced by the limitations placed on citizenship in Athens by Pericles' law 
in the mid-f i f th century and its re-enactment towards the end of the 
1 Dem. 23.126; cf. 23.114; [Dem.] 12.8-9. 
2 Though within the terms of these, of course, there were other honours which could be given, 
such as the prop>osal of inviolabihty sought for Charidemus (see Dem. 23 passim), or the 
privileges, such as ateleia, sometimes given with grants of npo^evia. 
3 Though the only sure grant of npo^evia to anybody in Thrace in the fifth and fourth centuries 
was that made to Nymphodorus of Abdera. 
^ See for the lists and analyses of naturalisations, Osborne Naturalization , esp. the summary 
4.210-21; see also M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 7; Manville The Origins of Citizenship 
in Athens 3; Herman Ritualised Friendship 141. On the differences between Tipo^evla and 
citizenship, see Ostxjme Naturalization 4.146 & n.25; Hornblower Comm. 288-9; Manville 
The Origins of Citizenship in Athens 207. 
5 M.B. Walbank Athenian Proxenies 7. 
6 See for example, Dem. 59.88. 
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century.^ But the main emphasis in dtizenship was the active involvement 
in the "business" of state.2 Manville writes, "To be an Athenian citizen, as 
an Athenian himself might say, was to be someone who metechei tes 
poleos: someone who 'shares in the polls'."^ In addition, Blundell writes 
that, for the dtizen. 
The fatherland must be cherished like a real father, and like a 
parent it must be 'repaid' for the benefits of birth and nurture 
which it has, metaphorically, bestowed upon us ... In return, the 
polis has ways of rewarding the service of its most devoted 
'children' which go beyond the benefits it provides.^ 
Some naturalised citizens did take part in the polis, such as Phanosthenes 
the Andrian, who seems to have served as a strategos in 407,^ and 
Charidemus, who was on the board of generals in the mid-fourth century 
and served as a trierarch perhaps in the 330s.^  
Although it was not always practical for grants of citizenship to be 
implemented, they were made on the assumption that they would, or at 
least could be.'' Some, such as the Thradan kings, simply lived too far away 
from Athens to make this feasible, though Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, may 
have exercised his citizenship.^ The practical difficulties of exercising 
citizenship notwithstanding, the award of citizenship made the recipient 
liable to the rights and obligations due to an Athenian citizen.^ As an 
Athenian citizen, there were rights and privileges one could draw upon. 
1 For Pericles' decree, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.4, Plut. Per. 37.3; Ael. VH 6.10,13.24, Suidas 
s.v. 5TIHO7COITIXO^ (A 451); for the re-enactment, see Dem. 57.30; Eumelus FGrHist 77 F 2, 
Carystius ap. Athen. 13.577 b-c; on both decrees see Rhodes Comm. 331-4. 
2 Manville The Origins of Citizenship in Athens 3-7. 
^Ibid. 7. 
Blundell Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 43 & esp. 44 and references there. 
5 For citizenship: IG i^ 182; for strategia: Xen. Hell. 1.5.18; Plato Ion 541 c-d; Develin 
Officials 174; see also Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 319. 
^ For citizer^hip, see 237 at»ove; for his dvic career in Athens, see PA 15380; Davies APF 
570-2; Develin Officials 268, 291, 310,312, 313, 343. 
7 Osborne Naturalization 4.148-9,187-92. 
^Ibid. 3.27. 
^Ibid. 4.189. 
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but, conversely, there were duties that one was also expected to perform. As 
Herman notes, grants of citizenship "not only convert the grantees into 
external allies but effect their actual incorporation into the communal 
group." 1 Citizenship drew the recipient - or was supposed to - into the 
network of duties and obligations that one owed to one's fellow countrymen 
and to one's polis. What was expected was that the individual would 
become part of this web of obligation and would respond in kind through 
services to the Athenian polis. 
Sometimes, such awards were made in response to initial 
benefactions, as were grants of TCpo^evia, with a view to receiving other 
benefactions.2 The kings of Bosporus were rewarded with citizenship for 
their benefactions to the city in maintaining the com supply.3 But, in the 
case of the Odrysian kings, the awards were prospective, looking for 
benefactions in the future.* This is in accord with the pattern we have 
already seen for the accepted method of dealing with Thracians: to offer 
them a "gift" which was prospective in nature. 
However, as has been shown above, the Thracian kings were 
notorious in their disregard for Athens and Athenian interests. They did 
not place the same value on the "gift" as the Athenians thought they 
should, or, at least, they did not unless it suited them to do so. Sadocus 
accepted the citizenship, and responded as he was expected to, but his father 
also expected Athenian help for his Macedonian campaign.^ Cersobleptes, 
on the other hand, only felt the weight of his Athenian citizenship when he 
1 Herman Ritualised Friendship 140-1. 
2 Osborne Naturalization 4.146,148-50,189-90. 
^ See Dem. 20 passim (esp. 29-35); Osborne Naturalization 3.41-4. The Bosporan kings were 
not only faithful, but quickly become hellenised, so much so that some time in the second half 
of the fourth century which records how Paerisades (Athenian citizenship: IG ii^ 212 [= Tod 
167]; citizenship of his father, Leucon, and grandfather, Satyrus: Dem. 20.30) and his sons 
made grants of npo^evia {Corpus Inscriptionum Regni Bosporani (1965) 1 (= SIG^ 217); also 2, 
3,5). Very Greek indeed. 
* Osborne Naturalization 4.188. 
5 See 229-30 above. 
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was being threatened by Philip. Athenian citizenship was not a gift which 
could hold its value, as this depended very much on whether it was useful 
to the recipient or not. Osborne says: 'The grants indeed are more a mark of 
desperation on the part of the Athenians, whose willingness to accord such 
honours was matched orUy by their optimism about their effects."^ Philip is 
supposed to have written mockingly to the Athenians, 
When <Cotys>2 died, to whom you had given a share in the 
dtizenship, you straight away made a ^ikia with the man who 
killed him. And you chose to go to war on Cersobleptes' behalf, 
in the f u l l knowledge that none of those who receive such 
Scopeal pay any attention to your laws and decrees.3 
The weakness of the Athenian position is plain. They were in the position 
of suppliants, offering a gift which the Thracians could accept or not as they 
chose. 
The Problems with Athens' Thracian Policy 
There were a number of problems with the in way in which Athens 
dealt with Thrace and the Thracians. Firstiy, they were forced to approach 
Thrace as suppliants. The loyalty and goodwill of the Thracian kings was 
important to Athens' interests in the north, so she was in the weaker 
position. "Giving" to the Thracians was also the acknowledged means of 
receiving from them. 
But this created further complications. The purpose of this "gift" was 
not only a supplicatory offering, but it also carried baggage of its own. 
Citizenship supposedly tied the recipients closely within the Athenian 
network of duties and obligations. The Athenians offered a "gift" -
citizenship - which only carried a value relative to the circumstances. 
1 Naturalization 3.59. 
2 See Osborne Naturalization 3.49,122 (under Sitalces of Thrace). 
3 [Dem]. 12.9. 
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Citizenship was useful to the Thracians some of the time, and then they 
were happy to share in it (with all that it entailed). At other times, it was of 
no use to them at all, and then they simply ignored it. The Thracians were 
in a position to accept or reject the gift as they chose. The Athenians were 
dependent upon their accepting it. 
Further, the "gift" was prospective: it anticipated future benefits. But 
again, this depended on the goodwill of the Thracians. If they ultimately 
chose not to respond to the gift, they were in a position not to, and there was 
nothing the Athenians could do. The power balance was in the Thracians' 
favour, and the Athenians were forced to accept what they were given. 
The Athenians failed to understand fully the way Thracian society 
worked; so much is clear from Thucydides. Because of this they failed to 
respond creatively to the problem of Thracian loyalty. They kept doing the 
same thing over and over again. This failure to appreciate the differences 
ful ly produced difficulties, if not disasters, for the Athenians in the fourth 
century. However, though the loss of control in Thrace could be sustained 
by the Athenians, their general lack of insight into the way non-Greek, or at 
most marginally Greek, societies worked and differed from their own was to 
prove their absolute undoing when they also misunderstood and 
underestimated Philip and the Macedonians. 
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Philip was a man of broad vision. He drank a great deal and had eight wives. 
He subdued the Greeks after they had knocked themselves out in the 
Peloponnesian VJar and appointed himself Captain General so that he could 
uphold the ideals of Hellas. The main ideal of Hellas was to get rid of Philip, 
but he didn't count that one. 
W. Cuppy The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody 
Odi dolosas munerum et malas artes: 
imitantur hamos dona: namque quis nescit 
avidum vorata decipi scarum musca? 
quotiens amico diviti nihil donat, 
0 Quintiane, liberalis est pauper. 
Martial Epigrams 5.18.6. 
This chapter wi l l discuss some of the main events in Philip's reign, 
looking at how Philip dealt with the Greeks and how they dealt with him. It 
wi l l consider his policy of gift-giving, and the relationship between gift-
giving, bribery and ^evia, before looking more specifically at how the 
significant events of this period can be analysed in terms of these 
phenomena. Finally, it wil l draw conclusions about the way Philip was able 
to use the reciprocity ethic to his own advantage, exploiting its subtleties, 
inconsistencies and ambiguities, in order to create the expectation of a 
relationship which he had no intention of maintaining. 
Philip brought himself from being the small-time ruler of a semi-
barbarian kingdom to become the most influential man in the Greek world. 
His growth in strength and influence was dependent not only upon his 
successful conquests in northern and central Greece, but also to a large 
degree upon his diplomatic tactics and the manner in which he dealt with 
the Greek states, particularly the Athenians. Supposedly of Argive descent,i 
1 Hdt. 8.137.1; Th. 2.99.3, 5.80.2. 
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he certainly spent three years of his adolescence as a hostage in Thebes.^  
There he may well have learned military skills from Epameinondas,2 but he 
also seems to have learned a great deal about the way the sophisticated and 
educated southern Greeks thought - not only their philosophy, but also the 
subtieties of their codes of friendship. It seems that it was largely through his 
appreciation of this code of behaviour and his shrewd ability to manipulate 
and exploit it that he brought the Greek states to their downfall. 
Philip and Gift-giving 
[Philip] was courteous in his dealings with others, and tried to 
bring the multitudes to the greatest goodwill (e\)VOia) through 
both gifts (Scopeai) and promises, and tried to counteract cleverly 
the crowd of impending dangers.3 
PhiUp's methods of deaUng with others were not untypical of other 
gift-giving sodeties: in order to win loyalty, he gave gifts, and he did this on 
both a state and a personal level. There are many examples of Philip giving 
gifts in one form or another for the purpose of winning individuals and 
poleis over to himself. Demosthenes recounts how Aeschines, on his way 
home from Arcadia, met with a certain Atrestidas to whom Phihp had 
given thirty of the Olynthian captives as a Bcoped.* Likewise, Olynthus made 
an alliance wi th him when he promised to give them Poteidaea and 
Anthemous,^ and later the Aetolians seem to have negotiated a treaty with 
Philip on the understanding that he would give them Naupactus, possibly 
in exchange for an alliance.^ Demosthenes recounts the reception of the 
1 Plut. Pelop. 26.5; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.2-3; Diod. 15.67.4, cf. 16.2.2; see Griffith HM 204-5. 
2 Plut. Pelop. 26.7; Diod. 16.2.3. 
3 Diod. 16.3.3. 
4 Dem. 19.305-6. 
5 Diod. 16.8.3; Tod 158 (Robinson TAPA 65 (1934) 103-22); Dem. 2.7; 6.20; 23.107-8. On the 
pro-Macedonian element and expulsion of the pro-Athenians in Olynthus, see Dem. 9.56,66, 
19.265. Note that the pro-Macedonians in Olynthus were supposedly won over by brih)es. 
6 Dem. 9.34; Strabo 9 c 426-7; see Griffith H M 508-9; EUis Philip II 158; cf. Theopompus 
fGrHist 115 F 235. 
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Theban ambassadors at Philip's court, saying that when the Theban 
ambassadors arrived, 
Philip wished to give them money, and a very large sum, they 
said. But the Theban ambassadors did not accept it or take it. After 
this, at a sacrifice and banquet, while he was drinking with them 
and being kindly ((l)iA,avepco7iet)6|ievo(;) to them, Philip offered 
them many other things, such as prisoners and the like, and, 
finally, gold and silver cups. They kept on refusing all these 
things and never giving in. Finally one of the ambassadors, Philo, 
spoke ... He said that he was pleased and rejoiced to see Philip 
being magnanimous and kind to them, but they were indeed 
(jiiXoi and ^evoi to him even without these Swpa. However, the 
ambassadors called on Philip to direct this kindness towards the 
affairs of the dty [Thebes], in which he was then engaged, and do 
something worthy of himself and the Thebans. Then they 
promised that in this way the whole city as well as themselves 
would be inclined towards him.i 
The Thebans might have required that he direct his benevolence towards a 
public cause rather than a private one, but it is still a form of exchange. He 
would have the goodwill of the Thebans, if he gave them what they wanted. 
Philip was more than happy to comply.2 
PhUip, Athens and Amphipolis 
Philip's first task as king was to consoUdate the kingdom he had and 
try to settle the problems on his borders. Philip executed one of his half-
brothers, and later pursued to Olynthus the other two, who were also rival 
claimants for the throne.^ He took an Illyrian bride, probably in 359/8,* 
1 Dem. 19.139-140. 
2 Dem. 19.141-2. On the implicit bribery involved, which Demosthenes commends them for 
declining to accept, see below. It would seem that the Theban ambassadors were not willing to 
take the risk that Aeschines did; and which did not produce the results he had hoped for. 
3 Justin 7.4.5, 8.3.10; Ellis Philip II 44-47; Griffith H M 208 & n. 2, though see Elhs (Philip II 
46; id. Historia 22 (1973) 3504) who places the death of Archelaus about 352. On Perdiccas' 
earlier attempt to seize the Macedonian throne, see Aeschin. 2.26-9. 
4 Satyrus ap. Athen. 13. 557 b-d; see also Polyaenus 8.60. Ellis (Philip II 47-8) suggests that 
the marriage sealed the negotiations for an armistice between Philip and the lllyrians, 
though Griffith (HM 211) considers that though there may well have tjeen negotiations, 
"certainly no treaty was made now". Both Ellis and Griffith, however, see the need to 
explain the inactivity of Bardylis and his failure to press home his advantage. 
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persuaded the Paeonians to keep peace, "having corrupted some wi th gifts, 
and having persuaded others wi th benevolent promises" {xovc, \^£V Scopeaiq 
diat^Qeipaq, xoxx; 5e knayyekiaiq (t)iA,av6pc67coiq Tieiaotq), and won over the 
Thracians in a similar way.^ 
Phi l ip dealt w i t h Argaeus, a pretender to the throne, and the 
Athenians by exploi t ing the Athenian desire to regain control of 
Amphipol is . In 359, Amphipolis was garrisoned w i t h Macedonian troops 
put there by Perdiccas to defend the Amphipolitans against the Athenians.^ 
The Athenians' backing of Argaeus was centred on their ambitions to 
recover Amphipolis , and they presumably hoped to obtain i t wi th his help 
once he was on the throne.^ Philip withdrew the garrison and gave the city 
its autonomy, and made overtures for peace w i t h the Athenians.^ The 
Athenians prevaricated over their support for Argaeus,^ and Philip 
despatched a letter to the Athenians saying that he was ready to make an 
alliance and renew his TuaxpiKTiv ^iXia\ w i th them.^ According to Diodorus, 
he renounced all claim to Amphipolis, and thus persuaded the Athenians 
to make peace7 
In 358/7, however, Philip laid siege to Amphipolis, supposedly under 
provocation by the Amphipolitans.^ Envoys were sent by the people of 
Amphipolis , invi t ing the Athenians "to come and receive the city", but the 
Athenians refused.^ The Olynthians also came to Athens wanting to open 
negotiations, but Philip won over the Athenians, negotiating in secret wi th 
1 Diod. 16.3.4. 
2 See Aeschin 2.29; Griffith HM 187; Cawkwell Philip 73. 
3 This seems to be implicit in Diod. 16.3.3; see also Griffith H M 236 & n. 3. 
4 Diod. 16.3.3, 4.1; Polyaenus 4.2.17. On the question of the autonomy of Amphipolis, 
however, see Ellis Philip 11 48-9. 
5 Diod. 16.3.5. 
^Dem. 23.121. 
7 Diod. 16.4.1. 
8 Diod. 16.8.2; see also Griffith HM 237. 
9 Dem. 1.8; Theopompus f GrHist 115 F 42; see also Griffith HM 238 & n. 1; Ellis Philip 11 64, 
66. 
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the Athenian ambassadors, Ant iphon and Charidemus, who promised to 
give up Pydna in return for Amphipolis.^ A letter was also sent by Philip to 
the Athenians during the siege, reassuring them that Amphipolis was theirs 
and that he w o u l d restore i t to them.2 Yet when Amphipol is was taken, 
Phi l ip d i d not hand i t over,^ but immediately reduced Pydna as wel l , 
probably through the treachery of some of those w i t h i n the city.4 The 
Athenians, not for the last time, were taken in by the hints and promises of 
the Macedonian. 
The first thing to understand about this incident is the importance of 
Amphipol is to Athens. Amphipolis was a colony founded by the Athenians 
i n 437/6 at the place called Ennea Hodoi on the River Strymon.5 The city 
was significant because of its access to timber for ship-building and the 
mines of the north.6 In 424, however, the Amphipolitans went over to the 
Spartan, Brasidas, whom they named as their founder in place of Hagnon, 
the actual oikistes7 Into the fourth century, the Athenians' lack of influence 
i n Amphipol i s remained a matter of grave concern to them, yet, despite 
their best efforts, they were unable to w i n i t back.^ Even after PhiHp had 
taken the city decisively, the Athenians were still arguing their claims to i t 
i n the negotiations of 346 and later in 344.9 the early 350s the Athenians 
were so obsessed wi th the city that they were ready to be duped. 
Philip also wanted Amphipolis, but was quite prepared to use i t as a 
bargaining point, at least for appearance's sake. A t first, the mere withdrawal 
of Macedonian troops f r o m AmphipoUs was enough for the Athenians to 
iTheopompusFGrHisf 115 F 30 a-b;Dem 2.6; see also deSte. Croix CQ n.s.l3 (1963) 110-9; 
Griffith H M 238-42. 
2 [Dem.] 7.27; Dem. 23.116. However, see Ellis Philip II 52. 
3 Polyaenus 4.2.17. 
4 Diod. 16.8.3; Dem. 1.5,8,20.63. 
5 Th. 4.102.3, 5.11.1; see also schol. Aeschin. 2.31. 
^ On the importance of Amphipolis and the Thraceward parts, see Chapter Six: 223-5. 
7 T h . 5.11.1. 
8 Aeschin. 2.32; [Dem.] 7.28-9; Cawkwell Philip 71-2; Griffith HM 230-3. 
9 Aeschin. 2.31-3. 
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think twice about their support for Argaeus. When, however, Philip laid 
siege to the city, a more substantial agreement needed to be made. The 
advantages for Athens in the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis are clear. 
They w o u l d regain Amphipolis at the cost only of a small allied city and 
wi thout an expensive northern battle. They must have been convinced, i f 
only through wishfu l thinking, that the deal w i t h Philip was secure, since 
they refused the Amphipolitans' offer to give them the dty.^ I t was a simple 
and s t ra ight forward exchange. Phi l ip , however, d i d not honour his 
undertaking. N o t only d i d he fa i l to hand over Amphipol is , but he took 
Pydna as wel l . The Athenians had no option but to declare war,2 and that 
when i t was too late. 
Philip and the Athenians in 346 
I n late 357 or early 356 Phil ip turned to the Olynthians for an 
alliance.3 I n 355 the Social War between Athens and her allies came to an 
end,4 and the war was declared against Phocis.^ I n 353, trouble also flared up 
i n Thessaly. Philip entered the war by supporting the Thessalians against the 
Pheraeans, w h o brought i n the Phocians under the command of 
Onomarchus . 6 In i t i a l ly , Onomarchus defeated Phi l ip , who retired to 
Macedon.7 This encouraged the Olynthians to look towards less threatening 
allies and to make an approach to Athens.^ In 352, Onomarchus was kil led 
1 Though, if they had accepted this offer, this would have xmdoubtedly brought them into 
direct conflict with Philip. 
2 Aeschin 2.70. 
3 See 250 n. 5. 
4 Diod. 16.22.1-2. 
5 For the opening stages of this nine year war, see Diod. 16.23.1-31.5; on the chronology of the 
war, I follow Hammond JHS 57 (1937) 44-77 (= Studies in Greek History 486-533). 
6 Diod. 16.35; though on the chronology, see Griffith HM 267-8. On the relations between 
Philip and the Thessalians prior to the Phocian intervention in Thessalian affairs, see 
Westlake Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC 160-8. 
7 Diod. 16.35.2-3. 
8 Dem. 3.7,23.107-9. 
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i n the battle of the Crocus Field,i and was succeeded by his brother 
Phayllus.2 Philip advanced south, intending to make war on the Phocians, 
but the Athenians prevented him f rom coming south through the pass at 
Thermopylae.3 Unable to get through, PhiUp returned to Macedon and went 
to f ight against Cersobleptes.^ 
In 349, Phil ip attacked Olynthus.^ The Olynthians sent envoys to 
Athens asking for an alliance, and, after some hesitation, an alliance was 
made and forces sent.^ But Phil ip, having f irs t dealt w i t h problems in 
Thessaly ,7 took Olynthus itself in 348, despite extra relief sent by the 
Athenians.8 
During the siege of Olynthus, ambassadors came f r o m the Euboeans 
to Athens w i t h the news that Philip wanted to make peace.^ Again, when 
Ctesiphon was sent to Macedon to recover ransom money for a certain 
Phrynon of Rhamnous, who was captured by pirates during the Olympic 
truce, he returned wi th the report that Philip wanted an end of the war.^o 
On the proposal of Philocrates, the demos voted that Philip be asked to send 
a herald and ambassadors to negotiate for peace, though the motion was 
attacked as unconstitutional.^^ Despite this reception to Philip's advances, in 
347 Eubulus passed a decree in the Athenian assembly to send ambassadors 
^ Diod. 16.35.3-6; Dem. 4.35; but against the emendation of Pagae to Pagasae in Diodorus, see 
Ehrhardt CQ n.s. 17 (1967) 298-301; Ellis Philip II 260 n. 95. 
2 Diod. 16.36.1. 
3 Diod. 16.38.1-2; Justin 8.2.8; Dem. 19.84. 
4 Diod. 16.38.2; schol. Aeschines 2.81; cf. Chapter Six 238-9. 
5 Justin 8.3.10; see also Ellis Hisfona 22 (1973) 350-4. 
6 Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 49-51; Dem. 3.7-8. 
7 Dem. 1.22, 2.11. 
8 Dem. 21.197; Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 50-1; Diod. 16.53.2. 
9 Aeschin. 2.12; see also Ellis Philip II 99. 
10 Aeschin. 2.12-3. 
11 Aeschin. 2.13-4,3.62. It should also pointed out here that it was Demosthenes, who was 
later to vilify Philocrates and his moves for peace, who defended him at the trial. 
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to the Greek cities to see whether they could organise a common resistance 
to Philip, though little was achieved.^ 
Meanwhile, i n central Greece, the Phocians, under the command of 
Phalaecus, seized a number of large cities i n Boeotia.2 However, the 
Phocians removed Phalaecus f r o m his command and replaced h im w i t h a 
t r i umvi ra t e , ^ whi le the Thebans sent envoys to Phil ip, who sent a few 
troops.4 The three Phocian generals decided to hand over to the Athenians 
and Spartans Alponus, Thron ium and Nicaea, and so the control of 
Thermopylae.^ I n addition, the pro-Athenian Thessalian town of Halus, on 
the coast south of the Crocus Field, was at war wi th Pharsalus, and Athens 
was i n a posit ion to help i t and therefore strengthen her control of 
Thermopylae.^ But when the Athenian general, Proxenus, and the Spartan, 
Archidamus, arrived in Phocis to receive the Phocian towns, the Phocians 
refused to hand them over.7 
Aristodemus, an actor, had been sent to Phi l ip concerning the 
Athenian hostages who had been captured when Oljmthus was taken.8 
Before Aristodemus reported to the boule on his return, one of the hostages, 
having been released by Phil ip, returned to Athens w i t h the news that 
Philip was ready for peace.^ Aristodemus then gave his report, according to 
Aeschines, to both the boule and the assembly that Philip even wished to 
become an ally.io Thereupon, Philocrates moved the resolution that ten 
1 Aeschin. 2.79; Dem. 19.10-11, 303-6; on the date of this decree, see Ellis Philip U 265 n. 51; 
Griffith HM 330 & n.l contra CawkweU REG 73 (1960) 418-25. 
2 Diod. 16.56.1-2. 
3 Diod. 16.56.3. 
4 Diod. 16.58.2-3. 
5 Aeschin. 2.132-3. 
6 Dem. 19.36 & schol., 39,159,163,174,334. 
7 Aeschin. 2.133. It would appear that the Phocian, Phalaecus, had regained control of 
Phocian affairs; see Cawkwell REG 73 (1960) 428; Ellis Philip 11 105-6, 266 n. 67; Griffith 
HM 333 & n . 2,334. 
8 Aeschin. 2.15. 
9 Aeschin. 2.16. 
10 Aeschin. 2.17. 
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ambassadors be sent to Philip to enter into discussions concerning peace and 
the common interests of Philip and the Athenians.i 
The First Embassy 
The members of the f irs t embassy to Phil ip included Aeschines, 
Demosthenes and Philocrates.2 The ambassadors arrived at Pella just as 
Phi l ip was about to set out on his Thracian campaign, but Philip gave 
assurances to the ambassadors that he would leave the Chersonese alone.3 
On the return of the embassy to Athens, the ambassadors gave a brief report 
to the boule and deUvered a letter f rom Philip, suggesting that there were 
benefits which w o u l d come to the Athenians i f or when they made an 
alliance w i t h him.4 
Demosthenes then proposed that, when the ambassadors came f rom 
Philip, the prytaneis should call a meeting about peace and alliance on two 
successive days.^ The terms finally agreed were:^ that each party should keep 
what i t held;7 that there should be peace and alliance wi th Philip and his 
descendants;^ that i t should be a defensive alliance;^ that i t should be 
binding on the allies (though the whole question of who were the alHes of 
each became one of the bones of contention);io and that neither party should 
support the operation of pirates.^ The synedrion of the allies put forward 
an alternative dogma proposing, firstly, that there should be peace without 
alliance, and, secondly, that wi th in a l imit of three months any Greek state 
1 Aeschin. 2.18, 3.63; Dem. 19.12. 
2 Aeschin 2.18-19. 
3 Aeschin. 2.81-2; see also Ellis Philip II 267 n. 78. 
4 Aeschin. 2.45,50; Dem. 19.40: "eypa<))ov 8' av K O I 5iappT^5r|v fjXix' w&c, eu TTOII^OCO, el eu 
Tj5eiv Kal xfiv av\niaxiav p.oi yevrioonEVTiv". 
5 Aeschin. 2.53, 55, 61. 
6 See Griffith H M 338-9. 
7 [Dem.] 726. 
8 Dem. 19.48. 
9 Dem. 19.143. 
10 Dem. 19.159, 321; Aeschin. 2.82-4. 
11 [Dem.] 12.2; 714. 
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Greek state that wished could have its name added to the treaty.^ This was 
not going to be acceptable to Philip, however, as his ambassadors made clear; 
there could be no peace without alliance, and no alliance i f the Phocians, 
Kalians and Cersobleptes were included.2 After warnings of what would 
happen i f peace was not made,3 the demos accepted the terms and elected 
the same ambassadors to return to Macedon and administer the oaths, and 
the ambassadors were also to do aXX' 6 xi dv Swcovxai dyaQovA 
The Second Embassy 
I t was PhiUp's policy to keep everyone guessing, and the Athenians 
were not the only ambassadors waiting on h im at Pella.5 When the second 
embassy reported to the assembly, Aeschines claimed that he had persuaded 
Phi l ip i n everything that w o u l d benefit the city, both in the matters 
concerning the A m p h i c t y o n y and everything else.^ According to 
Demosthenes, Aeschines went on to report that wi th in a few days Philip 
w o u l d lay siege to Thebes, repopulate Thespiae and Plataea, exact 
reparations for the shrine at Delphi f rom the Thebans, not the Phocians, 
give up Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis , and restore Oropus to the 
Athenians.' ' A letter f rom Philip was also read to the assembly, in which, as 
Demosthenes reports w i t h disgust, Philip, who had previously intimated 
that there w o u l d be great rewards for the Athenians i f they made an 
1 Aeschin. 3.69-70; Dem. 19.15. On koinai eirenai in general, see Ryder Koine Eirene. 
2 Aeschin. 2.82-9, 3.65, 71-4; Dem. 19.36, 69, 159, 174, 321, 334, Hypoth. 2.5. 
3 Dem. 19.291. 
4 Dem. 19.15-7; Aeschin. 2.82,104,120. 
5 Aeschin. 2.120,136-7. 
6 Dem. 19.20. 
7 Dem. 5.10,19.19-23, 35,42, 53, 63, 74,112, 220, 325-7; cf. Aeschin 2.119-29; on the promises 
and Aeschines' defence, see Markle CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253-4. 
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alliance, now said that he d i d not know what he could do to grat ify 
(xapiaaiio) the Athenians.i 
Eventually, at Pherae, the Athenians administered the oaths to 
Phi l ip , and those of his allies whom he chose to include.2 Philip's exact 
plans seem to have been unclear to all except Phil ip. By the time the 
embassy had returned to Athens, Philip was at Thermopylae and making 
assurances to the Phocians.^ The Athenians extended the peace to Philip's 
descendants and added in obedience to Philip that, i f the Phocians d id not do 
what they ought and hand over the sanctuary to the Amphictyons, then the 
Athenian demos wou ld come to help against those who were preventing 
this f r o m happening.^ Most of the same ambassadors were then elected to 
bear the news of this decree to Phihp, though Demosthenes refused to go 
and Aeschines was left behind on a plea of i l l health.^ 
Philip sent two letters to the Athenians calling them to take the f ield 
against the Phocians.^ By the time the letters f rom Philip had arrived, the 
mood i n Athens had changed. Troops were not sent, since, according to 
Aeschines, those who were agitating for war were alleging that Philip would 
take any soldiers as hostages.'' Phil ip next made an agreement w i t h 
Phalaecus, who was to w i t h d r a w w i t h his men, and the Phocians 
surrendered themselves into the hands of the Macedonian.^ Phil ip 
convened a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council and referred the matter to 
them.9 
1 Dem. 19.41. One should not, however, acquit Philip too readily here of a charge of 
duplicity. If he was not in fact deceiving the Athenians, he was certainly manipulating 
them, contra MarkleCQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253,256-60; Griffith H M 345^. 
2 Dem. 19.158. 
3 Dem. 19.58. 
4 Dem. 19.48-53. 
5 Dem. 19.121-5. 
6 Aeschin 2.137; Dem. 19.50-1. 
7 Aeschin. 2.137 
8 Diod. 16.59.3; Dem. 19.62-3; see also Griffith H M 346; cf. Ellis Philip II 120. 
9 Diod. 16.59.4. 
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The Amphictyonic Council decided that the cities of the Phocians 
should have their walls removed and that the Phocians would no longer be 
able to participate i n the sanctuary at Delphi or be members of the 
Amphictyonic Council, and their votes in the Amphictyonic Council were 
transferred to Philip.^ The Sacred War was brought to an end without a 
battle being fought. The Council meeting came to an end; Phil ip was 
appointed to hold the next Pythian games, and then returned to Macedon.2 
The events of 346 fo l low a similar pattern to those surrounding 
Amphipolis: on the basis of suggestions and hints of benefits that would be 
received, the Athenians let Philip enter central Greece and take the cities of 
their allies, the Phocians. As noted above, Philip sent letters back to Athens 
w i t h the f i rs t and second embassies, int imating benefits. Aeschines gave 
substance to these hints by report ing to the Athenians the alleged 
"promises" of Philip. Philip himself, i t must be noted, was all too careful not 
to make any definite statements himself as to his intentions. He only made 
suggestions of possibilities; Aeschines was lef t to make the hints into 
promises.3 Thus when the promises were left unful f i l led , the responsibility 
was deflected f r o m Philip on to Aeschines: it was Aeschines who actually 
told the "lies"; Philip himself had said nothing firm .4 
Epanorthosis 
Even after the disappointment of the Phocian settlement,^ there were 
some in Athens sti l l wi lhng to beUeve in PhiHp. Aeschines attended the 
celebration banquet to mark the end of the war, and continued to speak of 
1 Diod. 16.60.1-2; Dem. 19.325; Paus. 10.3.3, 8.2. 
2 Diod. 16.60.3-5; on the meaning of this passage see also Griffith JHS 59 (1939) 71-9; Ryder 
Koine Eirene 145-9. 
3 See Dem. 19.38-9, 68 
4 See Dem. 19.68-9, 328; [Dem.] 7.33. 
5 Athens refused to send delegates to the Pythian games that year (Dem. 19.128). 
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the fu l f i lmen t of the promises that had been made,i and when, possibly 
early i n 345, the Delians lodged an appeal at the Amphictyonic Council 
against Athens' control of the temple of Apollo on the island, the assembly 
elected Aeschines to defend their claim, though this was vetoed by the 
Areopagus and Hypereides was sent instead.2 Even Demosthenes urged the 
Athenians to accept the peace they had and not to give the Amphictyons any 
cause to declare war, though not in order to gratify Philip.3 
I n 344, Philip possibly interfered in the Peloponnese in a war between 
Messene, Argos and Sparta.4 In response, the Athenians, at the instigation of 
Demosthenes, sent embassies to the Peloponnesians, warning them against 
the Macedonian.^ Phil ip replied by sending Python of Byzantium and 
representatives f r o m his allies to Athens to attempt to revise the existing 
peace settlement, and the Athenians were given a free hand to amend any 
clause they wished.^ The Athenians proposed two amendments. The first 
required that each side should retain what belonged to them by right 
(eKaxepovq e%eiv xd eamdSv), which was aimed specifically at reclaiming 
Amphipol is ; and the second, that there should be a common peace.'' A t the 
same time as some of Philip's ambassadors were in Athens, an embassy was 
present f r o m the Persian k ing , requesting support for an Egyptian 
campaign.8 The Athenians, none too politely, refused, passing a decree that 
1 Dem. 19.111-3,128. 
2 Dem.18.134; on the date (placed variously between 345 & 343): Ellis Philip U 131-2, 274 n. 
25, puts it in 345; Osborne Eranos 72 (1974) 176-7 n. 19 is non-committal; Sealey (AJP 79 
(1958) 72-3 = Essays 184-5) suggests 340/39 for an episode which precedes this one; on 
Aeschines' selection and subsequent termination of his appointment, see Ellis Philip II 131. 
3 Dem. 5.13-4, 24-5. Ellis {Philip U 274 n. 10) conjectures that this speech was made at the 
time the Thessalian ambassadors were in Athens from the Amphictyony (Dem. 19.111). 
4 Dem. 6.15; see Griffith H M 474-84. 
5 Dem. 6.19-25,18.79. 
6 Dem. 18.136; [Dem.] 718-23; [Dem.] 12.18. 
7 [Dem] 7.18-23,30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2; on the common peace, Ryder Koine Eirene 100-1; cf. 
Cawkwell CQ n.s. 13 (1963) 132 & n. 5 (Cawkwell argues, wrongly, from the supposition 
that Philip, and not the Athenians, proposed the common peace; see Griffith H M 490 n. 3; 
Brunt CQ n.s.l9 (1969) 262 n. 2). 
8 Philochorus FGrHist 328 F157; Diod. 16.44.1; [Dem.] 12.6; see Cawkwell CQ n.s. 13 (1963) 
133. 
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there w o u l d be reprisals f rom Philip and the Greeks i f the King attacked any 
Greek cities.i The chances of reconciliation between Phi l ip and the 
Athenians seemed good. The Athenians elected Hegesippus and others to 
represent them before Philip, but he was not wel l received.2 Philip was so 
incensed by the demands of Hegesippus and his colleagues that Xenocleides, 
the poet, was banished for entertaining them dur ing their time in Pella, 
though they were fellow-citizens.3 
By 343, the mood i n Athens had turned against Philip. Hypereides 
impeached Philocrates,4 and Philocrates, assessing public opinion, fled f rom 
Athens.5 Demosthenes, in the same year, also impeached Aeschines, though 
he was acquitted.^ I n the same summer, before the trial of Aeschines, there 
was internal trouble i n Megara and Elis which Demosthenes blamed on 
Philip's intervention, though this was possibly unjustified.^ 
Yet, despite this apparent negative feeling i n Athens,^ Philip sent to 
Athens again at the end of 343 or early 342 for a revision of the peace.^ 
Al though he was not prepared to give up Amphipol is to them as they 
demanded, he was wi l l ing to accept a common peace.^o In addition, he was 
prepared to submit to arbitration the ownership of the forts i n Thrace, to 
compel the Cardians to submit to arbitration over the Chersonese, and to 
give the Athenians the island of Halonnesus as a Scopeid, though i t had 
1 [Dem.] 12.6; Dem. 10.34. 
2 Dem. 19. 331; see also [Dem.] 12.20-22. 
3 Dem. 19.331. 
4 Hypereides Euxen. 29-30; Dem. 19.114,116, cf. 145. 
5 Aeschin. 2.6, 3.79. 
6 Dem 19; Aeschin. 2; Plut. Dem. 155; [Plut.] Vit. X Or. 840 c. 
7 Dem. 19.87, 204, 260, 294-5, 326,334, 9.17-8, 27; 18.71,295; Paus. 4.28.4; 5.4.9; see Ellis (Philip 
II 151), who believes that Philip probably did not intervene either directly or indirectly; 
Griffith (HM 497-501) sees it as opportunism on Philip's part, rather than casting him as the 
"arch-initiator"; Cawkwell (Philip 126), despite Demosthenes' accusations of directly 
breaking the peace, suggests that there were a number of occasions, such as these, when Philip 
broke the spirit, if not the letter, of the peace; see also Cawkwell CQ n.s. 13 (1963) 200-5. 
8 Which, however, must have looked more favourable in the light of Aeschines' acquittal. 
9 See especially [Dem.] 7, where Hegesippus in turn advises the Athenians as to how they 
should respond to the letter from Philip; see also Griffith H M 510-12. 
10 [Dem.] 7.30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2. 
258 
Chapter Seven: Philip and the Greeks 
formerly belonged to them, or at least to submit the question of ownership 
to arbitration.! He also proposed setting up a commercial treaty (symbola) 
between Athens and Macedon, and requested that the Athenians should 
jo in Philip i n clearing the sea of pirates.2 What is more, while disclaiming 
that he had made any promises of benefits i n the past, he assured the 
Athenians that i f they trusted his ^{hji i n Athens and punished those who 
slandered h i m , he w o u l d confer great benefits upon them (cbq i^£YdX,a 
e'uepYexTiaei).3 But again the attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. In 
late 343, suspecting that there would be an end of the peace, the Athenians 
contracted alliances w i t h the Achaeans, Arcadians, Mantineians, Argives, 
Megalopolitans and Messenians.4 
The proposed revision of the peace of Philocrates also demonstrates 
Philip 's ski l l i n manipulating the principles of gif t -giving. In 344, Philip 
f o u n d i t expedient to patch up the peace w i t h Athens which was sti l l , 
though only nominally, i n operation. Of the two amendments proposed by 
the Atheruans, the one concerning common peace was acceptable to Philip, 
but the other demanding that each were to have what was their own was 
not. Phi l ip was to make i t abundantly clear that he was not going to 
relinquish Amphipolis.^ 
In 343/2 i t seems that Philip was prepared to make some concessions. 
Yet i t appears that the main issue, and the one on which the others 
ultimately hinged, was the question of Halonnesus. 
1 [Dem.] 7.2-7 (on Halonnesus, see below), 36-7,39-44; [Dem] 12.12-5. 
2 [Dem.] 7.9-15. 
3 [Dem.] 7.33-4. 
4 Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; IG ii^ 225. 
5 [Dem.] 12.20-1. 
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Halonnesus 
Halonnesus had been an island port of the Athenians i n the central 
Aegean. I t had been occupied by the pirate Sostratus, f rom whom Philip, in 
turn, wrested i t . i I t was now, PhiUp claimed, his,2 so that in the negotiations 
of 343/2 Phil ip was wi l l i ng to offer the Athenians Halonnesus as a gif t , a 
6copeid. But the Athenians would not accept i t on these terms. They would 
not receive i t as a gif t (AxxPeiv), but would only receive back (djioA,aPeTv) 
what had been their own.3 Hegesippus, i n his speech to the Athenian 
assembly, exclaims, 
i t does not escape h im that wi th both terms, whichever you use, 
you w i l l have the island, whether you receive i t (XapieTv), or 
receive i t back (djtoAxxPeiv). So what is the difference to h im, i f he 
does not use the just expression and "gives i t back" to you 
(d7i:o6o'Ovai), but uses the unjust expression to "have given you a 
g i f t " (Scopeid 6e5a)KEvai)? No t so that some benefaction 
(e-uepyexTiiid xi) might be credited to you (for this benefaction 
wou ld be laughable), but so that he might show to all the Greeks 
that the Athenians are happy to receive naval bases f r o m 
Macedon.4 
As Hegesippus was wel l aware, Philip was offering the Athenians a double-
edged sword. 
The f i rs t d i f f icu l ty had to do w i t h the technicality of receiving the 
island as a g i f t or receiving back f rom him that which was their own. As 
Hegesippus complains, i n either case the Athenians wou ld have the island, 
so what difference was i t going to make? A l l the difference in the wor ld . For 
i f they received i t f r om Philip as a gif t , this wou ld be an admission that it 
was, i n fact, his own property to give away. By extension, this wou ld mean 
that all territory which Philip had taken f rom them and f rom others was his 
1 [Dem.] 12.13. It was later to be occupied by Peparethians, from whom Phihp captured it 
again. The Peparethians then called on the Athenians to demand retribution from Philip 
([Dem.] 12.12-5). 
2 [Dem.] 7.2. 
3 [Dem.] 7.5; [Dem.] 12.14. 
4 [Dem.] 7.5-6. 
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property. This was not an admission the Athenians could, or would want to, 
make, and i t had a direct bearing upon Amphipolis. 
Philip's justification for holding AmphipoUs was that the Peace of 
Philocrates confirmed his right to keep what he held.i Later in the same 
speech, Hegesippus says. 
He [Philip] says Amphipolis is his, for you passed a decree that i t 
was his, when you passed the decree that he was to have what he 
held (exeiv avxbv a eixev). You passed this decree, but you did not 
ever pass a decree that Amphipolis was his. For i t is possible to 
"hold" that which belongs to others, and not all those who "hold" 
have that which is their own, but many are in possession of that 
which is another's. So this piece of wisdom of his is silly.2 
I f then the Athenians accepted that Phil ip had a r ight to give away 
Halonnesus, which he held, as a 5o)peid, then they must also give up any 
claim to Amphipol is , as wel l as any other territory they wished to claim 
f r o m h im. Secondly, i f they accepted Philip's g i f t and took Halonnesus, they 
wou ld be put t ing themselves i n his debt, despite Hegesippus' ridicule. Peace 
treaties, like alliances, are a particular kind of "balanced" relationship where 
each party "gives" the other promises which are returned promise for 
promise, according to the terms. The stability of such formalised "state 
friendships" depends upon the giving and receiving being symmetrically 
equivalent. Hegesippus realised that i f they d id accept the 6copeid, they 
wou ld be indebted to Philip for a benefaction. What was even more galling 
is what the acceptance of this g i f t wou ld mean: that Athens, who prided 
herself on her sea power, wou ld be tacitiy accepting Philip's control of the 
Aegean. Hegesippus claimed that this was Philip's true purpose, that he 
w o u l d be responsible for maintaining Athens' influence i n the Aegean, and 
that the Athenians were happy to accept this as a gif t . This would not be a 
1 [Dem.] 7.24-6. 
2 [Dem.] 7.26; see also [Dem.] 12.21-2. 
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balanced relationship. The Athenians would be doubly obligated to Philip, 
f i rs t ly for his ScopEid, and secondly for the control it wou ld restore to them 
in the central Aegean. But i t would only be a nominal control; Philip, as the 
giver of the gif t , would hold the real power. 
What is more, Philip was in a morally stronger position. Not only 
was he w i l l i n g to submit the matter to arbitration, but the Athenians had 
also refused to go to arbitration and come to terms. As Philip argued over 
Amphipolis , the Athenian position was not strong in any case. He says. 
I f i t [Amphipolis] belongs to its original owners, how do we not 
hold i t justly, for my ancestor, Alexander, first occupied the place 
....? Or i f someone disputes this, and claims i t belongs to those 
who had control of i t later, this also is justice i n m y favour. For I 
besieged those who cast you out and accepted the Lacedaemoruans 
as their founders, and captured the place. Indeed we all dwell i n 
cities either inherited f rom our forefathers, or conquered in war. 
You neither acquired i t f i rs t , nor have i t now, but having 
remained in the place for the least time, you claim the city back, 
and this after giving most secure assurances in our favour, i 
One is left wondering, as Gr i f f i th does,2 how much Philip truly wanted to be 
reconciled w i t h Athens, or indeed how much Athens wanted to be 
reconciled w i t h Philip. His attempts to make peace i n 344 were probably 
quite sincere, whatever his reasons. But by 342 the matter appears i n quite a 
d i f f e r en t l igh t . Perhaps weary w i t h their r id icu lous demands for 
Amphipol is , he presented Athens w i t h Halonnesus as a test case. I f they 
accepted the g i f t , they must relinquish their claims to Amphipol i s , 
Poteidaea, and perhaps the forts in Thrace. 
1 [Dem]. 12.21-2. 
2 Griffith H M 513. 
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After Chaeronea 
I n 340, under severe provocation, the Athenians declared war on 
Phil ip.1 The Fourth Sacred war also broke out, when, at a meeting of the 
Amphictyonic council at Delphi, the Amphissans tried to bring a dogma 
against the Athenians, claiming that they should be fined for aff ixing golden 
shields to the new temple at Delphi and dedicating them before the temple 
had been consecrated.2 Aeschines, who was one of the Athenian delegates, 
replied to the charge by claiming that the Amphissans had broken the oath 
which had been sworn not to till the plain of Cirrha or rebuild the harbour.3 
The Council subsequentiy brought charges against the Amphissans, and i t 
was decreed that all the hieromnemones should assemble at Thermopylae 
at a designated time w i t h a dogma for the punishment of the Amphissans.4 
When the meeting took place at Thermopylae, war was declared on the 
Amphissans, and they were ordered to pay a fine by the Pylaea of autumn 
339.5 xhe fine was not paid, and the war was placed in Philip's hands on his 
return f r o m the Scythian campaign.^ 
Thebes seized Nicaea, the town which controlled the pass at 
Thermopylae, but Phi l ip marched south and avoided Thermopylae by 
fo r t i fy ing Cyt in ium and seizing Elateia in Phocis.'' He then sent an embassy 
1 For Philip's activities in the Hellespont, see: (investment of Perinthus) Philochorus 
FGrHist 328 F 54; Diod. 16.74.2-5, 75.1-76.3 (on the date, see Jacoby Supp. I 331); (Persian 
involvement) Paus. 1.29.10; Arrian 2.14.5; (Philip's first letter) [Dem.] 12; see also Griffith 
H M 714-6; (investment of Byzantium and Selymbria) Diod. 16.76.3; schol. Dem. 18.76; 
Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 54,162; (capture of com ships) Dem. 18.139; Justin 9.1.5-8; 
Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 292; (Philip's second letter) Diod. 16.77.2; Philochorus FGrHist 
328 F 55a, b; schol. Dem. 18.76; cf. Dem. 18.73 & the forgery of Philip's letter 77-8. 
2 Aeschin. 3.115-6; on problems with the chronology of the Fourth Sacred War, see Ellis 
Philip II 291 n. 31; Griffith H M 585-8, 717-9. 
3 Aeschin. 3.106-13,116-21; cf. Dem. 149-50. 
4 Aeschin. 3.124. 
5 Aeschin. 3.128-9. 
6 Aeschin. 3.129; Dem. 18.152. 
7 Dem. 18.152; Aeschin. 3.140; PhUochorus FGrHist 328 F 56a, b; Diod. 16.84.1-2; Plut. Dem. 
18.1; see also Cawkwell (Philip 143) for Philip paving the way for entry into Phocis through 
Elateia by rumours that he would restore and fortify the city. 
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to Thebes demanding that they hand over Nicaea to the Locrians.^ 
Demosthenes urged the Athenians to mobiHse all men of military age and 
to appoint ten envoys to negotiate an alliance with Thebes.2 Demosthenes 
himself went as a member of the embassy.^ Although they found 
ambassadors from Phihp there as well, demanding that the Thebans join 
Philip in attacking Attica or, at least, giving the Macedonians the right of 
passage through Boeotia in order to pay back a favour to him (xdpiv 
d7to5o"ovai), Demosthenes brought Thebes into an alliance with Athens.^  
In 338, a pitched battle was fought with Philip on the plain near 
Chaeronea and Philip won the day.^  However, he did not march on against 
Athens as the Athenians themselves expected, but the prisoners returned to 
Athens with the news that Philip wanted peace.^  The Athenians sent a 
return embassy, which included Aeschines, Demades and possibly Phocion, 
all of whom were favoured at the Macedonian court7 The settlement was 
remarkably favourable to the Athenians, but disastrous for Thebes. Thebes 
itself was to have a Macedonian garrison and Philip installed a government 
that would be inclined to him from among the Theban exiles.^  Oropus was 
1 Philochorus f GrHist 328 F 56b. 
2 Dem. 18.173-8. 
3 Dem. 18.179, 211; Plut. Dem. 18.1; cf. Diod. 16.85.1 (though see Jacoby Supp. I 332). For this 
kind of "appropriate connection, see Oiapter Four. 
4 Diod. 16.85.1; Dem. 18.211, 213-4 (on the speech of the Macedonian ambassadors, see below); 
Plut. Dem. 18.1-2; Justin 9.3.5. On Philochorus f GrHist 328 F 56, see Jacoby Supp. I 332-3. 
Note, in addition, that Demosthenes was the Tcpo^ evoq of the Thebans, which would have 
facilitated negotiations (Aeschin. 2.141, 143). The alliance that was formed was 
advantageous to Thebes: it repudiated all former support for the autonomy of the Boeotian 
cities; Thebes was given the command by land and shared the command at sea, but only asked 
to pay a third of the costs, the war council was to be located on the Cadmeia in Thebes 
(Aeschin. 3.141-5, cf. 106); but see also Mosley Historia 20 (1971) 508-10. 
5 Diod. 16.86.1-6; Polyaenus 4.2.2, 7; Plut. Dem. 19.2; Plut. Alex. 9.2; on Lebadeia, see Ellis 
Philip II 294 n. 68. 
6 Diod. 16.87; Polybius 5.10.1-5; Justin 9.4.6; cf. [Demades] On the Twelve Years 9. 
7 Aeschin. 3.227; Suidas s.v. Demades ( A 415); Dem. 18.282-5; [Demades] On the Twelve 
Years 9-10; see also Hypereides F 76; cf. Justin 9.4.1-5 (on this, see Griffith HM 605 n. 4). On 
the reception of this embassy, see Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 236; Plut. Mor. 715 c. On 
Phocion as a possible member of the embassy, see Plut. Phoc. 17.6; Nepos Phoc. 1.3, but this is 
not conclusive evidence for the appointment (see Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis 366). 
8 Diod. 16.87.3; Justin 9.4.6-9. 
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taken from the Boeotians and given to the Athenians. ^  The Athenian naval 
league was dissolved, but her ownership of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros was 
confirmed and also Delos and Samos.2 Most significantly, Athens retained 
her freedom 3 
In 337, Philip summoned ambassadors from all the Greek states to 
attend a meeting at Corinth.^ Representatives came from all the Greek states 
except Sparta.5 Philip called for a common peace, which was accepted.^ 
Probably at another meeting of the league,7 Philip himself was elected 
axpaxTiYoc; a-uxoKpdxcop, and plans were discussed for a Persian campaign.8 
Philip returned home and began preparations for a Persian War, and 
married a Macedonian woman, Cleopatra.^ He then gave his daughter by 
Olympias, the mother of Alexander, in marriage to Olympias' brother, 
Alexander king of Epirus, at Aegae.io However, at the celebrations after this 
wedding Philip was struck down and killed by a certain Pausanias at the 
entrance to the theatre.^ i So came the untimely end of Philip of Macedon, 
ruler in deed, if not name, of all mainland Greece. 
Although his death came too soon to show what he would have 
made of his position in Greece, Philip's subsequent settlement of Greece 
after Chaeronea suggests that he was setting up a situation not unlike that 
which he had wanted in 346. In 338, however, Athens was neither in a 
position to deny him, nor did she want to, so great was the Athenians' relief 
that they had escaped so lightly. 
1 Paus. 1.34.1; schol. Dem. 18.99; [Demades] On the Twelve Years 9. 
2 Paus. 1.25.3, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.6, 62.2; Diod. 18.56.6-7. 
3 Paus. 7.10.5. 
4 Justin 9.5.1; Diod. 16.89.3; see also Plut. Phoc. 16.5. 
5 Plut. Mor. 240 a; Strabo 8 c 365; Justin 93.3. 
6 Plut. Phoc. 16.5; Justin 9.5.2. For the terms of the peace, see IG ii^ 23 b (= Tod 177); [Dem.] 
17.4,8,10,15,16,19,26. On the common peace, see Ryder Koine Eirene 150-4. 
7 See Griffith H M 626-8. 
8 Diod. 16.89.3; Justin 9.5.4-5. 
9 Satyrus ap. Athen. 13. 557 b-d; Plut. Alex. 9.6-7; cf. Beloch G.G.2 3.2.70-1. 
10 Diod. 16.91.4. 
" Diod. 16.92-94. 
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In contrast to Thebes, which was garrisoned, Athens was privileged by 
Philip's treatment of her. Though her naval empire was broken up, Philip 
left her free and in possession of Oropus and the islands. The Athenian 
reaction was joyful gratitude. The speech On the Twelve Years, written in 
the name of Demades, is a late composition, but it is true to fourth-century 
attitudes when it says: 
I admit it. I also decreed honours for Philip. I do not deny it... but 
the bribery (6o)po5oida) of the Macedonians did not take hold of 
the hand that drafted it, as those liars say, but the opportimity, the 
need, the interest of my country and the generosity (^i^v6pco7ua) 
of the king. For he entered the danger as an enemy (e%6p6q) but 
has come out of the struggles as a ^iXoq, conferring upon the 
conquered the prize of those who have won.^  
The e%9p6(; had become ^ikoq through his benefactions. From being the 
recipient of a "negative" reciprocity, Philip, by honouring the Athenians 
rather than vanquishing them, was again to be the recipient of a "positive" 
reciprocity. 
Philip did not retain his favoured position long. When he 
summoned the Greeks to form the League of Corinth, the Athenians 
agreed, though not without the misgivings of some. Plutarch writes that 
Phocion thought that it was necessary to accept the other policy 
and generosity of Philip, but when Demades decreed that the city 
should take part in the common peace and the synod of the 
Greeks, he tried not to allow it before they knew what Philip 
would demand the Greeks do for him. But his opinion was 
overridden because of the situation. When he saw that the 
Athenians were repenting because it was necessary to provide 
triremes and cavalry units for Philip, he said, "1 feared this and 
opposed you, but since you have agreed, you must not bear it 
badly nor be down-hearted, remembering that your forefathers 
both ruled and were ruled, but acting nobly in both situations, 
they saved the city and the Greeks.^ 
1 [Demades] On the Twelve Years 9-10; compare Diod. 16.89.2, where Diodorus says that 
through his goodwill (ewoia) - though here it is a promise to punish the Persians for their 
transgressions against the temples - Phihp made the Greeks "his own" (i5ioi). 
2piut. Ptoc. 16.5-7. 
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There was a cost to making Philip a ^iXjoq. He did not give gifts for nothing. 
On his death, Plutarch says the Athenians offered sacrifices for the good 
tidings.i This was their response to the man who had "entered the danger as 
an enemy (ex8p6(;) but come out of the struggles as ^iljoc^', for he did not 
give away prizes of victory without expecting a just return. 
Gift-giving and Bribery 
Philip was well known for his gifts to ambassadors, and allegations of 
bribery were rife against those who lent their assistance to Philip, albeit at a 
price.2 Not only were Philocrates and Aeschines charged with bribery at 
Athens, but Demosthenes alleges that the Olynthians, Lasthenes and 
Euthycrates, also received gifts in return for betraying their city.^  Mecybema, 
Torone, and later Megara and Elis, were also allegedly won through bribery, 
and, in his speech On the Crown, Demosthenes put together a black list of 
traitors among the dties.'* Diodorus sums up the situation when he says. 
Not even the city [of Demosthenes] was able to keep in check the 
citizens in their impulse for treachery; for such a rush of traitors 
had appeared at that time in Greece. Thus they say that whenever 
Philip wished to take a city excelling in its strength and one of the 
inhabitants said it could not be taken by force, he asked if not even 
gold would be able to scale the wall. For he had learned by 
experience that what was impossible to subdue with arms, was 
easy to conquer with gold. So, cultivating traitors in the cities by 
gift-receiving (5copo5oidai) and calling those who received the 
gold ^evoi and ^iXoi, he corrupted the morals of men by his 
wicked dealings.^ 
ipiutPftoc. 16.8. 
2 Though as de Ste. Croix notes {The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World 298-9), 
following Markle {}HS 96 (1976) 80-99, esp. 98-9), there were others, such as the oligarchs 
and intellectuals in Athens, who would have been ready to support Philip v^athout any 
persuasion. 
^ Dem. 19.265; cf. Diod. 16.53.2. 
4 Diod. 16.53.2; Dem. 18.295 (the "black l i s D , 19.260; Paus. 4.28.4. 
5 Diod. 16.54.2-4. 
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This raises two issues: the relationship between gift-giving and bribery; and 
their relationship to ^evia and ^ikia. 
To begin with it is necessary to try to understand the Greek view of 
bribery.1 The language of bribery and gift exchange is similar in some 
aspects, particularly in relation to 5c5pov and its cognates, which means both 
a "gift" and a "bribe".^  As Perlman has demonstrated, the classical Greek 
view of bribery was different from our own twentieth-century notions. He 
says. 
Though it is pointed out that bribery is a malpractice, the 
prevailing attitude was that accepting bribes is a crime only when 
it is connected with activity detrimental to the city. Even the 
wording and the interpretation of the \6\ioq exoayyekuKoq 
indicate that it is bribe-taking resulting in treason or activities 
harmful to the state which should be punished. Accusations of 
bribery are, therefore, always connected with accusations of 
treachery, thus turning into political trials in which the 
accusation of bribery serves to bring forward conflicting political 
views and to decide political conflicts between opposing pohtical 
parties.3 
As Harvey has shown, the evidence does not suggest that other kinds of 
bribery were condoned,^  but that the Athenians regarded 
taking bribes against the interests of the state as being particularly 
heinous (indeed it was only this type of doron that was actually 
illegal), and this attitude was not confined to the late fourth 
century, but can be discerned in the fifth century as well.^ 
1 For a discussion of bribery in elections and in the law-courts, see Staveley Greek and Roman 
Voting and Elections 108-13. 
2 Harvey Crux 82-3; Herman Ritualised Friendship 73-81, esp. 75-9. 
3 Perlman GR&BS 17 (1976) 224. 
On the purushment for bribery, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 54.2; Deinarchus 1.60, 2.17; Hypereides 
Contra Dem. col. 24; see also Rhodes Comm. 599. 
5 Harvey Crux 76-117, esp. 112. See Dem. 19.7,21.113. For the Athenians' willingness to 
interpret failure of their magistrates as guilt, especially of bribery, see Roberts 
Accountability in Athenian Government 9-10. 
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What is more, Harvey points to the major weakness in this view of 
"catapolitical" bribery, that is, that it relies upon a subjective judgement of 
what IS the best for the state.^  As Harvey says. 
Some things - for example, the annihilation of oneself and all the 
inhabitants of one's polis - were obviously undesirable, and 
policies unmistakably leading to such results were clearly 
catapolitical. But outside this area, and the corresponding area of 
uncontroversial benefits, practically anything might be asserted to 
be for or against the interests of the polis. A poUtician might have 
sincerely believed that it was advisable for Athens to be on good 
terms with Philip of Macedon, and might have taken money 
from Philip to persuade the Athenians to pursue a pro-
Macedonian poUcy. Demosthenes of course would have attacked 
this as 'taking money against the interests of the city'; his 
opponent would have retorted that, on the contrary, it was in the 
interests of the city.2 
What may be seen as legitimately receiving gifts by one man, may be 
condemned as bribery by another. 
Particular problems arose when Greeks came into contact with the 
courts of kings. Perlman concludes that 
There is ample evidence ... that the offering of gifts to ambassadors 
was part of the reception of embassies at the courts of kings of 
Persia and Macedon. The acceptance of these customary gifts was 
also a sign of proper diplomatic relations ... Though there may 
have been general conseiisus that there was no harm in accepting 
customary gifts, this may have served as an excuse for accusations 
of accepting bribes by ambassadors.^  
Thus the connection between receiving gifts and receiving bribes is 
problematic. In the same way, the establishment of a relationship based 
upon a gift exchange, such as ^evia, may be seen as either innocent or 
1 Harvey Crux 112-3; see also Herman Ritualised Friendship 76-8. 
2 Harvey Crux 112-3. 
3 Perlman GR&BS 17 (1976) 228; for the Persian attitude to gifts in relation to the Greek 
attitude to bribery, see Lewis RE>1 91 (1989) 227-235. 
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treacherous, depending on whether or not it is perceived to be against the 
interests of the community.^  
Diodorus writes that those who received bribes from Philip were 
called his ^iXoi and ^evoi.2 Demosthenes also refers to those who are the 
traitors in the poleis as those who consider themselves worthy to be called 
^iXoi and ^evoi of Philip,^ and brags that he himself did not ever prefer the 
Scopa and ^evia of Philip to the common advantage of the Greeks.^ But ^evia 
itself was a complex relationship which entailed certain rights and 
obligations. By the act of receiving gifts from Philip and entering into a 
^evia relationship, these supposed traitors were also signing themselves up 
for these rights, duties and obligations. Just as Philip could expect certain 
things from them on the basis of this relationship, they could also now 
have similar expectations of him. 
Philip and Aeschines 
This leads us to the question of Aeschines' conduct in 346. First of all, 
was Aeschines duped, or was he bribed and party to the whole plot?^ The 
1 Though compare Dem. 19.7. 
2 Diod. 16.54.4; see also [Dem.] 7.17. Compare Phocion, who was admired by Philip, according 
to Plutarch, and made the (^ikoq and ^evoq of Alexander (Plut. Phoc. 17.6-9), but was said to 
have refused money (munera magnae pecuniae) offered to him by the ambassadors of Philip 
(Nepos Phoc. 1.3). 
3 D e m 19.294-5. 
4 Dem. 18.109. 
5 Griffith (HM 344-6): "Of actual duplicity in the conduct of the formal exchanges with the 
demos Philip must certainly be acquitted", though he does concede that Philip sent the 
ambassadors back home ignorant of his plans. Of the ambassadors themselves, Griffith 
writes: "The positive encouragements were given by those ambassadors who had become his 
agents whether wittingly or not... Whether from conviction, or for money, or from despair and 
fear of the possible consequences to themselves if they were to tell nothing but the truth, they 
still fed the optimism of the demos up to the very moment, it seems, when the news came from 
the north that Phalaecus had surrendered Thermopylae and that Philip 'had given the 
Thebans a free hand'." Ellis Philip II (101-3): Philip was serious (see also Markle CQ n.s. 24 
(1974) 254 & n. 1); Cawkwell (Philip 105-6,123): Aeschines was not bribed nor did he 
actually make any "promises", though he reported to the assembly "various encouraging 
conversations" (see also Cawkwell CQ n.s. 13 (1963) 204: "there is no reason to believe that 
Aeschines' policy was in any way due to corruption."). Though perhaps of little real value, it 
is of interest that Philocrates was also impeached for bribery, and fled before the case came 
to trial, so condemning himself to death (Dem. 19.114,116-9,145; Hypereides Euxen. 29-30; 
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answer seems to lie somewhere in between. Though Demosthenes can 
produce little positive evidence, and even this is probably worthless,^ it 
would appear that Aeschines did receive gifts from Philip.2 The strongest 
evidence for this, in the light of what has been discussed above, is the 
references by Demosthenes to the bribes themselves being given as ^evia 
and to the ^evia between Aeschines and Philip. First of all, Demosthenes 
says of the second embassy. 
While we were there sitting about in Pella, consider what each of 
us chose to do. I to seek out and rescue the prisoners, and both to 
spend my own. money and to ask Philip to ransom the prisoners 
from the ^ma he gave us. But you will hear now what Aeschines 
kept on trying to bring off. And what was this? For Philip to give 
us money all together in common! So that you may not be 
ignorant, this man sounded us all out. In what way? By sending 
to each one in private, O men of Athens, and giving much gold. 
And since he was unlucky in some cases (for it is not necessary for 
me to speak of myself, but the deeds themselves and what has 
been done will make it clear), he considered that what had been 
given in common could be received good-naturedly. Thus there 
would be security for those who had sold themselves in private, if 
we all shared even a little of what had been received in common. 
He gave it in this way, and using ^evia as the pretext! When I 
prevented this, they divided it up again among themselves.^  
The important point to gain from this is that the "bribes" were, even 
notionally, offered as ^evia. As discussed above, giving gifts to ambassadors 
was a customary part of the ritual associated with receiving ambassadors at 
Aeschin. 2.6, 3.79, 81). Demosthenes claims that Philocrates openly admitted to accepting 
"bribes", and Aeschines implies that he did; though this possibly holds little weight 
considering that both had formerly approved the Peace of Philocrates, and were now trying 
desperately to distance themselves from him and it. 
1 Dem. 19.145 refers to houses, grain, timt»er (on this as "unreliable evidence" for bribery, see 
Harvey Crux 94), and an estate in Thrace worth thirty minas a year, which, as Griffith 
points out, is at least specific (HM 337 n. 4). 
2 Compare Cawkwell Philip 123: 'Thilip certainly offered gifts to ambassadors quite 
openly, but this was probably conventional, though the Thebans ostentatiously refused them. 
No serious evidence for the wild allegations against Aeschines was ever advanced and his 
policy is wholly explicable without recourse to the hypothesis of bribery." 
^ Dem. 19.166-8. Notice that this is one of the accusations for which Demosthenes is able to 
produce witnesses. 
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the Macedonian court, so it was not unusual that Philip should give gifts to 
the Athenian ambassadors. Ambassadors to Athens also received ^hna, 
though this was only a state dinner party in the prytaneion, and 
Demosthenes arranged for front row seats in the theatre for the Macedonian 
ambassadors.1 The difficulty lies in the spirit in which the ambassadors 
received them, and this is essentially what Demosthenes is attacking. He has 
no objection to the ^evia, he says, if they are to be used for the ransoming of 
the prisoners, but if the ambassadors are to become creatures of Philip (and 
this is what he claims they are to be) and act in his interests and not in the 
interests of Athens, then they are traitors, and the ^evia are not gifts, but 
bribes. 
Secondly, Aeschines claimed to have a ^evia with Philip and 
Alexander, and complains that Demosthenes taunts him with this.2 
Demosthenes' reply is telling. He says in his speech On the Crown, 
Indeed he [Aeschines] calls it (j>i?ila and ^evia, and just now spoke 
of "the man who reproaches me for my ^evia with Alexander." I 
reproach you for a |evia with Alexander? Where did you get it? 
Or how were you worthy of it? I would not say you are the e^vo<; 
or ^xXoc, of Philip and Alexander - I am not so crazy - unless I 
must also call the harvesters who do something for pay ^ikox and 
^Evoi of those who hire them. But this is impossible. How could it 
be? Far from it. But I call you the hired-hand first of Philip and 
now of Alexander, and all these men do as well. And if you don't 
believe me, ask them, or rather, I will do it for you. Men of 
Athens, do you think that Aeschines is the hired-hand of 
Alexander or his ^evoi;? You hear what they say.3 
Demosthenes claims that there is a clear difference between a e^voq and a 
paid traitor. Again, in the same speech, he says. 
As soon as news of the battle was announced, thinking nothing of 
what had gone before, you admitted straight away, or even laid 
claim to, a ^iXxa and ^evia between yourself and Philip, having 
1 Aeschin. 2.110-1, 3.76. 
2 Aeschin. 3.66; Dem. 18.284. 
3 Dem. 18.51-2. 
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swapped these names for "paid labour" (|j.ia6apvla). For from 
what kind of equality and justice could Philip admit to being the 
^Evoq, (jji^ oq or even acquaintance (yvc6pi|io<;) of Aeschines the son 
of Glaucothea, the drummer-girl? I do not see it, but you were 
paid to destroy the best interests of these men.^  
In both these passages the idea of ^evia is contrasted with payment to harm 
the interests of the state. Yet again, in his speech On the False Embassy, 
Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of valuing his ^evia and ^iXia with Philip 
above the state.2 For Demosthenes, ideas of receiving gifts and establishing 
^eviai are bound up with ideas of bribery. As he makes plain, one of the 
main issues is whether or not it was against the interest of the state. 
Demosthenes also points to another important factor in such ^evlai, 
that is that they should have been based upon equality. One of the 
hallmarks of the ^£vla relationship in classical Greece is its equality at all 
levels. Not only was the relationship itself a balanced relationship, where 
roughly equal "payment" was made by both parties, but, for the relationship 
to work effectively, the individuals involved should also have been of equal 
social rank and influence. This was manifestly not the case between Philip 
and Aeschines. The main difference between the two men was that Philip 
politically had the upper hand. He could betray the relationship when he 
had achieved what he wanted from it. This inequality is most clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that Aeschines pursued the relationship, as 
Demosthenes tells us, after Chaeronea with the full knowledge that he had 
been used. The point about 346, however, is that he obviously did not realise 
that this inequality existed, whereas Philip did. 
If Aeschines did accept gifts from Philip and establish a ^evia 
relationship with him, as it seems was the case, what then are the 
implications of this for the events of 346? As well as giving him gifts, Philip 
^ Dem. 18.284. 
2 Dem. 19.248. 
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also gave Aeschines certain assurances in secret,^  of which he seems to have 
had other confirmation, that Thebes would be diminished and the Phocians 
saved. All the indications would have been that Philip was going to do as he 
said. Not only had Philip told him that things would be so, but some of 
PhiHp's hetairoi had confirmed it, and even the Thebans were unsure what 
was happening.2 As Philip's ^ evoc;, it was Aeschines' obligation to look after 
the interests of Philip, just as Philip should look after his. This does not 
mean, however, that Aeschines would, or in fact did, put the interests of his 
^evoi; before the interests of his polis, as Demosthenes claimed he did. It may 
have seemed that he could advantage both e^voq and polis through the 
relationship. This is the risk that Aeschines took, based upon the reciprocal 
obligation of his e^voc; to do as he had said he would. For if things did not 
work out as they should, and the assurances Aeschines made to the 
Athenians for his ^evoq were not actually fulfilled, then he could face 
charges of bribery; which he did. But Aeschines would have had no reason 
to suspect his ^e\oq and every reason to expect that his t,evoq would keep his 
word, so the risk may have seemed very remote at the time. 
Philip: Balanced and Negative Reciprocity 
But what of Philip? Why did he behave as he did? The simplest 
explanation is because it worked. The Greeks were taken in time and again 
by this same ploy of giving gifts to establish a relationship of trust, which 
Philip could then choose to betray or not, as it suited him. So why were the 
Greeks, and especially the sophisticated Athenians, duped? Were they really 
so naive? 
^ Aeschines denied the charge, rather unconvincingly, that he had held secret talks with 
Philip, which Demosthenes declares the ambassadors had been forbidden to do, though such 
secret private negotiations may have been interpreted as doing "whatever good thing they 
could" (Dem. 19.175-6, 278; Aeschin. 2.124-7). 
2 Aeschin. 2.137. 
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There are a number of reasons why the Athenians were so easily 
deceived. Firstly, Philip always told the Athenians things they wanted to 
hear. It would have been easy to believe that Philip would hand over 
Amphipolis when that is exactly what they wanted. Again, in 346 it would 
have been easy to believe that the Phocians would be saved, the Thebans 
crushed and the Athenians' place in central Greece secured by their 
friendship with Philip, since that was the thing they really needed to 
happen. 
Secondly, Philip was always in the superior position; one can afford 
not to honour one's promises with the subsequent loss of xi|iii when one 
has xi|j.Ti in excess of everyone else, or when the loss of a certain amount of 
personal honour would result in an increase in power on a wider scale. 
Though we tend to write of Philip as a king, it is tmcertain whether Philip 
himself ever used the title ^aaxXE.vq.'^ But he was not a king of the same 
kind as the Persian King, nor were his ancestors, who were never even as 
powerful as Philip became. It must have been very difficult for the Greeks to 
assess his relative strength at any one time or to know what to make of him. 
When they had positive proof of his strength and influence, there was little 
that the Athenians could do to prevent him. Not only was the north too far 
away for them to react spontaneously,2 but the Athenians did not have the 
power or resources to stop him. 
On a more personal level, in his ^evia with Aeschines, the implicit 
asstmiption in the relationship in order for it to work was that it was equal. 
As Demosthenes jeered, Aeschines was no equal for the Macedonian king. 
1 For the debate on how early the Macedonian monarchs took the title PooiXeuc;, see, most 
recently, the exchange between Hammond and Badian, based on the probability of the 
restoration 7tp6<; PaaiAia in an inscription which is possibly to be dated early in Alexander's 
reign: Hammond CQ n.s. 38 (1988) 382-91; Badian ZPE 79 (1989) 64-70; Hammond ZPE 82 
(1990) 167-75; Badian ZPE 95 (1993) 131-9; Hammond ZPE 100 (1994 ) 385-7; Badian ZPE 
100 (1994) 388-90. 
2 There were n\any times when the Athenians simply arrived too late (Dem. 4.35). 
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The relationship was not just socially unequal, but there was also inequaUty 
in personal strength and capability. When Philip betrayed his ^evia, there 
was nothing that Aeschines could do, except to hang off the coat tails of his 
patron. 
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the Athenians did not appreciate 
the subtleties of their dealings with Philip, just as the Greeks generally failed 
to understand or appreciate the subtleties of dealing with cultures which did 
not operate within the same ethical and value systems. Philip operated 
within a gift-giving culture where the giving of a gift brought one into a 
relationship where there was an expectation of a return. That much would 
have been clear. The Persians and Thracians also operated along similar 
lines. But the giving and receiving of gifts could take place between 
unequals, such as a king and his subjects, as well as between equals. The 
Greeks also gave gifts, but generally within the context of ^evia, which was 
in the classical period a balanced relationship between equals.^  
There are two ways of looking at the relationships between PhiUp and 
the Athenians and Philip and Aeschines. Firstly, Philip made certain gifts to 
Aeschines in order to establish what was supposedly an equal and balanced 
relationship of ^evia, and made certain assurances to the Athenians. 
However, when Philip summoned the Athenians to Thermopylae in 346 
"to come with all your forces to give help to those who were just",2 the 
Athenians decided not to go. Thus, on the one hand, Aeschines could be 
seen to have broken his side of the bargain, and made the whole void, and 
on the other, the Athenians had not responded with the "initial gift", so 
there was to be no relationship and no benefits forthcoming. 
1 At least in its most basic sense. As has been discussed above, this could also be exploited in 
various ways. 
2 Aeschin. 2.137. 
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If one stopped here, this would, I think, lead to the view held by 
Markle and Ellis, who see that Philip had two alternatives: Philip made the 
assurances to the Athenians in all earnestness, but when they did not come 
when he summoned them, he had an alternative plan to defeat the 
Phocians with the support of Thebes, and simply put this into action 
instead.1 However, I think there is another possibility which is more 
consistent with Philip's earlier dealings with the Athenians. 
But first, there is a certain theoretical background which needs to be 
understood. As has been said, gift-giving within a Greek context was 
generally a balanced relationship conducted between equals where the gifts 
exchanged were also commensurate. In addition, on the Greek model of 
society, one is defined as friend or foe by whether one belongs to a 
friendship network or not, but other societies were based upon other 
divisions. So when a Greek in this period drew someone into the network 
of reciprocal exchange, or ^xXxa, or believed that he had done so, then he 
interacted with them in terms of generalised or balanced reciprocity, 
depending on the degree of friendship. Thus when the Athenians yielded 
Amphipolis up to Philip in exchange for Pydna, or Aeschines made certain 
promises to the Athenians on Philip's behalf as his e^voq, they would have 
understood the relationship to be operating on the basis of a balanced 
reciprocity. Philip, on the other hand, well aware that this is how they 
understood the relationship, responded by behaving in a negatively 
reciprocal way, that is, getting the most that he could with the least loss to 
himself. Philip set up an expectation of a balanced relationship, but actually 
operated in a negative way. He was in the position where he could imply 
that he had established equal and balanced relationships when this suited 
his needs. When such relationships were no longer advantageous to 
1 Markle CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253-68; Ellis Philip II 113-20. 
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himself, he could exploit his actual superiority in the relationship,^ and 
simply disregard it. Similarly, in his ^evta with Aeschines, Philip set up the 
expectation of an equal relationship, by the very fact that it was a ^evia. Yet, 
it was not truly an equal relationship and Philip did not conduct it on equal 
terms. Aeschines had every reason to expect that Philip would keep up his 
side of the bargain, but Philip simply did not. 
Again, in 342, when Philip was negotiating with the Athenians for a 
revision of the peace of 346, he was able to play v^th the Athenians and 
their ideas of gift-giving; offering them a gift they did not want to accept, 
since, they claimed, it was not his to give. Acceptance, or non-acceptance, of 
his terms would put the Athenians in a position they did not want to be in: 
either they must forsake Halonnesus, the Thracian forts and chances of 
common peace altogether, or effectually give up all claim to Amphipolis, 
Poteidaea and the Chersonese. It would seem that Philip was mocking them 
with his semantic dexterity. 
It was the Athenians' failure to understand that he would or could do 
this that led to their undoing. That is not to say that an Athenian could not 
act in a similar way - in fact it seems that Alcibiades did so in his treatment 
of Endius in 4202 - but that this was acting in a manner contrary to their 
general cultural expectations. What must have been galling for the 
Athenians was the fact that they were not in a position to retaliate in an 
equally negative manner. 
Philip and the Athenians - an Experiment in Social Dysfunction 
To conclude, the interaction between Philip and the Greeks, and 
particularly the Athenians, can be understood in terms of a social 
1 Which was highlighted by the fact that he could actually get away with it. 
2 See Endnote 2. 
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dysfunction, a misunderstanding of the true nature of the relationship. This 
is not simply a clash between two different cultures, it is a difference in 
understanding which was engineered and exploited by PhiUp. Philip led the 
Athenians to believe that they were entering into an equal and balanced 
relationship with him, and he then exploited their expectations to lull them 
into a false sense of security and inactivity. On the level of personal 
relationships, he contracted ^eviai with certain ambassadors who were sent 
to him, again creating a certain expectation of the relationship, as he did 
with Aeschines. When Philip chose not to honour the relationship, 
Aeschines was left open to charges of bribery - the risk he took when he 
contracted such a personal relationship - because the formation of such a 
relationship, and the receiving of gifts which is part of its formation, could 
be interpreted as bribery if it was commonly perceived that the relationship 
was formed against the interests of the state, whether it actually was or not. 
The problem with the Athenians' dealings with Philip was not so 
much that they were too stupid or too naive, but that he was too clever. He 
understood the ambiguities of their social constructs and was able to 
manipulate this for his own ends. Not only did the Athenians fail to 
appreciate these, but, when they did understand, it was too late and there 
was nothing they could do to stop him. 
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"H6e -f] xeXfDTi^, a E]^hcpaxEq, xov exodpov fjniv eyevexo, dvSpoq, ox; •fwia.c, 
<t)ai|i£v dv, xcov xoxe cov eTteipdOriHEv dpiaxou KOI aXkay; ^povmmaxov KOLI 
8iKcaoxdxov. 
Plato Phaedo 118. 
Friendship was important i n the Greek wor ld , not just socially, but 
also politically. Indeed the models for social friendships were adapted to suit 
the needs of political relationships. What this thesis has set out to do is to 
show that i n inter-po/is affairs, friendships played an important part in the 
creation and execution of foreign policy; and particuarly i n the years 435 to 
336 BC. 
We began by looking at what friendship i n the Greek wor ld was, and 
we saw that, principally, the Greeks saw their wor ld divided into two camps: 
friends and enemies. A t the heart of friendship there was also an embedded 
ideology of reciprocity - giving for a return. This, in turn, could be broken 
down into generalised, balanced and negative reciprocity, and correlated 
w i t h groups of friends, so that ^ t^o i (members of the household, 
companions, associates and ijEVOi) experienced positive reciprocity, while 
enemies, ex8poi, experienced negative reciprocity. In contrast to other 
models of friendship and reciprocity, those f r o m outside the community 
were not considered, per se, to be enemies, but could become friends 
through institutions such as ^evia. 
On a state level, friendship could be institutionalised in the fo rm of 
Ttpo^evia. I n this way, an ind iv idua l and a state could enter into a 
relationship w i t h each other. Just as w i t h social friendships, these essentially 
poli t ical - or politicised - relationships, were also bui l t upon reciprocal 
exchange, and poleis generally awarded Jtpo^evia i n return for services 
rendered and i n the expectation of services i n the future . However, 
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although Tcpo^evoi were the official friends in other states, they were by no 
means the only (^iXoi through whom poleis dealt w i t h each other, but there 
were a wide range of other friendship networks through which poleis could 
interact. 
Racial kinship could be a sufficient excuse for one polis to involve 
itself i n the affairs of another. There were also groups i n states which were 
sympathetic to other states, either because of a general ideological belief in a 
f o r m of government, or because another, more powerful state would help 
them enforce one k ind of political regime or another. 
Yet there were also more personal contacts. Political groups i n 
di f ferent poleis could contact each other through personal friends, and 
influence poUtical activity i n each other's polis through these links. We 
have a number of specific examples of such personal contacts, and the 
Spartan kings, in particular, cultivated and made use of such connections. 
What is more, these friendship links were particularly important when 
poleis had to deal w i t h states on the outer-edges of their world. 
We observed, however, that Sparta used such cormections i n inter-
polis relationships more than Athens d id , and that this was consistent wi th 
their d i f fe ren t styles of politics. A n oligarchy, by its nature largely 
aristocratic, wou ld have, and would be wi l l ing to make use of connections 
wh ich had risen out of the ancient aristocratic networks of friends. 
Democratic Athens, though using them to a lesser degree, d id not feel that 
the ethos of these aristocratic connections was incompatible to her own 
ideals. Instead, when she d id use them, she tended to adapt them to her 
more democratic needs; that is, i t was not only the aristocrats who now 
formed such connections, but anyone could, and some d i d in order to 
pursue their political careers. 
Such connections could be particularly relevant for magisterial 
appointments. N o t only were ambassadors appointed on the basis of 
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f r iendships i n other states, but there is also evidence that mi l i t a ry 
commanders, symbouloi, and oikistai were as wel l . Oath-takers, on the 
other hand, were generally public officials who represented a cross-section of 
the commimity, and, although there is some evidence in the four th century 
that Spartan Nauarchoi were selected for their connections, this does not 
seem to be the case i n the f i f t h century. Again, the numbers of Spartans 
selected for magisterial appointments because of their personal connections 
were signif icant ly higher than for their counter-parts in Athens. This 
provides an interesting, though not surprising, insight into the democratic 
and oligarchic styles of government, because i t demonstrates that even in a 
democracy of the classical period such connections were influential at this 
level, but that an oligarchy used these more. 
But Greeks d id not only have to deal w i th other Greeks w i t h the same 
cultural expectations. Because of the Greeks' internal wars, Persia became 
involved. The Athenians, i n particular, also had interests in Thrace, and 
Phil ip of Macedon expanded his power and influence south into central 
Greece i n the four th century. 
These non-Greeks and fringe-Greeks d id not always work wi th in the 
same cul tura l f ramework as the Greeks of the south. They d id not 
necessarily consider friendship and reciprocal relationships i n the same 
l ight as the Greeks, and the Greeks themselves did not appreciate this, and 
so relations between Greeks and non-Greeks often became strained and 
broke down owing to these cultural mistmderstandings. This socio-poUtical 
dysfunction came to a head wi th Philip of Macedon, who understood these 
differences all too wel l and exploited them for his own ends. 
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This is not the last w o r d on this subject, and there are many other 
questions which could be pursued, but not wi th in the constraints of a three-
year thesis. To begin with , the time period could, and should, be expanded. I f 
we go backwards i n time, i t would be interesting to see how such friendship 
connections were involved i n the development of the polis, and the 
democratic polis i n particular. I f we go forwards i n time, through the life of 
Alexander into the Hellenistic period, i t wou ld be thought-provoking to 
apply similar kinds of questions to those I have asked for the classical period 
to a Greek wor ld dominated by Macedon, and to a Hellenistic wor ld rtded by 
a Greco-Macedonian elite (indeed, what was a "Greco-Macedonian" culture 
going to be?). 
More w o r k could be done on defining social relationships i n the 
classical period, both wi th in the oikos, considering not so much the role of 
gender, but the l imits of who was "inside" and who was "outside", when 
being inside mattered and when i t d id not; and the political significance of 
such questions (the structure of the oikos in the Homeric period is clear 
enough, but i n the classical period, was the wife inside or outside, or even 
on loan to the oikos?). 
On specific questions, i n Athens an explanation of the apparently 
non-hereditary political leadership of pr\xopEc, in contrast to the hereditary 
nature of the axpaniYoi may be found in personal connections. We should 
also look more closely at the concept of patriotism in the classical period. 
Demosthenes certainly knew what he thought patriotism was (or what i t 
ought to be), but as I have tried to show, questions of loyalty were not always 
straightforward. 
So this is not an ending. I hope i t w i l l be a beginning. <I>tA,oi in the 
Greek wor ld , especially i n international relationships, were important; but 
the questions of who one's friends were, and how one should respond to 
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them, were not always obvious. Beware of Greeks bearing gifts? Or let the 
Greeks beware. 
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Endnote 1 
Thucydides, the Athenian npd^evoq at Pharsalus (Th. 8.92.8) 
Thucydides, the Atiienian itpo^evoq at Pharsalus, presents a difficulty, 
as i t is unclear exactiy what relation he may have had to other Pharsalians 
who are roughly contemporaneous and what his position was at Athens. I 
have set out the relevant evidence below: 
A . Thucydides 
a) Th. 8.92.8. 
[LoXiq 5e xcSv xe TupeaP x^epcov 5iaKO)>.\)6vxcov xoix; ev doxei 6ia0eovxaq Kai 
km. xd onXa (|)epo|ievo'U(; Kai 0O\)KD616O'O lov ^apcaXiov xo\) jipo^evcu 
xfjq TioA^ ecoq Tcapovxoc; Kai Jipoe-uiiox; e|i7to5c6v XE EKdaxoiq yiyvoiievot) Kai 
emPocoixevoD fj-f) e(l)e5peD6vxa)v kyyvq xd5v 7ioX£|ila)v dTioXiaai xfiv 7taxpi5a, 
ficuxaodv XE Kai o(j)d)v at)xc3v dTiEaxovxo. 
b) Androt ion FGrHist 324 F 57 (= Marcellinus Vit. Thuc. 28). 
|ifi dyvocaiiev 6e 6xi Eyevovxo GcuKDSiSai jioX,A.oi, o-uxoc; XE 6 'OXopoD 
Tiaii;- Kai SEVXEpoq 6ri|iaYCL)Y6q, M E X T I O I O D , 6q Kai nEpiKA£T SiEJioXixE-uaaxo-
xpixoq 5£ yEVEi ^apodkioc,, ov |i£|ivrixai noiificov EV XOTC; TiEpi 
' AKpoTio^ox;, (t)daKcov ambv Eivai naxpoq MEVCOVOC;. 
c) Schol. B Ar. Wasps 947. 
©ODK-oSiSric; ME?ir|cao\) moq, H E P I K X E I dvxiTOX,ix£\)ad|iEvo(;- XEaaapEq 5£ 
Eiai 00-0X1)61501 'ASrivaioi- iaxopioYpd(t)oq Kai 6 Fapynxxioq Kai 6 
0Exxa>.6<; Kai omoq, pi^ xcop dpioxoq XDyxdvcov ... £^cooxpaKio6ri. 
d) Schol. C Ar . Wasps 947: Koster's text, which differs f r o m that of 
Androt ion FGrHist 324 F 37. 
... 6 YEv6|i£voq oaxpaKia^ioc; E|i0alvEi xov M£A,riaio\). 0£67io|i7ioq |i£vxoi 6 
laxopiKoq xov navxalvoD (j)Tioiv dvxi xoiixoi) dvxiTcoX.ixE'uaaoGai riEpiK^T-
d^^ ' ot)K 'AvSpoxicov, akXa KOLX ambq xov M E ^ T I O I C U Kai xov 
6axpaKia6£vxa. 
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B. Menon 
a) Th. 2.22.3. 
f) 5e poTiGeia auxri xcov GeaaaXwv Kaxd x6 7caA.ai6v ^v^iKaxiKOv eYevexo 
xoic; ' AGr|vaioi(;, K O I d(l)iKovxo Ttap ' avxovic, AapioaToi, <I)apadA,ioi, 
rieipdaioi* , Kpavvcovioi, IlDpdaiGi, P-upxcovioi, Oepdioi. fiYcOvxc 6e a-uxwv 
eK |xev Aapiariq noA,D|ni5ri(; Kai ' ApioxovoDq, d7c6 xfjq axdaecoq EKdxepoq, 
E K 5e Oapad .^O'u Mevcov fjaav 6e Kai xc5v dxim Kaxd TtoXfiiq dp%ovxeq. 
b) Dem. 23.199.1 
EKeivoi Mevcovi xw OapaoXico 5c65eKa |iev xdA.avx' dyupioi) 56vxi Jipoq xov 
en' 'Hiovi xf| npbc, 'A|i(t)i7t6X£i 7i6X£|iov, xpiaKooioiq 5' iJiTieuai Tteveaxaiq 
iSioiq poTjOriaavxi, O"DK e\|fri(j)iaavxo, at)x6v dv XK; dTtOKxeivT], dY<»yi|J.ov 
eivai, aXXa 7io>.ixeiav eSoaav K O I xa-uxriv 'iKavfiv X)TZEX.d[L^avov eivai xfiv 
xijifiv. 
Andrewes^ suggests that Thucydides was the son of Menon (II) of Th. 
2.22.3 and great-grandson of Menon (I) of Pharsalus who helped Cimon 
against Eibn according to Dem. 23.199. Walbank likewise argues that he was 
probably the son or great-grandson of the Menon (II) and that the proxeny 
was hereditary, making Menon (II) a npo^evoq also.^ Phillips finds i t likely 
that Thucydides was the son of Menon (I) of Pharsalus who was granted 
citizenship in the 470s (thus, an Athenian citizen himself) and goes so far as 
to suggest that " I f Thoukydides Menonos was an Athenian citizen, and this 
... must remain a possibility for the period in question, then he could have 
been of an age to be a general in 440/39 and a respected elder statesman in 
411."4 However, he does not consider any relationship wi th the Menon (II) 
or adequately deal w i th the problem of a npo^evoq being so involved in the 
affairs of the patron state and indeed resident there so that he was a general 
* neipdaioi n^, accepted by Rhodes 
1 Compare [Dem.] 13.23 (OIJK e\|fri(j)laavTO Ttokxetav, 6XX axi'ke.icoj eSooKccv jiovov), although 
Osborne {Naturalization 3.21 n. 2) argues that this variant is falsified by the other evidence 
which supports naturalisation. 
2HCT 5.312-3. 
3 Athenian Proxenies 385. 
4 Historia 40 (1991) 392-3. 
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and "respected elder statesman". Hornblower claims that i t is impossible 
that either Menon (I) or his grandson was the father of Thucydides as "a 
man acting as the proxenos for a given city was by definition not a citizen of 
that city", and they may have been closely related, "but that is as far as we 
can go."^ 
Yet we can go further , and although we cannot come up w i t h 
conclusive proof, we can still produce a likely scenario. I t is arguable that 
Menon (I) was the same man as Menon (II) , and was the father of 
Thucydides. Since Thucydides is co-operating w i t h the older Athenians in 
Th 8.92.8, i t is more likely than not (though of course i t is not certain) that 
he was himself an older man. I f Thucydides is not an old man in 411, we 
then re turn to the possibili ty that Menon (I) and Menon (II) were 
grandfather and grandson - but what I say below about proxeny and 
citizenship w i l l not be invalidated. Menon son of Menecleides could have 
been made a citizen after 476, been ostracised in 471,2 come to the assistance 
of the Athenians as an old man in 431, and have a son who was an old man 
in 411 (if Thucydides was born in the 470s, he would be approaching sixty in 
411). 
But first we need to clear the way through some of the assumptions 
that seem to underpin the analyses described above. Firstly, naturalisation 
d i d not necessarily imply residence. Some grants of citizenship may have 
been made in the knowledge that they would never actually be taken up.^ 
Some grants of citizenship could be exercised intermittentiy, as Sadocus son 
of the Odrysian king, Sitalces, seems to have done.^ The point is that, if 
Thucydides d id inherit Athenian citizenship f rom his father (if his father 
^ Comm. 277; Mattingly also does not believe in Thucydides' citizenship: Antichthon 25 
(1991) 17. 
2 See Osborne Naturalization 3.22-3; and cf. below. 
^ See, for example, the awards made to the Bosporan kings (see Osborne Naturalization 3. 
41-44. 
4 Osborne Naturalization 3.27. 
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was Menon (I) who helped Cimon), then he wou ld not necessarily have 
been resident in Athens. 
This leads to m y second point. I f Thucydides only visited Athens 
rather than was resident,^ though he exercised his citizen rights while he 
was there, i t is not impossible, despite Hornblower's objections, that he 
could also have been, and have been popularly regarded as, the Athenian 
npotjEVoq in Pharsalus. This seems more probable when one considers that 
grants of Ttpo^evia usually preceded grants of citizenship (which were very 
rare i n the f i f t h century i n any case). Walbank is probably right in guessing 
at a Tipo^evia for Menon (if he is Thucydides' father), and this may have 
prompted his help for Cimon in the first place, and have been up-graded to 
citizenship after Eion. 
I t w i l l be useful to turn aside for a moment and consider Menon. 
Menon (I) of Pharsalus was granted citizenship after Eion in 477. 
Raubitschek,2 fo l lowed by Osborne,^ argues that Menon came to Athens 
after he was naturalised, and was later ostracised.^ This would in fact make 
h i m Menon son of Menecleides of Gargettus.^ I f Menon was ostracised. 
1 Thucydides (the historian) seems to imply, in fact, that Thucydides the Pharsalian was not 
resident in Athens in 411, but happened to be there (0ouK\)5i5ou xo\) Oapca?i.iou zov 
npo^evov xfjq ndT^ux; napovxoc), making his appearance particularly noteworthy as far as 
Thucydides (the historian) was concerned. For a possible reason for his being in Athens, see 
Morrison CQ 36 (1942) 66,74. 
^Hesperia 24 (1955) 286-9. 
3 Naturalization 3.20-3. 
^ The actual ostracism itself depends upon on Hesychius (s.v. Mev(ovi5ai). Although Lang 
(Athenian Agora: vol. 25, Ostraka 96) accepts that the Menon of the ostraca is probably 
Menon (I), she is more cautious in accepting an ostracism for Menon: "The number of ostraka is 
sufficient to indicate that there was considerable sentiment against him but hardly enough to 
prove that he was actually ostracized." 
5 An inference strengthened by the connection of a Thucydides with Gargettus, and 
Raubitschek (Hesperia 24 (1955) 287-8) is probably right in assuming that the four 
Thucydides in the scholium are actually three, and that the Thucydides from Gargettus and 
the Thucydides from Pharsalus are one and the same man. The name Menecleides is not 
common in Athens, but it does appear in two demes other than Gargettus. There are two 
Menecleides attested in Thessaly (though they may the same man) in a late third century 
inscription (IG ix (2) 517.73-4): Menecleides son of Simmus and Aristomachus son of 
Menecleides of Crannon were among the men living in Larisa who were made citizens of the 
city after the Social War (220-217). 
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although i t w o u l d not necessarily invalidate his citizenship, i t wou ld 
obviously restrict i t , and, i f he returned to Pharsalus, i t may have been 
forgotten.^ Presumably, after he was ostracised, he returned to Pharsalus, 
then came to the aid of Athens in 431.2 
To return to Thucydides: we know his father was Menon. If his father 
was Menon son of Menecleides of Gargettus, a Tipo^Evia could easily have 
been the honour that was generally recognised. Thucydides may have spent 
enough time in Pharsalus to be considered an Athenian jcpo^EVoq rather 
than a citizen, but enough time in Athens (with a real citizenship in his - or 
at least his father's - past) to be considered among the Athenians when a 
list, such as the list of MarceUinus, was being drawn up. 
^ Compare the reaffirmation of citizenship for Phormio son of Phormio (IG ifi 237.15-21 
Tod 178). 
2 Osborne Naturalization 3.23. 
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Alcibiades, Endius and the Embassy of420. 
I n 420, Spartan ambassadors came to Athens to try to prevent an 
Athenian alliance w i t h Argos.^ One of the ambassadors was Endius, the 
^evoq of Alcibiades. Alcibiades tricked the Spartans so that they d id not 
reveal their f u l l powers to the Athenian assembly (although they had 
already to ld the boule that they were autokratores), and then were 
denounced by Alcibiades, so the Athenians decided to go ahead wi th the 
Argive alliance. 
There are, however, problems w i t h the story. Hatzfeld argues that the 
main difficult ies are, f irst iy, why the Spartans should listen to Alcibiades, 
secondly, how d id Alcibiades persuade the Spartans that their denial of 
being autokratores wou ld help, and, th i rdly , the resumption of fr iendly 
relations between Alcibiades and his ^evoq, Endius.^ Andrewes,^ though he 
generally fo l lows Hatzfeld,"^ rejects the explanation of Plutarch that the 
assembly, i n contrast to the boule, was unreasonable, on the grounds that, 
f irst iy, the rest of the passage is unreliable; secondly, that 'Tlutarch, to make 
his point, has to stress the just and reasonable character of the Spartans' 
proposals, but neither he nor Thucydides indicates any proposals that would 
meet Athens' complaints"; th i rd ly , that Alcibiades' proposals entailed 
reference back to Sparta and therefore delay the Spartans could i l l afford. 
Ellis argues that the Spartans knew that they had no substantial 
concessions to offer, though they wanted to regain Pylos and prevent an 
1 See Chapter Three 70-2. 
2 Hatzfeld Alcibiade 89-93. 
3 H C T 4.51-3. 
4 With the reservation (ibid. 53) that his case "is built on facts taken from Thucydides and on 
probabilities which Thucydides can estimate better than we can." 
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alliance between Argos and Athens, and so had everything to gain and 
nothing to lose; Endius, on the other hand, restored his relationship wi th 
Alcibiades because i t was politically expedient.^ Kebric^ claims that Endius 
and Alcibiades were i n collusion, arguing that their later friendship is 
" improbable had Endius i n fact been humil ia ted i n 420",3 and that 
Alcibiades' purpose to acquire personal power and that Endius' purpose to 
weaken the kingship. Brunt regards Aldbiades as Thucydides' source for this 
episode, and believes that Thucydides has exaggerated the importance of the 
incident and Alcibiades' role i n i t , but he does not deal w i t h the apparent 
d i f f icu l ty of Alcibiades' treatment of Endius.4 
However, despite all the scholarly debate about why Alcibiades was 
able to get away w i t h this trick, Alcibiades himself knew quite wel l and was 
w i l l i n g to admit later to the Spartans that what he had done was a breach of 
good fa i th , though he claims he d id i t justly.^ Presumably the Spartan 
ambassadors were ini t ia l ly introduced to the boule by Nicias, and Plutarch 
Nic. 10.5 implies something of the sort, for he says they changed f r o m 
Nicias to Alcibiades, and Alcibiades introduced them to the assembly. What 
is happening here is the exploitation of inter-personal relations on various 
levels: Alcibiades no doubt used his connection wi th Endius to gain access to 
the ambassadors, then, although seeming to comply w i t h the "rules" by 
giving them a pistis,^ he duped them, w i t h or without Endius' knowledge. 
Perhaps what is more surprising than his later friendship wi th Endius is his 
later fr iendship w i t h the Spartans, and the ease w i t h which they seem to 
accept his explanation. Despite the surprising sequel, however, when we 
consider the ways i n which men d i d sometimes t ry to manipulate 
1 Ellis Alcihiades 39^0. 
2 Mnemosyne 29 (1976) 72-8 (= Historia 25 (1976) 249-252) 
3 Ibid. (Mnemosyne) 73 = (Historia) 250. 
4 Brunt J?EG 65 (1952) 65-9 (= Studies in Greek History and Thought 22-5). 
5 Th. 6.89.3. 
^ On which see Andrewes H C T 4.51. 
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friendship obligations, the story as told by Thucydides may be substantially 
correct. 
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Cyrus the Greek? 
I f Xenophon is to be believed, Cyrus the younger acted on the 
principle of binding his subordinates to himself by acts of of benevolence.^ 
I n his encomium of Cyrus, Xenophon writes at length of Cyrus' constancy 
and faithfulness to his ^iXoi. According to Xenophon, Cyrus considered i t of 
the utmost importance not to lie i f he made a treaty or came to terms or 
made a promise to anyone.2 He also tried to outdo any good or harm that 
was done h im.3 He judged his ^iXoi to be co-workers w i t h himself 
(aDVEpyot), and just as he thought he needed friends in order to have co-
workers w i t h himself, so he tried to be the best cvvEpyoq for his ^XT^JOI.'^ He 
ou td id his friends i n the greatness of his benefactions.^ I n addition, he 
received more 5(3pa than anyone else, but he distributed 5(3pa most 
generously among his ^iXoi, and surpassed his (^iXoi i n solicitude (xfj 
£jn,|i£X£igc) and eagerness to do them favours (x^ 7rpoGa)|x£ia9ai 
Xapi^£a6ai).^ When he marched anywhere and many were l ikely to see 
h im, he w o u l d summon his ^iXox and discuss things w i t h them, so that it 
w o u l d be clear whom he honoured.^ Xenophon concludes that no one had 
been loved iTze(^xXi\oQax) by more people among Greeks and barbarians 
alike.^ 
1 For similar sentiments, see also Xen Cyr. 8.2.7-9,13-15,19. Note Hirsch: "It is hard to resist 
the conclusion that Xenophon's portrayal of the character, conduct, and jjersonal relations of 
the elder Cyrus is largely based on the personality of his [Xenophon's] one time patron Cyrus 
the prince" (The Friendship of the Barbarians 75). 
2 Xen. Anab. 1.9.7; compare Hdt. 1.136.2. 
^Xen.Armb. 1.9.11. 
Xen. Anab. 1.9.21. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.9.24. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.9.22-4. 
Xen. Anab. 1.9.28. 
^ Xen. Anab. 1.9.28. 
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Before this is accepted, however, as a true picture of Persian practice 
and social expectation, a few points need to be taken into account. First of all, 
Xenophon's representation of Cyrus is of an idealised f igure, a man and 
leader who is nearly too good to be true.i He follows a similar model in his 
description of other leaders he wishes to eulogise. For example, i n his 
description of Hermocrates, Xenophon emphasises his e7n|i£X£ia, Jcpo6a)|iia 
and KOivoxTiq to his associates, and says that he gathered together each day in 
the morning and at night the best of those he knew and told them what he 
was going to do or say and instructed them in speaking.^ Krentz notes that 
care, enthusiasm and accessibility are "qualities of Xenophon's ideal 
commander." 3 The picture he draws is a stereotypical image of what a good 
commander should do or be. 
What is more, the description of Cyrus' egalitarianism is suspicious. 
The Persian court was hierarchical, w i th the King high above his subjects 
and almost divine."* I t is interesting then that Xenophon claims that Cyrus 
regarded his ^iXoi as auvepyoi. Is this consistent wi th a Persian, or is this a 
Greek ideal? The real t ruth is perhaps reflected in Xenophon's praise of his 
superiority i n both giving gifts and conferring benefits and i n his admission 
that this is probably due to Cyrus' greater resources. There would have been 
few who could have come near Cyrus in his position i n the west, in either 
wealth or prestige. He would , perhaps, not have been looking for equals 
among his friends so much as courtiers wi l l ing to do his bidding. Although 
Xenophon attributes to this Persian common Greek ethical standards, one 
must be careful i n accepting too readily that they are also Persian. The 
conclusion that should be drawn here is that caution must be exercised 
1 See Xen. Oeconomicus 4.18-9; Anderson Xenophon 69,71; cf. 95-6. 
2 Xen. Hell. 1.1.30-1; see also Anderson Xenophon 65; Gray The Character of Xenophon's 
'Hellenica' 152-3. 
3 Krentz Comm. 104: concern: He//. i.5.i;Anab. 4.5.7-9; Cyr. 1.6.16; enthusiasm: He//. 4.3.14; 
Cyr. 1.6.13,19; openness: >i«afc. 4.3.10; Cyr. 7.5.46. 
4 Cook The Persian Empire 132-5. 
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when dealing with Greek sources which purport to describe Persian ethics 
and values.^ 
1 On Greek "invention" of the barbarian, and the Persian in particular, see Hall Inventing the 
Barbarian. 
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Conflict of Interests 
In 395 Agesilaus, the Spartan King, as part of his Persian campaign, 
proceeded against the territory of the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus. After 
making successful raids upon Pharnabazus' encampment, Agesilaus, 
through the efforts of their common ^ivoq, Apollophanes of Cyzicus, agreed 
to a meeting with Phamabazus in order to negotiate for a friendship.^ After 
obtaining a truce, they met on the lawns at Dascyleium. Once they had 
exchanged greetings and clasped each other's right hands, Xenophon reports 
that Phamabazus began (for he was the older): 
"O Agesilaus and all you Spartans who are present, I was 
your ^iXoq and ally when you made war on the Athenians, 
and by providing money I made your fleet strong, and on 
land I myself fought on horseback with you and pursued the 
enemy into the sea. And you could not ever accuse me of 
treachery as you did Tissaphernes in either what I have 
done or said for you. Although I was such a man, I am now 
brought to this pass at your hands that I cannot have a meal 
in my own land, unless I pick up some of what you leave, 
like the wild beasts. And the beautiful houses and parks fu l l 
of trees and animals which my father left me and in which I 
took pleasure, I see have all been cut down and burnt. So if I 
do not know what is holy and just, you teach me how these 
things are the deeds of men who know how to pay back 
XdpiXEq." 
Thus he spoke. And all the Thirty [Spartiates] were 
ashamed before him and were silent. But after a time 
Agesilaus said, "I think you know, Pharnabazus, that even 
among the Greek cities there are men who are ^evoi of each 
other. And these men, when the cities are at war, fight with 
their fatherland even against those who were their ^evoi, 
and sometimes, so it would chance, they even k i l l each 
other. We now are at war with your King and and are forced 
to consider everything of his as hostile ..."2 
1 See Chapter Five 203-6. 
2Xen.He// . 4.1.32-4. 
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Thus Agesilaus summed up the problem that was constantly facing the 
Greeks: what happened when those who were formerly ^iXoi were made 
ex0poi by circumstances beyond their control? 
This note wi l l look at Greek friendships and how they affected the 
politics of war in the late f i f th and early fourth centuries BC. It wil l consider 
the conflicts and tensions that arose when Greeks were forced to fight 
against their ^ikoi and had to make decisions about conflicting obUgations. 
Finally, suggestions wil l be made as to how the Greeks responded to these 
difficulties and tried to resolve their conflict of interests. 
Almost unending war among the Greek poleis in the f i f th and fourth 
centuries meant that loyalties were brought into conflict and had the effect 
of testing the strength of obligations as states which were formerly friendly 
could become hostile; ^ihii could be forced to fight against ^iXjoi, or ^evoi 
against ^evoi. The moral dilemma of who were one's friends and what 
private friends could expect of public enemies was a question which reared 
its ugly head over and over again. Where did one's primary loyalty lie? 
With one's state? Or with one's friends? Could the two ever be reconciled? 
There are many examples of such conflicts of interest. For example, 
before the first invasion of the Spartans in 431, Pericles, fearing that his 
t,e\oq, Archidamus, might leave his fields uru-avaged in order to gratify him 
(xapi^eoGai) in private or that he might have been ordered to do so in order 
to raise doubts about him, declared publicly that he and Archidamus were 
^Evoi and made his private holdings public property.^ And indeed, 
Archidamus himself was accused by the Pelopormesians of lingering about 
Oenoe on the borders of Attica, since he seemed to be reluctant in the 
prosecution of the war and "friendly" to the Athenians. 
1 On this episode, see also Chapter Three 89-91. 
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When Endius, the Sparta ^evoq of Aldbiades, served on an embassy to 
Athens in 420, he and his colleagues were tricked and humiliated by 
Alcibiades, i f we can believe the story told by Thucydides, and Alcibiades 
proceeded to make a new treaty between Athens and Argos - yet this did not 
cause a permanent breach between the two men, but we find them co-
operating again in 413/2.^ 
npo^evoi were also sometimes faced with the question of where their 
greater obligation lay: with the awarding dty or with their fatherland. In 428, 
the Mytilenean Tipo^evoi of Athens initially chose to betray their city to the 
Atheruans and reveal the plot for revolt.^ One of the Tipo^Evoi later recanted, 
however, and became part of the embassy which was sent to Athens to try to 
prove that there was not, in fact, anything for the Athenians to worry about. 
Again, the question of "paying back" what was owed could be 
exploited and manipulated, in order to create an almost "notional" 
obligation which should have been negated by a more recent enmity. The 
Corinthians in their speech to the Athenians in 433 cannot claim to be 
friends of Athens, but state that they are at least evo7iov5oi with Athens, 
while Corcyra has never had any diplomatic relationship with Athens.^ 
They then refer to their help to Athens against Aegina before the Persian 
Wars (when Corinth and Athens were friends) and claim that they have 
benefited Athens more recently, by voting against Sparta's proposal to 
support Samos in 440.^  So they demand that the Athenians make an equal 
return (x6 ... laov dvxa7t65oxe).5 The essential hypocrisy of their position 
does not seem to concern them, and they sum up the ambiguity of the 
situation when they say. 
1 See esp. Endnote 2 above. 
2 On ti\is episode, see Chapter Two 57 & n. 5. 
3 Th. 1.40.4; cf. 31.2. 
4 Th. 1.40.5. 
5 Th. 1.43.2. 
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So we have a perfect right to these things from you according 
to the customs of the Greeks, and we have a recommendation 
and claim for this kind of xdpK;, which, though we are not 
exepoi so as to do you harm, nor ^iXoi so as to be of use to you, 
we say you ought to return to us in the present circumstances 
... For men consider both him who is of service a (jjiXoQ, even if 
he was formerly an kxQpoq, and him who stands in opposition 
as hostile, even if he was a ^ihic^ since even their close 
concerns are down-graded because of the present struggle ... 
Make an equal payment in return, having realised that this is 
the very time at which he who is of service is particularly a 
^iXoq, and he who stands in the way an exQpoc,.^ 
The Corinthians are playing upon the idea of reciprocity. In order to score 
political points, they try to argue there is a debt which must be paid back, a 
moral obligation which must be met, trying to skirt around the initial 
difficulty of a present enmity through a past friendship and the rights which 
could be demanded from this friendship; trying to create a conflict of 
interest. So how then did the Greeks try to deal with this problem? What did 
they do when faced with opposing loyalties? 
The Greeks were aware of this dilenuna, as Agesilaus made clear on 
the lawn of Dascyleium, and the question itself was as old as Homer.2 What 
did a fifth-century Greek do when faced with the practical choice? Clearchus, 
the Spartan ^evoq of Cyrus and commander of one of the mercenary armies, 
found his own answer. When Clearchus' army discovered that the true 
purpose of the campaign was to fight against the Persian King, they rebelled 
and wished to leave Cyrus' employ, saying that they had not been hired to 
fight the King.3 Clearchus tried to force them to go on, but they refused, so 
Clearchus called them together and said to them: 
Men, do not be amazed that I bear these present troubles badly. 
For Cyrus was my ^,e\oc^ and when I was an exile from my 
fatherland he both honoured me in other respects and gave me 
1 Th. 1.41.1,3,43.2. 
2 See Homer Iliad 6.224-31. 
^Xen.Anab. 1.3.1. 
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ten thousand darics, which I did not put aside for my private use, 
or squander, but spent it on you ... And when Cyrus summoned 
me, I went to him with you, so that if he needed anything, I might 
help him in return for the ways in which I was well-treated at his 
hands. But since you do not want to journey with me, I must 
either betray you and have his ^iXia, or be deceitful to him and be 
with you. I do not know whether I am acting justly, but I wi l l 
indeed choose you and I wi l l comply with you in whatever is 
necessary. And no one wil l ever say that, having led you among 
the barbarians, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the (j)iXia of the 
barbarians. But since you do not wish to comply with me, I wi l l 
follow you, and I wil l comply with you in regard to whatever is 
necessary. For I consider you to be my fatherland, my ^iXoi and 
my allies.^ 
This is the old problem of conflicting loyalties, but with the added 
complication that one of the parties is also a barbarian. Clearchus' response 
to this follows conventional Greek morality: he has a conflict of duty 
between what he owes to fellow-countrymen and what he owes to a i,i\oc; 
he says his fellow-countrymen can claim ties of country and friendship (they 
may not all have been Spartan, but were at least all Greek). To leave his 
^evoc; is deception, but abandoning the Greeks is betrayal of countrymen for 
a mere barbarian. Whose claim is the stronger? Clearchus asserts that no 
one wi l l say that he betrayed Greeks for the ^ikia of a barbarian. 
Yet the story does not end here. For Cyrus did not understand what 
was happening and kept sending to Clearchus.2 He well understood what 
was due to him. Clearchus refused to go to him, but sent to him in secret, 
telling him not to be discouraged, but that he would settle the matter, and he 
told Cyrus to keep on sending for him, though he would keep refusing to 
go.3 By means of this ruse, Clearchus was able to persuade the Greeks to 
continue, though still not openly against the King.^ Despite his claims to the 
contrary, Clearchus had remained faithful to his ^evoq. 
^Xen.Anab. 1.3.5-6. 
^Xen.Anab. 1.3.8. 
^Xen.Anab. 1.3.8; cf. 1.3.10. 
4 See esp. Xen. Amb. 1.3.15-20. 
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But this was not always possible. In 385/4 when the Spartans resolved 
to chastise their allies who had been more faithful to the enemy, they 
ordered the Mantineians to pull down their walls.^ When the Mantineians 
refused, the Spartans called out the army against them. However, Agesilaus 
requested that he be relieved of the command because the city had served 
his father in many ways in the war against the Messenians. Therefore 
Agesipolis, the other King, led them, though his father, Pausanias, was 
himself friendly ((t)iA.co<; exeiv) to the leaders of the demos in Mantineia. 
Thus while one king was able to avoid the confhct in his obligations, the 
other was forced to choose state over friends. Yet even Agesipolis was able to 
some extent to honour his obligations to the people of Mantineia. For those 
of the Mantineians who were sympathetic to Argos and the leaders of the 
people thought that they would be killed, but Pausanias negotiated with his 
son on their behalf and obtained their safety from Agesipolis as they 
departed from the city. 
Where does all this leave us? Herman believes that ties of ^evla 
meant more to the upper-class Greeks than ties of patriotism, and that this 
explains why Endius co-operated with Alcibiades in 420 against the interests 
of Sparta.2 In our own century, E.M. Forster has written: " I hate the idea of 
causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying 
my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country."^ Alcibiades 
was willing to betray Athens in 415, and then to desert the Spartans in 412, 
though he seems to have been thinking of his own interests, rather than 
those of any ^evoi. Pericles, in 431, had ostentatiously put his loyalty to 
Athens above his ^evia with Archidamus. But it is easy for people to 
persuade themselves that what they want to do is what is right for them to 
1 On this episode, see Chapter Three 86, 92-3. 
'^Ritualised Friendship 149. 
3 Two Cheers for Democracy 78. 
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do, and that what is best for them is best for their country and their friends 
too. Perhaps, by redefining their obligations, Greeks could persuade 
themselves that they were not having to choose between betraying their 
country and betraying their friends; perhaps even Alcibiades in 420 believed 
that his trickery would be good for Athens and yet would not be bad for 
Endius. 
However, the essential point is clear. Because the political world of 
the f i f th and fourth centuries was, at least in part, built upon friendship 
networks and ideas of repaying favours, and because the alliances and 
relationships between states were constantly shifting and changing, old 
friends could be forced to become new enemies. Old loyalties could be 
challenged and superseded by new ones; old obligations manipulated in 
order to score new points. It was a juggling act and a game that could not be 
played by consistent rules. For some it was easy to evade the issue altogether, 
as Agesilaus did at Mantineia in 385. Others had to find the best compromise 
they could. But in whatever way the situation was dealt with on each 
occasion, it is important for our understanding of what was happening in 
the world of the f i f th and fourth centuries to realise that this was one of the 
issues the Greeks had to face, that ^evoi could be forced to fight against ^evoi, 
and that sometimes it chanced that they killed each other, and that this 
"reciprocal tension" affected decisions that were made and things that were 
done. Paying backing the xdpixeq was not always as straightforward as it 
seemed. 
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Literary npo e^voi^  
Argos 
Athens 
nPOSENOZ HOME STATE SOURCE 
Lichas son of 
Arcesilaus 
Sparta Th. 5.76.3 
Aristonus Larisa w . 292 
Nyn\phodorus Abdera W. 30 
Nicias Gortyn W. 323 
Dexandrus of 
Mytilene and 
other Mytileneans 
Mytilene W. 38 
Peithias 
(eGeAx)7cp6^ evo(;) 
Corcyra Th. 3.70.34 
Maion Pharsalus Th. 2.22.35 
Archonides Sici ly W. 66^ 
Artas Messapia W. 707 
Thucydides Pharsalus w . 748 
Megillus Sparta Plato Laws 
Archebius Byzantium Dem. 20.60 
Heracleides Byzantium Dem. 20.60 
^ I have listed all the named Tipo^evoi of the years 435-336 to be found in the literary sources. 
There are, of course, also a great number of xcpo^evoi to be found in inscriptions, but as the only 
information we have concerning many of these is their names and perhaps their citizenship, 
their usefulness is limited for my purposes. Other np6^evoi from inscriptions are referred to in 
the various discussions as they arise. For a complete list of itpo^evlai (though he does not give 
men's names), see Marek Die Proxenie. 
2 Though Thucydides does not call him Ttpo^evoq. 
3 See also Chapter Two 58 & n. 7. 
4 See Chapter Two 61 n. 6. 
5 Not called a npo^svoq by Thucydides, but see Endnote 1. 
^ Thucydides does not mention that he was Ttpo^evoq, but does say that he was a (^ihiq of the 
Athenians (Th. 7.1.4). 
^ Here, again, Thucydides himself does not spell out the Ttpo^evta, but says Artas had a 
nakam <\iiXia with Athens (Th. 7.33.4). 
8 See also Endnote 1. 
304 
Appendix A: Literary npo^evoi 
Lycidas 
Dionysius 
Apollonides 
Arthmius 
Euthycrates 
Alcimachus 
Antipater 
?Thracel 
Mytilene 
Zeleia 
Olynthus 
Macedon 
Macedon 
Dem. 20.131-3 
Dem. 20.132 
Dem. 40.36 
Aeschin. 3.258 
Hypereides F 76 
Hypereides F 77; 
Anaximenes of 
Lampsacus f G r M s i 72 
F16 
Hypereides F 77; 
Anaximenes of 
Lampsacus f Grffisf 72 
F16 
Boeotia 
Pharax 
Jason 
Sparta 
Pherae 
Demosthenes son Athens 
of Demosthenes 
Thrason Athens 
Xen. He//. 4.5.6 
Xen. He//. 6.4.24 
Aeschin. 2.141, 143 
Aeschin. 3.138 
Byzantium 
Clearchus son of Sparta 
Ramphias 
Xen. He//. 1.1.35 
Chalcidice 
Strophacus Thessaly Th. 4.78.1 
Corcyra 
Eretria 
Corinthians 
Meidias^ 
Corinth 
Athens 
Th. 3.70.1 
Dem. 21.200 
Heracleia 
Callippus Athens Dem. 52.5,9,10,24 
^ The slave of Chabrias. His citizenship, which Marek gives as Thrace (Die Proxenie 9), can 
only be inferred from Chabrias' tours of duty in the north. 
2 He was also the (t)iXo(; and ^evoq of Plutarchus (Dem. 21.110). 
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Strammenus Argos Dem. 52.10 
Mossynoeci 
Timestheus Trapezous Xen.Anab. 5.4.2 
Paphlagonia 
Hecatonymus Sinope Xen. Amb. 5.6.11 
Sparta 
?Lacedaemonius Athens 
son of Cimon^ 
Alcibiades' 
grandfather 
Lacon son of 
Aiemnestus 
Athens 
Plataea 
Perhaps implied by a 
combination of his 
name and the rtpo^evta 
of his father: Andoc. 
3.3; Aeschin. 2.1722 
Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2; cf. 
P\ut.Alc. 14.1 
Th. 3.52.53 
Alciphron 
Callias son of 
Hipponicus 
?Nicias son of 
Niceratus 
Argos 
Athens 
Athens 
Th. 5.59.5 
Xen. He//. 5.4.22,6.3.4 
Perhaps implied by 
the events of 420.4 
Polydamas Thessaly Xen. He//. 6.1.4 
Syracuse 
Nicias son of 
Niceratus 
Athens Diod. 13.27.3 
^ A family connection with Thessaly can probably also be inferred from the name of his 
brother, Thessalus (Plut. Cimon 16.1), though there is no specific evidence of jrpo^evia. 
2 Note, however, the confusion of Miltiades son of Cimon for Cimon son of Miltiades. 
3 See also Chapter Two 58-9,59 n. 1. 
4 See Chapter Three 72 & n. 7. 
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Athenian Strategoii 
435/4 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus V * 
?G[laucon] son of Leagrus of Ceramds V * 
?[Pro]teas son of Epicles of Aexone V I I 
434/3 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus V 
433/2 
tDiotimussonof Strombichusof Euonymon I 
Despatched to Corcyra; also known to have visited 
Neapolis in southern Italy and founded a torch race 
there, perhaps in the 430s (Timaeus FGrHist 566 F 98; 
though on the date cf. Davies APF 161). Archena[utes] possibly of Icarium I I 
Glaucon son of Leagrus of Cerameis V * 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus V * 
Lacedaemoiuus son of Cimon of Ladadae V I 
Proteas son of Epides of Aexone V I I 
Archestratus son of Lycomedes (??of Phlya)2 ? ? V I I 
[Metagjenes of Coele V I I I 
Draconti[des] son of Leogoras of Thorae X 
^ I have used Develin {Officials ) as my starting point, since his is the most recent list for 
generals of these years. I have induded comments where I have disagreed with Develin, or 
where other comments seem appropriate over and above those of Develin, but within the 
limitations of this thesis I have not been able to discuss every problem. Refer to Develin 
throughout for discussion and references. 
* indicates possible cases of double representation. 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year. 
?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed 
in that year. (Those marked ? and ?? are nevertheless induded in my statistics.) 
{} enclose those generals included by Develin, but who I believe should be omitted. 
Unfortunately, limitations of space prevent full discussion of all the possible doubles or 
"suitable" elections. The most noteworthy examples are discussed at Chapter Four 111-21. 
2 For the tribe and the possibility of a double, see Chapter Four 137 n. 2. 
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432/1 
Socrates son of Antigenes of Halae 
Phornuo son of Asopius of Paeania^ 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus 
Carcinus son of Xenotimus of Thoricus 
Proteas son of Epicles of Aexone 
Eucrat[es] of Melite 
Callias son of Calliades2 
I I 
I I I 
V * 
V * 
V I I * 
V I I * 
431/0 
Socrates son of Antigenes of Halae 
Phormio son of Asopius of Paeania 
tHagnon son of Nidas of Steiria 
See main discussion 113-4. 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus 
Carcinus son of Xenotimus of Thoricus 
Qeopompus son of Cleinias of Scambonidae or Thria 
Proteas son of Epicles of Aexone 
?[Aristot]eles son of Timocrates of Thorae 
I I 
I I I * 
I I I * 
V * 
V * 
IV or VI 
V I I 
X 
430/29 
tPhormio son of Asopius of Paeania 
See main discussion 111-3. 
tHagnon son of Nicias of Steiria 
See main discussion 113-4. 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus 
Qeopompus son of Cleinias of Scambonidae or Thria 
Xenophon son of Euripides of Melite 
Melesander 
Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides 
Phanomachus son of Callimachus 
Cal l iades 
I I I * 
I I I * 
V 
IV or VI 
V I I 
1 For demotic, see Chapter Four 132-3. 
2 For problems with demotic and possible triple representation, see Chapter Four 139. 
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429/8 
fPhormio son of Asopius of Paeania 
See main discussion 111-3. 
tHagnon son of Nicias of Steiria^ 
See main discussion 113-4. 
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus 
Cleippides son of Deinias of Achamae 
I I I * 
I I I * 
V 
V I 
428/7 
tAsopius son of Phormio of Paeania 
See main discussion 111-3. 
Paches son of Epicurus 
Lysicles 
I I I 
427/6 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae2 
Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone 
t?Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna 
See main discussion 114-7. 
Charoeades son of Euphiletus 
?Prodes son of Theodorus 
See main discussion on Demosthenes (esp. 114 n. 2), 
though, as with Demosthenes, there is perhaps little 
doubt that he was strategos in this year. 
tEurymedon son of Thudes3 
Sent to Corcyra, see also 426/5,425/4,414/3,413/2. 
I I 
I V 
V I I 
I X 
426/5 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Hippocrates son of Ariphron of Cholargus 
I I 
V 
^ For Hagnon's strategia in this year, which I accept, see Chapter Four 133-4. 
2 For the demotic of Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, in addition to Develin, see Fomara CQ 
n.s. 20 (1970) 41; Hornblower Comm. 473. 
3 Develin tentatively accepts the attribution to the deme Mjm-hinous, but I think the 
evidence against the demotic (see Gonnme HCT 3.627-8; Davies APF 334; Fomara Generals 
78; see also Lewis /HS 81 (1961) 119; Mattingly BS>1 65 (1970) 137-8) outweighs the 
evidence for it (Wade-Gery CQ n.s. 24 (1930) 34-5; MacDowell CQ n.s. 15 1965 44 n. 4; 
Thompson in Phoros 147; see also (restoring the name in the inscription IG 369 of 423/2) 
Lang and MerittCQ n.s.l8 (1968) 90). 
309 
Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 
Sophodes son of Sostratides ?of tribe VI^ V I * 
?Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I * 
Not included by Develin, rejected by Fomara (Generals 
58; see also Sommerstein Acharnians 185-6), but I 
tentatively include him, following Lewis (/HS 81 (1961) 
121); see Ar. Acham. 593-619, but rf. 1073-8. 
Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone VI l2 
tPythodorus son of Isolochus VII'^ 
Sent to Sicily; seems to have connections with the 
philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno, from Elea in Italy 
(Plato Farm. 126 b, 127 a-d; identification secured by his 
father's name in [Plato] Ale. 1.119 a). 
tDemosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna^ I X 
See main discussion 114-7. 
Hipponicus son of Callias of Alopece X * 
Aristoteles son of Timocrates of Thorae X * 
Develin calls Aristoteles and Hierophon nauarchs 
(following Jordan TAPA 101 (1970) 238 = The Athenian 
Navy in the Classical Period 128-9), though he admits 
that their status is not secure. Fomara (Generals 38) 
includes them among the generals for this year, and 
Rhodes (Thucydides III 261-2) sees no reason to doubt 
that they were strategoi. 
Simonides 
1 Fomara has placed Sophocles in tribe VI (Generals 58), though Develin is not prepared to 
attribute tribes on the basis of Xen. Hell. 2.3.2. On Xenophon's list of the Thirty, see Rhodes 
(Comm. 435), who is prepared to believe in trios in tribal order, and Whitehead (/HS 100 
(1980) 208-13), who is vwUing to believe in tribal order, but not necessarily trios. See also 
Krentz The Thirty at Athens 51-5; M.B. Walbank Hesperia 51 (1982) 78-87. 
2 He was probably deposed and recalled on charges of embezzlement (see schol. Ar. Wasps 
240) and replaced by Pythodoms, though he was probably not prosecuted since his career 
continues in 422/1 (see Rhodes Thucydides III 268). 
3 Pythodoms vdll probably not form a double in this year, but will rather he suffect. It argues 
in favour of tribal elections, if indeed, as I think, Pythodoms replaced Laches in the mid-
winter of this year on Laches' recall, since Pythodorus was also from tribe VII. 
4 For his office as strategos in this year (contra Fomara Generals 58; Develin Officials 127), 
see Chapter Four 115-6. 
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Prodes son of Theodorus^ 
Not included by Develin (with Demosthenes (see entry 
under Demosthenes above), see Th. 3.91.1; though he died 
at the beginning of this year: Th. 3.98.4, so will probably 
have been replaced.) 
Hierophon son of Antimnestus. 
Called a nauarch by Develin; see Aristoteles above. 
tEurymedon son of Thudes 
Sent to Sidly with orders to stop off in Corcyra (see Lewis 
C A H V2 413: "Eurymedon was the expert on Corcyra"). 
See 427/6. 
425/4 
Demodocus of Anagyrous I 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae I I 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae I V 
tLamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I 
Led a military force to Sinope in the Black Sea 436/5 
(Plut. Per. 20.1-2); sent to collect tribute in this region 
425/4-424/3. 
Sophocles son of Sostratides ?of tribe VI (see 310 n. 1 above) V I 
{?Hyperlx)lus son of Antiphanes of Perithoedae {Vl2} 
Induded by Develin, but the evidence probably does not 
justify it.} 
Pythodorus son of Isolochus of Phlya V11 
tDemosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna I X 
On the possible drcumstances of his re-election in this 
year, see Gomme HCT 3.437-8,470-1,504-5; Lewis JHS 81 
(1961) 120. 
Autodes son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus X 
Aristeides son of Archippus 
* 
Contra FomaTSi Generals 58; Devehn Officials 127; see Lewis /HS 81 (1961) 119-20; see 
also discussion on Demosthenes' strategia: Chapter Four 115-6. 
2 If indeed Hyperbolas did hold the strategia for this year, it may well have been as the 
replacement for Sophocles, one of the generals who was deposed and exiled in this year. This 
would eliminate the difficulty of eleven attested strategoi. 
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tEuiymedon son of Thudes 
The campaign to Sicily left Athens in the spring so i t is 
l ikely that Eurymedon was re-elected i n the spring for 
425/4 w i t h this campaign i n mind. See also 427/6. 
Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathemeum^ III 
424/3 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Qeon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum 
tThucydides son of Olorus of Halimous 
Command i n Thrace (see Gomme H C T 3.577); he had 
interests i n Thracian gold mines and influence w i t h the 
leading Thracians (Th. 4.105.1); descended f r o m Olorus, 
k ing of Thrace (Plut. Cimon 4.1-2). 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae 
Hippocrates son of Ariphron of Cholargus 
tLamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe 
See 425 /4 . 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna 
Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus 
Eudes 
I I 
I I I 
I V " 
I V * 
V 
V I 
I X 
X 
423/2 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Q e o n son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum 
[-31-] of [Myrr]hinous 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae 
I I 
I I I * 
111*2 
V 
422/1 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum 
?Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone 
TEufliydemus son of Eudemus 
I I 
I I I 
V I I 
1 This was a special position, so is not included in the tribal count of the generals. 
2 The demotic is i n the inscription, so the double must stand. 
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421/20 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae I I 
420/191 
{Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Tentatively included by Develin, but I do not think that 
Plutarch implies a generalship.} 
fAlcibiades son of Qeinias of Scambonidae 
See main discussion 117-8. 
{ID 
I V 
419/8 
tAlcibiades son of Qeinias of Scambonidae 
See main discussion 117-8. 
I V 
418/7 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae 
{[?Aldbiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae]^ 
Tentatively included by Develin.} 
Cal[listr]atus son of Empedus of Oe 
tLaches son of Melanopus of Aexone 
Proposer of the armistice w i t h the Spartans (Th. 
4.118.11); oath swearer to the Peace of Nicias i n 421 (see 
Oath-takers 383); general to Argos i n this year.^ 
I I 
I V 
{ I V } 
V I 
v i r 
11 do not agree w i t h DeveUn's assignment of Nicias to this year, since Plutarch Nic. 10.9 does 
not seem at all to necessitate his inclusion here. 
2 His strategia is accepted by Fomara {Generals 62-3 & 63 n. 105). Develin does not agree 
that Th. 5.61.2 is "a conclusive bar to i t " , fol lowing Gomme (HCT 4.88), but Meiggs and Lewis 
do not accept Wade-Ger/s restoration in their commentary for 77. Other than Aldbiades' 
prominence in these years the restoration is not compjelling of itself. Though there seems to be 
no bar to a general performing the duties of an ambassador in the course of his command (see, 
f o r example, Th. 7.33.4, Dem. 23.173), the use of the specific title presbeutes does seem to 
suggest that he was just this, and Mosley (Envoys and Diplomacy 46) notes there was a 
tendency against pluralism in Athens and holding more than one office at a time (see Dem. 
24.150). 
^ Kagan (Peace of Nicias 103-4 on Th. 5.61.1-2) argues that Laches and Nicostratus were sent 
to Mantineia i n 418/7 i n the expectation that, i f the Spartans were victorious, they would be 
able to begin negotiations. Different pressure groups i n Athens d i d tend to be represented on 
the same embassy or board of generals, even though the interests of the constituent members 
might be i n open conflict w i th each other; compare the embassy to Sparta i n 372/1 (Xen. Hell. 
6.3.2 -17) and the generals selected for Sicily in 415 (Th. 6.8.2). I see no reason why 
Nicostratus should be at all connected vdth a pro-Spartan policy, but Laches may wel l have 
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?C[leomedes] son of Lycomedes of Phlya^ V11" 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna I X 
Autodes son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus X 
Euthydemus son of Eudemus 
417/6 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 11 
tAlcibiades son of Qeinias of Scambonidae I V 
See main discussion 117-8. 
Teisias son of Teisimachus of Cephale V 
Qeomedes son of Lycomedes of Phlya V I I 
416/5 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae I I 
Aldbiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae I V 
Teisias son of Teisimachus of Cephale V 
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I 
Qeomedes son of Lycomedes of Phlya V11 
Philocrates son of Demeas 
415/4 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae^ 11 
Aldbiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae I V 
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I 
Telephonus 
been. We may then have a situation where different members of the "team" despatched to 
Argos (on Alcibiades' status, see 313 n . 2) represent different pressure groups in Athens. 
1 Ventured by M L , accepted by Develin, though not by Fomara (Generals 62-3), and not 
restored i n IG i^. 
2 Diodorus says that Nicias was the JCp6 e^vo<; of the Syracusans (Diod. 13.27.3). This may go 
part of the way to explain his hesitancy for undertaking the expedition, and his contacts 
when he arrived (Th. 7.48.2,73.3), but I can see no plausible reason w h y i t would have 
affected his election. More reasonable is the supposition that he was elected as a counter-
balance to Aldbiades (see note on Laches (under 418/7) above). 
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414/31 
Euetion ?of Cephisia or Sphettus I or V 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 11 * 
Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae 11 * 
tDieitrephes son of Nicostratus of Scambonidae I V 
Escorted Thracian mercenaries home. See also 411 (under 
the 400). 
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I 
Charicles son of Apollodorus ?of tribe V I (see 310 n. 1 below) V I ^ 
Laespodias son of Andronymis ?of Coele V I I I 
t?Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna I X 
See main discussion and n. 1 (on 414/3) below. 
tConon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X 
For strategia see n. 1 (on 414/3) below. Strategos based at 
Naupactus; see also 411 (under 5000). 
Demaratus 
[Mel]es[a]ndr[us] 
tEurymedon son of Thucles 
Sent to Corcyra. See 427/6. 
Menander 
On status, see Develin Officials 152-3. 
Euthydemus son of Eudemus 
On status, see Develin Officials 152-3. 
1 This is a d i f f i cu l t year, w i t h too many attested generals, if they are all to be accepted, and 
many of the demotics are unsure or unknown. Develin suggests a number of solutions to the 
d i f f i cu l ty of twelve regular generals, though none satisfactorily reduce them to the required 
ten (he is dealing w i t h Fornara's d i f f icul ty of eleven regular generals, but does not explain 
away the twel f th , [Mel]es[a]ndr(os], whom he himself adds). Following Develin, however, I 
reject Fornara's hypothesis that autokratores was a special status which set Nicias and 
Lamachus (as wel l as Alcibiades before his fl ight) apart. It is more probable that, as Develin 
suggests, one of the attested generals replaced Lamachus on his death (fX)ssibly Charicles?). 
That leaves us w i t h still one general to dispose of, however. I am not convinced that Conon 
was simply a nauarch. I t is perhaps more likely that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were 
specially pre-selected for 413/2 (contra Develin) as Dover (HCT 4.393) suggests. 
2 I think Develin is right here in making h im a general (contra Jordan TAPA 101 (1970) 233 
= The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period 124, who makes h im nauarch). His known 
activity as strategos comes very late in the magisterial year (that is, in spring, 413), so he is 
probably suffect on the death of Lamachus. 
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413/2 
{?Strombichides son of Diotimus of Euonymon (I) 
Develin tentatively includes h im here, fol lowing 
Fomara (Generals 65-6), but I do not think Fomara's 
inference is necessary.) 
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 11 
Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia V I I 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna IX 
Menander 
Euthydemus son of Eudemus 
D i p h i l u s 
Develin questions whether he may have been nauarch, 
but I think not; see 315 n. 1 above in relation to Conon. 
Eurymedon son of Thucles 
?Hippocles son of Menippus 
Though he may belong in 412/1; see Andrewes HCT 5.32-
3 (wi th 23-4). 
412/1 
Strombichides son of Diotimus of Euonymon I 
Eucrates son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 11 
Phrynichus son of Stratonides of Deiradiotae I V 
Onomacles ?of tribe V I I I (see 310 n. 1 on Xen. Hell. 2.3.2) V I I I 
Thrasycles 
Diomedon 
Leon 
Scironides 
Charminus 
Euctemon^ 
411 
Athens - Appointments made under the 400 (summer 411) 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria I I I 
t Dieitrephes ?son of Nicostratus of Scambonidae I V 
Elected e; xa m epqf.Kr\q apxeiv (Th. 8.64.2). Cf. 414/3. 
1 Develin suggests Cephisia as a possible demotic by assodation wi th PA 5798, but Euctemon 
is not an uncommon name in the f i f t h century, and there are too many possibilities for 
certainty. 
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Thymochares ?of Sphettus V 
Aristarchus ?of Deceleia V I I I 
Aristoteles son of Timocrates of Thorae X 
Alexicles 
Melanth ius 
?Antiphon ?son of Lysonides 
Samos - Democratic (summer 411) 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria I I I 
Aldbiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae I V 
Thrasyl lus 
Period of Co-operation between Samos and Athens Under the 5000 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria ( f rom the city) I I I 
Thymochares ?of Sphettus ( f rom the d ty ) V 
Chaereas son of Archestratus ?of Phlya (demoaat f r o m V I I 
Samos) 
tConon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus (strategos of the X 
Athenians) 
Brought aid to the Corcyraeans f r o m Naupactus; see also 
414/3 above. 
Simichus/Symbichus/Strombichides (strategos of the 
Athenians) 
Eumachus ( f rom the c i ty) l 
410/92 
E[ ] of Euonymon (see n. 1 above on Eumachus) I 
Eudeides ?of tribe I I (see 310 n. 1) I I 
1 Develin suggests the demotic Euonymon on the basis of IG i ^ 375.35-6 (= M L 84), where the 
name is urwestored; Andrewes (JHS 73 (1953) 4 n. 13) says there are too many possibilities 
for restoration; see also Fomara Generals 68. 
2 I f one discounts Aldbiades and Theramenes, whose position in this year is imclear, this year 
bears the clearest testimony in these six years to tribal election, there being seven out of a 
possible ten tribes represented. 
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tThrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria^ 
A r r i v e d back at the Hellespont f r o m Thasos and 
Thraceward region; probably continued there unt i l 407; 
see also 390/89. Af te r he had served i n this region, 
Middle ton (CQ n.s. 32 (1986) 298-303) suggests he may 
have effected his pro-democratic coup in 404 w i t h the 
help of Thracian forces: see Chapter Three 100-1. 
Pasiphon of Phrearrhii 
Aristocrates son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia 
Oenobius of Deceleia 
Dexicrates of Aegilia 
Thrasyl lus 
I I I 
I V 
V I I 
V I I I 
X 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria 
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae 
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
/ / / 
IV 
409/8 
Anytus son of Anthemion of Euonymon 
tThrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria 
See 410/9 & n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
?Peri[des] son of Pericles of Cholargus 
Leotrophides 
Thrasyl lus 
Timarchus 
I 
I I I 
V 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria 
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
1 For the supposition that Thrasybulus, Alcibiades and Theramenes held an "unofficial 
position", see Andrewes }HS 73 (1953) 2-9; see also Develin. Fomara (Generals 69) 
maintains that the presence of Pasiphon does not imply that fresh elections were held after 
the restoration of f u l l democracy, though undoubtedly Xen. Hell. 1.4.10-1 suggests that 
Alcibiades' position previous to this had not been regular. However, Andrewes' assessment 
(JHS 73 (1953) 4) that i n the years 410-404 Thrasybulus' "associations were all wi th 
Alkibiades and Theramenes, whose equivocal position he may be presumed to share" is 
probably not fair. His absence f rom activities in the Hellespont, except Cyzicus (Diod. 
13.50.1) does not necessarily mean that he was not still engaged on official Athenian business. 
I prefer, then, to leave h im as one of the regularly appointed generals in this year. 
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Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae 
See 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
IV 
408/7 
tThrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria 
See 410/9 & 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
Thrasyl lus 
I I I 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria 
See n. 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae 
See n. 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus. 
/ / / 
IV 
407/6 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria 
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae 
Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae 
?P[ericles] son of Pericles of Cholargus 
Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia 
Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus 
t?Phanosthenes 
Probably an Andr ian by bir th, though now a naturalised 
Athenian (7G i ^ 182; Walbank Hesperia 45 (1976) 289-
5; MacDona ld Hesperia 50 (1981) 141-6; on the 
strategia: Develin; Osborne Naturalization 3.31-3; cf. 
KrentzComm. 144; Jordan TAP/l 101 (1970) 232), he was 
sent to Andros to replace Conon. 
I l l 
I V * 
I V * 
V 
V I I 
X 
406/5 
Archestratus of Phrearrhii 
Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae 
Pericles son of Pericles of Cholargus 
Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia 
Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus 
Diomedon 
I V 
I V l 
V 
V I I 
X 
1 He and Philocles were chosen " in addition" as colleagues for Conon after the deposition of 
the eight generals after Arginousae. 
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Lysias^ 
Leon^ 
N o t included by Develin. 
Erasinides 
Protomachus 
Thrasyl lus 
Aristogenes 
Philocles (see 319 n. 1 above) 
405/4 
Eucrates son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 11 
Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae I V 
Tydeus ?son of Lamachus of Oe^ V I 
Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X 
Philocles 
Menander (see n. 3 above on Tydeus) 
Cephisodotus (see n. 3 above on Tydeus) 
404/3 
N o known strategoi for this year (Rule of the Thirty) 
403/2 
Rhinon ?son of Charicles of Paeania I I I 
402/1-397/6 
No known strategoi for these years 
1 Diodorus has Lysanias, but this is probably a mistake for Lysias (most recently Krentz 
Comm. 143) whom Xenophon names at 1.6.30, 7.2 and Philochoms at f GrH 328 F 142. He was 
probably the suffect for Archestratus [see under Leon]. 
2 Neither Fomara nor Develin include h im on their lists, since Fornara, followed by Develin, 
claimed that this was probably a mistake for Lysias (Generals 70 & n. 124). Krentz (Comm. 
143) allows this as a possibility, but also suggests, fol lowing McCoy (A]P 96 (1975) 193) and 
Rhodes (Comm. 423), that Lysias replaced Archestratus after his death at Mytilene (Lys. 
21.8), while Leon either remained at Mytilene wi th Conon or sailed out on a ship captured by 
the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 1.6.16-22). 
3 Three generals, Menander, Tydeus and Cephisodotus, were chosen " in addition" 
(npoaetXovxo): Xen. Hell. 2.1.16. Krentz (Comm. 173) suggests that either the fleet chose the 
generals, fo l lowing the precedent of 411, or the assembly elected and dispatched additional 
generals at the spring election of 405, and, I think, rightly concludes that this second 
alternative is more likely since the elections were held in the spring. Fornara (Generals 70) 
and Develin do not doubt the patronymic, but Krentz (Comm. 173) has reservations. He finds 
i t more likely that this was the Tydeus who was a commander at Catana in 413 (Lys. 20.26). 
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396/5 
{Demaenetus son of Demeas of Paeanial { I I I } 
Included by Develin, but see n. 1 & entry for 390/89} 
395/4 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria I I I 
?Ctesicles 
?Hieronymus2 
394/3 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria I I I 
Mnesicles V I 
[Tho]ucle[ides] I X 
?Polystratus 
393/2 
{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhaimious {IX} 
Included by Develin, but I am inclined to think that 
Iphicrates was not a strategos while he was commanding 
the mercenary forces at Corinth, partly because of the 
distinction made by Xenophon at Hell. 4.5.13, and partly 
because of the difficulties concerning his age (see Develin 
for references); see Thompson GR&BS 26 (1985) 51-7, 
whose arguments I f ind appealing.} 
1 Develin makes Demaenetus a general in this year on the basis of Hell. Oxyrh. 6.1, but this is 
a secret mission of which he is simply described as iculpjioq (see Bruce Comm. 50-1; McKechnie 
& K e m Comm. 132-3), though DeveUn finds no diff icul ty wi th this. Demaenetus zs known to 
have held a generalship, probably before 388 (see Hansen Ecclesia II 40 revised f rom GR&BS 
24 (1983) 163), w i t h Cleobules (Aeschin. 2.78), but this was against the Spartan Nauarchos, 
Cheilon, who could not have been Nauarchos in this year. Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 272 
n. 14) suggests 390/89 as a possible year when Cheilon could have been Nauarchos, but, I 
think, Teleutias must be the Nauarchos in this year (Spartan Nauarchoi 334 & n. 2). Develin 
inclines to think that the Mi lon of Hell. Oxyrh. is the Cheilon of Aeschines, but this does not 
resolve the problem of an extra Nauarchos for the year 396/5. I f one is looking for years 
around this time when a nauarch could be fitted in , 392/1 (where Cawkwell would like to 
place Teleutias, but I do not think this can be so; again, see Spartan Nauarchoi 334) offers 
itself as a possibility. 
2 See the reasonable objections of Bruce to Hieronymus holding an official position in this 
year (Comm. 99); though Hansen ( Ecclesia II 49 revised f r o m GR&BS 24 (1983) 169) places 
h i m i n this year. 
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392/1 
??Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania 
[396/5 Develin. See 321 n. 1 above.] 
??aeobulus son of Glaucus of Alopece 
[396/5 Develin. See 321 n. 1 above.] 
(?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See entry for 393/2.} 
I l l 
I V 
{IX} 
391/0 
{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See entry for 393/2.} 
Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece 
{IX} 
X 
390/89 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See entry for 393/2.} 
Philocrates son of Ephialtes 
Ergocles 
?Diotimus 
I I I 
V I I 
{IX} 
389/8 
Agyrrhius of CoUytus 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria 
Pamphilus of Ceiriadae 
t?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
Like Develin, I think his strategia for this year is ahnost 
certain. He had by now proved himself to be a competent 
commander i n the f ie ld , so any difficult ies w i t h his age 
may have been waived. On his Thradan connections, see 
main discussion 118-20. 
?Diotimus 
I I 
I I I 
V I I I 
I X 
388/7 
Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
I I I 
V I I 
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t?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX 
See entry for 389/8 and main discussion 118-20. 
Diotimus 
387/6 
Thrasybulus son of Thrason of Collytus 11 
There is no need to doubt the strategia, as does Develin. 
Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania 111 
?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX 
See entry for 389/8 . 
Dionysius 
Leontichus 
Diot imus 
Phanias 
386/5-380/79 
N o known strategoi for these years 
379/8 
?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V11 
Demophon 
378/7 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V11 
Calhstratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna IX 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X 
377/6 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V11 
376/5 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V I I 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X 
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375/4 
tTimotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
Sent around the Peloponnese, brought the Corcyraeans 
under control , w o n over the cities there (Xen. Hell. 
5.4.64), persuaded the cities of Acamania to come over to 
Athens and made Alcetas, the king of the Molossians, his 
^I'koq (Diod . 15.36.5). Compare the commands of his 
father, Conon, i n 414/3 and 411. See also 374/3. 
374/3 
tTimotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
Timotheus again sent to help the Corcyraeans; see 375/4. 
Ctesicles 
373/2 
Thrasybulus son of Thrason of Collytus 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
Ctesicles 
I I 
V I I 
I X * 
I X * 
X 
372/1 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
V I I 
I X * 
I X * 
371/0 
?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
V I I 
IX 
370/69 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX 
369/8 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V I I 
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368/7 
Autodes son of Strombichides of Euonymon 
?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
Phormio 
Spoudias 
I 
V I I 
I X 
367/6 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Timomachus of Achamae 
tiphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See main discussion 118-20. 
fTimotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
Timotheus sent to help Ariobarzanes. Ariobarzanes was 
probably the brother of Phamabazus (Beloch G.G.^ I l l 
2.146-7, 151; cf. Hornb lower Mausolus 173; Sealey 
Demosthenes and His Time 43. Weiskopf (The So-called 
"Great Satraps' Revolt" 366-360 BC 27-31) would make 
h i m Pharnabazus' eldest son; Sealey (280 n. 134) notes: 
"that is possible, bu t not more l ike ly .") , w i t h w h o m 
Euagoras of Salamis found Conon a place as commander of 
the Persian mercenary fleet. Pharnabazus gave Conon 
money to maintain the fleet and rebuild the long walls at 
Athens. 
I l l 
V I 
IX 
366/5 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone 
tiphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See main discussion 118-20. 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlj^tus 
?Lysistratus 
I I I 
V I I 
I X 
365/4 
tiphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous 
See main discussion 118-20. 
I X 
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tTimotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X 
Took over Iphicrates' command at Amphipolis. Conon is 
said to have originally recruited the Thracian 
mercenaries stationed at Corinth (Nepos Iph. 1.3-4). 
There may be a connection, though i t is by no means 
certain. 
364/3 
Alcimachus of Anagyrous I 
Laches ?son of Laches of Aexone V11 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X 
363/2 
Hegesileus (Hegelochus) ?of ProbaUnthus I I I 
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone V I I 
t Aristophon son of Aristophanes of Azenia V I I I 
General to Ceos i n this year. He proposed a decree 
concerning the renewal of a treaty w i t h lulis, one of the 
cities on Ceos (IG ii2 111 Tod 142]). Tod (in his 
commentary on 142) says that Aristophon "was especially 
interested i n Ceos." He was the Jipo^evoq of Carthaea (IG 
12 (5) i 542.43), another city on Ceos, though he was 
accused of treating the inhabitants badly because of his 
love of money ((tuXoxpTinaxta); schol. Aeschin. 1.64; cf. 
Hypereides Euxen. 28; Aeschin. 3.194. 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X 
Ergophilus^ 
Callisthenes 
362/1 
Autocles son of Strombichides of Euonymon2 I 
Menon of Potamus I V 
1 O n Ergophilus' and Callisthenes' commands i n this year, see now Sealey Demosthenes and 
His Time 253-4. 
2 For the commands of Autocles and Menon in this year, see also Sealey Demosthenes and His 
Time 254. 
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361/0 
Chares son of Theochares of Angyle 
Leosthenes of Cephale 
Timomachus of Acharnae 
?Philon ?son of Callippus of Aexone 
?Theotimusl 
?[Charid]emus2 
I I I 
V 
V I 
V I I 
360/59 
Mantias son of Mantitheus of Thoricus 
Cephisodotus ?of Acharnae 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
V 
V I 
X 
359/8 
?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone^ V I I 
358/7 
?Chares son of Theochares of Angele I I I 
357/6 
Alci[machus of Anagyrous] 
Cha[res son of Theochares of Angele]^ 
Menon of Potamus 
Execestides son of Charias of Thoricus 
I[Cha]brias son of Ctesippus of Aexonel 
Philochares of Rhamnous 
[Iphicrates] son of Timotheus of Rhamnous^ 
Diodes of Alopece 
I 
I I I 
I V 
V 
V I I 
I X * 
I X * 
X 
1 Note that Sealey (Demosthenes and His Time 254) thinks i t l ikely that his command was 
in the next year, 360/59. 
2 The date of decree and the identification are uncertain; see Whitehead AHB 3.5 (1989) 
102-6; if the name is Charidemus, the man need not be the son of Philoxenus (who ought not to 
be an Athenian citizen as early as this: Dem. 23.141; see Parke Greek Mercenary Soldiers 128 
n. 4, contra Kirchner PA, Osborne Naturalization 3.56-8). 
Sealey (Demosthenes and His Time 255) places his command in 358/7. 
4 Chares' name may be wrongly restored in IG i i ^ 124 (= Tod 153) (see Appendix D: Oath-
takers 387 n. 1), but he was in any case a strategos in this year (Dem. 23.173). 
5 The demotic is i n the inscription, so the double must stand. 
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356/5 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Menestheus son of Iphicrates of Rhamnous 
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhanmous 
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus 
?Antidotus 
I I I 
I X * 
I X * 
X 
355/4 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
{Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone 
Included by Develin, but Lewis dates the inscription (IG 
ii^ 150) to the fifth century (see Homblower Mausolus 
217 n. 291), and, given the uncertainties in restoring the 
names, it is best left out of account. He was certainly a 
presbeutes (Dem. 24.12-3).} 
I l l 
{VII} 
354/3 
?AIcimachus of Anagyrous 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
I 
I I I 
353/2 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele I I I 
352/1 
Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe V I 
351/0 
tCharidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae 
See main discussion 120-1. 
V I 
350/49 
t?Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Achamae 
See main discussion 120-1. 
Ephialtes 
V I 
349/8 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Hegesileus ?of Probalinthus 
I I I * 
I I I * 
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tCharidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae V I 
See main discussion 120-1. 
Phodon son of Phocus 
348/7 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 111 
?Molossus (Molottus) 
347/6 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele I I I 
Phaedrus son of Callias of Sphettus V 
Proxenus son of Harmodius of Aphidna IX 
346/5 
No known strategoi for this year 
345/4 
Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae V I 
?Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna IX 
344/3 
Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae V I 
?Phocion son of Phocus 
343/2 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 111 
Diopeithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium I V 
Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae V I 
Phodon son of Phocus 
342/1 
Diopeithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium I V 
Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna IX 
341/0 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 111 
Diopeithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium I V 
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Phodon son of Phocus 
? C a l l i a s 
340/39 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna 
tPhodon son of Phocus 
The Athenians sent Phocion and Cephisophon to the 
Hellespont. Leon of Byzantium was an acquaintance of 
Phocion's from Plato's Academy, and Phocion and his men 
were admitted to the city (Plut. Phoc. 14.6-8; IG ii^ 
1628.436-438, 1629.957-59; [Plut.] Vitae X Orat. 851 a;. 
Tritle (Phocion the Good 52-3, cf. 92-3) says: "The key 
factor in Byzantium's defense [against Philip] was the 
bond of friendship between Phodon and Leon"; cf. Sealey 
Demosthenes and His Time 188. 
I l l 
IX 
339/8 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Proxenus son of Harmodius of Aphidna 
Phodon son of Phocus 
?Protomachus 
II I 
IX 
338/7 
Diotimus son of Dieitrephes of Euonymon 
Chares son of Theochares of Angele 
Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae 
Stratocles ?of Laciadae 
?Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe 
[ ]T[—] from tribe VI 
Lysicles 
Phodon son of Phocus 
I 
I I I 
VI*1 
V I * 
vr 
V I * 
^ Although only Charidemus is sure here, we probably have double, if not triple 
representation from tribe VI. The change seems to have taken place after 357/6 but before the 
time of the Ath. Pol. (see 61.1). It is quite possible that this year may postdate the change 
from tribal representation, and that what we have is literally four generals elected from the 
same tribe. 
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337/6 
Diotimus son of Dieitrephes of Euonymon 
Spartan Non- Royal Commands 
Nauarchoi^ 
Summer 430-Winter 429/8 
Cnemus PL 448 
Stunmer 428-Siunmer 427 
Alcidas PL 62 
Summer 425 
Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles PL 378 
Winter 413/12 
Melanchridas PL 517 
Summer 412-Summer 411 
Astyochus PL 169 
Summer 411-Stimmer 410 
Mindarus 
(Hippocrates ejaoToX£i3<;) 
PL 536 
PL 391 
1 On the regularity and tenure of the appointment, see Sealey Klio 58 (1976) 335-58; 
Bommelaer Lysandre de Sparte 66-79; Homblower Comm. 349; Andrewes H C T 4.38; 5.454-5. 
For Nauarchoi earlier than 408,1 simply give the dates for which they are attested in terms 
of Thucydidean years. When the source reference is dted in PL I give sources references only 
when necessary for the discussion. I have based my list, for the most part, upon the list of 
Pareti, though I do not always agree vnth all his dates or assignments, 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year. 
?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed 
in that year. 
{} enclose those generals included by Pareti, but who I believe should be omitted. 
Unfortunately, limitations of space prevent full discussion of all the "suitable" appointments. 
The most noteworthy examples are discussed at Chapter Four 147-51. 
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410/9 
?Pasippidasl PL 591 
408/7 (Sealey)2 
Autumn 409-Spring 407 (Bommelaer) 
Cratesippidas PL 456 
407/6 
Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504 
406/5 
Call icrat idas PL 408 
(?Clearchus emaxoAeii^ PL 425 
406/5 
{?Eteonicus PL 283 
Tentatively included by Pared (74), but he was in 
command of troops, not of the fleet.} 
405/4 
Aracus^ PL 107 
(tLysanderasejaaxoX£i3<; PL 504 
See main discussion 153,155 and Chapter Five 209-10.) 
404/3 
Libys PL 490 
403/2 
{?Panthoidas PL 585 
Induded tentatively by Pareti (83), but the emphasis is on 
him commanding troops (Diod. 14.12.6).} 
^ Provisionally included by Pareti (59,124), and he may well have been Nauarchos since 
Cratesippidas was sent to command the fleet which Pasippidas had collected from the 
allies, though Xenophon does not give him any title. 
2 On the dating for the Nauarchy, see 333 n. 1. 
3 His position was only nominal. Lysander held the command (Xen. Hell. 2.1.7). 
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402/1 
Samius/Pythagoras^ PL 659 
401/0 
Anaxibius PL 86 
400/399 
Polus PL 653 
398/7 
Pharax PL 718 
397/6 
Archelaidas PL 146 
396/5 
Pollis PL 621 
395/4 
Cheiricrates PL 758 
{Peisander PL 601 
This was a special position appointed by the king (who 
himself had been given command over the fleet and the 
power to appoint whomever he thought best (Xen. Hell. 
3.4.27,29)) and not a regular nauarchy. Xenophon does not 
always discriminate between his use of vaiSapxoq meaning 
the regular office of Nauarchos, and his use when simply 
referring to the commander of a contingent of ships.} 
393/2 
Podanemus PL 616 
(Pollis £7aaToA£TS<;) PL 621 
(Herippidas)2 PL 349 1 See Pareti 84; Poralla suggests that the Pythagoras mentioned at Xen. Anab. 1.4.2 is the 
same man as Samius under a pseudonym. 
2 Assumed the command of the fleet on the death of Podanemus (Xen. Hell. 4.8.11). 
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392/1 
?Cheilon (see Athenian Strategoi above under 396/5 n. 1) cf. PL 535 
391/0 
Ecdicus^ PL 256 
(Philodocus [=Philodicus] PL 726 
Perhaps he was emcxolzyy;; see Diod. 14.97.3; cf. Xen. 
Hell. 4.8.20-1; Pareti 128.) 
390/89 
Teleutias^ PL 689 
389/88 
Hierax PL 383 
(Gorgopas e7aatoX£v<;) PL 193 
388/7 
tAntalcidas PL 97 
Anta lc idas was appointed Nauarchos, as the 
Lacedaemonians thought this would gratify (xctptCeoGca) 
Tiribazus. See Chapter Five 213-4. 
(Nicolochus 87aaToX£U(;) PL 564 
387/6 
{Teleutias PL 689 
Induded here by Pareti (see 101), and Xenophon calls him 
vavapxoc, (Xen. Hell. 5.1.13). There seem to be two 
possibilities: either he held the command for a second 
time, despite the prohibition on this (see Xen. Hell. 
2.1.7; compare PoUis, though see Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26 
1 See Pareti 100. 
2 Since he was sent to take over from Ecdicus, who is called vaxHipxoq (Xen. Hell. 4.8.20), and 
is replaced in the next year by Hierax, who is also given the title of vauapxoq (Xen. Hell. 
5.1.3), I think we should assume that he was the Nauarchos for this year, despite the 
difficulties of Xen. Hell. 5.1.13 contra Pareti (100-1) who regards Teleutias here as holding a 
spedal office, and would place his nauarchy in 387/6; Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 272 n. 14) 
would like to make him tiie Nauarchos in 392/1. It is possible, since he took over the ships 
from Herippidas (who assumed the command on the death of Podanemus), but I think this 
year is more likely. 
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(1976) 272 n. 14) on this), the first time being probably in 
390/89 (see note there); or this use of vavapxoq does not 
refer to the annual regular command (see also entry on 
Peisander in 395/4). As there are difficulties with 
chronology and overlapping with Antalcidas (see 
Cawkwel l loc. cit.) then this second possibility seems 
more likely.} 
376/5 
PoUisl ?PL 621 
375/4 
Nicolochus PL 564 
374/3 
?Aristocrates2 PL 128 
?Alcidas PL 63 
373/2 
Miwsippus PL 538 
(Hypermenes ejaoxoX.ud<tx)po(;) PL 711 
^ He is apparently serving for his second year as Nauarchos (see also 396/5), though 
Cawkwell thinks they may be different men with the same name (Cawkwell CQ n.s. 26 
(1976) 272 n. 14). 
2 See esp. Pareti 106-7. One, or possibly both, of these was not the annually appointed 
Nauarchos. Pareti says {ibid. 107): "forse n^ I'uno nk I'altro furoni navarcW, ma due dud 
straordinari e probabilmente armosti; ma si pu6 anche supporre che uno di essi, e 
preferibilmente il primo, Aristocrate, sia stato il navarco del 374/3, e che Alcida fosse un duce 
straordinario." 
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Harmosts & Archons^ 
Summer 431 
Brasidas son of TeUis PL 177 
Winter 428-Summer 427 
(Salaethus)2 PL 657 
Autumn 426-Winter 426/5 
Eurylochus PL 329 
(Macarius PL 508 
Second-in-command (Th. 3.100.2)) 
(Menedaius PL 526 
Third-in-command (Th. 3.100.2); on the death of 
Eurylochus and Macarius, he took up the apxA (Th-
3.109.1)) 
Summer 425 
Epitadas son of Melobrius PL 275 
(Hippagretas PL 386 
Second-in-command (Th. 4.38.1)) 
(St3^hon son of Pharax PL 675 
Third-in-command, but assumed the leadership since 
Epitadas was dead and Hippagretas wounded (Th. 
4.38.1)) 
Sxunmer 424 
Tantalus son of Patrocles PL 684 
^ I have attempted to collect all those holding non-royal commands, whether of expeditions, 
garrisons or small squadrons of ships. When evidence is cited in PL, I give source references 
only when necessary for the discussion of a problem. I have consulted the lists and discussions 
of Pareti, Parke iJHS 50 (1930) 37-79) and Bockisch {Klio 46 (1965) 129-239), and compiled 
my own list on the basis of these. Years are calculated for Thucydidean years in summers and 
winters, and I have tried to maintain this as far as possible throughout the succeeding years. 
OrJy the First-in-command is included in the statistics, though I have included the names of 
the Second- and Third-in-command where they are known. OrJy the original appointment of 
the archon/harmost is included in the statistics. I will indicate when a command is continuing 
into subsequent years. 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
2 Not a commander of troops, but he was in charge at Mytilene; compare Gylippus at Syracuse; 
see Parke/HS 50 (1930) 43. 
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fBrasidas son of Tellis 
See main discussion 147-8. 
PL 177 
Summer 423 
tBrasidas son of Tellis [continuation] 
See main discussion 147-8. 
Polydamidas 
Qearidas son of Qeonymus 
fPasitelidas son of Agesander 
The archon of Torone (Th. 4.132.3; 5.3.1-2); Agesandridas, 
who was probably his brother (Th. 8.91.2; Gomme H C T 
1.451; P L (see under Pasitelidas and Agesandridas); on 
Agesander, see Th. 1.139.3) also held a command on the 
Thradan coast (Xen. Hell. 1.3.17; see under summer 408). 
This may be merely coincidental, but it may suggest 
family connections in the Thraceward parts. 
PL 177 
PL 626 
PL 424 
PL 592 
Sxunmer 422 
tBrasidas son of Tellis [continuation] 
See main discussion 147-8. 
Qearidas son of Qeonymus [continuation] 
tPasitelidas son of Agesander [continuation] 
See discussion above imder 423. 
PL 177 
PL 424 
PL 592 
Summer 421 
Qearidas son of Qeonymus [continuation] PL 424 
Winter 420/19 
tXenares son of Cnidis 
He was involved with the Boeotians during his ephorate 
of 421 (Th. 5.36.1, 37.1, 38.3, 46.4; Plut. Nic. 10.8); 
harmost of Heracleia Trachinia in 420 (Th. 5.51.2). The 
Boeotians had an interest in Heracleia Trachinia as 
evidenced in their expulsion of the harmost of 419, 
Hagesippidas (Th. 5.52.1). There is a possibility he was 
selected for this command because of his Boeotian 
sympathies in what was evidently a sensitive area. 
PL 567 
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Summer 419 
Hagesippidas (= Agesippidas [Th. 5.56.1]) PL 16 
Winter 415/4 
(Gylippus son of Cleandridas)^ PL 196 
Summer 414 
(Gylippus son of Qeandridas) [continuation] 
Eccritus 
PL 196 
PL 258 
Summer 413 
Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas 
Melanthus 
PL 57 
PL 518 
Winter 413/2 
Chalcideus PL 743 
Slimmer 412 
fClearchus son of Ramphias 
See main discussion 149-50. 
Eualas 
Deiniadas (one of the perioeci) 
tEteonicus 
See main discussion 151. 
tPedaritus son of Leon 
A Leon took over the command of Pedaritus at Chios in 
411. Thucydides does not point out a family connection, 
and Leon is too common a name for it to be sure. Poralla 
sees the connection as possible, but Andrewes (HCT 5.69) 
thinks it unlikely. Lewis {S&P 35 n. 65) doubts that this 
Leon is the father of Pedaritus, as do Whitehead (LCM 4 
(1979) 192) and Cartledge Oi^gsz/aos 145). 
Philippus 
Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas 
Thermon 
PL 425 
PL 291 
PL 221 
PL 283 
PL 599 
PL 725 
PL 57 
PL 366 
1 "On loan" to the Syracusaits against the Athenians. He remained v^th the Syracusans for 
the duration of their war against the Athenians (see Parke JHS 50 (1930) 43^). 
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?Therimenes PL 371 
Winter 412/1 
Hippocrates 
Antisthenes 
PL 391 
PL 104 
Summer 411 
tClearchus son of Ramphias 
See main discussion 149-50. 
tDercylidas 
See main discussion 150-1. 
tLeon ?son of Anticleidas 
See entry for Pedaritus under 412. 
Agesandridas son of Agesander (=Hegesandridas son of 
Hegesander) 
Hippocrates 
Epicles 
PL 425 
PL 228 
PL 482 
PL 5 
PL 391 
PL 269 
Summer 410 
tEteorucus 
See main discussion 151. 
t?Clearchus son of Ramphias 
See main discussion 149-50. 
PL 283 
PL 425 
Winter 409/8 
Labotas PL 461 
Summer 408 
tClearchus son of Ramphias 
See main discussion 149-50. 
Hippocrates 
fAgesandridas 
See entry under Pasitelidas in Summer 423. 
PL 425 
PL 391 
PL 5 
Summer 407 (Nauarchy of Lysander) 
tDercylidas 
See main discussion 150-1. 
PL 228 
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Summer 406 
Eteonicus 
(Dexippus)^ 
PL 283 
PL 227 
Summer 405 
Thorax 
t?Eteonicus 
See main discussion 151. 
Sthenelaus 
PL 380 
PL 283 
PL 665 
Summer 404 
Thorax 
Aristus [Aretes] 
PL 380 
PL 135 
Winter 404/3 
Callibius PL 405 
Slunmer 403 
Lysander son of Aristocritus 
?Panthoidas2 
PL 504 
PL 585 
Summer 401 
{?Eteonicus 
Pareti indudes him here, but he was not a commander, but 
served in some subordinate position to the Nauarchos, 
Anaxibius (Xen. Anab. 7.1.12,20.} 
Cleander 
PL 283 
PL 422 
Siunmer 400 
Aristarchus 
Cyniscus 
Bion 
Naucleidas 
Polynicus 
Charminus 
PL 117 
PL 460 
PL 174 
PL 550 
PL 630 
PL 750 
^ Seems to be "on loan" to the Syracusans (Diod. 13.93.1-4); see Gylippus above. He was sent 
back to Sparta in spring 405. 
2 Sent to Byzantium against Clearchus; see also Spartan Nauarchoi under this year. 
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Summer 399 
Thibron 
tDercylidas 
See main discussion 150-1. 
?tHerippidas 
Sent to Heracleia Trachinia to restore order (Diod. 
14.38.4-5); one of the harmosts in Thebes in the period 
during which the Spartans held the Cadmeia (Plut. 
Pelop. 12-3); given Theban interests in Heracleia 
Trachinia (see on Xenares son of Cnidis under 420/19), 
there is a possibility that his selection to both these 
commands was the results of some Theban connection. 
PNicander 
PL 374 
PL 228 
PL 349 
PL 556 
Summer 398 
tDercylidas [continuation] 
See main discussion 150-1. 
Lysippus 
PL 228 
PL 506 
Winter 398/7 
Dracon of Pellene 
Summer 397 
Milon^ 
tDercylidas [continuation] 
See main discussion 150-1. 
PL 535 
PL 228 
Summer 396 
Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504 
Summer 395 
?Alcisthenes (= Lacisthenes) 
?Pancalus2 
PL 467 
PL 584 
^ Harmost at Aegina. See Athenian Strategoi 321 n. 1 for Milon possibly = to Cheilon of 
Aeschin. 2.78, but I think not. 
2 See Parke JHS 50 (1930) 67. 
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Summer 394 
tDercylidas PL 228 
See main discussion 150-1. 
Euxenus PL 310 
393 
?Alexanderl PL 50 
Summer 391 
Thibron PL 374 
Diphridas2 PL 243 
tDercylidas [continuation] PL 228 
See main discussion 150-1. 
Teleutias PL 689 
Summer 390 
Therimachus PL 370 
tDercylidas [continuation] PL 228 
See main discussion 150-1. 
?Phylopidas3 PL 739 
Summer 389 
Anaxibius PL 86 
Winter 389/8 
?Eteonicus PL 283 
Goigopas PL 193 
1 Bockisch places him here (Klio 46 (1965) 218 n. 6), tiiough Parke (/HS 50 (1930) 68) 
places him in 392/1 and PL in 391. 
^ Replaced Thibron when he was killed (Xen. Hell. 4.8.19). 
3 Bockisch places him here (Klio 46 (1965) 218 n. 6), tiiough Parke (/HS 50 (1930) 68) 
places him in 393. 
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Summer 382 
?tEudamidas PL 295 
Whether one accepts the order of Xenophon or Diodorus 
(Xen. Hell. 5.2.24-5; Diod. 15.19.3, 20.1-3), both 
Eudamidas and his brother, Phoebidas, commanded 
troops for Olynthus in this year. It is perhaps suggestive 
of some kind of connection, though this is by no means sure. 
?tPhoebidas PL 734 
See on Eudamidas above. 
Teleutias PL 689 
Summer 380 
Polybiades PL 625 
Winter 379/8 
Sphodrias PL 680 
Period during which the Spartans held the Cadmeia (382-379) 
?tHerippidas PL 349 
See above on 399. 
Ardssus PL 142 
Lysanoridas PL 505 
Summer 378 
Phoebidas PL 734 
Summer 377 
Alcetas PL 59 
Theripides PL 372 
Panthoidas PL 585 
375 
Ischolaus PL 401 
Summer 371 
Hieron PL 384 
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Winter 370/69 
Ischolaus PL 401 
Slimmer 369 
Polytropus PL 633 
Winter 367/6 
?Naucles PL 549 
Before 371 
Euphratas Aen. Tact. 27.7 
Military Commanders of other States^ 
Arcadia 
Simimer 427 
Hippias Th. 3.34.3 
Arcadian Federation 
369/8 
Lycomedes Diod. 15.62.1 
366/5 
Aeneas (Stymphalian)^ Xen. Hell. 7.3.1 
Argos 
Summer 418 
Thrasyllus Th. 5.59.5 
366 
Peisias Xen. He//. 7.1.41 
1 This is not an exhaustive search of all possible texts, but I have attempted to collect all 
conunanders of states other than Athens and Sparta from the major sources and as many others 
as I have come across in my reading. 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
2 On his probable status as president of the Arcadian Federation, see Underbill Comm. 289. 
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?344 (but Diodorus' year 351/0) 
Nicostratus Diod. 16.44.2 
Ceos (lulis) 
362 
Echetimus /G i i ^ 111.15-7 (= 
Tod 142) 
Nicoleu[s] IG i i ^ 111.15-7 (= 
Tod 142) 
S[a]tyrus IG i i ^ 111.15-7 (= 
Tod 142) 
Glaucon IG i i ^ 111.15-7 (= 
Tod 142) 
Heracleides IG i i ^ 111.15-7 (= 
Tod 142) 
Chaonia 
Sxunmer 429 
Photius Th. 2.80.5 
Nicanor Th. 2.80.5 
Chios 
Summer 412 
Eubulus Th. 823.4 
Corcyra 
432 
Miciades T j , j 47 j 
Aesimides Tl^ I 471 
Euiybatus Th. 1.47.1 
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Corinth 
435 
Aristeus son of PeUichus Th. 1.29.2 
Callicrates son of Callias Th. 129.2 
Timanor son of Timanthes Th. 1.29.2 
Archetimus son of Eurytimus Th. 1.29.2 
Isarchidas son of Isarchus Th. 1.29.2 
432 
Xenocleides son of Euthycles Th. 1.46.2 
tAristeussonof Adeimantiis Th. 1.60.2 
See main discussion 158-9. 
Winter 431/0 
Euphamidas son of Aristonomus Th. 2.33.1 
Timoxenus son of Timocrates Th. 2.33.1 
Eumachus son of Chrysis Th. 2.33.1 
Summer 429 
Machaon Th. 2.83.4 
Isocrates Th. 2.83.4 
Agatharchidas Th. 2.83.4 
Summer 425 
Battus Th. 4.43.1 
Lycophron Th. 4.43.1 
Summer 414 
Pythen Th. 6.104.1, 7.1.1 
Gongyius Th. 7.2.1 
Erasinides Th. 7.7.1 
Alexarchus Th. 7.19.4 
Summer 413 
Polyanthes Th. 7.34.2 
Pythen Th. 7.70.1 
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404 
Nicoteles Diod. 14.10.3 
Summer 394 
Agathinus (Nauarchos) Xen. Hell. 4.8.10 
Summer 393 
Proaenus {Nauarchos) Xen. Hell. 4.8.11 
Italian Load 
Winter 426/5 
Proxenus son of Capaton^ Th. 3.103.3 
Slimmer 425 
Demoteles Th. 4.25.11 
Megara 
Summer 411 
Helixus Th. 8.80.3 
Summer 408 
Helixus Xen. He//. 1.3.15, 
17,21 
Phods^ 
356 
Philomelus Diod. 16.23.1, 24.1 
355 
Philomelus Diod. 16.28.1 
^ See Homblower Comm. 516-7. 
2 Accepting Hammond's chronology for the Third Sacred War: ]HS 17 (1937) 44-77 (= 
Studies in Greek History 486-533). For a shghtly different chronology, see Buckler Philip 11 
and the Sacred War. 
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354 
Philomelus (killed: Diod. 16.31.4) Diod. 16.30.1 
Onomarchus Diod. 16.31.5 
353 
Onomarchus Diod. 16.33.2 
352 
Onomarchus (killed: Diod. 16.35.6) Diod. 16.35.2 
Phayllus Diod. 16.36.1 
351 
Phayllus (killed: Diod. 16.38.6) Diod. 16.38.2 
350 
Phalaecus Diod. 16.38.6, 39.8 
Mnaseas (guardian of Phalaecus) Diod. 16.38.6 
348/7 
Phalaecus (deposed) Diod. 16.56.3 
347 
Deinocrates Diod. 16.56.3 
Callias Diod. 16.56.3 
Sophanes Diod. 16.56.3 
346/5 
Phalaecus Diod. 16.59.2-3 (cf. 
Aeschin. 2.142) 
Santos 
Summer 406 
Hippeus Xen. He//. 1.6.29 
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Sicyon 
Summer 414 
Sargeus Th. 7.19.4 
3681 
tEuphron 
Euphron and his son, Adeas, were elected commanders 
under the new regime sponsored by the Argives and 
Arcadians, probably because of his new Argive and 
Arcadian connections (see Chapter Three 82-3). 
Hippodamus 
Cleander 
Acrisius 
Lysander 
t Adeas son of Euphron 
See above on Euphron. 
Xen. He//. 7.1.45; 
Diod. 15.70.3 
Xen. He//. 7.1.45 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.45 
Xen. He//. 7.1.45 
Xen. He//. 7.1.45 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.45 
Syracuse 
Winter 415/4 
Hermocrates 
Heracleidas son of Lysimachus 
Sicanus son of Execestus 
Th. 6.73.1, 96.3 
Th. 6.73.1 
Th. 6.73.1 
Summer 414 
Hermocrates^ Th. 6.99.2 
Heracleides ?son of Aristogenes^ 
Eucles 
Tellias 
Th. 6.103.4 
Th. 6.103.4 
Th. 6.103.4 
Summer 413 
Agatharchus Th. 7.25.1, 70.1 
1 With Buckler {The Theban Hegemony 243), I am following Diodorus' dating rather than 
Xenophon's. 
^ The original generals, including Hermocrates, were deposed on account of their defeat at 
Epipolae and three new generals were elected (Th. 6.103.4). 
3 For Heracleides' patronymic, see Dover HCT 4.376. 
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Sicanus son of Execestus Th. 7.46, 70.1 
Summer 412 
Hermocrates Th. 8.26.1 
Summer 411^  
Hermocrates Th. 8.85.3 
Potamis son of Gnosis Th. 8.85.3 
Myscon son of Meneaates Th. 8.85.3 
Demarchus son of Epicydes Th. 8.85.3 
Summer 409 
Eucles son of Hippon Xen. Hell. 1.2.8 
Heracleides son of Aristogenes Xen. He//. 1.2.8 
372 
Crinippus Xen. Hell. 6.2.36 
368 
Cissidas Xen. Hell. 7.1.28 
Thebes^ 
431 
Pythangelus son of Phyleidas (Boeotarch) Th. 2.2.1 
Diemp)oros son of Ontoridas (Boeotarch) Th. 2.2.1 
Winter 424/3 
Pagondas son of Aeoladas Th. 4.91.1 
Arianthadas son of Lysimachidas Th. 4.91.1 
11 am following Andrewes (HCT 5.281-5), who defends Thucydides in putting Hermocrates' 
deposition here, though some think Thucydides has anticipated. Xenophon puts the 
deposition after Cyzicus in 410 (see Xen. Hell. 1.1.27, 29). 
2 I indicate the use of "Boeotarch" and "strategos" in the sources; usually, if not always, men 
designated strategoi will in fact be boeotarchs. 
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Summer 413 
Xenon Th. 7.19.3 
Nicon Th. 7.19.3 
Scirphondas (Boeotarch) Th. 7.30.3 
Sximmer 408 
Coeratadas (apztov) Xen. Hell. 1.3.15, 
22 
371 
Epameinondas {strategos) Diod. 15.52.1 
370 
Pelopidas (Boeotarch) Diod. 15.62.4 
Epameinondas (Boeotarch) Diod. 15.62.4 
369 
Epameinondas Diod. 15.68.1. 
368 
Pelopidas Diod. 15.71.2 
Epameinondas^ Diod. 15.71.6 
367 
Epameinondas Diod. 15.75.2; Plut. 
Pelop. 29.1 
366 
Epameinondas Xen. Hell. 7.1.41 
364 
Pelopidas Diod. 15.80.2 
362 
Epameinondas {strategos) Xen. Hell. 7.4.40 
1 He was serving as a private soldier, but was elected by the men as strategos when Pelopidas 
was captured. 
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Pammenes (strategos) Diod. 15.94.2 
353 
Pammenes (strategos) Diod. 16.34.2 
351 
Cephision (strategos) Diod. 16.39.2 
?344 (but Diodorus' year 351/0) 
Lacrates (strategos) Diod. 16.44.2 
?343 (but Diodorus' year 350/49) 
Lacrates Diod. 16.47.2 
Note: 1. Diodorus (under the year 375/4) says that Pelopidas, Gorgidas (or Gorgias) and 
Epameinondas were the most famous of the Theban hegemones and strategoi (Diod. 15.39.2; cf. 
15.50.6); 
2. Plutarch writes that Pelopidas was elected to a command every year, either as 
leader of the sacred band, or as one of the boeotarchs (Plut. Pelop. 15.4-5). 
Thespiae 
Summer 413 
Hegesander Th. 7.19.3 
Thurii 
Winter 412/1 
Dorieus son of Diagoreus Th. 8.35.1 
See Chapter Three 87-8. 
Winter 411/0 
Dorieus son of Diagoreus Xen. Hell. 1.1.2 
Winter 407/6 
Dorieus son of Diagoreus Diod. 13.385 
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430/29 
Learchus son of Callimachus 
Ameiniades son of Philemon 
426/5 
Leogo[ras] 
[Plleistias 
?Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe V I 
?Megacles son of Megacles of Alopece X 
TTheorus 
424/3 
{Agac[les?] 
Included by Develin, but he must be an ambassador of 
Halieis, not of Athens, see Appendix D: Oath-takers 
under 424/3 (the alliance between Athens and Halieis). 
Note also that JG i ^ 75 only restores the X, and three more 
letters seem to be required.} 
Aristonymus 
Epilycus son of Teisander 
1 Again, this list is based upon that of Develin {Officials), and, since my primary purpose is 
to identify those ambassadors whose appointment may have depended on their personal 
connections, I have othervnse restricted comments for the most part to those cases where I 
disagree with Devehn's assignment to a particular year. Refer to Develin throughout for 
discussion and references. For a discussion of trends in ambassadorial appointments at Athens, 
see especially Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 55-62. 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year. 
?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed 
in that year. 
{} enclose those presbeis included by Develin, but who I believe should be omitted. 
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423/2 
Amynias son of Pronapes ?of Prasiae I I I 
Phaeax son of Erisistratus of Acharnae V I 
422/1 
?Procles of ?Euonymon or ?Cephisia 
Andrewes and Lewis (JHS 77 (1957) 177-80) suggest that 
these ten men were the negotiating team for the peace and 
alliance (see also Diod. 12.75.4). However Nicias and 
Laches, who were oath-takers and whom Andrewes and 
Lewis consider to be representatives from the board of 
generals, are said by Thucydides to have negotiated the 
treaty (Th. 5.43.2). 1 am ready to believe that they were 
representatives of the ten tribes (though 1 take Develin's 
warning that the deme/tribe attributions were made up to 
show tribal order and that there are other possibilities), 
but less ready to accept that they were also the embassy 
of ten that negotiated the peace and the alliance. Note 
that Develin lists these men as oath-takers rather than 
as ambassadors. 
?Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae 
?Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria 
?Myrtilus ?son of Lysis 
?Thrasycles 
?Theogenes (?Theagenes) ?of Acharnae 
?Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia 
?Iolcius 
?Timocrates 
?Leon 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V I 
V I I 
420/19 
tNicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
See main discussion 162. 
I I 
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419/8 
tAlcibiades son of Qeinias of Scambonidae IV 
Ambassador to Argos. For his Argive connections, see 
Chapter Four 118-9. 
415/4 
Euphemus 
412/1 
Peisander son of Glaucetes of Achamae V I 
These were two separate missions: one to Athens from the 
fleet at Samos (Th. 8.49); and one to Tissaphemes and 
Alcibiades from the Athenians (Th. 8.54.2). 
Peisander son of Glaucetes of Achamae V I 
See above. 
411 (the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred) 
Laespodias son of Andronymis V I I I 
Melesias son of Thucydides of Alopece X 
Aristophon 
t Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus of Agryle I 
Appealed for peace with Sparta after Pylos (Ar. Knights 
794; cf. Peace 665-6); a member of the 400, he was an 
envoy to Sparta in this year. 
Phrynichus son of Stratonides of Deiradiotae I V 
Onomacles ?of tribe V m V I I I 
On Tribe, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 310 n. 1. 
t Antiphon ?son of Lysonides 
Plutarch {Mor. 832 f-833 a) says that Antiphon was sent 
on every embassy to Sparta during the period of the 400. 
This at least demonstrates a consistency in the 
appointment. 
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409/8 
tEuryptolemus ?son of Peisianax ?of Sunium^ IV 
He received the oaths of Pharnabazus on Alcibiades' 
behalf for that man's private friendship with the 
Persian (Xen. Hell. 1.3.12; cf. Thompson TAPA 100 (1969) 
586 n. 21); then was part of the embassy which 
accompanied Phamabazus to the Persian King (Xen. Hell. 
1.3.13). 
Dorotheus 
Philocydes 
Theogenes 
Mantitheus 
405/4 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria 111 
These should be treated as two separate missions: one to 
Lysander (Xen. Hell. 2.2.16); and one to the ephors (Xen. 
Hell. 2.2.17). 
Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria I I I 
See above. 
404/3 
Aeschines ?of tribe VII^ V I I 
For tribe, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 310 n. 1. 
^ As Krentz notes, this was presumably the cousin of Aldbiades (Krentz Comm. 121). The 
difficulty is that the embassy, according to Xenophon, did not return for three years (Xen. 
He//. 1.4.7), so would have been unable to be a member of the group that greeted Alcibiades 
on his return to Athens, as Euryptolemus, the cousin of Alcibiades, did (Xen. Hell. 1.4.19). 
Krentz finds the emendation (see Andrewes JHS 73 (1953) 2 n. 1) of \xi\v&:; for eviauxoi very 
attractive: "Only by changing the text can we have Mantitheos back in the Hellespont by 408 
(l.lOn.) and Euryptolemos back in Athens by 407 (3.12 n.)" (127), though Davies (APF 377), 
following the chronology of Beloch (G.G.2 I I 2.274) and Ferguson (CAH V 483-4), claims that 
"Euryptolemus could have returned from Persia well before Alkibiades reached Athens." The 
point is, given that Alcibiades had just exchanged oaths with Phamabazus (Xen. Hell. 
1.3.12), Euryptolemus, the presbeutes, whether he was the cousin of Aldbiades or not, was one 
of Alcibiades' men. His selection may well have been based upon this double connection: his 
friendship with Alcibiades, who, in turn had a friendship with Phamabazus. 
2 Develin does not include Aeschines or his colleague Aristoteles among the presbeis for this 
year (though see Kienast RE Supp. 13 col. 599). This is presumably on the grounds that they 
were members of the Thirty. They are not called presbeis, but since their mission, to persuade 
Lysander to send a garrison, was ambassadorial, they should be included here. 
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tAristoteles ?son of Timocrates of Thorae 
Athenian exile with Lysander; then on the accession of 
the Thirty, sent by them to Lysander to ask for a garrison 
(Xen. He//. 2.2.18). 
Cephisophon ?of Paeania 
Meletus 
I I I 
435-404 (tinable to be precisely dated) 
None 
403/2 
Philon of Coele V I I I 
397/6 
Telesagorus ?of Collytus^ 
Hagnias ?son of Polemon of Oeon 
I I 
IV 
394/3 
?Epicrates of Cephisia 
?Phormisius 
t?Aristophanes son of Nicophemus 
See main discussion 163. 
t?Eunomus 
OiXoc; and ^evoq to Dionysus of Syracuse, to whom the 
embassy was sent (Lysias 19.19). 
?Euripides ?son of Adeimantus of Myrrhinous I I I 
393/2 
Dion ?of Lamptrae 
1 On the date of this embassy, see also now Harding Androtion and the Atthis 113. 
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tConon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus 
Commanded fleet of Greek mercenaries under 
Pharnabazus (see also Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 
367/6 [Timotheus]) from 398 (Diod. 14.39.1-4) to 393; after 
his return to Atheits he was sent on this embassy to the 
Persian, Tiribazus [Xen. Hell. 4.8.13] (who seized and 
imprisoned him [Xen. Hell. 4.8.16]); in all likelihood he 
was sent on this embassy because he was one of the few 
Athenians ever to deal successfully with a Persian. 
Hermogenes 
Callisthenes 
Callimedon 
392/1 
Epicrates of Cephisia 
Andoddes son of Leagoras of Cydathenaevun 
Cratinus of ?Sphettus 
Eubulides son of Epideides of Eleusis 
I 
I I I 
V 
V I I I 
390/89 
t Aristophanes son of Nicophemus 
See main discussion 163. 
387/6 
t?Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece 
See main discussion 163-4. 
384/3 
Cephalus of CoUytus 
Aesimu[s] 
Democleides 
I I 
Athenion of Araphen 
Hermippus of Poms 
Phaenippus of Azenia 
Thrasycles of Pallene 
N[ic]ostratus of Thorae 
I I 
V 
V I I I 
X 
X 
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378/7 
Alcimachus son of Cephisius of Angele 
Orthobulus of Cerameis 
Xenodocus of Achamae 
Execestides of Pallene 
Pyrrhander of Anaphlystus 
I I I 
V 
V I 
X 
X 
?Ae[si]mus 
fThrasybulus son of Thrason of CoUytus 
See main discussion 164. 
[A]ristoteles of Marathon 
fPyrrhander of Anaphlystus 
He is described by Aeschines as being "particularly 
intimate" with the Thebans (Aeschin. 3.138-9). 
I I 
IX 
X 
Theopompus 
375/4 
t?Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece 
See main discussion 164. 
X 
?[Democh]ares son of Demon of Paeania 
Not included by Develin, but see IG i i ^ 102.19 (= Tod 129). 
Tod places the embassy in either 375 or 373. 
372/1 
Strombichides ?of Euonymon^ 
Demostratus ?of Pandionis or Cytherrus 
Cephisodotus of Cerameis 
Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone 
Aristophon ?of Azenia 
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna (see n. 1 above) 
I 
I I or I I I 
V 
V I I 
V I I I 
IX 
11 am following here the emendation of the text suggested by Tuplin, that is, to keep 
XTpo^Pixi6ri(; of the MSS at Xen. Hell. 6.3.2 and emend' ApiaTO(t>covxo(; to ' ApiaTOcjxov. Among 
other things, if one keeps Callistratus as an ambassador, which I , with Tuplin and Mosley, 
see little reason to doubt, then we have a full complement of ten ambassadors for making 
peace (see main discussion 168). See Tuplin LCM 2 (1977) 51-6; Mosley PCPS n.s. 8 (1962) 
41-6. For demotics and possible ful l tribal representation, see Tuplin. 
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tCallias son of Hipponicus of Alopece X 
See main discussion 163-4. 
Aristocles 
Lycaethus 
Autocles 
368/7 
Autolyc[us] of Thoricus V 
T[i]monothus 
A[r]istopeithes 
Timagoras 
Leon 
361/0 
[Th]e[ae]tetus f r o m Erchia I I 
N o t included by Develin (but see Kienast RE Supp. 13 col. 
603). One of the ambassadors to Thessaly (Tod 147.45-6). 
?[Em]pedusofOe V I 
N o t dated by Develin. These ambassadors were concerned 
w i t h Thessaly; Bengtson (Staatsvertriige 257-8) dates 
this to 361/0; as does Hansen w i t h some hesitation 
{Ecclesiall 45 revised f rom GR&BS 24 (1983) 159). 
?Aeschine[s] 
See above on Empedus. 
403-360 (unable to be precisely dated) 
tAris tophon son Aristophanes of Azenia V I I I 
Of those noted by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.138-9) for Theban 
connections on embassies to Thebes. 
tLeodamas ?son of Eristratus of Acharnae V I 
See above on Aristophon. 
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tThrason of Erchia 
Thrason was 7rp6^evo(; of the Thebans (Aeschin. 3.138) and 
seems to have been one of those who helped the Theban 
exiles i n the recapture of the Cadmeia (Deinarchus 1.38). 
Aeschines includes h i m among those who had been on 
embassies to Thebes (Aeschin. 3.138-9), and this may 
have been i n 379. 
I I 
t?Demus son of Pyrilampes 
Demus' father, Pyrilampes, was a ^evo^ of the King of 
Persia, and was sent on at least one embassy to h im (Plato 
Charm. 158 a) and was possibly given a pair of peacocks 
(Plut. Per. 13.15; cf. Ant iphon ap. Athen. 9.397 c; see esp. 
Cartledge i n Notnos 41-61). MacDowell (Wasps 144) 
infers that Demus was later chosen for an embassy to the 
k ing on the grounds that he was presented w i t h a gold 
phiale (Lys. 19.25); see Badian JHS 107 (1987) 14. 
Callistratus son of Callicratidas of Aphidna IX 
Hagnias son of Polemon of Oeon I V 
358/7 
Ant iphon 
Charidemus 
357/6 
Peisianax ?of Sunium I V 
356/5 
[Thra]son of Erchia 
Lysicrates of Oenoe 
Antimachus 
I I 
V m or DC 
355/4 
Androtion son of Andron of Gargettus 
Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone 
I I 
V I I 
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Glaucetes 
?Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone 11 
He may have also been ambassador to Egypt i n this year 
(see Dem. 24.127), though Kienast (RE Supp. 13 col. 603) 
places this i n 371. 
348/7 
tCtesiphon 
He was sent to Philip to negotiate concerning the ransom 
for Phrynon (Aeschin. 2.12-3; cf. Dem. 19.12). 
tAristodemus of Metapontum 
Aeschines says that he was sent to Philip as ambassador 
6 id t f iv yvmcHV KOLI (jjiAavepaMdav Ti\q xixyj\<; (Aeschin. 
2.15). 
347/6 
Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothoddae V I 
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania^ I I I 
Philocrates son of Pythodorus of Hagnous^ V 
Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous V 
Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe V I 
Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae'^ V I 
Cimon ?of Laciadae V I 
1 This embassy served hvice on missions to the Macedonian court: the first embassy to 
negotiate wiih Phil ip for peace, and the second embassy to receive the oaths f r o m Philip. 
Since the first board of ambassadors was simply re-elected to serve again, I think i t is 
methodologically unsound to count them tv^ice. 
2 He probably received gif ts f r o m Phil ip on the first embassy (see Chapter Seven 270 n . 5,271 
& n. 1), so probably also became the <^i}x)q and ^evo<; of Philip. This was not a factor affecting 
his election to the second embassy, since the whole embassy was re-elected. 
^ Became the ^{TMC, and ^evoq of Philip after receiving gifts at the Macedonian court on the 
first embassy (see Chapter Seven 270-4), but see n. 2 above on Philocrates. 
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tPhrynon of Rhamnous 
Bought his ransom f r o m Macedonian pirates, then 
persuaded the Athenians to send Ctesiphon to seek 
reimbursement f r o m Phil ip; he sent his son to Macedon 
(Dem. 19.230). 
tlatrocles son of Pasiphon 
H e was an Athen ian prisoner taken by Phi l ip at 
Olynthus, then released without ransom to bring the news 
back to Athens that Philip wanted peace (Aeschin. 2.16). 
tCtesiphon 
See above on 348/7. 
t Aristodemus of Metapontum 
He seems to have been i n favour of Philip (see Aeschin. 
2.15,17), and was certainly sent on the mission to Philip 
i n 346 to make approaches concerning peace. 
I X 
346/5 
<Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania> 
Elected, but d i d not accept the appointment (Dem. 19.121-
2). 
Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous 
t<Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae>^ 
He was now the ^ikoq and ^evoc; of Phil ip; for the 
implications of this, see Chapter Seven 270-4. 
Aphobetus son of Atrometus of Cothocidae 
Stephanus ?son of Antorides of Eroeadae 
I I I 
V 
V I 
V I 
V I I I 
Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous 
t Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae 
See above. 
Stephanus ?son of Antorides of Eroeadae 
V 
V I 
V I I I 
345/4 
?Eucleides 
1 Aeschines, though elected, claimed he was i l l and d id not go; Aphobetus, his brother, went 
i n his place (see Aeschin. 2.94-5; Dem. 19.124). 
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344/3 
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania I I I 
(Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium 
Develin includes h im here, but I , w i t h Hansen (Ecclesia 
II 47 revised f r o m GR&BS 24 (1983) 161), place 
Hegesippus' mission in 343/2.) 
I V 
(Aristodemus of Metapontum 
If he is concerned wi th the epanorthosis and negotiations 
over Halonnesus as Develin conjectures, he should belong 
i n the fo l lowing year.} 
343/2 
Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium 
(344/3 Develin; see note there.) 
I V 
t?Aristodemus of Metapontum 
(344/3 Develin; see note there.) See 348/7. 
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania 
Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium 
Polyeuctus son of Sostratus of Sphettus 
Lycurgus son of Lycophron of Butadae 
?Cleitomachus 
I I I 
I V 
V 
V I 
341/0 
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania I I I 
Ephial tes 
?Hypereides son of Glaucippus of Collytus I I 
?Menelaus ?son of Menelochus of Myrrhinous I I I 
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339/8 
tDemosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania 
He was npo^evoc; of the Thebans (Aeschin. 2.141, 143); so 
an easy choice for this embassy to Thebes for an alliance. 
I l l 
338/7 
tDemades son of Demeas of Paeania 
Released by Philip after Chaeronea to bring the terms of 
peace back to Athens; maintained a pro-Macedonian 
policy (see Chapter Seven 266). 
I l l 
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania I I I 
t Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae 
See above on 346/5. 
V I 
?Hypereides son of Glaucippus of CoUytus 
360-336 (unable to be precisely dated) 
Euphrosynus of Paeania 
Before 350; see IG ifi 1128.39-40 (= Tod 162). 
Andron of Cerameis 
See above on Euphrosynus. 
I l l 
V 
t Archedemus of Peleces 
A m o n g those whom Aeschines says were intimate w i t h 
the Thebans and went on embassies to Thebes (Aeschin. 
3.138-9). Probably the nearest that his embassy can be 
dated is before Demosthenes' embassy to Thebes in 338/9. 
I V 
Pythodes son of Pythodorus 
N o t induded by Develin. Seems to have been sent on an 
embassy to Philip (see Dem. 19.225). 
Hypereides son of Glaucippus of CoUytus 
365 
Appendix C: Athenian Presbeis 
Aphobetus son of Atrometus of Cothocidae 
Mission to Persia sometime before 343. 
V I 
Timarchus son of Arizelus of Sphettus 
Served on a number of missions before 346/5. 
V 
{Phodon son of Phocus 
Included by Develin on the basis of Nepos Phoc. 1.3. This 
passage is generally taken to i m p l y an embassy for 
Phocion (see, for example, Tritle Phocion the Good 114), 
bu t I do not th ink this is r ight . The point is that 
Macedonian envoys are urging Phocion to receive gifts. 
Surely this impUes that the Macedonian envoys are i n 
Athens, rather than that Phocion is at the Macedonian 
court.} 
Spartan Presbeis^ 
433/2 
?Polyalces 
Probably to be dated soon after the Megarian decree: on 
the date of the decree, see Kagan Outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War 257-60. 
PL 623 
432/1 
Ramphias PL 654 
^ I have consulted Kienasf s list of Spartan ambassadors (RE Supp. 13 col. 619-27), but 
because of certain difficulties and irregiilarities w i t h this list, I have decided to compile my 
own. I have only included references where these cannot be found in Poralla (PL). Owing to 
the Hmitations of the thesis, I have, as elsewhere, normally included discussion only where 
the ambassador appears to have connections which influenced his selection, 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong i n that year. 
77 indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed 
i n that year. 
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tMelesippus son of Diacritas 
He was sent to Athens again by Archidamus to issue a 
f ina l warn ing (Th. 2.12.1), though this may have been as 
a keryx rather than a presbeutes. 
Agesander ( = ?Hegesander) 
PL 522 
PL 6 
Summer 431 
t?Melesippus son of Diacritas 
See above; he does not have a knovm connection wdth 
Athens, but this at least demonstrates a continuity of 
service to a particular state. 
PL 522 
Summer 430 
tAneristus son of Sperthias 
See main discussion 173. 
tNicolaus son of Bulis 
See main discussion 173. 
Pratodamus 
PL 95 
PL 562 
PL 639 
Summer 428 
Meleas PL 519 
Summer 423 
tAthenaeus son of Pericleidas 
See discussion of Oath-takers 179. 
PL 32 
Winter 422/1 - Spring 421 
?Dai"thus 
For the suggestion that these ten men were the negotiators 
fo r the Peace of Nicias and alliance w i t h Athens, see 
Andrewes & Lewis JHS (1957) 177-80. 
?Ischagoras 
PL 202 
PL 400 
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?tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilaidas PL 731 
He was thought to be e7aTi^ 8eiO(; to the Athenians (Th. 
5.44.3; see also discussion of Athenian ambassadors under 
Nicias son of Neiceratus (162 n. 5), and the rather 
tentative suggestion that Philocharidas and Nicias may 
have had some kind of personal connection); he was one of 
the oath-takers for the armistice between Athens and 
Sparta i n 424/3 (see Appendix D: Oath-takers i n 424/3); 
he was an oath-taker for the Peace of Nidas and alliance 
w i t h Athens, and possibly also an envoy (see entry on 
Daithus above); he was sent on an embassy to Athens i n 
421/0 (Th. 5.21.1) and perhaps also in 408/7 (Androtion 
FGrH 324 F 44; on the emendation: Jacoby Supp. 1152-3). 
?Zeuxidas PL 346 
PAntippus PL 103 
?Tell is PL 690 
?Alcinadas PL 65 
?Empedias PL 262 
?Menas PL 534 
TLaphi lus PL 478 
tischagoras PL 400 
Sent to Brasidas i n Thrace, probably as symhoulos (see 
A p p e n d i x E: Other Spartan Magistrates under 423); 
returned to Chalcidice i n this year to tell Clearidas to 
give up Amphipo l i s (Th. 5.21.1): this at least shows a 
degree of continuity i n appointments. 
Menas PL 534 
tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilaidas PL 731 
As Hard ing notes {Androtion and the Atthis 163), he 
went to Thrace to see that Amphi fx j l i s was restored to 
the Athenians (Th. 5.21.1). A n appropriate selection in 
v iew of his Athenian interests (see above). 
Summer 421 
Ampel idas PL 74 
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tLichas son of Arcesilaus PL 492 
See main discussion 174. 
Spring 420 
Andromenes [Andromedes] PL 92 
Phaedimus PL 714 
Antimenidas PL 101 
tLeon son of Antideidas PL 482 
These three men were selected to go to Athens to prevent 
an Athens/Argos alliance because they seemed to be 
emrt^aaoi to the Athenians (Th. 5.44.3). 
tEndius son of Aldbiades PL 264 
See main discussion 173-4. 
tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilaidas PL 731 
See 422/1 above. 
Winter 418/7 
tLichas son of Arcesilaus PL 492 
See main discussion 174. 
Summer 414 
tGyhppus PL 196 
Sent on a mission (npeaPe-uad(ievo<;) to Thurii Kod xf|v lov 
naxpoc, dv(xve(oadn£vo<; JtoA-iteiav (Th. 6.104.2); note 
textual difficulties - of the MSS only B has this reading; 
the rest have Kaxd xfiv xoC TtaTp6<; jcoxe noXixeiov: on 
this, see H C T 4.376; see also Badham Mnemosyne (1875) 
244; Wade-Gery Essays in Greek History Oxford 1958 
267 n. 5. With either reading of the text, Gylippus has a 
connection with Thurii through his father. 
Summer 412 
Chalddeus PL 743 
Late Summer 412 - Winter 412/11 
Therimenes PL 371 
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Winter 412/11 - ?Sxmimer 411^  
Lichas son of Arcesilaus PL 492 
Summer 411 
Phi l ippus PL 725 
410 (After the battle of Cyzicus) 
tEndius son of Aldbiades 
See main discussion 173-4. 
PL 264 
Summer 408^ 
tPasippidas 
He was accused of having colluded w i t h Tissaphemes to 
b r ing about the downfa l l of Thasos, which entailed the 
expulsion of the harmost, Eteonicus, and o l hxKmioxai, 
and was subsequently expelled f r o m Sparta i n 410 (Xen. 
Hell. 1.1.32).^ Nevertheless, Pasippidas was sent i n this 
year as an ambassador to the Persian king (presumably he 
had been recalled [Underbi l l Comm. 14; Krentz Comm. 
121]) w h e n the Athen ian embassy set o f f w i t h 
Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 1.3.13). If , indeed, this was an 
off ic ia l embassy, which the use of npeapeii; should signify 
( U n d e r b i l l Comm.; Krentz Comm.), then i t is possible 
that earlier Persian contacts influenced his selection. 
PL 591 
408/7 
tMegi l lus 
He is probably to be ident i f ied w i t h the Athenian 
jcp6^ev0(; i n Sparta (Plato Laws 1.642 b-d); an appropriate 
choice fo r this embassy concerning the repatriation of 
Spartan prisoners i n Athens (Androtion FGrHist 324 F 44; 
on the emendation, see Jacoby Supp. I 152-3); see also 
Mosley Envoys and Diplomacy 52). 
PL 513=7514 
^ The th i rd treaty between Sparta and Tissaphemes was made in the winter of 412/1 (Th. 
858-59), but Lichas seems to continue liaising w i th Tissaphemes imt i l the summer (Th. 
8.87.1). 
2 On Xenophon's missing year and the difficulties wi th dating, see Andrewes CAH V^ 503-5 
( w i t h Andrewes, I have fol lowed the later dating). 
3 See Chapter Four 151. 
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tEndius son of Aldbiades 
See main discussion 173-4. 
tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilai'das 
See above on 422/1. 
PL 264 
PL 731 
Spring 407 
Boeotius PL 175 
Winter 407/6 
PLysander son of Aristocritus 
He was also Nauarchos i n this year; accompanied the 
Spartan ambassadors to Cyrus, where he played a major 
part i n the negotiations (see Chapter Five 209-10). 
PL 504 
396 
?Lysander son of Aristocritus 
Sent by Agesilaus to the Hellespont and he brought back 
Spithradates; Plutarch calls h i m presbeutes (Xen. Hell. 
3.4.10; Plut. Lys. 24.1). 
PL 504 
tAristomenidas [Aristomelidas] 
See main discussion 175. 
PL 134 
394 
Epicydidas 
?Diphr idas 
Ephor (395/4) who came to give new orders to Agesilaus in 
Thessaly in the summer of 394 (Plut. Ages. 17.1). He may 
not technically be a presbentes. 
PL 273 
PL 243 
Xenocles 
Scythes 
PL 569 
PL 668 
393/2 
tAntalcidas son of Leon (also nauarch in this year) 
See Chapter Five 213-4. 
PL 97 
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388 
PoUis PL 621 
387 
tAntalcidas son of Leon PL 97 
See Chapter Five 213-5. 
C a l l i a s PL 404 
378/7 
tEtymocles PL 287 
Ambassador to Athens i n this year (Xen. Hell. 5.4.22) 
and i n 370/69 (Xen. Hell. 6.5.33). 
Aristolochus PL 130 
tOcyl lus PL 770 
Ambassador to Athens both i n this year (Xen. Hell. 
5.4.22) and i n 370/69 (Xen. Hell. 63.33). 
375 
tAntalcidas son of Leon PL 97 
See Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 151; see also Chapter Five 
214-5. 
371 
t Agesilaus son of Archidamus PL 9 
Sent as presbeutes to Mantineia because he seemed to be a 
rtaTpiK6<; ^iXjoc, to them (Xen. Hell. 6.5.4). 
Winter 370/69 
Aracusl PL 107 
tOcyl lus PL 770 
See above on 378/7. 
Pharax PL 718 
tEtymocles PL 287 
See above on 378/7. 
Olontheus [Olyntheus] PL 576 
1 Mosley suggests that this embassy was composed of three Athenian spedalists and two 
ntulitary spedalists {Historia 12 (1963) 247-50). 
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369 
Timocrates PL 700 
Phrixus PL 736 
367 
t Antalcidas son of Leon PL 97 
See Chapter Five 214-5. 
tEuthycles PL 301=7302 
Ambassador to Persia i n this year (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33) and 
is perhaps the same man who went to Persia again in 333 
(Arr ian Anab. 2.15.2). 
Unable to be precisely dated 
t?Lysander son of Aristocritus (sometime before his death in PL 504 
395) 
Supposedly sent gifts by Dionysius of Syracuse, then later 
despatched to Dionysius as ambassador (Plut. Lys. 25), 
though Cartledge suggests that the embassy "may be 
s imply an anecdotal inven t ion" (Agesilaos 320; but 
compare Homblower Creek World 188). 
Eucleidas PL 305 
Presbeis of other States^ 
Acanthus 
Summer 382 
Xen. Hell. 5.2.12 
1 This is not an exhaustive search of al l possible texts, but I have attempted to collect at least 
all ambassadors of states other than Athens and Sparta f r o m the major sources and as many 
others as I have come across in my reading. States are listed in alphabetical order, 
t indicates possible election on the basis of connections. 
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Acamania 
375 
?[A]eschylusl 
?Euarchus 
IG ii2 96.25-6 (= 
Tod 126) 
IG ii2 96.25-6 (= 
Tod 126) 
Aetolians 
Stunmer 426 
Tolophon of the Ophiones 
Boriades of the Eurytanes 
Teisander of the Apodot i 
Th. 3.100.1 
Th. 3.100.1 
Th. 3.100.1 
Amphipolis 
358/7 
Stratocles 
H i e r ax 
Dem. 1.8; 
Theopompus 
FGrHist 115 F 42 
Theopompus 
FGrHist 115 F 42 
Arcadian Federation 
367 
Antiochus Xen. He//. 7.1.33 
366 
Lycomedes Xen. He//. 7.1.39 
1 The status of Aeschylus and Euarchus is undear (see Tod in his discussion), but they may 
have been ambassadors. 
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Argos 
430 
[Pol l i s ] ! Th. 2.67.1 
Summer 420 
tEustrophus 
The Argives sent Eustrophus and Aeson to Sparta, 
th inking they would be 7cpoa(t)iX£axaTOi (Th. 5.40.1-3). See 
also Chapter Three 70. 
tAeson 
See above on Eustrophus. 
Th. 5.40.3 
Th. 5.40.3 
Summer 408 
Cleostratus 
Pyrrolochus 
Xen. He//. 1.3.13 
Xen. He//. 1.3.13 
Ceos 
362 
Demetrius 
Heracle[ide]s 
E[cheti]mu[s] 
C[al ] l iphantus 
; G ii2 111.51-2 (= 
Tod 142) 
IG ii2 111.51-2 (= 
Tod 142) 
IG ii2 11151-2 (= 
Tod 142) 
IG ii2 111.51-2 (= 
Tod 142) 
Corinth 
Summer 430 
Aristeus (7son of Adeimantus) Th. 2.67.1 
Summer 419 
Euphamidas Th. 5.55.1 
1 PoUis went ISiQt, so does not, strictly speaking, belong here as an official representative of 
his state. However, he was sti l l a member of the presbeia so is included for the sake of 
completeness; see Rhodes Thucydides II 247. 
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Elis 
367 
Archidamus Xen. Hell. 7.1.33 
Halieis 
424/3 
Neon IG 75 
Agac[ l . . . ] l 7G P 75 
Heracleia Trachinia 
Summer 426 
tTdsamenus Th. 3.92.2 
See main discussion 160. 
Leontini 
433/2 
Timenor son of Agathocles IG 54.4-5 (= M L 
64) 
Sosis son of Glaucus IG 54.5 (= M L 64) 
Gelon son of Execestus IG i ^ 54.5-6 (= M L 
64) 
Macedon 
375 or 373 
Ptolemaeu[s] IG i f i 102.6-7 (= 
Tod 129) 
Antenor IG i i ^ 102.6-7 (= 
Tod 129) 
1 Note that Develin restores this man as Agacles, and as an Athenian ambassador. This is 
impossible; see 353 & 380 n. 2. 
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346 
Ant ipa te r 
Parmenio 
Eurylochus 
Aeschin. 3.72; Dem. 
19.69; Dem. 19 
Hypoth. 2.5 
Dem. 19.69; Dem. 19 
Hypoth. 2.5 
Dem. 19 Hypoth. 
2.5 
344 
Python (of Byzantium) Dem. 18.136. 
Plataea 
Summer 427 
Astymachus son of Asopolaus 
Lacon the son of Aeimnestus^ 
Th. 3.52.5 
Th. 3.52.5 
Rhegiutn 
433/2 
Qeander son of Xen[ ] 
Silenus son of Phocus 
IG i3 5 3 . 2 - 3 ( = M L 
63) 
JG i3 5 3 . 3 ( = M L 
63) 
Syracuse 
Winter 415/4 
Hermocrates (strategos) Th. 6.75.4 
Summer 408 
[Hermocrates]^ 
Proxenus 
Xen. He//. 1.3.13 
Xen. He//. 1.3.13 
1 Note that he was also the Spartan Ttpo^evoq (Th. 3.52.5). 
2 He wou ld not have been an official ambassador of Syracuse, as Xenophon tells us that he 
was already an exile. 
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Tegea 
Summer 430 
Timagoras Th. 2.67.1 
Thebes 
Stunmer 428 
Hermaeondas Th. 3.5.2 
371 
Epameinondas PlutAges. 28.1-3; 
Nepos Epam. 6.4; 
Diod. 15.38.3 
(referring to 375); 
just ©nPottOi at 
15.50.4 (referring to 
371).l 
367 
Pelopidas Xen. He//. 7.1.33 
346 
t P h i l o 
He was the ^D^c, and ^evoq of Philip. 
D e m 19.140 
Synod of the Allies of the Second Athenian Confederacy 
346 
Aglaocreon of Tenedus Aeschin. 2.20, 97, 
126 
Greeks sent by Persians 
Winter 413/2 (from Phamabazus) 
Calligeitus son of Laophon (Megara) Th. 8.6.1 
Timagoras son of Athenagoras (Cyzicus) Th. 8.6.1 
1 O n Diodorus' confusion wi th the peace negotiations for 375 and 371: Chapter Five 194 n. 3. 
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402 (from the King) 
Phalynus (Zacynthus) Diod. 14.25.1 
?397 (from ?Phamabazus)i 
Timocrates (Rhodes) Xen. He//. 35 .1 ; 
Hell. Oxyrh. 
(Bartoletti) 7.2, 5 = 
(Chambers) 10.2, 5. 
368 (from Ariobarzanes) 
Philiscus (Abydus) Xen. He//. 7.1.27 
Greeks sent by Thracians 
346 (from Cersobleptes) 
Critobulus (Lampsacus) Aeschin. 2.83 
^ On the date and the satrap (Xenophon says Timoaates was sent by Tithraustes i n 395), see 
Bruce Comm. 58-60. 
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Oath-takers^ 
424/3 
The Alliance between Athens and Halieis (IG i'^  75) 
Athens: [the boule] and the strategoi 
Haliaeans: [the Haliaeans]; [the presbeis]'^ -
Neon 
Agac[l. . .] 
The Armistice between Athens and Sparta (Th. 4.119.2) 
Spartans: 
Taurus son of Echetimidas 
tAthenaeus son of Pericleidas 
See main discussion 181. 
tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilaidas 
See main discussion of Oath-takers (179) and Appendix C: 
Spartan Presbeis under 422/1. 
Corinthians: 
Aeneas son of Ocutus 
Euphamidas son of Aristonymus 
Sicyonians: 
Damotimus son of Naucrates 
Onasimus son of Megacles 
Megarians: 
Nicasus son of Caelus 
Menecrates son of Amphidorus 
Epidaurians: 
Amphias son of Eupaeidas 
11 supply patronymics and, i n the case of Athenians, demotics wherever they are known. 
2 Mer i t t {Hesperia 14 (1945) 100-5) suggests that the Haliaeans swore the oath first, and 
d i d so as "the Haliaeans" i n the same way as the Selymbrians in 409/8, but that the presbeis 
were required to swear again on their behalf in Athens (cf. the alliance between Athens and 
Meth5anna i n 378/7). I f the restoration is correct, the ambassadors must be Haliaean rather 
than Athenian (contra Devehn Officials 133-4). 
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Athenians: strategoi 
INicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae 
See main discussion of Oath-takers (178) and discussion 
under Athenian Presbeis (162). 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae^ 
Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus 
I I 
I V 
X 
423/2? 
Alliance between Athens and Perdiccas 11 of Macedon and Arrhabaeus of Lyncetsus (/G i ^ 
89)2 
Macedon: 
Perdiccas son of [Alexander] 
Alcetes son of Alexander 
Archelas son of P[erdiccas] 
Menelaus son of Alexa[nder] 
Burginus son of Craston 
Agerrus son of Philip 
Eurylochus son of Bo[ ] 
[Alejxander son of Pantapon 
Neoptole[mus] 
Euland[r]us 
Antigenes 
Adimus 
Oleander 
Lycaeus 
Nomenius 
Crastoln] 
Stadmeas 
Nicander 
Gateas 
C a l l i a s 
Corratas 
Corrabus 
Dad[.]nus 
Idatas 
Corratas 
[Mejleager 
Dirbe[a]s 
Arrhabaeus 
[LJimnaeus 
Boc[..]s 
Autarmius 
[Dejrdas 
[AJntiochus (basileus ) 
Attacinus 
Etharus 
Cratennas 
[?Pau]sanias son of Machetus 
[Algerrus 
Botres 
Agathon 
1 For demotic, see Appendix B: Athenian Strategoi 309 n. 2. 
2 For other dates between 435 and 413, see IG iC 
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Misgon 
422/1 
Alliance between the Athens and the Bottiaeans (IG 76) 
Athenians: the boule, the [strategoi] and [the other magistrates (dpxai)] 
Bottiaeans: the bo[ule], [the strategoi and the rest of the] magistrates ([dpJxovxei;) i n [the 
cities of the Bot]ti[aeans] 
Peace of Nicias and Alliance with Sparta (Th. 5.19.2, 24.1; D i o d . 12.75.4) 
Spartans:^ 
Pleistoanax 
Agis 
Pleistolas 
Damagetus 
Chionis 
Metagenes 
Acanthus 
Da i thus 
Ischagoras 
tPhilocharidas son of Eryxilaidas 
See above on Armistice between Athens and Sparta i n 
424/3. 
Zeuxidas 
Antippus 
Te l l i s 
Alcinadas 
Empedias 
Menas 
Laph i lus 
Athenians:"^ 
Lampon 
1 On the possible composition of this board of oath-takers (two kings, five ephors and ten 
negotiators), see Andrewes & Lewis ]HS 77 (1957) 177-80. 
2 On these oath-takers, see esp. Andrewes & Lewis ]HS 77 (1957) 177-80. 
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Isthm(i)onicus 
tNicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae I I 
See above on Armistice between Athens and Sparta i n 
424/3. 
tLaches son of Melanopus of Aexone V I I 
See main discussion (178-9) and Appendix B: Athenian 
Strategoi under 418/7. 
Euthydemus son of Eudemus 
Prodes of ?Euonymon or ?Cephisia I 
Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae 11 
Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria I I I 
Myr t i lus ?son of Lysis I V 
Thrasycles 
Theogenes (?Theagenes) ?of Achamae V I 
Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia V I I 
lolcius 
Timocrates 
Leon 
Lamachussonof Xenophanesof Oe V I 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna X 
420 
Hundred Years' Alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantineia and Elis (Th. 5.47.9; cf. I G i ^ 83) 
Athenians: the boule, the state magistrates (evSimoi dpxcd) 
Argives: the boule, the "eighty" and the magistrates (dpTuvca) 
Mantineians: the demiourgoi, the boule and the other magistrates (dp%Ctt) 
Eleans: the demiourgoi, those holding offices (oi t d xiXr\ exovxa;) and the "six hundred" 
After 411 
Treaty between Thasos and Neapolis (IG 12 (5) i 109 [=Staatsvertrdge 204 ]) 
Thasians: 
Alceides 
Aristarchus 
Pytholeus 
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409 
Treaty between Athenian Generals and Phamabazus (Xen. Hell. 1.3.8-9) 
Athenians: the strategoi 
Phamabazus 
409/8 
Treaty between Athens and Selymbria (IG i ^ 118 [= M L 87])^ 
Athenians: the strategoi, the [trierarchs], the hoplites and [any other Athenian] who is 
present 
Selymbrians: a l l the Selymbrians 
403 
Spartan Decree Restoring Control of the Sanctuary to the Delians (Inscriptions de Delos 87 [= 
Tod99])2 
Spartans: the kings: 
Agis 
Pausanias 
the ephors: 
Thyionidas 
Aristogenidas 
Archistas 
Sologas 
Phe id i las 
396 
Armistice between Agesilaus and Phamabazus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-6; cf. Xen. Ages. 1.10-11) 
Spartans: 
Her ipp idas 
tDercyl idas 
See main discussion 179. 
Megi l lus 
Tissaphemes 
1 Ratified at Athens in 407; see Andrewes JHS 73 (1953) 8. 
2 For a discussion of this decree, see Chapter Four 180 n. 1. 
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394 
Alliance between Eretria and Athens 
Athenians: the strategoi, [the boule] and the [hip]peis 
Eretrians: [the strategoi], the boule, [the hippeis] and the [other] magistracies 
389 
Alliance between Athens and the Thracian kings, Medocus I and Seuthes II (Xen. H e l l . 
4.8.26; D i o d . 14.942; I G i i ^ 21) 
Athenians: the st[rategoi], [the hipparchs], the taxiarchs and [the phylarchs] 
384 
Alliance between Athen and Chios (JG i i ^ 34 [= Tod 118]) 
Athenians: the boule, the [strategoi] and [the ta]xiarchs 
Chians: [the boule] and [the other] magistracies 
378 
Alliance between Athens and Byzantium (IG i i ^ 41 [= Tod 121]) 
Athenians: [the boule], [the strategoi] and the hip[parchs] 
378/7 
Alliance between Athens, the Thebans and the Mytileneans (IG i i ^ 40)^ 
Mytileneans: seventeen men f r o m each of the cities. 
Alliance between Athens and Methymna (IG i i ^ 42 [=Tod 122]) 
Athenians: the synedroi of the allies, the strategoi and the hipparchs 
Methymnians: the presbeia of the Methymnians in Athens, and the magistrates (ctpxai) i n 
Methymna. 
Between 377/6 and 352/2 
Alliance between Mausolus and Phaselis (Staatsvertrdge 260) 
Phaselians: [as many of the Phaselians as M]ausolus decrees 
[Mausolus and ?Artemisia] 
375 
Alliance between Athens, Corcyra, Acamania and Cephellania (IG i i ^ 96 (= Tod 126]) 
Athenians: the boule, [the strategoi] and the hippeis ; and the allies are to swear the oath 
1 See Andrewes& Lewis JHS 77 (1957) 177. 
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375 or 373 
Alliance between Athens and Amyntas U ofMacedon (IG i i ^ 102 [=Tod 129]) 
Macedon: Amy[ntas] and [Alexander] 
368 
Alliance between Athens and Leucas (IG i i ^ 104 [= Tod 134]) 
Athenians: two hipparchs; strategoi -
Phorm[io] 
Spodias 
Leucadians: 
Isodemus 
Olympiadas 
367 
Alliance between Athens and Dionysius I of Syracuse (IG i i ^ 105,523 [= Tod 136]) 
Athenians: the boule, [the strategoi], [the hippa]rchs and [the taxiarchs] 
Syracusans: [Dio]nysius, [the magistrates], [the boule] of the Syracusans, [the sfrafe^oi] and 
[the trie]rarchs 
363/2 
Alliance between Athens and Ceos (IG i i ^ 111 [= Tod 142]) 
Athenians: i) Chabrias (17-8);^ i i ) the strategoi and the allies 
362/1 
Alliance between Athens, Arcadia, Achaea, Elis and Phleius (IG i i ^ 112 [= Tod 144]) 
Athenians: [the strategoi], the taxiar[chs], [the hipparchs], [the phylar]chs and [the 
hippeis] 
Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phleiasians: [the highest officials (xd niryiaxa xtkr\) in 
each of the cities of the Pelo]pormesians2 
361/0 
Alliance between Athens and Thessalian ko inon (IG i i ^ 116 [= Tod 147]) 
Athenians: the strategoi, the boule, the hipparchs and the hippeis 
^ Chabrias swore the oath on behalf of the Atheruans as a "stop-gap" measure (cf: the 
alhance w i t h Selymbria i n 409/8); see main discussion 178 n. 1. 
2 Cf. Xen. He//. 7.5.3. 
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Thessaly: Agelaus (the archon), polemarchs, the h i [p]parchs , the hippeis, [ t h e 
hier]o[mn]emones and all the other officials in the koinon of the Thessalians; the 
ambassadors of the Thessalians 
Treaty between Athens and Thessaly of a similar date (IG i i ^ 175) 
Thessalians: 
polemarchs -
Phthiotians: 
Megalus 
Hesfif lef l«s; 
Eiron 
pezarchoi -
P h i l i p 
Polymides 
Thibron 
Cot imi las 
Theodorus 
Phi lolaus 
Hippocrates 
357/6 
Alliance between Athens and the Euboean States: Eretria, Chalcis, Carystus and Histiaea 
(IG i i 2 l 2 4 [ = T o d l 5 3 ] ) 
Athenians: the t[axiarchs], the boule and most of the strategoi 
the fo l lowing strategoi -
Alci[machus of Anagyrous] I 
Cha[res son of Theochares of Angele]^ I I I 
Menon of Potamus I V 
ExecesHdes son of Charias of Thoricus V 
I[Cha]brias son of Ctesippus of Aexonel V11 
Philochares of Rhamnous IX 
[Iphicrates] son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX 
Diocles of Alopece X 
^ For the suggestion that Chabrias' name was inscribed again at this point, see Cawkwell 
C&M 23 (1962) 38-9 n. 23. 
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Alliance between Philip II of Macedon and the Chalcidians (Staatsvertrdge 308 [= Tod 158]) 
Chalcidians: the public magistrates ( ^ w a i dpxal) and [?the presbeis]^ 
Macedon: Phil ip and whomever the Chalcidians stipulate 
356/5? 
Alliance between Athens and Locris (IG i i ^ 148) 
Athenians: [the boule], [the strategoi], [the hipparchs], [the taxiarchs] and the phylarchs 
After 350 
Alliance between Erythrae and Hermias of Atarneus (Staatsvertrdge 322 [= Tod 165]) 
Erythraeans: the Erythraeans 
Hermias: the angeloi on behalf of Hermias and his hetairoi 
341/0 
Alliance between Athens and Eretria (IG i i ^ 230) 
Athenians: the boule and the officials 
Eretrians: [the boule] (the five hundred), [the strategoi] and all the other officials (including 
hipparchs and hippeis) 
[Al]cias 
Hipposthen[es] of Minthous 
Xenotimus 
Clearchus 
Phileas of Za[r]ecus 
taxiarchs -
De[mar]chus of Hermes 
Era[sip]pus 
D[e]m[ocra]tes 
^ See however MosleyPCPS 187 (1961) 59-60. 
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Symbouloi 
429 (Symbouloi sent to Cnemus: Th. 2.85.1) 
Timocrates PL 699 
Brasidas son of Tellis PL 178 
Lycophron PL 500 
427 (Symboulos w i t h Alcidas: Th . 3.69.1) 
Brasidas son of Tellis PL 178 
423 (ISymbouloi sent to Brasidas i n Thrace: Th. 4.132.3)^ 
tischagoras PL 400 
See main discussion 182. 
Ameinias PL 71 
Aristeus PL 18 
422/1 (ISymbouloi w i t h Brasidas i n Thrace: Th . 5.12,1)2 
Ramphias PL 654 
Autocharidas PL 171 
Epicydidas PL 273 
418 (10 Symbouloi w i t h Agis: Th . 5.63.4) 
No names known. 
412/1 (11 Symbouloi sent to Astyochus: Th. 8.39.2) 
Lichas the son of Arcesilaus PL 492 
^ They are not specifically called symbouloi, Thucydides writes (Th. 4.132.3) that they were 
sent mSe iv ... AaKe5aifiovi(ov xd itpdyixaxa in Thrace: essentially the function of the 
symbouloi (see Westlake Historia 35 (1986) 417 n. 33 (= Studies 257 n. 33); id . Individuals in 
Thucydides Cambridge 1968 160. 
2 Also not called symbouloi, though they seem to have similar functions to Ischagoras and 
company in the preceding year. 
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398 (?Symbouloi to Dercylidas)! 
tAracus PL 108 
See main discussion 182. 
Naubates PL 547 
tAntisthenes PL 104 
See main discussion 182. 
396 (?Thirty Symbouloi to Agesilaus i n Asia: P l u t Ages. 6.5; Lys. 23.4; cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.2, 
6)2 
tLysander son of Aristocritus PL 504 
See main discussion 182. 
?Herippidas3 PL 349 
t?Dercyl idas PL 228 
On his cormections in the Hellespont, see Chapter Four 
150-1. 
?Megillus PL 413=414 
395 (TThirty Symbouloi to Agesilaus i n Asia: Xen. Hell. 3.4.20)^ 
Her ipp idas PL 349 
Xenocles PL 569 
Scythes PL 668 
Mygdon PL 541 
1 O n their status at symbouloi, see Pritchett The Greek State at War I I 38 contra Cartledge 
Agesilaos 212-3. 
2 See Pritchett The Greek State at War I I 37 contra Smith Historia 2 (1954 ) 279 n. 9; cf. 
Xen. Hell. 5.3.8: the Thir ty Spartiatae sent w i t h Agesipolis; Plut. Ages. 36.6: thir ty 
symbouloi sent w i t h Agesilaus to Egypt i n 361/0. 
^ Herippidas, Dercylidas and Megillus, who received the oaths f r o m Tissaphemes (Xen. 
Hell. 3.4.6), must almost certainly be among the "Thirty'', though i t should be noted that 
Herippidas appears again i n the next year among those who "succeeded" to the original 
T h i r t y . 
^ These succeeded to the Thirty of the previous year (Xen. Hell. 3.4.20). 
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Athenian Strategoi During The Peloponnesian War 
Men Appointed to the Strategia between 435 and 404. 
(Italics indicate election in 411, which was an usual year, and w i l l not be included in most of 
the statistics. The last column gives the reason for the ending of the man's career where 
known.) 
Adeimantus son of Leucophides 
Alcibiades son of Cleiiuas 
Alexicles 
Antiphon son of Lysonides 
Anytus son of Anthemion 
Archenautes 
Archestratus 
Archestratus son of Lycomedes 
Aristarchus 
Aristeides son of Archippus 
Aristocrates son of Scellias 
Aristogenes 
Aristoteles son of Timocrates 
Asopius son of Phormio 
Autocles son of Tolmaeus 
Ca l l i ades 
Callias son of Calliades 
Callistratus son of Empedus 
Carcinus son of Xenotimus 
Cephisodotus 
Chareas son of Archestratus 
Charicles son of ApoUodorus 
Charminus 
Charoeades son of Euphiletus 
Cleippides 
Qeomedes son of Lycomedes 
a e o n son of Qeaenetus 
Qeopompus son of Cleinias 
Conon son of Timotiheus 
Demaratus 
Demodocus of Anagyrous 
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes 
Dexi crates 
Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus 
Diomedon 
Diot imus son of Strombichides 
D i p h i l u s 
Dracontides son of Leogoras 
Erasinides 
Eucleides 
Eucles 
EuCTates 
407,406,405 
420,419,417,416,415,411 
(Democr.), 407 
412 (400) 
411 (400) 
409 
433 
406 
433 
411 (400) 
425 
413,410,407,406 
406 
431,426,421 (400) 
428 
425,424,418 
430 
432 
418 
432,431 
405 
422 (5000) 
414 
412 
427 
429 
418,417,416 
424,423,422 
431,430 
414,422 (5000), 407,406,405 
414 
425 
427,426,425,424,418,414, 
413 
410 
414,422 (400) 
412,406 
433 
413 
433 
406 
410 
424 
432 
Captured 
Exiled 
K i l l e d 
Death Penalty 
Exiled 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
Death Penalty 
Death Penalty 
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Eucrates son of Niceratus 
Euctemon 
Euetion 
Eumachus 
Eurymedon son of Thucles 
Euthydemus son of Eudemus 
Glaucon son of Leagrus 
Hagnon son of Nidas 
Hestiodorus 
Hierophon son of Antimnestus 
Hipfxjcles son of Menippus 
Hippocrates son of Ar iphron 
Hipponicus son of Callias 
Laoedaenvonius son of Q m o n 
Laches son of Melanopus 
Laespodias son of Andronjmiis 
Lamachus son of Xenophanes 
Leon 
Leotrophides 
Lysias 
Lysicles 
Melanthius 
Melesander 
Melesander 
Menander 
Metagenes 
Nicias son of Niceratus 
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes 
Oenobius 
Onomacles 
Paches son of Epicurus 
Pasiphon 
Pericles son of Pericles 
Pericles son of Xanthippus 
Phanomachus 
Phanosthenes 
Philocles 
Philocrates son of Demeas 
Phormio son of Asopius 
Phrynichus son of Stratonides 
Procles son of Theodorus 
Proteas son of Epicles 
Protomachus 
Pythodorus son of Epizelus 
Pythodorus son of Isolochus 
Scironides 
Simichus 
Simonides 
Socrates son of Antigenes 
Sophocles son of Sostratides 
Strombichides son of E>iotimus 
Teisias son of Teisimachus 
412,405 
412 
414 
413 (5000) 
427,426,425,414,413 
422,418,414,413 
435,433 
431,430,429 
430 
426 
413 
426,424 
426 
433 
427,426,422,418 
414 
426,425,424,416,415,414 
412,406 
409 
406 
428 
421 4^00) 
430 
414 
414,413,405 
433 
427,426,425,424,423,422, 
421,418,417,416,415,414, 
413 
427,425,424,423,418 
410 
412 
428 
410 
409,407,406 
435,434,433,432,431,430, 
429 
430 
407 
406,405 
416 
432,431,430,429 
412 
427,426 
435,433,432,431 
406 
414 
426,425 
412 
421 (5000) 
426 
432,431 
426,425 
412 
417,416 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
Captured? 
Death Penalty 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
Suicide (after 
eu thynai) 
K i l l e d 
Death Penalty 
Died 
K i l l e d 
K i l l e d 
Exiled 
Exiled 
Exiled 
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Telephonus 
Theramenes son of Hagnon 
Thrasybulus son of Lycus 
Thrasycles 
Thrasyl lus 
Thucydides son of Olorus 
Thymochares 
Timarchus 
Tydeus son of Lamachus 
Xenophon son of Euripides 
415 
411 (4001 411 (5000) 
411 (Democr.), 410, 409, 408, 
407,(395,394,390,389) 
412 
411 (Democr.), 410,409,408, 
406 
424 
411 (400;, 422 (5000; 
409 
405 
430 
K i l l e d 
Death Penalty 
Exiled 
K i l l e d 
M i n i m u m number of men appointed, 435-404 
(ie. all men known to have held appointments) 
M i n i m u m number of men appointed, 435-404 excluding 
411 
M a x i m u m number possible appointed, 435-404 
(ie. all men known to have held appointments + 
total unknown appointments)^ 
Total men serving 1 year, 435-404 excluding 411 
Number kil led/exiled/captured/otherwise 
incapable of holding office a second time 
Total men serving 3 years or less, 435-404 
excluding 411 
Number kil led/exiled/captured/otherwise 
incapable of holding office again 
Total men serving four years or more, 435-404 
excluding 411 
Number kil led/exiled/captured/otherwise 
incapable of holding office again 
104 
95 
227 
58 
14 
80 
26 
15 
12 
Athenian Strategoi - A Summary of Tribal Representation During the 
Peloponnesian War 
I I I I I I I V V V I V I I V I I I I X X 
435/4 XX X 
434/3 X 
433/2 X X XX X x ? ? x X X 
432/1 X X XX X X 
431/0 X XX ?x XX ?x X X 
430/29 XX ?x X ?x X 
429/8 XX X X 
428/7 X 
1 This assumes that al l appointments to the board of generals where the name of the strategos 
is unknown were f i l led by different men and not either by men who had held office before or 
by unknown men holding office i n multiple years. 
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427/6 X X X X 
426/5 X X XX X X XX 
425/4 X X X XX X X X 
424/3 X X XX X X X X 
423/2 X XX X 
422/1 X X X 
421/0 X 
420/19 X 
419/8 X 
418/7 X X X XX X X 
417/6 X X X X 
416/5 X X X X X 
415/4 X X X 
414/3 ?X X X X ?x X X X X 
413/2 X X X 
412/1 X X X X 
41ll ~ ~ ~ 
410/9 X X X X X X X 
409/8 X X X 
408/7 X 
407/6 X XX X X X 
406/5 X X X X 
405/4 X X X X 
404/3 No known strategoi in this year 
^ This year is excluded because of the difficulties which arise because of the revolutions and 
counter-revolutions. 
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